Constantin Iordachi

The Fascist Faith of the Legion "Archangel Michael" in Romania, 1927–1941

Martyrdom and National Purification



ROUTLEDGE STUDIES IN FASCISM AND THE FAR RIGHT

"Gentlemen, we are a nation that must be entirely renewed; we must throw away all our old cloths. We are like Lazarus from the Gospel, when Jesus raised him from the grave … Let's remove the shroud, with all its dust and dirt spots, and dress ourselves in the combat clothing appropriate for those who live."

Nicolae Iorga, *Cultura Națională și Politica Națională* (Vălenii de Munte: Neamul Românesc, 1908), 30.

"Our program? We want to change everything from its very foundations. The total resurrection of the country. On the ruins of the old state—sick, impotent and unjust—the powerful structure of the new state must be erected. The New Romania. The Modern Romania."

Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, "Legionari!" *Legionarii* II, no. 8 (October 11, 1931), 1.

"With violence and extremism, we fulfill our mission to uplift the Romanian Nation to the rank of the ruling races."

Alexandru Cantacuzino, *Românul de mâine. Românismul nostru* (București: Editura Mișcării Legionare, 1940 [1935]), 17.

"To us, the Romanians, God gave, as to any other people of the world, a mission. The first law a people should follow is that of walking on the path of this destiny, fulfilling the mission entrusted to them."

Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, *Pentru legionari*, vol. 1 (Sibiu: "Totul pentru țară," 1936), 426.

"I believe in the eternal superiority of the principle of the Christian church! The true and eternal victory is born out of martyrdom."

Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, *Circulări și manifeste, 1927–1938* (München: Colecţia Europa, 1981).

"So God wanted: the germ of renewal can only grow out of death, of suffering."

Ion I. Moța, *Cranii de Lemn. Articole, 1922–1936* (Sibiu: Totul Pentru Țară, 1936), 74–75.

"The living doctrine dwells in every true fighter, it is called *faith*. At the base of any new age lies a foundation of faith, not a doctrine. The fighter prevails through his faith. This leads him in battle, keeps him unto his position until the end, and instills in him rivers of energy."

George Macrin, "Luptători și doctrinari," *Iconar* II, no. 9 (1937), 1.

"The Legion is more than a political organization (in the best sense of the word), for us Romanians it is a Religion (if we could use that work to give it the necessary connotation of holiness). He who baptizes himself [in that religion] builds ties of brotherhood with us, abandons the old life of politics and strives to strengthen himself in faith to become a proselytizer and a conqueror of humans."

"Copie depe scrisoarea lui Corneliu Z. Codreanu,"
March 18, 1930, Iaşi, National Archive of the Republic
of Moldova [Arhivele Naţionale ale Republicii Moldova],
Chişinău, Fond 680/1, files 3433, 510.

THE FASCIST FAITH OF THE LEGION "ARCHANGEL MICHAEL" IN ROMANIA, 1927–1941

The Fascist Faith of the Legion "Archangel Michael" in Romania, 1927–1941 engages critically with recent works on fascism, totalitarianism, and religion, and advances an original theoretical and methodological approach to fascism as a political faith.

On this basis, the book constructs an innovative comparative research framework for reconceptualizing the history of the Legion "Archangel Michael" in Romania, 1927–1941. It contends that the Legion put forward a palingenetic political faith of a theological type, called Legionarism. To provide a comprehensive analysis of the origins, main features, mechanisms of institutionalization, and demise of this self-proclaimed salvific political faith, the book documents the palingenetic foundations of the Legionary faith, the syncretism between fascist and Christian rites and rituals, and the intricate relationship between the Legion and the Orthodox Church and its dogma. The book documents three main sacrificial strategies employed by the Legion to "re-evangelize" the people in the new faith: (1) the appropriation of the cult of the fallen soldiers; (2) terrorist missions meant to create fascist heroes through violent sacrifice; and (3) sanctification through heroic fight for Christianity in the Spanish Civil War, in an attempt to link Legionarism with the transnational crusade against "Judeo-Bolshevism." As well as providing a detailed historical and interpretive account of the Legion, the book makes a significant contribution to debates about defining fascism and its relation to religion. It also provides novel comparative perspectives for studying other attempts at constructing fascist faiths in interwar Europe, most notably in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany but also in Central and Eastern Europe.

This book will be of interest to students and scholars of fascism, Romanian studies, politics and religion, political theory, totalitarianism, youth radicalization, violence, and the emergence of terrorism.

Constantin Iordachi is Professor of History at the Central European University in Vienna, Austria.

Routledge Studies in Fascism and the Far Right

Series editors:
Nigel Copsey, Teesside University, UK and Graham Macklin, Center for Research on Extremism (C-REX), University of Oslo, Norway.

This book series focuses upon national, transnational, and global manifestations of fascist, far right, and right-wing politics primarily within a historical context but also drawing on insights and approaches from other disciplinary perspectives. Its scope also includes anti-fascism, radical-right populism, extreme-right violence, and terrorism, cultural manifestations of the far right, and points of convergence and exchange with the mainstream and traditional right.

Titles include:

Nordic Fascism
Fragments of an Entangled History
Edited by Nicola Karcher and Markus Lundström

Histories of Fascism and Anti-Fascism in Australia
Edited by Evan Smith, Jayne Persian, and Vashti Jane Fox

Foreign Fighters in the Ukraine
Kacper Rękawek

The Nature of Identitarianism
Göran Dahl

Nazi Occultism
Between the SS and Esotericism
Stéphane François

Inside the Black Box of 'White Backlash'
Letters of Support to Enoch Powell (1968–1969)
Olivier Esteves

For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/Routledge-Studies-in-Fascism-and-the-Far-Right/book-series/FFR.

THE FASCIST FAITH OF THE LEGION "ARCHANGEL MICHAEL" IN ROMANIA, 1927–1941

Martyrdom and National Purification

Constantin Iordachi

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group
LONDON AND NEW YORK

Cover image: “Funeral procession of Legionaries forming a column, in the shape of a cross on the streets of Bucharest. The march is watched by the inhabitants of the city” (1940), by Tempel Marek, Scherl Press Agency, Reference code, 3/2/0/-/16321, Collection Krakow-Warsaw Press Publishing House (Wydawnictwo Prasowe Kraków-Warszawa), National Digital Archives (Narodowe Archiwum Cyfrowe), Poland.

First published 2023
by Routledge
4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN

and by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

© 2023 Constantin Iordachi

The right of Constantin Iordachi to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Iordachi, Constantin, author.
Title: The fascist faith of the Legion "Archangel Michael" in Romania, 1927-1941 : martyrdom and national purification / Constantin Iordachi.
Description: Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge, 2023. | Series: Routledge studies in fascism and the far right |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2022023959 (print) | LCCN 2022023960 (ebook) | ISBN 9781138624436 (hardback) | ISBN 9781138624559 (paperback) | ISBN 9780429428043 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Legiunea Arhanghelul Mihail--History. | Romania--History--1914-1944. | Fascism--Romania--History--20th century. | Romania--Politics and government--1914-1944. | Nationalism--Romania--History--20th century. | Codreanu, Corneliu Zelea, 1899-1938--Influence.
Classification: LCC DR264 .I594 2023 (print) | LCC DR264 (ebook) | DDC 949.8/02--dc23/eng/20220614
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022023959
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022023960

ISBN: 978-1-138-62443-6 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-138-62455-9 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-0-429-42804-3 (ebk)

DOI: 10.4324/9780429428043

Typeset in Bembo
by KnowledgeWorks Global Ltd.

CONTENTS

List of Figures, Maps, Graphs, Diagrams, and Tables *ix*
Preface *xii*

Introduction: Fascism as a Political Faith: Toward a New Research Framework 1

PART I
A New Covenant: The Making of the Legionary Political Faith, 1927–1937 **49**

1 National Unification, Cleavages, and Charismatic Nationalism in Greater Romania 51

2 A New Political Faith: National Authenticity and the Cult of the Ancestors 78

3 Charismatic Nationalism, Patriarchalism, and Salvation: The Cult of the "Captain" 152

4 Manufacturing Martyrdom: The Cult of the Fallen Soldiers, Terrorism, and Salvific Sacrifice 187

5 Fascist Constituencies: Social Identities and Fascist Radicalization 238

PART II
A Continuum of Dictatorships: Hybrid Totalitarian Experiments, 1937–1944 **267**

6 Carol II's Dictatorship: From Antifascism to Fascistization (1938–1940) 269

7 Teaching the New Faith: The Legion's Rule (1940–1941) 289

8 A Fascist Festival of the Dead: Codreanu's Reburial and the Politics of National Resurrection 308

9 The Legionary Faith and the Romanian Orthodox Church 362

Conclusion: From a Civil Religion to a Fascist Political Faith 414

References *433*
Index *462*

LIST OF FIGURES, MAPS, GRAPHS, DIAGRAMS, AND TABLES

Figures

2.1	Electoral poster of the "All for the Country" Party	88
2.2	The icon of Archangel Michael from the Văcăreşti Monastery, which allegedly inspired Codreanu's charismatic "revelation"	95
2.3	Cover of the official publication of the Legion "Archangel Michael," *Pământul Strămoşesc*	98
2.4	The representation of Archangel Michael on the shrine of the Cathedral of the Coronation (*Catedrala Încoronării*) in Alba Iulia	99
3.1	Portrait of Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu as a student in law, 1924	154
3.2	Poster inviting all "good Romanians" to the wedding of Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu and Ileana Ilinoiu, June 1924	156
3.3	The "Căpitan" Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, on an electoral poster, 1934	158
4.1	Representation of the Archangel Michael as guardian angel in the Cupola of Glory, the Mărăşeşti Mausoleum	192
4.2	The masterminds behind the Legion: Ion Zelea-Codreanu, his son, Corneliu, and his son-in-law, Ion I. Moţa	194
4.3	Plans of the National Christian Party for a monument commemorating the war dead, Gâlma Mountain, Prahova	197
4.4	Legionary shrine for the veneration of fallen soldiers, Predeal, called "The Captain's Hut"	198
4.5	The visual symbol of the Iron Guard	200
4.6	Postcard of the Nicadori, a souvenir sold to heroize the Legionary terrorists	207

4.7	The *Decemviri* death squad, 1936	211
4.8	Representations of Moța and Marin as knights of Christianity	223
6.1	The place of Codreanu's execution, near the forest of Tâncăbești, currently a pilgrimage site for Legionary sympathizers	280
7.1	Romanian leader Ion Antonescu (left) and Legionary Commander Horia Sima at the Victory Parade, Bucharest, October 6, 1940, under the portrait of the deceased leader Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu	292
7.2	Portrait of Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu	296
7.3	Portrait of Horia Sima as head of the Iron Guard (*comandantul*), in Legionary green paramilitary uniform	296
8.1	The exhumation of the corpses of Codreanu, the *Decemviri*, and the *Nicadori*, November 27, 1940	325
8.2	The Legionary church, St. Ilie Gorgani	331
8.3	The representation of Archangel Michael in the church	331
8.4	Codreanu's coffin guarded by Legionary commandants in the St. Ilie Gorgani Church	333
8.5	Kneeling in front of the coffins of the martyrs at the St. Ilie Gorgani Church	333
8.6	People waiting in line on the streets of Bucharest to pay homage to "The Captain"	334
8.7	General Ion Antonescu, Horia Sima, and representatives of the Axis diplomatic corps, at Codreanu's funeral	335
8.8	The coffins of the martyrs carried out of the St. Ilie Gorgani Church	336
8.9	The St. Ilie Gorgani Church adorned for Codreanu's burial	337
8.10	The funerary convoy of the Legionary martyrs	338
8.11	The procession of priests proceeding Codreanu's coffin, backing Codreanu's claims to divine election	339
8.12	Shrine of the Captain set up at the center of the Legionary charity organization *Ajutorul Legionar*	344
8.13	Banner of the Legion, December 1, 1940	348

Maps

1.1	New administrative organization of Greater Romania in regions, 1929	58
4.1	Itinerary of the funeral train of Ion I. Mota and Vasile Marin, Jan.–Feb. 1937	217
5.1	Electoral results of "All for the Country," by counties, 1937	257
5.2	Results of general parliamentary elections in Romania, 1937	259
8.1	Itineraries of Legionary funeral trains, Sept.–Nov. 1940	312

Graphs

1.1 Ethnic Romanians in the general population; level of urbanization; urban Romanians; and literacy rates in Greater Romania by historical provinces, 1930 53
5.1 Share of votes by historical region, out of the total number of votes gained by the Legion, 1937 256
9.1 Religious composition of Romania, 1930 367

Diagrams

2.1 The Legion's apocalyptic view of the palingenetic cycle of decadence and regeneration leading to damnation or salvation 104
3.1 The structure of the Brotherhood of the Cross 165
3.2 The structure of the Legion, 1927 166

Tables

3.1 Hierarchies of Legionary membership based on age, status, and function 168
5.1 Distribution of the ownership of agrarian land in Romania, 1905 247
5.2 Distribution of the ownership of agrarian land in Romania, 1927 247
5.3 Electoral results of the Legion, 1927–1937 (percentages) 253
5.4 Votes for the Legion in 1937 out of the total number of voters by historical region 255

PREFACE

Writing a book is a complex scholarly journey demanding years of conceptual spadework, primary and secondary research in archives and libraries, professional conversations and debates with students and colleagues during seminars and conferences, negotiations with publishers, responses to peer reviewers, and, eventually, the interaction with the readers and book reviewers. But a book is, most often, also a story of becoming that involves the author's professional development, and his/her thinking about a given topic. This book, in particular, is as much a scholarly endeavor as is the product of a sense of a civic duty and investigation of collective historical and national identity. As a teenager under the late communist regime in Romania and then a student at the University of Bucharest in the first year of the post-communist era, my research interests were slightly different. My main goal was to study Romania, and other socialist societies, in comparison; in order to find out not only how they were shaped by their socialist development but, equally importantly, what they missed out, by isolating themselves from the Euro-Atlantic world. To this end, I set out to explore, first and foremost, the evolution of Western societies in the emerging post-industrial age. In my teenage naivete, I thought that fascism and antisemitism were things of the past, relegated, once and for all, to the history textbook, and that we should rather understand how sweeping technological changes impact our lives and societies.

Yet, as Romania, and Eastern Europe, in general, took the first unsteady steps toward democratization, I learned the hard way that extremism is a recurrent phenomenon in most societies and that the past always impacts the present in multiple, unexpected ways. It is well known that in post-communist Eastern Europe, the revolution of 1989 did not necessarily bring the "triumph of liberalism" but a return to local political traditions, in novel and often peculiar post-communist garments.[1] This trend was arguably even more pronounced in Romania where, due to the lack of significant dissident movements in the late

communist period, the new political elites turned to the pre-communist interwar period as a model of democratization. The country's constitution and political system, and its structure of private property were all recreated on interwar foundations. Yet, what seemed at first sight a golden age of democracy turned out to be, on closer scrutiny, a period of great societal tensions and of tormented conflicts over the country's path of development. Many interwar debates were transplanted, *mutatis mutandis*, into post-communist politics. As democratic political parties resurfaced, so did authoritarian tendencies. The revival of authoritarian and antisemitic traditions was filtered, however, through the peculiarities of the communist politics of history. Under the communist regime, the writing of interwar and wartime history was highly politicized. The history of the working class and of the Romanian Communist Party were inflated and glorified, while other topics, dealing with the monarchy or the democratic political parties were misrepresented or simply suppressed. In this context, the history of the Legion "Archangel Michael" and of Marshall Ion Antonescu were truncated to fit the Stalinist dogma on fascism as the dictatorship of the grand bourgeoise, but also national-communist myths of history. Controversially, however, while the Communist Party capitalized on antifascism as its main source of historical legitimacy, certain ultranationalist leaders were partially rehabilitated and a number of right-wing political themes such as national messianism, charismatic politics, and protocronism integrated into the national-communist propaganda.

In the post-communist period, public interest in the history of the Legion surged, concentrating on topics that used to be taboo under communism, such as Romania's wartime territorial losses, anti-Soviet resentments, but also nationalism, antisemitism, romanticized visions of national salvation, and utopian—or, better said, dystopian—totalitarian temptations. While the communist propaganda tropes faded away, the general public wanted to get not only a better sense of historical responsibilities for Romania's tortuous political past but to also discover the real characters behind historical events. In the 1990s, the public debates on interwar history were highly personalized, focusing on political conflicts among key historical figures, such as King Carol II, Ion Antonescu, Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, or Iuliu Maniu. They also scrutinized the fate of, and interpersonal relations among, a number of famous intellectuals associated with the radical "young generation"—most notably Mircea Eliade, Emil Cioran, Eugen Ionescu, and Mihail Sebastian, to name but a few—in an attempt to understand the shifts and turns of their life stories, their political and ethical dilemmas, choices, and personal dramas.

More recently, this public interest, as well as the repeated attempts to revive the Legion in a new key, on the one hand, and to officially outlaw extremism, on the other, led to a grand historiographical but also legal-political debate: was the Legion a fascist or a radical right organization? Was it antisemitic? What role did it play in the extermination of Romanian Jews? Were the Legionaries violent extremists or virtuous patriots? Should they be celebrated as heroes of anti-communist resistance or, on the contrary, banned from the public memory? In revisiting these questions from new angles, the aim of this book is not to "medicalize"

extremism or to pass ready-made black and white moral judgments but to identify and explain the sociopolitical mechanisms that led to right-wing radicalization. The book explores, from a long-term perspective, the structural conditions as well as the political and cultural traditions that led part of the Romanian youth to enroll in the Legion. Needless to say, explaining does not mean exculpating, but understanding and de-mythicizing with the aim of preventing radicalization to violent extremism. Instead of subscribing emotionally to the story of Codreanu as an allegedly virtuous, altruistic but tragic charismatic leader who fell prey to evil forces, I want to show how and why a 'charismatic persona' was socially created and disseminated, how it took a life of its own, and how the faith in an idealized, infallible leader was merged with nationalist messianic beliefs into a seductive yet harmful doctrine of national salvation through cleansing.

⋆

This book aims at explaining why Romania hosted one of the strongest and most original fascist movements in interwar Europe, and at evaluating its long-term political impact. Yet, the book does not only speak about Romania but illuminates more general, European and global, paths of radicalization to violent extremism, both past and contemporary. It is very telling in this respect that, on 12 August 2017, Matthew Heimbach, chairman of the US Traditionalist Worker Party and co-founder of the Traditionalist Youth Network, came to a court hearing in Charlottesville, Virginia—following an infamous march which polarized American political life—dressed in a T-shirt displaying the image of Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu. Heimbach is a well-known radical activist. In his interviews, he does not object to being called a fascist but is quick to stress that: "I do not identify as a neo-Nazi. I consider my biggest spiritual inspiration to be the Legion of St Michael the Archangel."[2] In many instances, Heimbach openly confessed his admiration for Corneliu Codreanu, placing the leader of the Legion on a par with other European fascist leaders such as "Jose Antonio of the Spanish Falange, Sir Oswald Mosley of the BUF [British Union of Fascists], and Léon Degrelle of the [Belgian] Rexist Party."[3]

The fact that, after more than a century, the Legion's message, and Codreanu's personality, continue to inspire radical movements in Romania, the US, and in other parts of the world, is more than a simple coincidence. As I am writing these lines, we are living through times of disruptive societal transformations. The world order has become multipolar but also more unstable. On the one hand, we witness the emergence of novel types of authoritarian regimes, which utilize their accumulated resources and technological gains to experiment with new techniques of mass surveillance and selective repression, combined with welfare provisions and a strong symbolic-ideological control of society. These regimes also conduct an aggressive foreign policy against their neighbors, as exemplified by Putin's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and exercise a concerted pressure on the existing international order. On the other hand, climate change, global pandemics, the widening of socio-economic inequalities, and the resulting ever-growing political polarization, as well as unprecedentedly

rapid technological advances impact our lives more than ever. These enhanced challenges create insecurity, a retreat to local forms of collective identities, and counter-movements against globalization and supranational integration, destabilizing unconsolidated as well as established democracies. It is therefore important to understand what stimulates radicalization to extremism, in general, and to fascism and the radical right, in particular, in novel societal contexts. The book points out the structural conditions generating violent, antisystemic movements of protest, such as the existence of long-term regional or ethnoreligious cleavages; the economic impoverishment of large segments of society, especially among the middle classes leading to the rise of economic nationalism of the "titular nation" during particular stages in the process of state-building and national consolidation; and lack of education for democracy and of well-functioning democratic and media institutions. In such contexts, pauperized strata of society might find it tempting to scapegoat ethnoreligious or political minorities for their economic troubles and to demand state polices meant to shelter their interest through the discrimination against, or even the removal of, rival groups in society.

These factors, however, do not necessarily lead to fascism and the radical right. To understand this type of middle-class radicalism, one should also consider the agency of charismatic political entrepreneurs who manage to channel societal protest into a radical direction and to set in motion processes of mass mobilization and grass roots socialization in an extremist political culture. The book points out the responsibility of certain interwar politicians, journalists, and university educators in encouraging youth radicalization, with the hidden aim of manipulating it to their own benefit. It also shows how, in the lack of good governance and the rule of law, the harsh and often lawless confrontation between repressive state agencies and terrorist organizations can lead to a dark and frightening spiral of violence. In the interwar period, these trends were further exacerbated by the international context, marked by a wave of authoritarian regimes that swept European and global politics in the 1930s, promoting a bellicose, revisionist foreign policy. Well into the twenty-first century, as a historian of comparative politics, I often have a vexing sense of *déjà vu* in contemporary European and global politics, and a saddening—indeed infuriating—impression that present day authoritarian leaders seem to learn more effectively from history about how to undermine democracy and build autocratic regimes than their democratic counterparts learn how to prevent or counter political radicalization and to successfully deradicalize and reintegrate former extremists.

★

Acknowledgments

The book stems from my long-term interest in the history of fascism in East Central Europe in general, and in Romania, in particular. My previous research on the topic resulted in a 2004 work on the relationship between the Legion's charismatic ideology and its violent political practice.[4] In the

continuation of my work, I have explored other key aspects in the history of the Legion, such as the association between aristocracy and fascism;[5] the relationship between theories of social palingenesis, romantic nationalism, and fascism;[6] and the succession of authoritarian right-wing dictatorial regimes in Romania.[7] A few chapters of the book draw on these materials that have been published elsewhere, in different formats; these parts, reproduced with permission, have been re-worked, upgraded, expanded, and integrated into a new theoretical and methodological framework focusing on the rites and rituals associated with the fascist campaign of sacralizing politics with the aim of creating a fascist political faith. An earlier version of this English-language monograph was also translated in Hungarian and published with *L'Harmattan* publishing house;[8] a Romanian translation is also in preparation for publication. While some of the ideas I have advanced during the time have thus already been in circulation and have been taken up by the scholarship on the topic, becoming part of the received wisdom (e.g.: the charismatic nature of Codreanu's cult and of the Legion's organization), it is hoped that this novel and expanded summary provides a useful systematic perspective into my approach to fascism.

Notes

1 Not surprisingly, the first bestseller of the post-communist period was not Max Weber, *Etica protestantă şi spiritul capitalismului* [Protestant Ethnics and the Spirit of Capitalism] (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1993), but Gustave Le Bon, *Psihologia mulţimilor* [Psychology of the Masses] (Bucharest: Anima, 1990).
2 Ryan P. Hunger, "My Interview with Matthew Heimbach" June 26, 2015, https://ryanphunter.wordpress.com/2015/06/26/my-interview-with-matthew-heimbach/.
3 Blake Neff, "Meet Some of the Literal Fascists Attending the RNC," July 18, 2016, https://dailycaller.com/2016/07/18/meet-some-of-the-literal-fascists-attending-the-rnc/.
4 For an earlier work focusing solely on Codreanu's charisma, see Constantin Iordachi, *Charisma, Politics and Violence: The Legion of the "Archangel Michael" in Inter-war Romania* (Trondheim: Program on East European Cultures and Societies, 2004).
5 Constantin Iordachi, "Aristocracy, Fascism and the Social Origins of Mass Politics in Inter-war Romania," in Karina Urbach, ed., *Noble Fascists? European Aristocracies and the Radical Right* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 201–232.
6 Constantin Iordachi, "Introduction" and "God's Chosen Warriors: Romantic Palingenesis, Militarism and Fascism in Modern Romania," in *Comparative Fascist Studies: New Perspectives*, edited by Constantin Iordachi (London: Routledge, 2010), 1–57, 316–357 (reproduced by permission of Taylor and Francis Group).
7 Constantin Iordachi, "A Continuum of Dictatorships: Hybrid Totalitarian Experiments in Romania, 1937–1944," in *Rethinking Fascism and Dictatorship in Interwar Europe*, edited by António Costa Pinto and Aristotle Kallis (London: Palgrave, 2014), 233–271 (reproduced with permission of Springer Nature BV).
8 Constantin Iordachi, *A Vasgárda: Karizma, politika és erőszak Romániában, 1927-1941* (Budapest: L'Harmattan, 1st ed. 2017, second ed. 2018). The manuscript was submitted in September 2016 and successfully defended as a habilitation thesis at the CEU, Budapest, in February 2017.

References

Hunger, Ryan P. "My Interview with Matthew Heimbach" June 26, 2015, https://ryanphunter.wordpress.com/2015/06/26/my-interview-with-matthew-heimbach/.

Iordachi, Constantin. *Charisma, Politics and Violence: The Legion of the "Archangel Michael" in Inter-war Romania*. Trondheim: Program on East European Cultures and Societies, 2004.

Iordachi, Constantin. "Aristocracy, Fascism and the Social Origins of Mass Politics in Inter-war Romania." In *Noble Fascists? European Aristocracies and the Radical Right*, edited by Karina Urbach, 201–232. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Iordachi, Constantin. "Introduction." In *Comparative Fascist Studies: New Perspectives*, edited by Constantin Iordachi, 1–57. London: Routledge, 2010.

Iordachi, Constantin. "God's Chosen Warriors: Romantic Palingenesis, Militarism, and Fascism in Modern Romania." In *Comparative Fascist Studies: New Perspectives*, edited by Constantin Iordachi, 316–357. London: Routledge, 2010.

Iordachi, Constantin. "A Continuum of Dictatorships: Hybrid Totalitarian Experiments in Romania, 1937–1944." In *Rethinking Fascism and Dictatorship in Interwar Europe*, edited by António Costa Pinto, and Aristotle Kallis, 233–271. London: Palgrave, 2014.

Iordachi, Constantin. *A Vasgárda: Karizma, politika és erőszak Romániában, 1927–1941. Karizma, politika és erőszak*. Budapest: L'Harmattan, 1st ed. 2017, 2nd ed. 2018.

Le Bon, Gustav. *Psihologia mulțimilor* [Psychology of the Masses]. Bucharest: Anima, 1990.

Neff, Blake. "Meet Some of The Literal Fascists Attending The RNC," July 18, 2016, https://dailycaller.com/2016/07/18/meet-some-of-the-literal-fascists-attending-the-rnc/

Weber, Eugen. *Etica protestantă și spiritul capitalismului* [Protestant Ethnics and the Spirit of Capitalism]. Bucharest: Humanitas, 1993.

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

INTRODUCTION

Fascism as a Political Faith: Toward a New Research Framework

In February 1937, the coffins of Ion I. Moța and Vasile Marin—two leading members of the Legion "Archangel Michael"[1] who were killed in the Spanish Civil War during a propaganda fighting-mission on Franco's side—were carried by train from Majadahonda to Bucharest in an impressive funerary ceremony. On February 9, the mortuary train entered Romania and stopped at the Cernăuți (Czernowitz) railway station. Presiding over the ceremony, the Legionary commandant Vasile Iasinschi called upon the participants: "Romanians from everywhere, men and women, take the baptism in the Legionary faith!"[2] Repeated along the way, in all the railway stations where the funerary train stopped for commemorations, the call was followed by a collective oath-taking ceremony taken in front of the two coffins by large audiences made up of Legionaries in uniform, a general public, and even by state officials monitoring the event: "I swear before God and on our holy sacrifice for Christ and the Legion, to break with earthly joy and to renounce human love for the resurrection (*învierea*) of my people and to be ready to die. I swear! I swear! I swear!"[3]

Iasinschi's call, and Moța and Marin's funerals, marked a new stage in the history of the Legion: after only one decade of existence (1927–1937), the movement proclaimed its own political faith, called "holy Legionary faith" (*sfânta credință legionară*) or "Legionarism." This new, would-be salvific "religion of the people" had a highly disruptive impact upon Romania's political life, competing with the established churches and subverting the country's pluralist political regime. Reports filed by the Ministry of Interior—or by agents of police's secret service, the *Siguranța*—emphasized the compelling character of the Legion's propaganda, and its strong impact on the masses. They perceived the Legion's proselytizing campaign as "a defeat" of the authorities and "a straightforward defiance of the laws of public order," by a movement which, a few years earlier (in 1933), had been outlawed for terrorism against the state.[4]

DOI: 10.4324/9780429428043-1

The Legion's campaign to "re-evangelize" the Romanians—as the elect nation—into the new Legionary faith was temporarily blocked by the establishment of King Carol II's personal regime (1938–1940). After this period of violent repression, in September 1940 the Legion re-emerged with vigor and re-launched its campaign to convert the masses to its new political faith during its 130-day-long rule. Placed at the very heart of Legionary propaganda, this political faith claimed the following main components: its own Messiah (Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu[5]); an annunciator (Ion I. Moța), calculatingly playing the role of John the Baptist in relation to Jesus Christ; its circles of disciples and apostles, represented by the leaders grouped in the Legionary elite forum called the "Knights of the Annunciation"; its own religious creed, based on the idea of the Romanians' divine election and historical mission; its holy books proclaiming its set of laws and code of ethical behaviors, namely Codreanu's autobiography called *Pentru legionari* [*For My Legionaries*],[6] and *Cărticica Șefului de Cuib* [*The Nest Leader's Manual*],[7] supplemented by Moța's and other Legionaries' writings; its rites and rituals, ranging from ceremonies of initiation to the movement and conversion of full members to gradual promotion through its ranks; as well as its pantheon of heroes, martyrs, and saints.

The book provides a novel theoretical research framework for reconceptualizing the origins, history, and main features of the Legion "Archangel Michael" in Romania, as it existed between 1927 and 1941. My main research questions are: did the Legion manage to construct a full-fledged political faith? Or, was its claim only an empty, self-fashioning propaganda trope? What were the intellectual origins of this new, would-be political faith? What were its main features and forms of ritual manifestation? How did the Legion institutionalize this new faith during its stay in power? What were its short-term political impacts and its long-term political legacies? What was the new faith's relation to established churches and dogmas? In order to answer these questions, this book attempts to take the fascist claim of constructing a new political faith "seriously" and to analyze it in a systematic manner. Needless to say, taking fascism "seriously" does not mean taking its claims "at face value." Instead, I aim to explain and deconstruct this radical political phenomenon by placing it under *critical* scholarly scrutiny. The analysis exposes the irrational and demagogic nature of the fascist ideology of national salvation, underscoring its constructed nature and its inherent internal contradictions. It shows that Legionary propaganda stood not only in flagrant contradiction to reality, and—from the point of view of Christian churches—a blasphemy, but was also downright grotesque in its claims: see, for example, the Legion's pretense that its murderous terrorists who killed unarmed civilians (be they enemy politicians or former comrades) should be part of the gallery of national heroes, on par with those fallen for the fatherland during the Great War. Nevertheless, we cannot overlook the fact that this self-proclaimed faith enlisted the support of fanatical followers, who did not hesitate to sacrifice themselves for the cause, and that it had a genuine mass appeal, managing to enroll and mobilize the masses. The confession made by the writer, journalist,

and Legionary commandant Radu Demetrescu-Gyr to the People's Tribunal in 1945 is revealing in this respect:

> I had a faith. And I loved it. If I would say otherwise, if I would deny it, then you should all spit in my face. Regardless if this belief of mine appears today as good or bad, justified or wrong, *for me it was a true faith*. I gave it my soul; I bowed my forehead to it. I suffer even more intensely nowadays, when I see it bleeding to death.[8]

Gyr's confession is confirmed by numerous witness accounts underscoring the Legionaries' quasi-religious fanaticism. Thus, sociologist H. H. Stahl—a member of the interwar young generation who frequented leading Legionary circles—argued that "Legionarism was, indeed, a faith," one which managed to establish "a mystical mass movement." The Legionaries "believed effectively in this [mystique], going as far as to glorify sacrifice until death, with the sacrifice of their lives."[9] It is a historian's challenging task to understand, explain, and deconstruct the intellectual genealogies and ideological articulations of this radical collective belief-system, its dissemination, and its political implementation. I see this effort as the key to understanding fascism in general, and the Legion "Archangel Michael" in particular. I also believe that the insights gained from this case study will provide a valuable comparative perspective for studying other attempts at constructing "fascist faiths" not only in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, but also in Franco's Spain, by the Polish ONR, or the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, to name but a few.[10] This case study might also shed light on current patterns of youth radicalization in Europe and contribute insights into the emergence of global terrorism.

To date, numerous scholars have pointed out the religious components of the Legion.[11] In view of its religiously charged language, visual symbolism, and ritual practice, as well as the massive participation of clerics in its activities, the organization has been defined during the time in a bewildering number of ways: as an opportunistic pseudo-religious movement; a premodern religious sect; a form of clerical fascism; or a political religion. In comparative terms, the Legion has often been singled out within the general typology of fascism as "a distinct sub-type,"[12] standing either alone or lumped together with other Central European movements under the label of clerical fascism.

Romanian Legionaries themselves were, in fact, the first to advance claims on the religious nature of their organization.[13] In a letter sent to would-be converts on March 17, 1930, Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu stated:

> The Legion is more than a political organization (in the best sense of the word), for us Romanians, it is a Religion (if we could use that work to give it the necessary connotation of holiness). He who baptizes himself [in that religion] builds ties of brotherhood with us, abandons the old life of politics, and strives to strengthen himself in faith to become a proselytizer and a conqueror of humans.[14]

The essence of the new religion was the idea of voluntary sacrifice: as Vasile Marin—himself a future martyr of the cause—claimed in 1932, the Legionaries were "twenty-year-old ascetics, pioneers of a new religion, the martyrs of deeds without reward."[15] In their efforts to spell out their identity and to distinguish their profile from that of Italian Fascism and German National Socialism, other important doctrinaires of the Legion argued that the Christian faith, ethics, and spirit constituted the foundation of the Legion's ideology, and were the most important marks of the movement's *uniqueness*. Thus, in 1935 Alexandru Cantacuzino defined the Legion as a "totalitarian, Christian-Spiritualist ultra-nationalist" movement, the only genuine political faith in interwar Europe, based on a vision of "Heroic Christianity."[16] Victor Puiu Gârniceanu argued in 1936 that the Legion was "a unique phenomenon in the modern history of Europe," namely "a religiously-structured political movement."[17] These ideological claims were taken at face value by propagandist analysts, such as Klaus Charlé, who, in a 1939 apologetic work, argued that the Legion was "the only political movement [of the time] within a religious framework."[18]

Paradoxically, this self-presentation of the Legion as a religious phenomenon was further reinforced, but in a new key, by a major ideological opponent, the Marxist intellectual and activist Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu. In the first significant work on the Iron Guard, authored in 1944, Pătrășcanu emphasized the vital role played by symbolic politics, rites, and rituals in the Legion's mass appeal and electoral success, echoing Gramsci's cultural approach to fascism. On this basis, Pătrășcanu affirmed the Legion's religious nature, yet he presented it not as a new political religion but as a conscious political exploitation of the Christian Orthodox dogma. The Marxist thinker pointed out that, while German National Socialists and Italian Fascists "kept a certain distance from the dominant religions and churches," the Legion "inserted the Orthodox Christian religion into its political agitation," in both "form" and "substance."[19] In his view, this syncretism was, in fact, a counterfeit appropriation of central tenets of Eastern Orthodox dogma by the Legion, based on a charlatanic, masquerade-like "exploitation of the religious mysticism of the peasantry."[20] More recently, historian Radu Ioanid continued this line of reasoning. In a phrase highly reminiscent of Gârniceanu's and then Charlé's formulations, Ioanid claimed that the Legion was "one of the rare modern European political movements with a religious structure."[21] In line with Pătrășcanu, Ioanid argued, however, that "Orthodox Christian spirituality underwent significant modifications within the Iron Guard mindset," and that "despite its pronounced Orthodox character, Legionary mysticism did not signify the total assimilation of Orthodox theology," but instead "it is to be seen as an attempt at subordinating and transforming that theology into a political instrument."[22]

In the 1960s and 1970s, the religious components of Legionary ideology and practice were reinterpreted in the spirit of then-dominant theories of modernization.[23] Pioneering scholars of Central European fascism, most notably Eugen Weber and Zeev Barbu, defined the Legion as a sort of premodern and

prepolitical millennial movement, a curious revival—even if in seemingly modern garments—of similar phenomena that took place in early modern Europe. In a series of path-breaking studies, Eugen Weber provided a novel interpretation of the Legion's nature, based on a preliminary sociological overview of its membership and organizational structure. Arguing that Codreanu's doctrine and nationalism "were of a completely different essence than that which we discover in other social movements of our time," Weber compared them to Christian chiliastic movements "the West had known in the 14th and 16th century but forgotten since."[24] These features reflected Central Europe's economic and political backwardness; they placed the Legion and other similar movements "closer to cargo cults than they are to fascism."[25] Zeev Barbu shared Weber's interpretation. Following Eric Hobsbawm's theoretical perspective on modernization put forward in *Primitive Rebels*,[26] Barbu argued that the Legion illustrates "the transition from a religious to a political movement in a developing country."[27] He added, nevertheless, a socio-psychological dimension to the study of the Legion, arguing that Legionaries constituted "a psychological rather than a political group," a form of "messianic salvationist movement."[28]

Starting in the 1980s, some historians of comparative fascism in the Anglophone world began to acknowledge the Legion's fascist features, but still hesitated to place it within the mainstream conception of fascism. Stanley G. Payne defined the Legion as "a mystical kenotic form of *semi-religious fascism*," and "the only notable movement of this kind in an Orthodox country."[29] He pointed out that the Legion "is generally classified as fascist because it met the main criteria of any appropriate fascist typology, but it presented undeniably individual characteristics of its own."[30] In his view, "what made Codreanu especially different was that he became a sort of religious mystic, and though the Legion had the same general political goals as other fascist movements, its final aims were spiritual and transcendental."[31]

A significant breakthrough in the study of the Legion, stemming from the tradition of German historiography on fascism, was Armin Heinen's massive 1986 monograph *Die Legion "Erzengel Michael" in Rumänien*. This groundbreaking book provided a much needed, systematic history of the movement, covering its ideological origins, its organizational roots, its political evolution, and, equally important, its assumption of state power and demise (1940–1941). Based on solid empirical foundations, Heinen refuted the thesis that the Legion "Archangel Michael" was a non-fascist populist movement, previously argued by Renzo de Felice and some of his followers.[32] Anchoring the scholarly discussion in the contemporary German—but not yet Anglo-American—literature on fascism, Heinen established convincingly the Legion's genuinely fascist character.[33] Another significant contribution was made, a few years later, by Francisco Veiga: coming from the tradition of Spanish studies on fascism, Veiga provided an unconventional interpretation of the Legion's ideology and social profile, defining it as "a political chameleon, able to paint itself in the colors of the background against which it acted."[34]

In a more recent article, Payne reiterated his claim that the Iron Guard politicized "a peculiar form of Romanian orthodox mysticism" in "a bizarre and extreme way," but denied that the movement created a "distinct political religion."[35] Similarly, in view of its "overtly and sincerely religious" character, Roger Eatwell defined the Legion as a form of "clerical fascism" that typically developed "in highly peasant-based societies, where outside the radical Left there was little scope for parties which were not overtly religious."[36] Pointing out that "increasingly during the 1930s Codreanu moved away from some of his early fascist radicalism towards an emphasis on the rebirth of a vaguely defined 'new man' and conservative mysticism," Eatwell concluded that "there are problems in unequivocally including the Iron Guard within a radical generic fascist pantheon."[37]

However, asserting the fascist nature of the Legion did little to illuminate its religious components. It is telling in this respect that, while reiterating that fact that the Legion was one of the major examples of fascist movements in interwar Europe, sociologist Michael Mann was nevertheless puzzled by its "religious" nature, confessing that "we find it difficult to make sense of its antirationalism," one that was "preoccupied with personal moral reform."[38] Two prominent scholars of fascism approached the religious component of the Legion from the perspective of the process of sacralizing politics, while at the same time accepting Pătrăşcanu's view (via Ioanid) of the Legion's appropriation of Orthodox dogma for political ends. The Italian historian Emilio Gentile suggested that the Iron Guard, together with the *Falange*, "may already be placed within the dimension of sacralized politics … because their ideology makes the sacralization of the nation and the State evident, even if through a strongly politicized version of a traditional religion." He further argued that "movements like the Iron Guard assume, in reality, the character of a political religion in that they become the main factor of legitimation for the sacralization of the nation, and for the nationalization of Orthodox Christianity itself." Confronting the Iron Guard with his typology on political religions, Gentile concluded that Legionary ideology is "a clear example" of the "syncretic symbiosis between political religion and traditional religion."[39] More recently, Roger Griffin adopted a similar view. In his 1991 book *The Nature of Fascism*, Griffin emphasized the "strong Orthodox Christian component in the thinking of the Iron Guard," but defined the movement as a form of religious politics, and thus *not* as a political religion.[40] In a later book, Griffin argued that the Iron Guard was an expression of fascist modernism based on the sacralization of politics and the appropriation of Christian Orthodox dogma.[41]

For many decades, research in Romania shunned these international developments. As in other Soviet satellite states, the communist regime in Romania based its claims of political legitimacy on the antifascist struggle. The official interpretation of history rested on the thesis that General Ion Antonescu's regime (1940–1944) was a fascist dictatorship. In the late 1970s and 1980s, Romanian historiography partially liberated itself from the dogmatic constraints of the

prevailing Stalinist interpretation of the Antonescu regime,[42] but instead developed a highly problematic revisionist approach to the topic. In the context of Nicolae Ceauşescu's ideological conflict with the reformist political agenda promoted by Mikhail Gorbachev in the USSR and János Kádár in Hungary, General Antonescu was gradually rehabilitated as a fighter for Romania's territorial integrity against Stalinist Russia and Horthy's Hungary. Communist historiography also tried to obscure Antonescu's antisemitism, arguing instead that the general instituted a regime of "law and order" against the Legion's unruly anarchy and terrorism, and even facilitated the rescue of Jews across Romanian territory toward the end of the war. However, this changing perspective on the Antonescu regime did not stimulate research on fascism proper. At a time when scholars in other socialist countries were experimenting with alternative Marxist interpretations of fascism, Romanian historiography still argued that the Legion had neither an ideology of its own, nor mass support and that it was nothing more than a terrorist organization subsidized by Nazi Germany.[43]

Antonescu's rehabilitation continued for a while in Romanian historiography after 1989 as well. In the ideological confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism that marked the process of democratic consolidation in post-communist Romania, Antonescu was presented as a martyr for the national cause and a victim of communist repression.[44] Post-communist revisionist historiography has also attempted to rehabilitate the Legion, downplaying its conflict with Antonescu and underscoring their patriotism, idealism, and sacrifice for the national cause.[45] In response to this revisionist trend, a new wave of critical scholarship has deconstructed the political instrumentalization of the "Antonescu myth."[46] These scholars also focused on the rise of antisemitism to the level of systematic state policy during General Antonescu's rule, his responsibility in the partial extermination of Romanian Jews during World War II, and the repressive nature of his regime.[47] This trend culminated with the publication of the Final Report of the International Presidential Commission for the Study of the Holocaust in Romania, led by Elie Wiesel, which concluded that the campaign of deportation and extermination of Jews conducted by Antonescu's government was an integral part of the Holocaust during World War II.[48]

This research interest in antisemitism has been extended to the history of the Legion as well.[49] The bulk of this research effort has focused, first, on the identity dilemmas and political trajectories of several prominent interwar intellectuals who collaborated, to various degrees, with the Legion, and, second, on the connection between fascism and contemporary debates on national ideology.[50] Unfortunately, most of these works almost completely lacked references to recent scholarly works on fascism. Only recently has a new generation of historians placed the topic of fascism in Romania in a European context.[51] In the last two decades, we have witnessed a genuine 'renaissance' of works on fascism in Romanian studies: a vibrant wave of scholarship explores new topics of research connected with mass politics, such as Codreanu's charismatic cult, the history of labor camps, the history of Legionary activism, intellectuals, and fascism, etc.[52]

Main Argument

Despite several waves of academic research on the topic, the Legionary ideology's relation to religion remains a matter of scholarly contention. Although there seems to be an implicit consensus that the Legion had a religious "structure" or "matrix," various scholars of fascism have argued—from markedly different perspectives—that Legionary ideology was either mimetic, syncretic, or parasitic to Eastern Orthodox Christianity. In a departure from these lines of reasoning, this book contends that Legionary ideology should be defined as a palingenetic political faith of a theological type, called *Legionarism*. This political faith was molded in the palingenetic tradition of Romantic messianism. Its ultimate aim was to bring about a "new covenant" between God and the Romanians, as the elect people. The prototype of this religious scenario of salvation was the Passion of Christ: Legionaries claimed to emulate the behavioral model of *imitatio Christi*, based on the belief that the ethnical guidance and suffering of a charismatic personality can lead humanity on the path to world salvation. The central claim of the new fascist faith was its alleged ability to transform the suffering and violent self-sacrifice of the Legionaries—as the chosen warriors of a post-war messianic generation—into central events of world historical significance, leading to national and universal salvation.

The Legion employed three main sacrificial strategies for re-evangelizing the Romanian people in its new faith: (1) the appropriation of the cult of fallen soldiers, meant to re-sacralize the nation in fascist values; (2) terrorist missions as a means to promote the heroization of its own members through violent sacrifice, leading to martyrdom; and (3) sanctification through a heroic fight for Christianity, in an attempt to place the new would-be religion at the core of Romania's foreign policy, and to link it with a transnational crusade against "Judeo-Bolshevism." These sacrificial practices created a panoply of Legionary heroes, martyrs, and "saints," which the Legionaries attempted to insert into the broader national and Christian Orthodox pantheons. These strategies were part of a comprehensive attempt to appropriate the main symbols of Romanian nationalism, presenting *Legionarism* not only as a continuation, but also as a culmination of the historical development of the Romanian people, leading to salvation and redemption.

In order to provide a comprehensive analysis of the origins, main features, mechanisms of institutionalization, and the demise of this self-proclaimed fascist political faith, this book approaches the history of the Legion at three analytical levels, studying its *ideology*, the political evolution and social composition of the *Legionary movement* (1927–1941), and the *National Legionary regime* (September 1940–January 1941). The main emphasis is laid on the emergence of the doctrine of national salvation during the nineteenth century and its crystallization into a new fascist political faith in the interwar period at the level of ideology and practice. I also evaluate the Legion's success in the fascistization of the masses, as well as its political legacy.

Book Organization

The book is made up of a historiographic introduction, two main parts, and a conclusion. The historiographic introduction provides a critical review of recent works on fascism, totalitarianism, and political religion, and their relevance for studying fascist movements and regimes. In the end, I advance my own theoretical and methodological approach, and arrive at a new definition of fascism, which is then tested on the case of the Legion.

Part I focuses on the main features of the Legionary political faith at the following levels: the cult of the Archangel—which is generally taken as a primary piece of evidence for the movement's Christian religious character,[53]—the "salvational formula" of the movement, Codreanu's leadership, the structure and social composition of the movement, and its political trajectory. The first chapter provides an introduction to the social, political, ethnoreligious, and generational cleavages in Greater Romania; special attention is paid to an emerging violent youth subculture and its confrontation with the "hegemonic" official culture. I argue that the Legion was a totalitarian political organization; while inheriting major themes of palingenetic Romantic nationalism, its ideology reinterpreted them in novel forms, adapting them to the new socio-political context of interwar Romania. The Legion gave the militant spirit of turn-of-the-century integral nationalism a revolutionary, antisystemic orientation that was missing in its conservative-elitist variant. It merged prewar antisemitism with post-1917 anticommunism into a new ideological formula, that of the "Judeo-Bolshevik" world conspiracy.[54] It also added new elements to the conservative-elitist commitment to militarism and religious values, with deep roots in Romantic palingenetic discourses, such as the urgency of apocalyptic thinking, emphasis on the atonement of sins through suffering and violent self-sacrifice, and ideas about metempsychosis linked with the cult of the ancestors, the cult of the dead, and the martyrs.

To exemplify the implementation of these ideas, Part I also focuses on the cult of the martyrs in Legionary ideology and practice. It points out that, since its creation in 1927, the Legion was involved in a battle against state authorities over the "holy bones" of fallen soldiers. With the consolidation of the Legion in the 1930s, the movement created its panoply of heroes and martyrs, made up of three main categories:

1. Legionaries imprisoned following their participation in terrorist political assassinations,[55]
2. Legionaries who sacrificed their lives "in the service of the Cross,"[56] and
3. Legionaries killed in direct confrontation with Romanian authorities or in retaliation for their fascist activism.[57]

Part II focuses on the cumulative departures from democracy, leading to multiple totalitarian experiments in Romania's political life between 1937 and 1944. It highlights the fact that the 1937 elections marked a turning point in Romania's

history, the first in a series of departures from the pluralistic, multiparty parliamentary political system established after World War I. Over the next six years, Romania would experience a succession of hybrid dictatorial regimes: the royal dictatorship (February 10, 1938–September 6, 1940); the National Legionary State (September 6, 1940–January 21, 1941); and the military dictatorship of General (later Marshal) Ion Antonescu (September 6, 1940–August 23, 1944), followed, after a short interregnum in the post-war period, by the Communist takeover on March 6, 1945. While the history of these regimes has been routinely approached in isolation from each other, I approach this period of upheaval in Romania's history as a continuum, being mostly interested in the political legacy of these experiments and the way they built on each other as part of a broader transnational process of political radicalization. Part II further documents the Legion's attempt to convert the masses to the new political faith through the aestheticization of politics in grandiose public ceremonies. I point out that, from the Legionary perspective, the movement's victory did not merely mean its seizure of power in order to build a totalitarian state, but also the fascistization of the nation and the creation of the new Romanian man and woman.

The book's conclusion evaluates the usefulness of the concept of "political faith" for the study of the Legion and its relevance for the more general debate on generic fascism. On the basis of these findings, the book refutes the idea of an alleged exceptionalism of the Legion based either on Balkan/Central European backwardness or Orthodox specificity. In doing so, it goes against the prevailing tendency to exoticize Romanian fascism as a peripheral "mutant," instead integrating it firmly within mainstream European fascism.

The analysis draws on a wide array of primary sources, extracted mostly from the Archives of the National Council for the Study of the Archive of State Security and the National Historical Archives, Bucharest, Romania; the National Archive of the Republic of Moldova, Chișinău; and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, D.C., U.S.A. My research has greatly benefited from the unprecedented openness of historical archives in Romania and the Republic of Moldova, concerning mostly the holdings of the secret services, which led to a genuine "archival revolution" in Romanian studies. Given the active involvement of secret services in politics, the information historians can now gather is truly spectacular. It has become evident that, without access to information on back-stage political machinations, historians could only see the tip of the iceberg on certain issues. We are now in a much better position to understand the manipulative strategies of leading political actors, the *modus operandi* of repressive systems in different periods, and the cooperation but also conflicts among various state agencies. Nevertheless, the highly politicized nature of these archival fonds challenges historians to go beyond a naïve temptation to uncover the historical truth through "revelatory" findings and to tackle critical questions concerning continuities and ruptures among epistemic regimes of knowledge production and archival classification instead. Most of these sources were produced by the secret police, *Siguranța*, during successive democratic or

dictatorial political regimes; some of them were then re-processed or even added to by the *Securitate*, the political police of the Communist regime. As such, these sources reveal as much about the Legion as they do about the nature of the Romanian state in the interwar, wartime, and post-war periods, its techniques of surveillance and repression, and the concepts of "truth" and "evidence" its agencies employed. In critically evaluating these sources, I used the methodological framework put forward by Katherine Verdery on the ethnography of the archive,[58] also taking into account the intertwined but also shifting relationship among "victims," "victimizers," "informers," and "collaborators" under successive fascist and communist dictatorial regimes.

★★★

Fascism as Charismatic Nationalism

This book aims to provide a new theoretical framework for studying the relationships among fascism, religion, and political violence. My approach to fascism is interdisciplinary, with an emphasis on sociocultural methodologies; it is integrative, clustering concepts that have been so far analyzed separately, such as social palingenesis, messianic nationalism, charisma, totalitarianism, and political religions;[59] and is comparative and transnational, with a focus on the history of transfers and entanglements among fascist movements and regimes in Europe. In laying the theoretical foundations of my approach, I take as a starting point an emerging, loose—yet dynamic—convergence in research among recent approaches to fascism around several major interpretative or analytical tenets.[60] The first is that fascism has an ideology of its own and is thus a comprehensive "ism." The second is that, in order to understand that ideology, we need to study its original sources and to try to understand and deconstruct its intellectual references, its symbols, and political aims "from the inside out," as George Mosse put it.[61] Naturally, this approach does not intend to rehabilitate fascism by taking its ideological claims at face value, but rather argues that—in order to explain fascism's mass appeal—we need to understand the fascist worldview, its own "culture," and how that culture appealed to the masses. The third is that fascism is a form of hyper- or ultranationalism that aims to transform society radically through violent means. These interrelated statements constitute the basis for a culturalist approach to the history of fascism.

While sharing common ground with the major culturalist interpretations of fascism described above, my approach revisits three main issues that I believe are central to defining fascism:

1. Fascism's relation to the larger, modern phenomenon of sacralizing politics in general, and religion, in particular, most manifest in its tendency to create a fascist political faith.
2. The totalitarian nature of fascism; and, in close connection to the first two issues.
3. Fascism as a form of "charismatic nationalism."

In addition, my approach goes beyond a purely culturalist methodology fixated on the study of an abstract 'fascist ideological minimum." As Mosse pointed out, fascism did not simply develop a political ideology, but promoted a specific culture or way of life. While the history of ideas is undoubtedly important for understanding the articulation of the fascist worldview. we also need to study everyday practices and their eventual institutionalization. That is because ideology and social practices are inseparable: On the one hand, we cannot understand ideas without the practices that informed and inspired them. On the other hand, everyday practices do not exist in a vacuum but are shaped by the prevailing ideological precepts and worldviews of the people who animated them. Since worldviews are not ready-made products but are always in flux and motion, they are constantly influenced by individual life experiences, education, societal events, collective moods, etc. The result is a sociocultural approach that bridges the culturalist and praxeological trends in studying fascism,[62] based on the triad *ideology-movement-regime*.[63]

In the following sub-sections, I review the main scholarly trends on these topics, I put forward my own definition of fascism, and I detail my approach to, and the definition of, a political faith, the relation between political faith and totalitarianism, and their links to crucial analytical concepts such as nationalism and charismatic authority.

Fascism as a Revolutionary Political Faith

Based on my empirical work on the history of fascism, but also on my theoretical engagement with the existing scholarship on the topic, I claim that *fascism is a revolutionary political faith, a form of charismatic nationalism aimed at the salvation—through various forms of regeneration—of the patriarchal national community in this world*. Fascist salvation was understood as a fulfillment of national character through a return to the mythical origins of the nation, by means of the terrestrial action of the charismatic leader and the paramilitary movement he organized. This type of salvation could be achieved via a concerted set of actions at four interrelated levels: individual, collective, statal, and international. It entailed:

1. The rebirth and regeneration of the self through new forms of socialization based on a new ethical code of conduct meant to craft a "new man" and "woman."
2. The ethnic, racial, or religious purification of the nation through the removal of unwanted "others."
3. The re-organization of the state along totalitarian and corporatist lines.
4. The emancipation of the status of the titular nation in international affairs through an apocalyptic battle against arch-enemies.

This definition differs from other existing definitions in the field in its claim that fascism is first and foremost a *salvific political faith*, a theology of liberation centered on the myth of salvation from decadence;[64] in the importance assigned

to the role played by the charismatic leader in forging the fascist community of sacrifice and in bringing salvation to the national community; and in its emphasis on the religious "technologies of the self" incorporated into the fascist "anthropological revolution" meant to create a "new man," having at the forefront the idea of violent sacrifice.

I deliberately use the word "faith" rather than "religion" for several reasons. First, "faith" is, in fact, the word used by fascists to define their political creed. Fascist leaders asserted, time and again, the religious nature of their movements. Even Mussolini, a politician notorious for his atheistic-socialist credentials, pointed out in 1932:

> The Fascist conception of life is a religious one, in which man is viewed in his immanent relation to *a higher law*, endowed with an objective will transcending the individual and raising him to conscious membership of a spiritual society. Those who perceive nothing beyond opportunistic considerations in the religious policy of the Fascist regime fail to realize that Fascism is not only a system of government but also and above all a system of thought.[65]

However, fascist ideologues were also adamant in distinguishing between established religions and their political faith. It is illustrative in this respect that the 1925 "Manifest of the Fascist Intellectuals" defined Italian Fascism as "an energetic, violent faith (*fede*)," which conceived of politics "as a training ground for self-denial and self-sacrifice."[66]

The concept of *fede* in the discourse of Italian Fascism is mirrored by the concepts of *politischen Glauben* in the political language of German National Socialism and *credință* in the political vocabulary of the Romanian Legion. In *Mein Kampf*, Adolf Hitler denounced attacks on religious dogmas as leading to "worthless religious nihilism."[67] "For the political man," continued Hitler, "the value of a religion must be estimated less by its deficiencies than by the virtue of a visibly better substitute. As long as this appears to be lacking, what is present can be demolished only by fools or criminals."[68] Hitler argued that National Socialism was that better alternative to established religions because it was animated "by a new conviction, a new faith, a new will."[69] For Hitler, a political faith was superior to an established religion, on the count that "every philosophy of life … will remain without significance for the practical shaping of a people's life, as long as its principles have not become the banner of a fighting movement." Consequently, "without *clearly delimited faith*, religiosity with its unclarity and multiplicity of form would not only be worthless for humans but would probably contribute to general disintegration."[70] He then made an apology of political faith: "By helping to raise man above the level of bestial vegetation, faith contributes in reality to the securing and safeguarding of his existence."[71] Similarly, the Conservative politician Franz von Papen underscored in 1932 the religious nature of the NSDAP, distinguishing between "Conservative Politics rooted in [Christian] Faith and a National Socialist Faith rooted in Politics."[72]

Second, in line with both fascist ideologues and their Catholic and Protestant critics, I argue that the concept of *political faith* captures more aptly the religious dimension of fascism than that of religion itself.[73] The use of these concepts—religion and faith—has been highly debated in the social sciences. A new wave of critical studies has pertinently pointed out that the concept of religion was coined by modern Western European scholarship in colonial contexts.[74] As a category of analysis, the complex concept of religion is necessarily interdisciplinary. It is, therefore, particularly difficult to disentangle it from other sociopolitical categories. This book does not strive to measure the Legionary doctrine against a supposedly universal and immutable or transhistorical essence of religion, but to explore ways in which the concept "religion" was defined and redefined in the political-ideological battles of the interwar period. Also, instead of defining religion through a fixed set of dogmas and practices, the book aims at identifying the practices and beliefs with which this socially constructed category was associated in the interwar period by various communities. In doing so, the book tries to overcome misleading sharp dichotomies between religion and secularism, religion and politics, and religion and nationalism.

Faith is a polysemous word, as well. In this work, I employ it to refer not merely to a strong personal belief in a religious-like doctrine, but the comprehensive religious belief-system of a distinct salvational community, similar to a "denomination" or "cult." Fascism had a religious nature because it aimed at normatively regulating all aspects of human existence, and not only the political organization of a given society. Its belief system was concerned with fundamental institutions such as family, kinship, marriage, and sexuality, as well as rites and rituals of passage to death, and the afterlife. The fascist belief system had most attributes of a religion, such as the belief in a supernatural power (be it history, laws of nature, or divinity itself), a covenant of salvation with the divinity, a charismatic leader, a gallery of heroes, saints, and martyrs, an ethical code of conduct, a concept of sacrality, a set of rites, rituals, and places of worship, etc.

Nevertheless, this book argues that, conceptually, fascism cannot be defined as a full-fledged religion but rather as a *political faith*, a hybrid category situated between an organized, established religion and a political ideology. As Howard B. White pointed out, a political faith is a derivate of religion which remains dependent on traditional religious concepts and practices: "political faith is a lineal descendent of religious faith, and, in Western society, particularly of Christian faith."[75] The two types of faith, religious and political, share many characteristics: both are based on the concept of grace; both inspire extreme passions, resting on fanaticism and exclusivism; and both apply the concept of salvation to society. Moreover, since a religious faith is "a theological virtue,"[76] political faith, too, claims a theological character. However, the two types of faith, political vs. religious, also differ in many aspects, and these differences make them irreconcilable. Thus, although a political faith is dependent on traditional theological concepts such as salvation and redemption, it is, however, I would argue, a work of *bricolage*, amalgamating elements from various fields such

as science and politics (mostly nationalism) aside from theology. The central axis of a political faith is the concept of salvation through suffering; that religious (predominantly Christian) concept is re-worked in a secular manner to pertain to this-worldly salvation. As a result, if Christian faith is "an assurance of salvation," as White puts it, political faith is "a prerequisite to a beneficent society."[77] A political faith thus implies "the translation of a conjecture regarding man's political future into a certitude."[78]

My approach to fascism as a *political faith* builds upon recent works on religion, which argue that the process of modernization did not bring about the secularization of social life, as it is often claimed, but generated, on the contrary, new socio-political roles for religion, expressed in novel forms. On the one hand, the process of secularization (understood as the separation between state and church) generated a more general phenomenon of religious revival. As Michael Allen Gillespie argued, modernity is not secular; rather, it should be "best understood as a series of attempts to formulate a new and coherent metaphysics or theology."[79] World War I, in particular, intensified the search for alternatives to established religious beliefs, as Theodore Ziolkowski showed.[80] Some thinkers advocated a return to the fundamentalism of early Christianity but in modern garments; others tried to re-work sacred values outside of traditional churches and canonical precepts by appealing to radical ideas such as Marxism, modern science, Nietzschean philosophy, and critical theology. This European-wide search resulted in the emergence of new modes of faith, among which Ziolkowski identified art, escapist travel (mostly the flight to India), socialism, politicized myths, and utopian visions.

On the other hand, there has been a long tradition of fusing religion with newly emerging nationalisms, so that the two phenomena are not mutually exclusive but syncretic.[81] To understand the interplay between religion and nationalism, I explore the tradition of palingenetic nationalism, which originated in the Catholic counter-reaction to the French Revolution. I argue that this European-wide tradition, which focused on the myth of regeneration, was reactivated in a more radical key in interwar Europe, stimulated by the radical mutations brought about by the upheaval of the Great War, the dissolution of multinational empires, the reconfiguration of state borders, and the waning of traditional authority. New, religiously minded ideologies emerged as products of these developments.

Interwar fascism was part and parcel of this proliferation of new modes of religious-political faith. In approaching its history, I explore ways of re-enchanting politics through religious-like mechanisms and techniques of sacralization. In line with anthropological works on nationalism that focus on meanings rather than causes,[82] I focus in particular on the reconfiguration of the meaning of the social universe through the cult of kinship and the ancestors, the cult of the ancestral land, funerals rites and rituals, practices of sacralization and their counterparts, de-sacralization or profanation, and attempts at community-rebuilding through the re-writing of history and the reconfiguration of memory and identity. As Katherine Verdery pertinently asserted, one cannot understand nationalism by only focusing on competitions over territories, but instead needs to engage with

concepts of kinship, the circulation of cultural values, and the production and reproduction of an extensive set of social and even cosmic meanings.[83] From this perspective, notions of sacrality, morality, suffering, and victimization are not simple elements of ad hoc political legitimation, but fundamental notions within comprehensive cultural systems.

Political faith is thus not a fascist invention but has a long tradition in European politics. To substantiate this claim, I revisit the *genealogy of fascism as a political faith*, by focusing, from a *longue durée* perspective, on the interplay between pre-existing cultural traditions and fascism as a nationalist belief system, paying attention—in a non-deterministic and non-teleological fashion—to the issue of path dependency. The starting point of my analysis is the grand interpretative scheme on the origins of fascism advanced by Jacob L. Talmon and continued by Zeev Sternhell. In a groundbreaking trilogy, Talmon distinguished between two main ideological trends originating in the French Revolution: liberal and totalitarian messianic democracies.[84] Concerning the latter trend, Talmon further differentiated between the "totalitarianism of the right," based on glorifying the collective entity of the state, the nation, or the race, which culminated in fascism, and the "totalitarianism of the left," which proclaimed the goodness and perfectibility of the human nature, and culminated in communism.[85] Talmon argued that the conflict between the "empirical and liberal democracy" and "totalitarian Messianic democracy" has dominated modern politics.[86] The intellectual origins of twentieth-century totalitarianism are to be found in the totalitarian democracy that emerged in eighteenth-century political thought as a rival to the liberal type of democracy. "An integral part of the Western tradition," the totalitarian democratic paradigm was a form of collective political representation, just like its liberal counterpart, but was based on different assumptions: it claimed "a sole and exclusive truth in politics."[87]

The first volume of Talmon's trilogy explored the stages through which the social ideals of the eighteenth century were transformed into totalitarian democracy, leading to the emergence of economic communism on the one hand, and syntheses of popular sovereignty and single-party dictatorship on the other.[88] The evolution of the totalitarianism of the right unfolded in several acts: eighteen-century (mostly French) political thought; national messianism in the first half of the nineteenth century; and exclusive, integral nationalism in the interwar era. Talmon documents the way totalitarian messianism "hardened into an exclusive doctrine represented by a vanguard of the enlightened, who justified themselves in the use of coercion against those who refused to be free and virtuous."[89] In his view, political messianism "postulates a preordained, harmonious and perfect scheme of things, to which men are irresistibly driven."[90] In doing so, "it widens the scope of politics to embrace the whole of human existence." For the proponents of totalitarian democracy, politics is "the art of applying this philosophy to the organization of society, and the final purpose of politics is only achieved when this philosophy reigns supreme over all fields of life."[91] Following the path opened by Talmon, Sternhell explored the intellectual origins of fascism, with an emphasis on France[92] and Italy.[93] Sternhell regarded fascist ideology as a result

of a long-term synthesis of several pre-World War I ideological trends, filtered by the intellectual revolt of the turn of the century, and then crystallized and implemented in political practice after the Great War.

My approach builds on two important points underscored by Talmon: the claim that the totalitarianism of the right is "an integral part of the Western tradition"; and that the main matrix of the totalitarian attitude—and by extension, of fascist ideology—"was contained in the original and general eighteenth-century pattern of thought."[94] In an attempt to fill in some glaring gaps in the existing accounts on the genealogy of fascism as a political faith, I underscore the link between social palingenesis during the eighteenth century, messianic nationalism during the Romantic period, and interwar fascism. I also de-center the approach to the intellectual origins of fascism, moving away from the exclusive concentration on France and Italy to point out other laboratories of radical politics, situated in the West as well as in the East (such as Romania).

First, my approach builds on recent culture-oriented works that assert that the essence of fascist ideology was the palingenetic myth of the regeneration of the nation through violent cleansing.[95] However, while these works use the concept of palingenesis in a "generic" or "metaphorical" way to refer to the idea of rebirth and regeneration as one universal archetype of human thinking, my approach situates the fascist ideology within a concrete, long-term tradition of palingenetic thinking centered on salvation through the expiation of sins. Inaugurated in the eighteenth century in discourses of social palingenesis by the Swiss philosopher and scientist Charles Bonnet (1720–1793) in *La Palingénésie philosophique* (1769/70), and continued by Pierre-Simon Ballanche (1776–1847) in *Essais de palingénésie sociale* (1820), this tradition was incorporated at the time in a variety of new ideological forms, resulting in Romantic, conservative, fascist, and even socialist palingenetic doctrines of regeneration of the body politic. I argue that interwar fascist ideology was the heir of theological discourse on social palingenesis that advocated for collective regeneration in the form of *religious sacrifice*, following the biblical metaphor on the germination of seeds.[96]

At first sight, this argument confirms the palingenetic core of the fascist ideology, thus validating the definition of generic fascism proposed by Roger Griffin as "a palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism."[97] However, in an attempt to enhance our understanding of *the sacred components of nationalism*, in general, and fascism, in particular, I depart from Griffin's usage of the term palingenesis in three ways. First, although Griffin is well aware of the etymology and history of the term palingenesis, he picked up the term from present-day Italian scholars of fascism and not from original Romantic sources,[98] deliberately disregarding the concept's original discursive context as irrelevant. Unlike Griffin, I locate the origins of the fascist palingenetic myth in time and space by linking it to pan-European Romantic theories of palingenesis. Second, in constructing an ideal-typical analytical model of fascism, Griffin uses the term palingenesis metaphorically to refer to a universal archetype of human thinking; in doing so, he also reduces palingenesis to the myth of regeneration, defined as the ideological

core of fascism. My approach differentiates between universal ideas of regeneration and more complex, even if intimately related, Romantic *palingenetic ideologies*, defined as mystical discourses on the regeneration of society. Based on the reconceptualization of central themes of the Christian dogma, palingenetic ideologies encompass not solely the idea of regeneration but also additional key components such as the dogma of the original sin, providentialism and the idea of divine election, the idea of purification through expiation, and the myth of final resurrection. Third, Griffin accepts that "the most obvious well-head of palingenetic myth in the wider sense is religion"; yet, his approach is based on the premise that the fascist "secular palingenetic myth" does not originate from religious sources but that it "is simply the expression of an archetype of the human mythopoeic faculty in secular form."[99] In disagreement over this point, I argue that fascism inherited from Romantic thinkers is a new conception of the "sacred," one which can be documented by way of intellectual genealogies and affinities with theories of social palingenesis. Far from constituting a simple addition to Griffin's approach, my argument on the direct link between the fascist ideology and historical ideologies of social palingenesis sets the study on the ideological origins of fascism on new foundations, opening up novel research perspectives.

★

A second key dimension of my approach is the effort to grasp the analytical implications of treating fascism as a form of revolutionary nationalism. While this assertion seems to be commonplace, most scholars, in fact, treat fascism as a new political ideology of the interwar period, artificially separating it from its prewar roots. In line with Moses, I argue that we need to go back to the "bedrock" of nationalism as a belief system and to approach it from a long-term historical perspective, looking at the cultural resources fascists had at hand in articulating their views about the nation, as well as at the innovations they brought about. Following also the path opened by Anthony Smith, my goal is to uncover the sacred roots of modern nationalism and their role in redefining the nation in the modern period. I aim nevertheless to take Smith's approach a step further, *by bridging his view on nationalism as a political religion with the literature on fascism as a totalitarian political religion*. I contend that a religious core runs through modern nationalist myths, symbols, and rituals, crystallized in the Romantic period, and reactivated in a new mode in the interwar period.

To understand the manifestation of nationalism as a political faith, one needs first to account for the emergence of revolutionary nationalism itself. James H. Billington pointed out that revolutionary nationalism was "invented" by exile Francophone intellectuals from Poland and Italy, who conducted violent guerilla wars of national liberation.[100] The new form of nationalism spread mainly:

1. In societies which did not break with traditional forms of religious and political authority.
2. In authoritarian Catholic countries, such as France, Italy, or Poland.
3. In religious autocracies, such as Lutheran Prussia, or Orthodox Russia.[101]

The main innovations of revolutionary nationalism did not only consist of the birth of revolutionary language, symbols, and rituals, but in the creation of a new "matrix of politics," expressed through "mythical histories, vernacular poetry, operatic melodrama."[102] This matrix of thoughts was first evident in Romantic palingenesis, which represented "secularized nineteenth century versions of the old Judeo-Christian belief in deliverance-through-history."[103]

In the first half of the nineteenth century, the idea of a special mission of the elect nation, combined with eschatological visions and ideas of universal salvation, led to forms of Romantic national messianism. In line with Andrej Walicki, I understand national messianism as the belief in the "unique, incomparable, *messianic* mission" of the nation as a divine category, "bringing about the *universal* salvation of mankind."[104] The appropriation of the central religious category of salvation by political messianism accounts for its complex relation to established religions. As Talmon argued, after the French Revolution, political messianism

> [c]onverted the secular religion of the eighteenth century from a mainly ethical into a social and economic doctrine, based on ethical premises. The postulate of salvation, implied in the idea of the natural order, came to signify to the masses stirred by the Revolution a message of social salvation before all.[105]

The heyday of messianic nationalism was between the beginning of the French Revolution in 1789 and the pan-European Revolutions of 1848. During this time, the tradition of messianic nationalism was dispersed across Europe, and suffered many mutations as it was adapted to varying national conditions. The evolution of messianic nationalism was studied mostly in Western Europe, in countries such as France and Italy, and only to a lesser extent in Eastern Europe, the most important case studies being Russia and Poland. Walicki, in particular, explored the emergence of Polish national messianism in the thought of Adam Mickiewicz (1798–1855), Juliusz Słowacki (1809–1849), and Zygmunt Krasiński (1812–1859), the political-intellectual entanglements between Poland and France leading to combinations of French-Slavonic messianism, and the comparison between Polish and Russian socio-political thought, especially Slavophilism.[106] I argue that, in the 1840s, intellectuals from Moldova and Wallachia were also an integral part of this sizeable political-intellectual trend, due mostly to their special relation to France, which opened multiple channels of influence.

After 1848, messianic nationalism disappeared from mainstream politics, being overcome, as Talmon pointed out, by a new form of exclusivist nationalism. While agreeing with Talmon on this point, I emphasize the multiple continuities between messianic nationalism and the new trend of exclusivist nationalism culminating in fascism, pointing out the enduring genealogies of these ideas leading to the interwar period. We, therefore, cannot understand the roots of fascism without exploring the emergence of Romantic national messianism in the 1830s and 1840s, its political legacy, and its connection with the process of sacralizing

politics during the long nineteenth century. Fascists themselves were keen to emphasize this long-term genealogy: "Fascism became, like Mazzini's *Giovane Italia*, the faith of all Italians who disdained the past and longed for renewal," claimed Giovanni Gentile.[107]

★

The *third* key dimension of my approach is the assertion that fascism is a particular form of charismatic politics, merging the idea of the elect nation with that of a charismatic savior. In analytical terms, my main aim is to integrate the charismatic component of fascism at the very core of the ideal-type definition of the fascist minimum and as a central dimension guiding empirical research. I argue that the process of molding the Romantic tradition of messianic nationalism into the ideological matrix of fascism resulted in a particular type of nationalism, which I call "charismatic nationalism," encompassing the ideas of national salvation and totalitarian political organization.

My approach to charismatic nationalism is indebted to the German sociologist Max Weber. As part of his tripartite typology of forms of authority, Weber theorized charismatic authority (*Herrschaft*, also translated as "leadership" or "domination"),[108] based on devotion to an exceptional leader and on the normative rules ordained by him (e.g., prophets or warlords).[109] Following Weber, "charisma" became one of the most widespread but debated concepts in Western social science, being subject to a broad range of interdisciplinary applications.[110] The concept was often employed by fascist propaganda to explain the nature of fascist leadership, a clear indication that fascist ideologues were well aware of the distinct nature of their claim to power.[111] Nevertheless, the term entered political science dictionaries only in the 1950s and has been more systematically applied to the study of fascism only since the 1960s.[112] More recently, the issue of charismatic leadership has been tackled in treatments of generic fascism authored by Stanley G. Payne, Roger Eatwell, and Roger Griffin, among others.[113] These scholars argue that the charismatic nature of mass movements in interwar Europe challenges social scientists to rethink the concepts of legitimization, consensus, and resistance, often comparing fascism and communism.[114] However, even in these works, charisma is often either relegated to an issue of political style or treated as a marginal feature rather than as a core characteristic of fascism.

My approach to fascism as a form of charismatic politics is based on a set of interrelated statements. First, I reject theoretical perspectives that regard charismatic movements as "pre-political" manifestations in peripheral or post-colonial countries. Instead, I build on sociological and political science approaches that—although using Weber's theory as a starting point—attempt to reformulate the concept of charisma in order to concomitantly preserve its universality (including the study of politics in Western Europe) and to offer a more workable methodological apparatus for its application to politics.

Second, I argue that, in fascist studies, charisma is often improperly reduced to the issue of the leader cult and should be reconceptualized as a claim on authority that both legitimizes and organizes power. To this end, my approach

strives to recover the original religious connotations of the concept of charisma. It should not be forgotten that the concept of "charisma" originated in the field of religion, being transplanted by Weber to the realm of politics. Following Weber, political analysts have further secularized the concept of charisma, but in the process have often also "trivialized" it to stand for personal attraction, magnetism, or notoriety. In so doing, they lost sight of the religious connotations of the concept as a divinely bestowed gift of grace, which are crucial for understanding the charismatic type of authority.

Third, I argue that we need to explore more thoroughly the social connotation of charismatic leadership. Weber treated charisma as "a certain quality of an *individual personality*."[115] But he also pointed out the need for the validation of charismatic leaders by their followers and noted that charisma produces a peculiar social structure, a staff, and an apparatus of service and resources adapted to the leader's mission.[116] Weber also accounted for the creation of charismatic communities (*Gemeinde*), based on an emotional form of communal relationship (*Vergemeinschaftung*).[117] However, although Weber contributed to the study of nationalism and was himself an active German nationalist, he did not elaborate on the connection between charismatic authority and nationalism as an ideology and social-political movement. Building on Weber's work, several political scientists have underscored the impact charismatic authority has on the organization of social groups, theorizing charismatic community as a distinct type of political community.[118] Yet, the multiple links between charismatic claims and *national* communities and ideologies have remained unexplored.

To account for the fascist doctrine of national salvation and its vision of the nation as a divinely inspired community, I put forward the concept of "charismatic nationalism," based on a merger between pretenses to charismatic authority and national messianism.[119] I define charismatic nationalism as a doctrine that regards the nation as an elect community of shared destiny living in a sacred homeland which, based on a glorious past, claims a divine mission leading to salvation through sacrifice under the guidance of a charismatic leader. The concept of charismatic nationalism illuminates the nature of the "holy" or the "sacred" in nationalism, differentiating it from both established forms of traditional religions and modern secular ideologies.

Charisma has a transcendental dimension, since the belief in a divine, supernatural mission depends on belief in God as the absolute form of authority, even if that supreme divinity is different from the image of God as propagated by established churches: "We believe in God," claimed Hitler, "but it is our God, the God of the Germans."[120] "We, Legionaries, are Christians," claimed the Romanian Legionary ideologue Alexandru Cantacuzino, "we believe in our Savior Jesus Christ, we believe in a single, almighty God who gives life and death and regulates our fate, a God with whom we communicate and interact and yet a God who is outside and above our human norms and events."[121] This is a reformulation of the concept of the "holy," or the "sacred," that originated in palingenetic discourses on society, was adopted by Romantic nationalism, was

redefined, and expanded at the turn of the century before being implemented in political practices during the interwar period. The religious roots of nationalism prepared the ground for claims of charismatic leadership for achieving national unity and internal renewal, while the belief in the doctrine of the chosen people gave birth to an extreme form of national self-glorification. The corollaries of interwar charismatic nationalism are not merely the ideas of the "holy" community, history, and territory—arguably part of any form of nationalism—but a new way of defining the holy, which does not originate from the numinous but from the charismatic leader.[122] In other words, interwar charismatic nationalism merged the idea of the holy, elect national community with that of the divine mission of the charismatic leader as a chosen prophet or savior of the nation, and applied them to political practice.

I find charisma to be the most integrative aspect of the fascist ideology because it illuminates several of its interrelated claims, such as the relationship between divinity and the charismatic leader; the idea of a divine election and mission to fulfill God's commandments; the relation between divinity and the chosen people; the relationship between the charismatic leader and his followers; the profile and expectations of the followers; and the nation and its mission to the mankind, in its entirety. From an analytical point of view, charisma can serve as a tool for clustering key concepts pertaining to fascism into an integrative theoretical framework. So understood, the charismatic nature of fascism accounts for the merger between the ideology of messianic nationalism and the post-war paramilitary revolutionary movements of change based on an oath-taking, totalizing authority, leading to the development of new forms of political faiths.

Beyond the "Fascism–Totalitarianism–Political Religion" Triad

My theoretical approach to fascism as a political faith is related to, yet different from, the dominant approach to "political religions." My aim is to reconfigure the relationship among the composite elements of the conceptual triad *fascism–totalitarianism–political religion* (faith, in my conceptual language). Political analysts noted, early on, the quasi-religious nature of fascism, calling it a political religion. Research on the topic was further stimulated in the post-World War II period by the emergence of Holocaust studies as a distinct field.[123] The interest in the history of the Holocaust also incited *longue durée* research on fascist rites, rituals, and ceremonies, in an effort to account for the emotional appeal and the disturbing "fascination with the evil" exercised by fascism. Two main approaches to the emotional appeal of fascism can be distinguished: one explores the process of the "nationalization of the masses" and the aestheticization of politics; the other, the process of sacralizing politics and the emergence of political religions.

The first approach is mostly indebted to George Mosse. In *The Nationalization of the Masses*, Mosse underscored the relationship between nineteenth-century nationalism and fascism, pointing out that "what we call fascist style was, in

reality, the climax of a 'new politics' based upon the emerging eighteenth-century idea of popular sovereignty."[124] In his view, the "general will" became a "secular religion," expressed through a wide range of myths and symbols aiming at recreating the nation as a homogeneous community. The essence of the new style of politics was the aestheticization of politics, "the force which linked myths, symbols, and the feeling of the masses." Mosse pointed out that fascism created "a theology which provided the framework for national worship." He also emphasized the link between Romantic nationalism and fascism, which made symbols the essence of the new style of politics. Holy flames, flags, songs, and national monuments "had always played a cardinal role in Christianity and now in a secularized form they become part and parcel of German national worship." Mosse's pioneering approach, and the related rich literature on the relationship between power and its representations, has opened a new research agenda in fascist studies, focusing on the aestheticization of politics. Yet, it is important to stress that Mosse was not prepared to treat nationalism as a religious-like phenomenon per se, but described it as a "secular religion," or a substitute for traditional religion, implying a clear break between the two.

In contrast to Mosse, authors such as Elie Kedourie, Conor Cruise O'Brien, Adrian Hastings, and Anthony Smith emphasized the fluid boundaries between religion and modern nationalist ideologies, highlighting the Christian *origins* of nationalist ideology.[125] Anthony Smith, in particular, advanced his own ethnosymbolic approach to nationalism, underscoring the biblical background and premodern origins of nationalism.[126] Building on Kedourie's insights on the relationship between nationalism and religion, Smith argues that, while nationalism was initially conceived as a secular ideology, biblical and religious motives actually played a more important role in the construction of modern nationalist ideologies than secular ones.[127] In Smith's view, the essence of nationalism as a secular ideology is the striving for human self-emancipation. But since emancipation can only mean the fulfillment of the true spirit and destiny of the nation, nationalism necessarily had to incorporate "the very core of traditional religions, their conception of the sacred and their rites of salvation."[128]

Smith argues that nationalism is a secular political ideology, but that it is also a political religion, "a form of culture and a type of belief-system whose object is the nation conceived as a sacred communion."[129] The grid of this belief system is made up of community, territory, history, and destiny. Its core is the cult of authenticity; its ultimate aim is the salvation of the nation. "The salvation drama of nationalism" thus consists of the quest for rediscovering authenticity, leading to the restoration of the "national character" and of the "in-born" features of the respective people. That restoration is to be achieved through re-rooting the nation by a return to nature and the ancestral land, and the rediscovery of the true self, through a process of spiritual or "inner-worldly" transformation meant to uncover the pure, unmixed elements of one's national identity. Nationalism thus promotes the creation of the sacred community of people as an ethnic, cultic, and moral-legal entity. To uncover the original, pristine, or autochthonous

elements, nationalism proclaims the elevation of the people, especially of the peasantry, to the rank of the repository of the national values.

Smith has also underscored the fact that religion, in general, and the idea of the divine election in particular, have been central ingredients in the development of national ideologies. Symbols and myths of ethnic election can be found in various epochs or historical regions, such the ancient Near East, Judea, Greece, Armenia, and Persia, as well as in medieval Byzantium, Russia, and Western Europe, mobilizing and inspiring ethnic survival. Smith outlines four main patterns of ethnic survival: imperial-dynastic, communal-demotic, emigrant-colonist, and diaspora-restoration, each of them perpetuating and adapting old myths of ethnic election in various ways.[130]

The second approach to political religions has been developed mostly in recent Italian historiography. Emilio Gentile, in particular, highlighted the tendency of totalitarian-revolutionary movements to sacralize politics and create political religions.[131] Building on a school of thought originating in interwar Europe, Gentile put forward a comprehensive theoretical framework for analyzing "the sacralization of politics," defined as a form of politics that "confers a sacred status on an earthly entity (nation, country, state, humanity, society, race, proletariat, history, liberty or revolution) and renders it an absolute principle of collective existence, considers it the main source of values for individual and mass behavior, and exalts it as the supreme ethical precept of public life. It becomes an object for veneration and dedication, even to the point of self-sacrifice."[132] Gentile differentiated between *civil religion*, defined as a "common civic creed" based on the sacralization of a collective political entity that is not attached to a particular ideology, accepts the separation between church and state, and tolerates the existence of traditional religious; and *political religion*, with an "exclusive and integralist" character, denying individual autonomy, subordinating traditional religions, and eliminating rival movements.[133] He provided a typology of political religions as a function of their relationship to traditional religions, made up of *mimetic*, s*yncretic*, or e*phemeral* categories.

Gentile also pointed out the close relationship between political religions and totalitarianism, defining the former as "an *experiment in political domination* undertaken by a *revolutionary movement* with an *integralist conception* of politics that aspires toward a *monopoly of power* and that, after having secured power whether by legal or illegal means, destroys or transforms the previous regime and constructs a new state based on a *single-party regime*, with the chief objective of *conquering society*."[134] In his view, a totalitarian movement "seeks the subordination, integration and homogenization of the governed on the basis of the *integral politicization of existence*, whether collective or individual, interpreted according to the categories, myths, and values of a *palingenetic ideology*, institutionalized in the form of a *political religion*, that aims to shape the individual and the masses through an *anthropological revolution* in order to regenerate the human being and create the *new man*, who is dedicated in body and soul to the realization of the revolutionary and imperialistic policies of the totalitarian party."[135] Its ultimate aim is to create the "*unitary and*

homogenous body politic morally united in their totalitarian religion."[136] Following Hannah Arendt, Gentile defines totalitarianism as an experiment rather than a regime, a complex outcome of the continuous interaction of several elements: the party, the regime, the political religion, and the anthropological revolution. The translation of Gentile's works into English[137] further stimulated interest in the issue of political religions,[138] scholarly research in the field concentrating mostly on the nexus of fascism, totalitarianism, and political religions.[139]

Gentile's theoretical framework for studying political religions has several limitations. First, in terms of empirical research, his historical interpretation relies overwhelmingly on Fascist Italy. Since in the case of Italy's National Fascist Party (*Partito Nazionale Fascista*) the transition from the movement phase to the regime phase was extremely short, Gentile tends to overemphasize the "institutionalization" of the fascist governmental ideology "in the form of a *political religion*" at the expense of the movement in its prepower phase. Under the influence of C. S. Liebman and E. Don-Yehiya, Gentile sees political religions as closer to the ideology of *statism*.[140] Moreover, using an elite manipulation theory, he regards political religion as a technique of integrating the masses into a totalitarian political system. In doing so, Gentile tends to reduce political religions to an instrument of the socialization of the masses made up of rites and rituals or, in other words, *an appendix of the totalitarian state*. Second, Gentile's understanding of totalitarianism is reminiscent of the Cold War political and scholarly tradition of defining totalitarianism as an *ism*, a supra-ideology that *supersedes* in importance the fascist or communist ideologies themselves. It is on this basis that Gentile concludes unambiguously that "political religion is one element of totalitarianism, not the principal element and not even the most important in defining its essence."[141] This conclusion is in stark contrast to his conceptualization of fascism as a system of meaning built on the matrix of nationalism as a political religion, and to his empirical research demonstrating that Italian Fascism created a political religion both at the level of *ideology* and practice.

I argue that, in order to fully grasp the religious nature of fascism, there is an imperious need to revisit the concept of totalitarianism, and to enlarge research beyond Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. In approaching fascism as a political faith, I concur with Gentile that this phenomenon originated with the French Revolution; that political religions/faiths are rooted in the sacralization of politics; that there is an intrinsic link between political religions and totalitarianism; and that fascism can and should be studied as a form of political religion/faith. While drawing on the "anthropological-cultural" approach of Gentile, I nevertheless distance myself from Gentile's treatment of the political religion of fascism as a mere appendix of totalitarianism; rather, I see *political faith* as *the most integrative belief system* of fascism, which provided an *ultimate meaning*, a matrix of thought from which derived *all other key fascist myths*, including its political ideology and totalitarian organization of power.

For Gentile, fascism is, first and foremost, a form of totalitarianism which can be fully established through the institutionalization of the rites and rituals of a

political religion. In my view, fascism is a political faith that attempts to reach its goals of salvation through the implementation of a totalitarian system of government. I hold that the most crucial fascist myth is that of the salvation or redemption of the nation from decadence; its central axis is the idea of charismatic nationalism. In contrast, statism and totalitarianism are not ends in themselves but *means* through which fascist movements and regimes attempted to reach their ultimate goal of salvation. To think otherwise is to subordinate ends to means; by implication, it is also to make political faith dependent on the state and to suggest that fascist movements cannot develop political faiths in their prepower stage.

This view of fascism as being primarily a political faith leads to a reconsideration of totalitarianism as a dynamic and fluid political category, produced and reproduced during the political process. First, I depart from the almost exclusive concentration on totalitarianism as a form of government, and its integration into rigid political taxonomies elaborated during the Cold War. Instead, in line with Arendt, I reiterate the need to study totalitarian *movements* as experiments in exercising a would-be totalizing power, and the process by which some of them managed to establish totalitarian regimes.[142] Second, I argue that the declared aim of totalitarianism was not simply the creation of an almighty state, characterized by a "total" or "perfect control" over society, but—as David Roberts pointed out—the articulation of "a new mode of collective action."[143] Third, I contend that in order to understand totalitarianism in action, one has to explore ways of legitimizing and exercising power but also forms of socialization and indoctrination within political movements and regimes. The aim of these new forms of socialization was not only the concentration of power in the hands of a charismatic leader but also the education and disciplining of the followers leading to the creation of a new type of human being, *the new man* and *woman*. My research focuses, therefore, on documenting the link between the totalitarian organization of fascist movements and regimes and their promotion of an inner "anthropological revolution," leading to the individual and collective psychological transformation of the followers following the precepts of their political faith.

What are the main features of the fascist "anthropological revolution"? Walking on the path opened by Foucault's thought on theology, I argue that fascism was not simply a political ideology but a *theology of redemption*.[144] Rejecting the thesis that the modern era is characterized by secularization alone, Foucault noted the "new" or "in-depth Christianization" that occurred throughout this period.[145] This phenomenon was mainly characterized by the dissemination of traditional Christian practices on power, knowledge, and relation to the self, following the process of modern confessionalization that marked the clash between Catholicism and Protestantism and which generated, in the long run, sharply opposed collective identities. The essence of these practices was the "pastoral power," consisting of the shepherd-flock game of the Christian pastorate: on the one hand, the charismatic shepherd leading the flock to salvation; and on the other hand, "the obedient subject," based on specific forms of knowledge, subjectivity, and brotherly surveillance.[146] I contend that fascist movements

incorporated, via theories of social palingenesis and messianic nationalism, Christian "technologies of the self" meant to lead to inner transformation, such as baptism, confession, penance, and self-sacrifice.[147] From this perspective, I hold that the fascist faith can be defined as a *gospel of national redemption* based on an inner transformation of the followers through Christian technologies of the self; the articulation of new collective identities through novel rites, rituals, and forms of socialization; the nationalization of the masses through their indoctrination and the aestheticization of politics; and the totalitarian organization of the state in order to re-draw the borders of the nation through violent cleansing.

Central to the Christian "technologies of the self" emulated by fascism were mechanisms of expiation of sins through violent sacrifice, following the behavioral model of *Imitatio Christi*. First adopted in politics by Romantic thinkers, this idea became an integral part of the matrix of modern nationalism as a collective belief system centered on the glorification of blood sacrifice as a means toward the regeneration of the nation.[148] The fascist sacrificial ideology was built on this tradition, but the fascists also attempted to appropriate and redefine the myth of self-sacrifice, by pushing the boundaries of socially accepted violence to include new forms of armed combat. The fascist behavioral role models and practices of sacrifice had three primary sources: the culture of chivalry, based on Christian concepts of love and self-sacrifice for others;[149] the cult of the fallen soldier in the Great War;[150] and new forms of political violence relating to modern warfare and terrorism.[151] The result was the development of a fascist *culture of martyrdom*, imbued with elements of paramilitarism, the crusading spirit, and specific fascist ideological values such as the fight against (racial) degeneration, anticommunism, and antisemitism. For fascists, voluntary self-sacrifice was thus more than just a strategy of political struggle: in line with the original meaning of the Latin *sacrificum* ("to make sacred"), it was a way of *bestowing sacrality on the fascist community of sacrifice through martyrdom*. A main function of violent self-sacrifice was that of manufacturing martyrdom: as such, salvational sacrifice of oneself *was the engine of the fascist political faith*, since it provided fascists with means of objectifying their claims to rebirth and regeneration. The fascist fighters who died in action (be they terrorists or victims of antifascist resistance) were glorified as martyrs and venerated as role models.[152]

I will test this working definition of fascism in the case of the Legion "Archangel Michael" in Romania.

Notes

1 The initial name of the movement was the Legion "Archangel Michael" for the Defense of the Ancestral Land (*Legiunea "Arhangelul Mihail" pentru apărarea pământului strămoşesc*) founded on June 24, 1927, in Iaşi (NB: the Legion "Archangel Michael" and not *of the* "Archangel Michael," as it is routinely but improperly translated into English). On April 13, 1930, Codreanu established the Iron Guard (*Garda de fier*), as a larger political unit, which would include the Legion "Archangel Michael." Soon, the Legion and the Iron Guard became interchangeable labels for the same movement.

On January 3, 1931, authorities dissolved the Legion "Archangel Michael"/Iron Guard. In April 1931, Codreanu formed the "Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu Grouping" (*Gruparea Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu*) which gained five parliamentary seats in the 1932 national elections. The grouping was banned by authorities on December 9/10, 1933. In 1935, Codreanu established the "All for the Country" Party (*Partidul "Totul pentru Țară"*), which took part in the national elections of December 1937, and gained 16 percent of the total number of votes at the national level and 66 parliamentary seats. The new party was dissolved on February 22, 1938, following the establishment of King Carol II's personal regime. The organization is also generically referred to as the "Legionary Movement" (*Mişcarea Legionară*); in this work, I use "Legion" as a generic name for the movement, while the names of the various political parties representing the Legion are used to refer to their own actions.

2 Vasile Iasinschi, Cernăuți, February 9, 1937, Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale, București (hereafter ANIC), Fond "Ministerul de Interne - Diverse" (MI), file 4/1937, 4.

3 ANIC, MI, 4/1937, 4.

4 Ibid., 4.

5 The family name of the Legion's leader is "Zelea-Codreanu." This is the form that appears in official documents and also on the grave-cross of the family. However, the name is spelled differently in various Legionary publications, either as Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, Corneliu Z. Codreanu, or Corneliu Codreanu. In this work, I use either the official version, Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, or simply Codreanu.

6 Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, *Pentru legionari*, vol. 1 (Sibiu: "Totul pentru țară," 1936).

7 Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, *Cărticica șefului de cuib* (București: Tipografia "C. S. m. c.," 1933). All citations in this book originate from the English edition, *The Nest Leader's Handbook* (London: The Rising Press, 2001).

8 Radu Gyr, "Ultimul cuvânt la Tribunalul Poporului," June 2, 1945, cited in *Adevărul literar și artistic*, March 6, 1994, http://ro.metapedia.org/wiki/Radu_Gyr.

9 Zoltan Rostas, *Monografia ca utopie. Inverviuri cu Henry H. Stahl* (București: Paideia, 2001), 229.

10 On the link between religion and authoritarian politics in interwar Europe, with a focus on fascism, see selectively: John F. Pollard, *The Vatican and Italian Fascism, 1929–1932: A Study in Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Richard J. Wolff and Jörg K. Hoensch, eds., *Catholics, the State and the European Radical Right, 1919–1945* (Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 1987); Emilio Gentile, *The Sacralization of Politics in* Fascist *Italy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996); Emilio Gentile, *Politics as Religion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006); Martin Conway, *Catholic Politics in Europe, 1918–1945* (London: Routledge, 1997); Uriel Tal, *Faith, Politics, and Nazism: Selected Essays* (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Derek Hastings, "How Catholic was the early Nazi movement? Religion, Race, and Culture in Munich 1919-1924." *Central European History* 36, no. 3 (2003): 383–433; Richard Steigmann-Gall, *The Holy Reich: Nazi Conceptions of Christianity, 1919–1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); David Redles, *Hitler's Millennial Reich: Apocalyptic Belief and the Search for Salvation* (New York: New York University Press, 2005); Mark Biondich, "Radical Catholicism and Fascism in Croatia, 1918–1945," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 8, no. 2 (2007): 383–399; Paul A. Hanebrink, *In Defense of Christian Hungary: Religion, Nationalism, and Antisemitism, 1890–1944* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006); Matthew Feldman, Marius Turda, and Tudor Georgescu, eds., *Clerical Fascism in Interwar Europe* (London: Routledge, 2008); Rory Yeomans, *Visions of Annihilation: The Ustasha Regime and the Cultural Politics of Fascism, 1941–1945* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2013); and Oleksandr Zajcev, *Ukrayins'kyj integral'nyj nacionalizm 1920–1930-x rokiv Narysy intelektual'noyi istoriyi* (Kyyiv: Krytyka 2013).

11 See, selectively, Radu Ioanid, "The Sacralized Politics of the Romanian Iron Guard," *Totalitarian Movements & Political Religions* 5, no. 3 (2003): 419–453; Mirel Bănică,

Biserca Ortodoxă Română: stat şi societate în anii '30 (Iaşi: Polirom, 2007); Paul Shapiro, "Faith, Murder, Resurrection: The Iron Guard and the Romanian Orthodox Church," in *Antisemitism, Christian Ambivalence, and the Holocaust*, edited by Kevin P. Spicer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007), 136–170.

12 Stanley G. Payne, "The NDH State in Comparative Perspective," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 7, no. 4 (2006), 411–412.

13 See mainly Zelea-Codreanu, *Pentru legionari*; Ion I. Moţa, *Cranii de Lemn. Articole, 1922–1936* (Sibiu: Totul Pentru Ţară, 1936); Ion Banea, *Ce este şi ce vrea Mişcarea legionară. Cărticică pentru săteni* (Sibiu: Curierul, 1937); Alexandru Cantacuzino, *Românul de mâine. Românismul nostru* (Bucureşti: Editura Mişcării Legionare, [1935] 1940); Victor Puiu Gârniceanu, *Din lumea legionară* (Madrid: Colectia Omul Nou, 1951), 6.

14 "Copie depe scrisoarea lui Corneliu Z. Codreanu," March 18, 1930, Iaşi, National Archive of the Republic of Moldova [Arhivele Naţionale ale Republicii Moldova], Chişinău, fond 680/1, files 3433, 510.

15 Vasile Marin, "Răboj," *Axa*, November 19, 1932, in *Crez de Generatie* (Bucureşti: Bucovina, 1937), 117.

16 See Cantacuzino, *Românul de mâine*, 49; Alexandru Cantacuzino, *Între lumea legionară şi lumea comunistă* (Bucureşti: Editura Mişcării Legionare, 1940).

17 Victor Puiu Gârniceanu, *Din lumea legionară* (Madrid: Colectia Omul Nou, 1951), 6.

18 Klaus Charlé, *Die Eiserne Garde: Eine Darstellung der völkischen Erneuerungsbewegung in Rumänien* (Berlin-Vienna: Deutsches Rechtsverlag, 1939), as summarized in E. Wiskemann, "Reviewed work(s): Die Eiserne Garde: Eine Darstellung der völkischen Erneuerungsbewegung in Rumänien, by Klaus Charlé," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931–1939)* 18, no. 6 (Nov.–Dec. 1939): 863.

19 Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, *Sub trei dictaturi* (Bucureşti: Forum, 1944), 42, 44.

20 Pătrăşcanu, *Sub trei dictaturi*, 44. One should note the apparent contradiction inherent in this interpretation: if the Legion inserted the Orthodox dogma both "in substance" and in form, it would follow logically that its doctrine was more than just a sheer form of charlatanism.

21 Radu Ioanid, *The Sword of the Archangel: Fascist Ideology in Romania* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1990); and Ioanid, "The Sacralized Politics," 419.

22 Ioanid, "The Sacralized Politics," 419.

23 For pioneering works, see Eugen Weber, *Varieties of Fascism: Doctrines of Revolution in the Twentieth Century* **(**Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1964); Eugen Weber, "Romania," in *The European Right. A Historical Profile*, edited by Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1965), 501–574; and Eugen Weber, "The Men of the Archangel," *Journal of Contemporary History* 1, no. 1 (1966): 101–126; Zeev Barbu, "Rumania," in *European Fascism*, edited by S. J. Woolf (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), 146–166; Zeev Barbu, "Psycho-Historical and Sociological Perspectives on the Iron Guard, the Fascist Movement of Romania," in *Who Were the Fascists? Social Roots of European Fascism*, edited by Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet, and Jan Petter Myklebust (Bergen–Oslo–Tromso: Universitetsforlaget, 1980): 379–394; Stephen Fischer-Galaţi, "Fascism in Romania," in *Native Fascism in the Successor States, 1918–1945*, edited by Peter F. Sugar (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 1971), 112–121; and Emanuel Turczynski, "The Background of Romanian Fascism," in ibid., 101–111.

24 Weber, *Varieties of Fascism*, 96.

25 Weber, "Romania," in *The European Right*, 523–524.

26 E. J. Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1959).

27 Barbu, "Rumania," 156, 160; Barbu, "Psycho-Historical and Sociological Perspectives," 393.

28 Barbu, "Psycho-Historical and Sociological Perspectives," 393.

29 Stanley G. Payne, *Fascism. Comparison and Definition* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980), 198–199.

30 Stanley G. Payne, *A History of Fascism, 1914–1945* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1995), 280.
31 Ibid., 280.
32 Peter Wiles, "A Syndrome, not a Doctrine, Some Elementary Theses on Populism," in *Populism: Its Meanings and National Characteristics*, edited by Ghiţă Ionescu and Ernest Gellner (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), 176; Renzo de Felice, *Intervista sul fascismo, a cura di Michael A. Ledeen* (Roma: Laterza, 1999), 82–84, 99–100; Kurt W. Treptow, "Populism in Twentieth Century Romanian Politics," in *Populism in Eastern Europe*, edited by Joseph Held (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 197–218.
33 Armin Heinen, *Die Legion "Erzengel Michael" in Rumänien: soziale Bewegung und politische Organisation. Ein Beitrag zum Problem des internationalen Faschismus* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1986), published in Romanian as *Legiunea "Arhanghelul Mihail." Mişcare socială şi organizaţie politică. O contribuţie la problema fascismului internaţional* (Bucureşti: Humanitas, 1998).
34 Francisco Veiga, *La Mística del Ultranacionalismo. Historia de la Guardia de Hierron. Rumania, 1919–1941* (Bellaterra: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 1989), published in Romanian as *Istoria Gărzii de Fier, 1919–1941. Mistica ultranaţionalismului* (Bucureşti: Humanitas, 1993; 2nd ed., 1995).
35 Stanley G. Payne, "On the Heuristic Value of the Concept of Political Religion and its Application," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 6, no. 2 (2005): 169; for a contrary view, see below.
36 Roger Eatwell, "Reflections on Fascism and Religion," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 4, no. 3 (2003): 154.
37 Eatwell, "Reflections on Fascism and Religion," 154.
38 Michael Mann, *Fascists* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 271.
39 Emilio Gentile, "Fascism, Totalitarianism and Political Religion: Definitions and Critical Reflections on Criticism of an Interpretation," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 5, no. 3 (2004), 361–362.
40 Roger Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), 30.
41 Roger Griffin, *Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 356.
42 Aurică Simion, *Regimul politic din România în perioada septembrie 1940–ianuarie 1941* (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1976); Aurică Simion, *Preliminarii politico-diplomatice ale insurecţiei române din august 1944* (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1978).
43 Mihai Fătu and Ion Spălăţelu, *Garda de Fier: Organizaţie teroristă de tip fascist* (Bucureşti: Editura Politică, 1971).
44 Gheorghe Buzatu et al., ed., *Mareşalul Antonescu în faţa istoriei*, 2 vols. (Iaşi: BAI, 1990); Larry L. Watts, *Romanian Cassandra: Ion Antonescu and the Struggle for Reform, 1916–1941* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1993); Kurt W. Treptow and Gheorghe Buzatu, *Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu în faţa istoriei* (Iaşi, 1994); Dorel Bancoş, *Social şi national în politica guvernului Ion Antonescu* (Bucureşti: Eminescu, 2000); and Ioan Dan, "*Procesul*" *Mareşalului Antonescu* (Bucureşti: Lucman, 2005).
45 For attempts to rehabilitate Codreanu and the Iron Guard, see mainly Buzatu et al., eds., *Mareşalul Antonescu în faţa istoriei*; and Treptow and Buzatu, *Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu*.
46 Randolph L. Braham, *Romanian Nationalists and the Holocaust: The Political Exploitation of Unfounded Rescue Accounts* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998); Michael Shafir, *Între negare şi trivializare. Negarea Holocaustului în ţările postcomuniste din Europa central şi de Est* (Iaşi: Polirom, 2000); Michael Shafir, "Marshal Antonescu's Post-communist Rehabilitation. *Cui bono*?" in *The Destruction of Romanian and Ukrainian Jews during the Antonescu Era*, edited by Randolph L. Braham (Boulder, CO: The Rosenthal Institute for Holocaust Studies, The Graduate Center, City University of New York and Social Science Monographs, 1997), 349–410; Lucian Boia, *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001); Dennis Deletant, *Hitler's Forgotten Ally: Ion Antonescu and His Regime, Romania, 1940–44* (Hampshire, UK, and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).

47 For works on the Holocaust in Romania, see, among others, I. C. Butnaru, *The Silent Holocaust: Romania and its Jews*, with a preface by Elie Wiesel (New York: Greenwood Press, 1992), published in Romanian as *Holocaustul uitat: consideraţiuni istorice, politice şi sociale cu privire la antisemitismul românesc* (Tel Aviv: I.C. Butnaru, 1985); Radu Ioanid, *The Holocaust in Romania: The Destruction of Jews and Gypsies under the Antonescu Regime, 1940–1944* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000); Carol Iancu, ed. *La Shoah En Roumanie: Les Juifs Sous Le Régime D'antonescu (1940–1944): Documents Diplomatiques Français Inédits* (Montpellier: Université Paul Valéry, 1998); Lya Benjamin, *Prigoană şi rezistenţă în istoria evreilor din Romania, 1940–1944* (Bucureşti: Hasefer, 2001); and Jean Ancel, *Contribuţii la istoria României. Problema evreiască, 1933–1944*, 3 vols. (Bucureşti: Hassefer, 2001); Viorel Achim, Constantin Iordachi, eds., *România şi Transnistria: Problema Holocaustului. Perspective istorice şi comparative* (Bucureşti: Curtea Veche, 2004); Vladimir Solonari, *Purifying the Nation: Population Exchange and Ethnic Cleansing in Nazi-Allied Romania* (Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010); and Vladimir Solonari, *A Satellite Empire: Romanian Rule in Southwestern Ukraine, 1941–1944* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019).

48 Tuvia Friling, Radu Ioanid, and Mihai E. Ionescu, eds., *Final Report of the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania* (Iaşi: Polirom, 2005).

49 Alexandru Florian and Constantin Petculescu, eds., *Ideea care ucide: dimensiunile ideologiei legionare* (Bucureşti: Noua Alternativă, 1994); Constantin Petculescu, *Mişcarea legionară: mit şi realitate* (Bucureşti: Noua Alternativă, 1997); Dragoş Zamfirescu, *Legiunea "Arhanghelului Mihail." De la mit la realitate* (Bucureşti: Editura Enciclopedică, 1997); Ioan Constantinescu, *Despre exegeza extremei dreptei româneşti. Însemnări polemice* (Iaşi: Junimea, 1999).

50 See Leon Volovici, *Nationalist Ideology and Anti-Semitism: The Case of Romanian Intellectuals in the 1930s* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1991); Zigu Ornea, *Anii treizeci: extrema dreaptă românească* (Bucureşti: Editura Fundatiei Culturale Române, 1995), translated into English as *The Romanian Extreme Right: The Nineteen Thirties* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1999); Matei Călinescu, "Ionesco and Rhinoceros: Personal and Political Backgrounds," *East European Politics and Societies* 9, no. 3 (1995): 393–434; Marta Petreu, *Un trecut deocheat sau "Schimbarea la faţă a României"* (Cluj: Biblioteca Apostrof, 1999), translated into English as *An Infamous Past. E. M. Cioran and the Rise of Fascism in Romania* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee Publisher, 2005); Marta Petreu, *Diavolul şi ucenicul său: Nae Ionescu - Mihail Sebastian* (Iaşi: Editura Polirom, 2009); Alexandra Laignel-Lavastine, *Cioran, Eliade, Ionescu: L'oubli du fascisme. Trois intellectuels roumains dans la tourmente du siècle* (Paris: PUF, 2003); Ilinca Zarifopol-Johnston, *Searching for Cioran* (Bloomington: Indiana Univeristy Press, 2009); Alexandra Laignel-Lavastine, *Filozofie şi nationalism: Paradoxul Noica* (Bucureşti: Humanitas, 1998); and Sorin Lavric, *Noica şi Mişcarea Legionară* (Bucureşti: Humanitas, 2007); and Cristina A. Bejan, *Intellectuals and Fascism in Interwar Romania: The Criterion Association* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019)..

51 For a synthetic collective volume, Armin Heinen, Oliver Jens Schmitt, eds. *Inszenierte Gegenmacht von rechts Die "Legion Erzengel Michael" in Rumanien 1918–1938* (Munchen: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2013). For general introductions to fascism studies available in Romanian, see Mihai Chioveanu, *Feţele fascismului. Politică, ideologie şi scrisul istoric în secolul 20* (Bucureşti: Editura Universităţii din Bucureşti, 2005); and Constantin Iordachi, ed., *Fascismul European, 1918–1945: Ideologie, Experimente Totalitare şi Religii Politice* (Cluj: Institutului pentru Studiul Minorităţilor Naţionale, 2014). For more general perspectives on fascism in the twentieth century and its revival in the post-communist times, see Vladimir Tismăneanu: *Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism, and Myth in Post-Communist Europe.* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009); and *The Devil in History: Communism, Fascism, and Some Lessons of the Twentieth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014). This wave of research culminated with two comprehensive monographs on the Legion, see Traian Sandu, *Un Fascisme Roumain: Histoire de la Garde de Fer* (Paris: Perrin, 2014); and Roland Clark, *Holy Legionary Youth: Fascist Activism in Interwar Romania* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), focusing on the way Legionaries "performed" fascism at the level of everyday life.

52 This research wave is too vast and variegated to summarize it here, beyond a selection of few representative works. On education and nation- and state-building, see Irina Livezeanu, *Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building and Ethnic Struggle, 1918–1930* (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1995). On the fascist sacralization of politics, see Valentin Săndulescu, "Sacralised Politics in Action: The February 1937 Burial of the Romanian Legionary Leaders Ion Moţa and Vasile Marin," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 8 (2007) 2, 259–269; and Raul Cârstocea, "Breaking the Teeth of Time. Mythical Time and the 'Terror of History' in the Rhetoric of the Legionary Movement in Interwar Romania," *Journal of Modern European History,* 13 (2015), 79–97. On charisma, see Iordachi, *Charisma, Violence and Politics*; and Oliver Jens Schmitt, *Căpitan Codreanu: Aufstieg Und Fall Des Rumänischen Faschistenführers* (Wien: Paul Zsolnay Verlag, 2016). On Legionary work camps, see Valentin Săndulescu, "'Taming the Body': Preliminary Considerations regarding the Legionary Work Camps System (1933–1937)," *Historical Yearbook* 5 (2008), 85–94; and Rebecca Haynes, "Work Camps, Commerce, and the Education of the 'New Man' in the Romanian Legionary Movement," *Historical Journal* 51 (2008) 4, 943–967. On comparative perspectives, see Constantin Iordachi, "Fascism in Southeastern Europe: A Comparison between Romania's Legion of Archangel Michael and Croatia's Ustaša," in Roumen Daskalov, Diana Mishkova, eds, *Entangled History of the Balkans*. Volume Two: *Transfers of Political Ideologies and Institutions* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 355–468; and Radu Harald Dinu, *Faschismus, Religion und Gewalt in Südosteuropa. Die Legion Erzengel Michael und die Ustasa im historischen Vergleich* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2013). On gender discourses within the Legion, see Mihai Stelian Rusu, "Domesticating Viragos. The Politics of Womanhood in the Romanian Legionary Movement," *Fascism* 5, (2016) 2, 49–176; on the Legion and the Orthodox Church, see Ionuţ Biliuţă, "Fascism, Race, and Religion in Interwar Transylvania: The Case of Father Liviu Stan (1910–1973)," *Church History* 89:1 (March 2020), 101–124.

53 Pătrăşcanu, *Sub trei dictaturi*, 42; see also George L. Mosse, *The Fascist Revolution. Toward a General Theory of Fascism* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1999), 37.

54 Paul A. Hanebrink, *A Specter Haunting Europe: The Myth of Judeo-Bolshevism* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2018).

55 The most important were the three *Nicadori* who murdered Prime Minister Duca on December 29, 1933; the ten *Decemviri* who assassinated the former Legionary leader Mihai Stelescu on July 16, 1936; and the team led by Miti Constantinescu who killed Prime Minister Armand Călinescu on September 21, 1939.

56 Most notably, Ion Moţa and Vasile Marin (1904–1937), who were killed in January 1937 during the Spanish Civil War, fighting on Franco's side.

57 Among others, Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu himself, assassinated at the order of King Carol II in November 1938, and 250 other top Legionary leaders killed in September 1939 in response to the assassination of Prime Minister Călinescu.

58 Katherine Verdery, *Secrets and Truths: Ethnography in the Archive of Romania's Secret Police* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2014).

59 For an appeal to cluster concepts in fascist studies, see Roger Griffin, "Cloister or cluster? The Implications of Emilio Gentile's ecumenical theory of political religion for the study of extremism," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 6 (2005) 1, 33–52.

60 See mainly Mosse, *The Fascist Revolution*; Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism*; Payne, *A History of Fascism, 1914–1945*; Gentile, *The Sacralization of Politics*; Roger Eatwell, "On defining the 'Fascist Minimum': The centrality of ideology," *Journal of Political Ideologies* 1, no. 3 (1996), 303–319; Robert O. Paxton, *The Anatomy of Fascism* (London: Allen Lane, 2004); and Mann, *Fascists*. For my detailed analysis of debates on generic fascism, see Iordachi, "Introduction," in *Comparative Fascist Studies*, edited by Constantin Iordachi (New York–Oxford: Routledge, 2010), 21–29.

61 Mosse, *The Fascist Revolution*, x. On the cultural approach to fascism, see also Roger Griffin, "The Primacy of Culture: The Current Growth (or Manufacture) of Consensus within Fascist Studies." *The Journal of Contemporary History* 37, no. 1 (2002), 21–43.

62 For a succinct presentation of the praxeological approach, see Sven Reichardt, "Fascist Communities of Action and Violence: A Praxeological Approach," in Constantin Iordachi, Aristotle Kallis, eds., *Beyond the Fascist Century* (London: Palgrave Macmillian, 2020), 51-71.
63 I further detail my socio-cultural approach to fascism in Chapter 5.
64 Scholars of fascism routinely point out the paramount role played by myths in politics, based on Georges Sorel's highly influential *Reflections on Violence* (1908). However, it is important to stress that, for Sorel, the most important mobilizing myth was the "salvation of the world" through violent action: "It is to violence that socialism owes those high ethical ideals by means of which it brings salvation to the modern world." See Georges Sorel, *Reflections on Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 226, 251. To date, the centrality of salvation in Sorel's work has been neglected.
65 Benito Mussolini, "The Doctrine of Fascism," in *Fascism: Doctrine and Institutions* (Rome: Ardita Publishers, 1935 [1932]), 11.
66 Giovanni Gentile, "Manifest of the Fascist Intellectuals to the Intellectuals of Other Nations," April 21, 1925, in *Italian Fascism and Antifascism: A Critical Anthology*, ed. by Stanislao G. Pugliese (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), 118.
67 Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, translated by Ralph Manhein (London: Pimlico, 1992), 243.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid., 336.
70 Ibid., 345.
71 Ibid.
72 Cited in Tal, *Faith, Politics, and Nazism*, 17.
73 For pioneering perspectives in this respect, see Tal, *Faith, Politics, and Nazism*, 16; and Klaus Vondung, "National Socialism as a Political Religion: Potentials and Limits of an Analytical Concept," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 6, no. 1 (2005): 89. For a Catholic critique of fascism as a faith, see Romolo Murri, *Fede e Fascismo* (Milano: Alpes, 1924).
74 Talal Asad, "The Construction of Religion as an Anthropological Category," in *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 27–54.
75 Howard B. White, "Political Faith and Francis Bacon," *Social Research* 23, no. 3 (1956), 343–366.
76 Ibid., 343.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 Michael Allen Gillespie, *The Theological Origins of Modernity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), xii.
80 Theodore Ziolkowski, *Modes of Faith: Secular Surrogates for Lost Religious Belief* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), ix.
81 On the anthropological approach to the close connection between religion and nationalism and its various permutations, see Peter van der Veer, "Nation, Politics, Religion," *Journal of Religious and Political Practice*," 1 (2015) 1: 7–21; and *Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003).
82 Katherine Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Rebuiral and Postsocialist Change* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 25–26.
83 Ibid., 26–27.
84 See Jacob L. Talmon, *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy* (New York: Norton, 1970 [1952]); idem., *Political Messianism: The Romantic Phase* (New York: Praeger, 1960); and idem., *The Myth of the Nation and the Vision of Revolution*: *Ideological Polarisation in the Twentieth Century* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1991). See also his *Romanticism and Revolt: Europe 1815–1848* (New York: Norton, 1979).

85 Talmon, *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy*, 6–7.
86 Ibid., 1.
87 Ibid., 1, 3.
88 Ibid., 6.
89 Ibid., 5.
90 Ibid., 2.
91 Ibid., 3.
92 Zeev Sternhell, ed., *Maurice Barrès et le nationalisme français* (Paris, A. Colin, 1972); Zeev Sternhell, *La droite révolutionnaire: 1885–1914. Les origines françaises du fascisme* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1978); Zeev Sternhell, *Neither Right nor Left: Fascist Ideology in France*, trans. by David Maisel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); Zeev Sternhell, with Mario Sznajder and Maia Asheri, *The Birth of Fascist Ideology: From Cultural Rebellion to Political Revolution* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994).
93 Zeev Sternhell, "Fascism: Reflections on the Fate of Ideas in Twentieth Century History," *Journal of Political Ideologies* 5, no. 2 (2000), 139–162.
94 Talmon, *Political Messianism*, 3.
95 For the core of this approach, see Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism*; and Griffin, *Modernism and Fascism*.
96 "Very truly, I tell you, unless a grain of wheat falls into the earth and dies, it remains just a single grain; but if it dies, it bears much fruit." John 12:24.
97 Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism*, x.
98 Emilio Gentile, *Le origini dell'ideologia fascista (1918–1925)* (Roma: Laterza, 1975), 5, 26, 236; G. Lazzari, "Linguaggio, ideologia, politica culturale del fascismo," *Movimento Operaio e Socialista* 7, no. 1 (1984), 55.
99 Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism*, 33.
100 James H. Billington, *Fire in the Minds of Men: Origins of the Revolutionary Faith* (New York: Basic Books, 1980).
101 Ibid., 5.
102 Ibid., 4.
103 Ibid., 8.
104 Andrzej Walicki, "Polish Romantic Messianism in Comparative Perspective," *Slavic Studies* 22, no. 1 (1978): 1.
105 Talmon, *Political Messianism*, 5.
106 Andrzej Walicki, "National Messianism and the Historical Controversies in the Polish Thought of 1831–1848," in *Culture and Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Eastern Europe*, edited by Roland Sussex and J. C. Eade (Columbus, Ohio: Slavica Publishers, 1983), 128–142; Andrzej Walicki, *Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism: The Case of Poland* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982); and Andrzej Walicki, "Polish Romantic Messianism in Comparative Perspective," *Slavic Studies* 22, no. 1 (1978), 1–15.
107 Gentile, "Manifest of the Fascist Intellectuals," in *Italian Fascism*, 118.
108 See Vatro Murvar, "Some Reflections Weber's Typology of *Herrschaft*," *The Sociological Quarterly* 5, no. 4 (1964): 374–384. In my work, I also use the term charismatic "legitimization" to refer to claims to power which assert a divine origin.
109 Max Weber, "The Pure Types of Legitimate Authority," in *Max Weber on Charisma and Institution Building*, edited by S. N. Eisenstadt (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 1968), 46. See also Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); Max Weber, *Basic Concepts in Sociology*, translated by H. Secher (New York: Citadel Press, 1990); and *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, translated by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1998).
110 See, selectively, Edward Shils, "Charisma, Order, and Status," *American Sociological Review* 30, no. 2 (1965): 199–213; Reinhard Bendix, "Charismatic Leadership," in *Scholarship and Partisanship: Essays on Max Weber*, edited by Reinhard Bendix

and Guenther Roth (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1971), 170–187; Irvine Schiffer, *Charisma: A Psychoanalytic Look at Mass Society* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973); Arthur Schweitzer, "Theory and Political Charisma," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 16, no. 2 (March 1974), 150–181; Ronald M. Glassman and William H. Swatos, eds, *Charisma, History and Social Structure*, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986), 147–162. For a comprehensive if popularizing history of the concept of charisma and the various meanings with which the term was invested in various societal contexts, see John Potts, *A History of Charisma* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillian, 2009).

111 In 1940, the Legionary Alexandru Rada proclaimed: "The Duce, the Führer, the Captain transform the nation into a permanent force, into a 'corpus mysticus' freed of limitations. This is the deepest sense of the 'totality,' of the 'consensus,' of 'ecumenicity' which legitimizes and fulfills the form Charisma." Alexandru Randa, "The Wings of the Archangel," *Axa* (December 5, 1940), 1.

112 See Joseph Nyomarkay, *Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi Party* (Minneapolis, 1967); Dietrich Orlow, *The History of the Nazi Party: 1919–1945,* 2 vols. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1969–1973); Ian Kershaw, *Hitler* (London, New York: Longman, 1991); and Ian Kershaw, *The "Hitler Myth." Image and Reality in the Third Reich* (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987). On Mussolini's charisma and the cult of the *Duce*—called *Mussolinianism*—as a form of societal consensus, see Renzo de Felice, ed. *Mussolini*, 8 vols. (Torino: Einaudi, 1965–1997); Emilio Gentile, "Mussolini's Charisma," *Modern Italy* 3, no. 2 (1998): 219–235; Piero Melograni, "The Cult of the Duce in Mussolini's Italy," *Journal of Contemporary History* 11, no. 4 (1976): 221–237. On comparative perspectives on Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, see Maurizio Bach, *Die charismatischen Führerdiktaturen: Drittes Reich und italienischer Faschismus im Vergleich ihrer Herrschaftsstrukturen* (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1990); Sven Reichardt, *Faschistische Kampfbünde: Gewalt und Gemeinschaft im italienischen Squadrismus und in der deutschen SA* (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2002); and Sven Reichardt, Armin Nolzen, eds. *Faschismus in Italien und Deutschland. Studien zu Transfer und Vergleich* (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2005).

113 For such accounts of the place of charisma in ideal-typical definitions of fascism, see, for example, Payne, *A History of Fascism, 1914–1945*, 6–8; and Roger Griffin, *Fascism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 5. For a reconceptualization of charisma and a reassessment of its relevance for fascist studies, see António Costa Pinto, Roger Eatwell, and Stein Ugelvik Larsen, eds., *Charisma and Fascism in Interwar Europe* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007).

114 See Introduction: God's counterfeiters? Investigating the Triad of Fascism, Totalitarianism, and (political) Religion." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 5, no. 3 (2004), 291–326.

115 Max Weber, "The Nature of Charismatic Authority and its Routinization," in *Max Weber on Charisma and Institution Building*, edited by S. N. Eisenstadt (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 1968), 48. My emphasis.

116 Max Weber, "Charisma and its Transformation," in *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, vol. 2 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 1119.

117 Weber, *Economy and Society*, vol. 1, 243.

118 James A. Gregor, *The Ideology of Fascism* (New York: Free Press, 1969); Russell A. Berman, *The Rise of Modern Germany* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989).

119 The concept of "charismatic nationalism" might sound inappropriate to those who treat charisma as a personal attribute of a leader as opposed to an impersonal organization or social-political phenomena. However, similar concepts, denoting mostly religious phenomena, are in use, e.g., "charismatic Christianity," "charismatic church," "charismatic movement," "charismatic Catholics," etc.

120 See Hitler's first, nocturnal speech in the film *The Triumph of the Will*, directed by Leni Riefenstahl, 1936.

121 Alexandru Cantacuzino, *Opere complete* (Munich, 1940), 17.
122 On the concept of the numinous, see Rudolf Otto, *The Idea of the Holy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1923). On the construction of the sacred in politics, see Harald Wydra, *Politics and the Sacred* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
123 Hans Maier, "Political Religion: a Concept and its Limitations," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 8, no. 1 (2007), 5–16, at 5.
124 George L. Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich* (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1991), 1.
125 Adrian Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (London: Hutchinson, 1960); Conor Cruise O'Brien, *God-Land: Reflections on Religion and Nationalism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988); Anthony D. Smith, *Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
126 Anthony D. Smith, "Chosen Peoples: Why Ethnic Groups Survive," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 15, no. 3 (1992), 436–457.
127 Anthony D. Smith, *Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), viii.
128 Ibid., 15.
129 Ibid., 18.
130 Ibid., 436–457.
131 See the following works by Emilio Gentile: "Fascism as Political Religion," *Journal of Contemporary History* 25, no. 2–3 (May–June 1990): 229–251; "The Sacralisation of Politics: Definitions, Interpretations and Reflections on the Question of Secular Religion and Totalitarianism," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religion* 1, no. 1 (2000): 18–55; *Le religioni della politica: Fra democrazie e totalitarismi* (Bari: Laterza, 2001); and *The Sacralization of Politics*. For previous works on the intimate links between politics and religion in the modern period, see works by Eric Voegelin: *Die Politische Religionen* (Wien: Bermann-Fischen Verlag, 1938); *Religion and the Rise of Modernity* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1998); and *Hitler and the Germans* (Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1999).
132 Gentile, "The Sacralisation of Politics," 19.
133 The term "civil religion" was coined by Durkheim to denote the incorporation of religious symbols and practices in laic ceremonies, different from institutionalized church-based religion. See Emil Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (New York: Macmillian, 1915).
134 Gentile, "The Sacralisation of Politics," 19.
135 Ibid.
136 Ibid., 21.
137 See Gentile, *The Sacralization of Politics*; and "The Sacralisation of Politics," 18–55. On political religions, see Gentile, "Fascism as Political Religion," 229–251; idem., "Fascism, Totalitarianism and Political Religion," 326–375; idem., "Political religion: a concept and its critics – a critical survey." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 6, no. 1 (2005), 19–32; and idem., *Politics as Religion*.
138 See, among others, Phillipe Burrin, "Political Religion: The Relevance of a Concept," *History and Theory* 9, no. 1–2 (1997), 321–349; Hans Maier and Michael Schäfer, eds., *Totalitarismus und politische Religionen. Konzepte des Diktaturvergleichs*, 3 vols. (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1997–2003); Hans Maier, *Politische Religionen. Die totalitären Regime und das Christentum* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1995); Michael Ley and Julius H. Schoeps, *Der Nationalsozialismus als politische Religion* (Bodenheim b. Mainz: Philo Verlagsgesellschaft, 1997); Michael Ley, *Apokalypse und Moderne. Aufsätze zu politischen Religionen* (Vienna: Sonderzahl-Verlag-Ges., 1997); Claus-Ekkehard Bärsch, *Die politische Religion des Nationalsozialismus: die religiöse*

Dimension der NS-Ideologie in den Schriften von Dietrich Eckart, Joseph Goebbels, Alfred Rosenberg und Adolf Hitler (Munich: W. Fink., 1998); Markus Huttner, *Totalitarismus und säkulare Religionen: zur Frühgeschichte totalitarismuskritischer Begriffs- und Theoriebildung in Grossbritannien* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1998); Thomas Linehan, "The British Union of Fascists as a Totalitarian Movement and Political Religion." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 5, no. 3 (2004): 397–418; Roger Griffin, ed., *Fascism, Totalitarianism and Political Religion* (London: Routledge, 2005); Martin Blinkhorn, "Afterthoughts, Route Maps and Landscapes: Historians, 'Fascist Studies' and the Study of Fascism," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 5, no. 3 (2004): 507–526. For a through critique of the concept, see David R. Roberts, "'Political Religion' and the Totalitarian Departures of Interwar Europe: On the Uses and Disadvantages of an Analytical Category," *Contemporary European History* 18, no. 4 (2009), 381–414.

139 See the agenda promoted by the journal *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 2000–2010, published since 2011 under the name *Politics, Religion, and Ideology*. For broad historical overviews on political religion, see Michael Burleigh, *Earthly Powers: The Clash of Religion and Politics in Europe from the French Revolution to the Great War* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2005); and idem., *Sacred Causes: The Clash of Religion and Politics from the Great War to the War on Terror* (New York: Harper Collins, 2007).

140 C. S. Liebman and E. Don-Yehiya, *Civil Religion in Israel* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

141 Emilio Gentile, "Fascism, Totalitarianism and Political Religion," 359–360.

142 See Arendt, "The Totalitarian Movement," in *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1973), 341–388.

143 David Roberts, *The Totalitarian Experiment in Twentieth Century Europe. Understanding the Poverty of Great Politics* (New York, London: Routledge, 2006), 430.

144 See Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton, eds., *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988); James W. Bernauer, "Confessions of the Soul. Foucault and Theological Culture," *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 31, no. 5–6 (September 2005): 557–572; James W. Bernauer, "Michel Foucault's Ecstatic Thinking," *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 12, no. 2–3 (July 1987): 156–193; James W. Bernauer, "Michel Foucault's Philosophy of Religion: An Introduction to the Non-Fascist Life," in James W. Bernauer and Jeremy Carrette, eds., *Michel Foucault and Theology: The Politics of Religious Experience* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 77–97; James W. Bernauer, "The Prisons of Man: An Introduction to Foucault's Negative Theology," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 27 (1987): 365–380; John McSweeney, "Foucault and Theology," *Foucault Studies* 2 (2005): 117–144. For the late Foucault's views on religion, see James W. Bernauer and David Rasmussen, eds., *The Final Foucault* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1988).

145 Bernauer, "Confessions of the soul," 559.

146 Ibid., 561.

147 Ibid., 567.

148 On this tradition, see Richard A. Koenigsberg, *Dying for One's Country: War As Sacrifice* (New York: Library of Social Science, 1996); Barbara Ehrenreich, *Blood Rites: Origins and History of the Passions of War* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 1997); Carolyn Marvin and David W. Ingle, *Blood Sacrifice and the Nation: Totem Rituals and the American Flag* (Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Jim Donovan, *The Blood of Heroes: The 13-Day Struggle for the Alamo and the Sacrifice that Forged a Nation* (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 2012).

149 Allen J. Frantzen, *Bloody Good: Chivalry, Sacrifice, and the Great War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003).

150 Paul Fussell, *The Great War and Modern Memory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975); Nicoletta Gullace, *The Blood of Our Sons: Men, Women, and the Renegotiation of British Citizenship During the Great War* (New York: Palgrave, 2002).

151 Angelo Ventrone, *La seduzione totalitaria: Guerra, modernità, violenza politica (1914–1918)* (Roma: Donzelli, 2003).

152 See the cult of the "Nazi Immortals" of November 9, 1923, and of Horst Wessel (elevated on January 22, 1933, to the circle of "Nazi Immortals") in Nazi Germany; the cult of Ion I. Moța and of Vasile Marin in Romania; and of Mijo Babić and Jure Francetić in the Independent State of Croatia, among others. The burials of these fascist "heroes" were propaganda *tours de force* meant to objectify the myth of regeneration. On the Nazi cult of heroism and self-sacrifice, see Jay W. Baird, "Goebbels, Horst Wessel, and the Myth of Resurrection and Return," *Journal of Contemporary History* 17, no. 4 (1982): 633–650; and Jay W. Baird, *To Die for Germany: Heroes in the Nazi Pantheon* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990). For the paramount importance of the cult of the martyrs in the fascist ideology, see the room "Per La Patria Immortale!" in the 1932 *Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution* in Rome, in Dino Alfieri and Luigi Freddi, eds., *Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution. 1st Decennial of the March on Rome* (Rome: National Fascist Party, 1933). *Mutatis mutandi*, see also the Valley of the Fallen in Spain, assembled by General Franco in the 1960s, gathering the bones of approximately 70,000 soldiers killed in the Spanish Civil War.

References

Primary Sources

Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale, București (hereafter ANIC), Fond "Ministerul de Interne - Diverse" (MI), file 4/1937, 4.

National Archive of the Republic of Moldova [Arhivele Naționale ale Republicii Moldova], Chișinău, fond 680/1, files 3433, 510.

Books and Articles

Alfieri, Dino, and Luigi Freddi, eds. *Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution. 1st Decennial of the March on Rome*. Rome: National Fascist Party, 1933.

Ancel, Jean. *Contribuții la istoria României. Problema evreiască, 1933–1944*, 3 vols. București: Hassefer, 2001.

Arendt, Hannah. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1973.

Asad, Talal. "The Construction of Religion as an Anthropological Category." In *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam*, 27–54. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993.

Bach, Maurizio. *Die charismatischen Führerdiktaturen: Drittes Reich und italienischer Faschismus im Vergleich ihrer Herrschaftsstrukturen*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1990.

Baird, Jay W. "Goebbels, Horst Wessel, and the Myth of Resurrection and Return," *Journal of Contemporary History* 17, no. 4 (1982): 633–650.

Baird, Jay W. *To Die for Germany: Heroes in the Nazi Pantheon*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990.

Bancoș, Dorel. *Social și național în politica guvernului Ion Antonescu*. București: Eminescu, 2000.

Banea, Ion. *Ce este și ce vrea Mișcarea legionară. Cărticică pentru săteni*. Sibiu: Curierul, 1937.

Bănică, Mirel. *Biserca Ortodoxă Română: stat și societate în anii '30*. Iași: Polirom, 2007.

Barbu, Zeev. "Psycho-Historical and Sociological Perspectives on the Iron Guard, the Fascist Movement of Romania." In *Who Were the Fascists? Social Roots of European Fascism*, edited by Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet, and Jan Petter Myklebust, 379–394. Bergen–Oslo–Tromso: Universitetsforlaget, 1980.

Barbu, Zeev. "Rumania."In *European Fascism*, edited by S. J. Woolf, 146–166. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968.

Bärsch, Claus-Ekkehard. *Die politische Religion des Nationalsozialismus: die religiöse Dimension der NS-Ideologie in den Schriften von Dietrich Eckart, Joseph Goebbels, Alfred Rosenberg und Adolf Hitler.* Munich: W. Fink, 1998.

Bendix, Reinhard. "Charismatic Leadership." In *Scholarship and Partisanship: Essays on Max Weber*, edited by Reinhard Bendix and Guenther Roth, 170–187. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971.

Benjamin, Lya. *Prigoană şi rezistenţă în istoria evreilor din România, 1940–1944.* Bucureşti: Hasefer, 2001.

Berman, Russell A. *The Rise of Modern Germany.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989.

Bernauer, James W. "Confessions of the soul. Foucault and theological culture," *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 31, no. 5–6 (2005): 557–572.

———. "Michel Foucault's Ecstatic Thinking," *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 12, no. 2–3 (1987): 156–193.

———. "The Prisons of Man: An Introduction to Foucault's Negative Theology," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 27, no. 4 (1987): 365–380.

———, and David Rasmussen, eds. *The Final Foucault*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988.

———, and Jeremy Carrette, eds. *Michel Foucault and Theology: The Politics of Religious Experience*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004.

Billington, James H. *Fire in the Minds of Men: Origins of the Revolutionary Faith*. New York: Basic Books, 1980.

Biondich, Mark. "Radical Catholicism and Fascism in Croatia, 1918–1945," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 8, no. 2 (2007): 383–399.

Blinkhorn, Martin. "Afterthoughts, Route Maps and Landscapes: Historians, 'Fascist Studies' and the Study of Fascism," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 5, no. 3 (2004): 507–526.

Boia, Lucian. *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness*. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001. Romanian ed.: *Istorie şi mit în conştiinţa românească*. Bucureşti: Humanitas, 1997.

Braham, Randolph L. *Romanian Nationalists and the Holocaust: The Political Exploitation of Unfounded Rescue Accounts*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998.

Burleigh, Michael. *Earthly Powers: The Clash of Religion and Politics in Europe from the French Revolution to the Great War.* New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2005.

———. *Sacred Causes: The Clash of Religion and Politics from the Great War to the War on Terror.* New York: Harper Collins, 2007.

Burrin, Phillipe. "Political Religion: The Relevance of a Concept," *History and Theory* 9, no. 1–2 (1997): 321–349.

Butnaru, I. C. *The Silent Holocaust: Romania and its Jews*, with a preface by Elie Wiesel. New York: Greenwood Press, 1992.

Buzatu, Gheorghe, et al., eds. *Mareşalul Antonescu în faţa istoriei*, 2 vols. Iaşi: BAI 1990.

Călinescu, Matei. "Ionesco and Rhinoceros: Personal and Political Backgrounds," *East European Politics and Societies* 9, no. 3 (1995): 393–434.

Cantacuzino, Alexandru. *Între lumea legionară şi lumea comunistă*. Bucureşti: Editura Mişcării Legionare, 1940.

———. *Opere complete*. Munich, 1940.

———. *Românul de mâine. Românismul nostru*. Bucureşti: Editura Mişcării Legionare, 1940 [1935].

Cârstocea, Raul. "Breaking the Teeth of Time. Mythical Time and the 'Terror of History' in the Rhetoric of the Legionary Movement in Interwar Romania." *Journal of Modern European History*, 13 (2015): 79–97.

Clark, Roland. *Holy Legionary Youth: Fascist Activism in Interwar Romania*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015.

Constantinescu, Ioan. *Despre exegeza extremei drepte româneşti. Însemnări polemice*, 2nd ed. Iaşi: Junimea, 1999.

Conway, Martin. *Catholic Politics in Europe, 1918–1945*. London: Routledge, 1997.

Dan, Ioan. *"Procesul" Mareşalului Antonescu*. Bucureşti: Lucman, 2005.

Deletant, Dennis. *Hitler's Forgotten Ally: Ion Antonescu and His Regime, Romania, 1940–44*. Hampshire, and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

Dinu, Radu Harald. *Faschismus, Religion und Gewalt in Südosteuropa. Die Legion Erzengel Michael und die Ustasa im historischen Vergleich*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2013.

Donovan, Jim. *The Blood of Heroes: The 13-Day Struggle for the Alamo and the Sacrifice that Forged a Nation*. New York: Little, Brown and Co, 2012.

Durkheim, Emil. *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*. New York: Macmillian, 1915.

Eatwell, Roger. "On defining the 'Fascist Minimum:' The centrality of ideology," *Journal of Political Ideologies* 1, no. 3 (1996): 303–319.

———. "Reflections on Fascism and Religion," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religion* 4, no. 3 (2003): 145–166.

Ehrenreich, Barbara. *Blood Rites: Origins and History of the Passions of War*. New York: Metropolitan Books, 1997.

Eisenstadt, S. N., ed. *Max Weber on Charisma and Institution Building*. Chicago, London: Chicago University Press, 1968.

Fătu, Mihai, and Ion Spălăţelu. *Garda de Fier: Organizaţie teroristă de tip fascistă*, 2nd ed. Bucureşti: Editura Politică, 1980.

Feldman, Matthew, Marius Turda, and Tudor Georgescu, eds. *Clerical Fascism in Interwar Europe*. London: Routledge, 2008.

Felice, Renzo de, ed. *Mussolini*, 8 vols. Torino: Einaudi, 1965–1997.

———. *Intervista sul fascismo, a cura di Michael A. Ledeen*. Roma: Laterza, 1999. [1975]. English ed.: *Fascism: An informal introduction to its theory and practice, an interview with Michael A. Ledeen*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1976.

Fischer-Galaţi, Stephen. "Fascism in Romania." In *Native Fascism in the Successor States, 1918-1945*, edited by Peter F. Sugar, 112–122. Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 1971.

Florian, Alexandru, and Constantin Petculescu, eds. *Ideea care ucide: dimensiunile ideologiei legionare*. Bucureşti: Noua Alternativă, 1994.

Frantzen, Allen J. *Bloody Good: Chivalry, Sacrifice, and the Great War*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.

Friling, Tuvia, Radu Ioanid, and Mihai E. Ionescu, eds. *Final Report of the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania*. Iaşi: Polirom, 2005.

Fussell, Paul. *The Great War and Modern Memory*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975.

Gârniceanu, Victor Puiu. *Din lumea legionară*. Madrid: Colectia Omul Nou, 1951.

Gentile, Emilio. *Le origini dell'ideologia fascista (1918–1925)*. Roma: Laterza, 1975.

———. "Fascism as Political Religion," *Journal of Contemporary History* 25, no. 2–3 (1990): 229–251.

———. *The Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996.
———. "Mussolini's Charisma," *Modern Italy* 3, no. 2 (1998): 219–235.
———. "The Sacralisation of Politics: Definitions, Interpretations and Reflections on the Question of Secular Religion and Totalitarianism," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religion* 1, no. 1 (2000): 18–55.
———. *Le religioni della politica: Fra democrazie e totalitarismi*. Bari: Laterza, 2001.
———. "Fascism, Totalitarianism and Political Religion: Definitions and Critical Reflections on Criticism of an Interpretation," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 5, no. 3 (2004): 326–375.
———. "Political religion: a concept and its critics – a critical survey," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 6, no. 1 (2005): 19–32.
———. *Politics as Religion*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.
Gillespie, Michael Allen. *The Theological Origins of Modernity*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008.
Glassman, Ronald M., and William H. Swatos, eds. *Charisma, History and Social Structure*. New York, Wesport Conn: Greenwood Press, 1986.
Gregor, James A. *The Ideology of Fascism*. New York: Free Press, 1969.
Griffin, Roger. *The Nature of Fascism*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.
Griffin, Roger, ed. *Fascism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
Griffin, Roger. "The Primacy of Culture: The Current Growth (or Manufacture) of Consensus within Fascist Studies," *The Journal of Contemporary History* 37, no. 1 (2002): 21–43.
Griffin, Roger. "Introduction: God's counterfeiters? Investigating the Triad of Fascism, Totalitarianism, and (political) Religion,"*Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 5, no. 3 (2004): 291–326.
Griffin, Roger. "Cloister or cluster? The Implications of Emilio Gentile's ecumenical theory of political religion for the study of extremism," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 6, no. 1 (2005): 33–52.
Griffin, Roger, ed. *Fascism, Totalitarianism and Political Religion*. London: Routledge, 2005.
Griffin, Roger, ed. *Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler*. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
Gullace, Nicoletta. *The Blood of Our Sons: Men, Women, and the Renegotiation of British Citizenship During the Great War*. New York: Palgrave, 2002.
Gyr, Corneliu. "Ultimul cuvânt la Tribunalul Poporului," June 2, 1945, *Adevărul literar şi artistic*, March 6, 1994, http://ro.metapedia.org/wiki/Radu_Gyr.
Hanebrink, Paul A. *A Specter Haunting Europe: The Myth of Judeo-Bolshevism*. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2018.
Hanebrink, Paul A. *In Defense of Christian Hungary: Religion, Nationalism, and Antisemitism, 1890–1944*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006.
Hastings, Adrian. *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Hastings, Derek. "How Catholic was the early Nazi movement? Religion, Race, and Culture in Munich 1919-1924," *Central European History* 36, no. 3 (2003): 383–433.
Haynes, Rebecca. "Work Camps, Commerce, and the Education of the 'New Man' in the Romanian Legionary Movement," *Historical Journal* 51, no. 4 (2008): 943–967.

Heinen, Armin, and Oliver Jens Schmitt, eds. *Inszenierte Gegenmacht von rechts Die "Legion Erzengel Michael" in Rumanien 1918–1938*. Munchen: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2013.

Heinen, Armin. *Die Legion "Erzengel Michael" in Rumänien: soziale Bewegung und politische Organisation. Ein Beitrag zum Problem des internationalen Faschismus*. München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1986. Romanian ed.: *Legiunea "Arhanghelul Mihail." Mişcare socială şi organizaţie politică. O contribuţie la problema fascismului internaţional* (Bucureşti: Humanitas, 1998). (Bucureşti: Humanitas, 1998).

Hitler, Adolf. *Mein Kampf*, translated by Ralph Manhein. London: Pimlico, 1992.

Hobsbawm, E. J. *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1959.

Huttner, Markus. *Totalitarismus und säkulare Religionen: zur Frühgeschichte totalitarismuskritischer Begriffs- und Theoriebildung in Großbritannien*. Bonn: Bouvier, 1999.

Iancu, Carol, ed. *La Shoah en Roumanie: Les Juifs sous le Régime d'Antonescu (1940–1944): Documents Diplomatiques Français Inédits*. Montpellier: Université Paul Valéry, 1998.

Ioanid, Radu. *The Sword of the Archangel: Fascist Ideology in Romania*. Boulder: East European Monographs, 1990.

———. "The Sacralized Politics of the Romanian Iron Guard," *Totalitarian Movements & Political Religions* 5, no. 3 (2003): 419–453.

———. *The Holocaust in Romania: The Destruction of Jews and Gypsies under the Antonescu Regime, 1940–1944*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000.

Iordachi, Constantin. *Comparative Fascist Studies*. New York–Oxford: Routledge, 2009.

Iordachi, Constantin, and Ottmar Traşcă. "Ideological Transfers and Bureaucratic Entanglements: Nazi 'Experts' on the 'Jewish Question' and the Romanian-German Relations, 1940–1944," *Fascism: Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies* 4, no. 1 (2015): 48–100.

———. "Aristocracy, Fascism and the Social Origins of Mass Politics in Inter-war Romania." In *Noble Fascists? European Aristocracies and the Radical Right*, edited by Karina Urbach, 201–232. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

———. "Problema Holocaustului în România şi Transnistria – Dezbateri istoriografice." In *România şi Transnistria: Problema Holocaustului. Perspective istorice şi comparative*, edited by Viorel Achim, and Constantin Iordachi, 23–77. Bucureşti: Curtea Veche, 2004.

Kedourie, Elie. *Nationalism*. London: Hutchinson, 1960.

Kershaw, Ian. *Hitler.* London, New York: Longman, 1991.

———. *The 'Hitler Myth.' Image and Reality in the Third Reich*. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.

Laignel-Lavastine, Alexandra. *Cioran, Eliade, Ionescu: L'oubli du fascisme. Trois intellectuels roumains dans la tourmente du siècle*. Paris: PUF, 2003.

———. *Filozofie şi nationalism: Paradoxul Noica*. Bucureşti: Humanitas, 1998.

Lavric, Sorin. *Noica şi Mişcarea Legionară*. Bucureşti: Humanitas, 2007.

Lazzari, Giovanni. "Linguaggio, ideologia, politica culturale del fascismo," *Movimenteo Operaio e Socialista* 7, no. 1 (1984): 49–56.

Ley, Michael, and Julius H. Schoeps. *Der Nationalsozialismus als politische Religion*. Bodenheim b. Mainz: Philo Verlagsgesellschaft, 1997.

Ley, Michael. *Apokalypse und Moderne: Aufsätze zu politischen Religionen*. Wien: Sonderzahl, 1997.

Liebman, C.S., and E. Don-Yehiya. *Civil Religion in Israel*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.

Linehan, Thomas. "The British Union of Fascists as a Totalitarian Movement and Political Religion," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 5, no. 3 (2004): 397–418.

Livezeanu, Irina. *Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building and Ethnic Struggle, 1918–1930*. Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1995.

Maier, Hans. *Politische Religionen: die totalitären Regime und das Christentum*. Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder Spektrum, 1995.

———, and Michael Schäfer, eds. *Totalitarismus und Politische Religionen. Konzepte des Diktaturvergleichs*, 3 vols. Paderborn: Schöningh, 1997.

———. "Political Religion: A Concept and its Limitations," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 8, no. 1 (2007): 5–16.

Mann, Michael. *Fascists*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Marin, Vasile. *Crez de Generatie*. Bucureşti: Bucovina, 1937.

Martin, Luther H., Huck Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton, eds., *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988.

Marvin, Carolyn, and David W. Ingle. *Blood Sacrifice and the Nation: Totem Rituals and the American Flag*. Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

McSweeney, John. "Foucault and Theology," *Foucault Studies* 2 (2005): 117–144.

Melograni, Piero. "The Cult of the Duce in Mussolini's Italy," *Journal of Contemporary History* 11, no. 4 (1976): 221–237.

Mosse, George L. *The Nationalization of the Masses. Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich*. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1991.

———. *The Fascist Revolution. Toward a General Theory of Fascism*. New York: Howard Fertig, 1999.

Moţa, Ion I. *Cranii de Lemn. Articole, 1922–1936*. Sibiu: Totul Pentru Ţară, 1936.

Murri, Romolo. *Fede e Fascismo*. Milano: Alpes, 1924.

Murvar, Vatro. "Some Reflections Weber's Typology of Herrschaft," *The Sociological Quarterly* 5, no. 4 (1964): 374–384.

Mussolini, Benito. "The Doctrine of Fascism." In *Fascism: Doctrine and Institutions*. Rome: Ardita Publishers, 1935 [1932], 7–42.

Nyomarkay, Joseph. *Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi Party*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1967.

O'Brien, Conor Cruise. *God-Land: Reflections on Religion and Nationalism*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988.

Orlow, Dietrich. *The History of the Nazi Party: 1919–1933*, 2 vol. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1969–73.

Ornea, Zigu. *Anii treizeci: extrema dreaptă românească*. Bucureşti: Editura Fundatiei Culturale Române, 1995. English ed.: *The Romanian Extreme Right: The Nineteen Thirties*. Boulder: East European Monographs, 1999.

Otto, Rudolf. *The Idea of the Holy*, translated by John W. Harvey. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1923.

Pătrăşcanu, Lucreţiu. *Sub trei dictaturi*. Bucureşti: Forum, 1944.

Paxton, Robert O. *The Anatomy of Fascism*. London: Allen Lane, 2004.

Payne, Stanley G. *Fascism. Comparison and Definition*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980.

———. *A History of Fascism, 1914–1945*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1995.

———. "On the Heuristic Value of the Concept of Political Religion and its Application," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 6, no. 2 (2005): 163–174.

———. "The NDH State in Comparative Perspective," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 7, no. 4 (2006): 409–415.

Petculescu, Constantin. *Mişcarea legionară: mit şi realitate*. Bucureşti: Noua Alternativă, 1997.

Petreu, Marta. *Diavolul şi Ucenicul Său: Nae Ionescu - Mihail Sebastian*. Iaşi: Polirom, 2009.
———. *Un trecut deocheat sau "Schimbarea la faţă a României"*. Cluj: Biblioteca Apostrof, 1999.
Pinto, António C., Roger Eatwell, and Stein U. Larsen, eds. *Charisma and Fascism in Interwar Europe*. London: New York, 2007.
Pollard, John F. *The Vatican and Italian Fascism, 1929–1932: A Study in Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Potts, John. *A History of Charisma*. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillian, 2009.
Pugliese, Stanislao G. ed. *Italian Fascism and Antifascism: A Critical Anthology*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001.
Randa, Alexandru. "The Wings of the Archangel," *Axa* (December 5, 1940): 1.
Redles, David. *Hitler's Millennial Reich: Apocalyptic Belief and the Search for Salvation*. New York: New York University Press, 2005.
Reichardt, Sven. *Faschistische Kampfbünde: Gewalt und Gemeinschaft im italienischen Squadrismus und in der deutschen SA*. Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2002.
Reichardt, Sven, and Armin Nolzen, eds. *Faschismus in Italien und Deutschland. Studien zu Transfer und Vergleich*. Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2005.
Reichardt, Sven. "Fascist Communities of Action and Violence: A Praxeological Approach." In *Beyond the Fascist Century*, edited by Constantin Iordachi, and Aristotle Kallis, 51–71. London: Palgrave Macmillian, 2020.
Roberts, David R. *The Totalitarian Experiment in Twentieth Century Europe. Understanding the Poverty of Great Politics*. New York, London: Routledge, 2006.
Roberts, David R. "Political Religion' and the Totalitarian Departures of Interwar Europe: On the Uses and Disadvantages of an Analytical Category," *Contemporary European History* 18, no. 4 (2009): 381–414.
Rostás, Zoltán. *Monografia ca utopie. Inverviuri cu Henri H. Stahl (1985–1987)*. Bucureşti: Paideia, 2000.
Rusu, Mihai Stelian. "Domesticating Viragos. The Politics of Womanhood in the Romanian Legionary Movement," *Fascism* 5, no. 2 (2016): 49–176.
Sandu, Traian. *Un Fascisme Roumain: Histoire De La Garde De Fer*. Paris: Perrin, 2014.
Săndulescu, Valentin. "Sacralised Politics in Action: The February 1937 Burial of the Romanian Legionary Leaders Ion Moţa and Vasile Marin." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 8, no. 2 (2007): 259–269.
———. "Taming the Body: Preliminary Considerations regarding the Legionary Work Camps System (1933–1937)." *Historical Yearbook* V, (2008): 85–94.
Schiffer, Irvine. *Charisma: A Psychoanalytic Look at Mass Society*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973.
Schmitt, Oliver Jens. *Căpitan Codreanu: Aufstieg Und Fall Des Rumänischen Faschistenführers*. Wien: Paul Zsolnay Verlag, 2016.
Schweitzer, Arthur. "Theory and Political Charisma," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 16, no. 2 (1974): 150–181.
Shafir, Michael. "Marshal Antonescu's Postcommunist Rehabilitation. *Cui bono*?" In *The Destruction of Romanian and Ukrainian Jews during the Antonescu Era*, edited by L. Randolph, and Braham, 349–410. Boulder, CO: The Rosenthal Institute for Holocaust Studies, Graduate Center, City University of New York, and Social Science Monographs, 1997.
———. *Între negare şi trivializare. Negarea Holocaustului în ţările postcomuniste din Europa Centrală şi de Est*. Iaşi: Polirom, 2000.
Shapiro, Paul. "Faith, Murder, Resurrection: The Iron Guard and the Romanian Orthodox Church." In *Antisemitism, Christian Ambivalence, and the Holocaust*, edited by Kevin P. Spicer, 136–170. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007.

Shils, Edward. "Charisma, Order, and Status," *American Sociological Review* 30, no. 2 (1965): 199–213.
Simion, Aurică. *Regimul politic din România în perioada septembrie 1940–ianuarie 1941*. Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1976.
———. *Preliminarii politico-diplomatice ale insurecţiei române din august 1944*. Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1978.
Smith, Anthony D. "Culture, Community, and Territory: The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism," *International Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1996): 445–458.
———. *Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Sorel, Georges. *Reflections on Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Spicer, Kevin P., ed. *Antisemitism, Christian Ambivalence, and the Holocaust*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007.
Steigmann-Gall, Richard. *The Holy Reich: Nazi Conceptions of Christianity, 1919–1945*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Sternhell, Zeev, ed. *Maurice Barrès et le nationalisme français*. Paris: A. Colin, 1972.
———. *La droite révolutionnaire: 1885-1914. Les origines françaises du fascisme*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1978.
———. *Neither Right nor Left: Fascist ideology in France*, trans. by David Maisel (Ed.). Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.
———, Mario Sznajder and Maia Asheri. *The Birth of Fascist Ideology: From Cultural Rebellion to Political Revolution*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1994.
———. "Fascism: Reflections on the Fate of Ideas in Twentieth Century History," *Journal of Political Ideologies* 5, no. 2 (2000): 139–162.
Stigliano, Tony. "Fascism's Mythologist Mircea Eliade and the Politics of Myth," *ReVision* 24, no. 3 (2002): 32–38.
Tal, Uriel. *Faith, Politics, and Nazism: Selected Essays*. London: Frank Cass, 2003.
Talmon, Jacob L. *Political Messianism: The Romantic Phase*. New York: Praeger, 1960.
———. *Romanticism and Revolt: Europe 1815–1848*. New York: Norton, 1979.
———. *The Myth of the Nation and the Vision of Revolution: Ideological Polarisation in the Twentieth Century*. New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction Publishers, 1991.
———. *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy*. New York: Norton, 1970.
Tismăneanu, Vladimir. *Fantasies of Salvation: Democracy, Nationalism, and Myth in Post-Communist Europe*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009.
Tismăneanu, Vladimir. *The Devil in History: Communism, Fascism, and Some Lessons of the Twentieth Century*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014.
Treptow, Kurt W. "Populism in Twentieth Century Romanian Politics." In *Populism in Eastern Europe*, edited by Joseph Held, 197–218. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.
———. and Gheorghe Buzatu, eds. *"Procesul" lui Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu (Mai, 1938)*. Iaşi: S.C. Dosoftei, 1994.
———. *Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu în fata istoriei*. Iasi: n.p., 1994.
van der Veer, Peter. "Nation, Politics, Religion," *Journal of Religious and Political Practice* 1, no. 1 (2015): 7–21.
———. *Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.
Veiga, Francisco. *La Mística del Ultranacionalismo. Historia de la Guardia de Hierron. Rumania, 1919–1941*. Bellaterra: Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, 1989. Romanian ed.: *Istoria Gărzii de Fier, 1919–1941. Mistica ultranaţionalismului*. Bucureşti: Humanitas; 2nd ed., 1995.
Ventrone, Angelo. *La Seduzione Totalitaria: Guerra, Modernità, Violenza Politica (1914–1918)*. Roma: Donzelli, 2003.

Verdery, Katherine. *National Ideology under Socialism. Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceaușescu's Romania*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.

———. *Secrets and Truths: Ethnography in the Archive of Romania's Secret Police*. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2014.

Voegelin, Eric. *Die Politische Religionen*. Wien: Bermann-Fischen Verlag, 1938.

———. *Religion and the Rise of Modernity*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1998.

———. *Hitler and the Germans*. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1999.

Volovici, Leon. *Nationalist Ideology and Anti-Semitism: The Case of Romanian Intellectuals in the 1930s*. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1991.

Vondung, Klaus. "National Socialism as a Political Religion: Potentials and Limits of an Analytical Concept," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 6, no. 1 (2005): 87–95.

Walicki, Andrzej. "Polish Romantic Messianism in Comparative Perspective," *Slavic Studies* 22, no. 1 (1978): 1–15.

———. *Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism: The Case of Poland*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982.

Walicki, Andrzej. "National Messianism and the Historical Controversies in the Polish Thought of 1831–1848." In *Culture and Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Eastern Europe*, edited by Roland Sussex, and J. C. Eade, 128–142. Columbus, Ohio: Slavica Publishers, 1983.

Watts, Larry L. *Romanian Cassandra: Ion Antonescu and the Struggle for Reform, 1916–1941*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1993.

Weber, Eugen. "Romania." In *The European Right. A Historical Profile*, edited by Hans Rogger, and Eugen Weber, 501–574. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1965.

———. "The Man of the Archangel," *Journal of Contemporary History* 1, no. 1 (1966): 101–126.

———. *Varieties of Fascism: Doctrines of Revolution in the Twentieth Century*. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1964.

Weber, Max. *Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*, 2 vols, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.

——— ed. *Basic Concepts in Sociology*, translated by H. Secher, New York: Citadel Press, 1990.

Weber, Max. *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, translated by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1998.

White, Howard B. "Political Faith and Francis Bacon," *Social Research* 23, no. 3 (1956): 343–366.

Wiles, Peter. "A Syndrome, not a Doctrine, Some Elementary Theses on Populism." In *Populism: Its Meanings and National Characteristics*, edited by Ghiță Ionescu, and Ernest Gellner, 166–179. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969.

Wiskemann, E. "Reviewed work(s): Die Eiserne Garde: Eine Darstellung der völkischen Erneuerungsbewegung in Rumänien, by Klaus Charlé," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931–1939)* 18, no. 6 (1939): 863.

Wolff, Richard J., and Jörg K. Hoensch, eds. *Catholics, the State and the European Radical Right, 1919–1945*. Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 1987.

Yeomans, Rory. *Visions of Annihilation: The Ustasha Regime and the Cultural Politics of Fascism, 1941–1945*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2013.

Zajcev, Oleksandr. *Ukrayins'kyj integral'nyj nacionalizm 1920–1930-x rokiv Narysy intelektual'noyi istoriyi*. Kyiv: Krytyka, 2013.

Zamfirescu, Dragoş. *Legiunea "Arhangelul Mihail." De la mit la realitate*. Bucureşti: Editura Enciclopedică, 1997.

Zarifopol-Johnston, Ilinca. *Searching for Cioran*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009.

Zelea-Codreanu, Codreanu. *Cărticica şefului de cuib*. Bucureşti: Tipografia "C. S. m. c.," 1933. English ed.: *The Nest Leader's Handbook*. London: The Rising Press, 2001The Rising Press, 2001.

Zelea-Codreanu, Corneliu. *Pentru legionari*, vol. 1. Sibiu: "Totul pentru ţară," 1936. English ed.: *For My Legionaries (The Iron Guard)* (Reedy, West Virginia, Liberty Bell Publications, 1990).

Ziolkowski, Theodore. *Modes of Faith: Secular Surrogates for Lost Religious Belief*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007.

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

PART I

A New Covenant: The Making of the Legionary Political Faith, 1927–1937

Part I focuses on the origins, creation, and consolidation of the Legionary political faith in the first decade of its existence: from its establishment in 1927 to the death of Moța and Marin in January 1937 and the general national parliamentary elections in November 1937. It tackles a number of research questions. How was the new fascist political faith forged? What were its main components? What was its relation to the contemporary Romanian national ideology? How was this faith implemented in practice? What was its impact on followers?

Chapter 1 argues that the emergence of the new fascist political faith was intimately linked to the process of nation- and state-building. Although Romania was a net winner of World War I, managing to double its size and population, radical nationalist factions of the political elites developed a discourse of national victimization resembling what Wolfgang Schivelbusch defined as a "culture of defeat."[1] Radical nationalist politicians argued that, while the establishment of Greater Romania was indeed a glorious achievement, the Great War did not bring about a full-fledged national victory. First, Romania's feeling of victory was shadowed by the country's high human and material sacrifices in the war; by the massive financial debt the country had to take over on behalf of newly annexed territories; and by the imposition of the Minority Convention in the Peace Treaties, seen as a direct foreign intervention in Romania's internal affairs. Second, and more importantly, after the 1918 union, Romanian political elites had the daunting task of forging a unified nation out of disparate provinces that had been shaped by distinct imperial legacies and inhabited, to varying degrees, by multi-ethnic populations. Mainstream democratic projects of nation-building conceived of national integration as a gradual process implemented under a multiparty, parliamentary system and in line with international norms on minority protection. By contrast, radical nationalist politicians argued that territorial unification should be accompanied by a national revolution, one which would lead to a major social

DOI: 10.4324/9780429428043-2

transformation of the country. The nationalists' image of an incomplete, truncated war victory was thus supplemented by a discourse of national victimization based on claims of relative deprivation. In their view, although seemingly victorious, the Romanians remained economically and politically subordinated "in their own house" by foreign oppressors. Nationalists blamed the Romanians' subordinate status on a universal "Judeo-Bolshevik" conspiracy, but also on the "corrupt" democratic regime and the treacherous politicians collaborating with the Jews. These gloomy visions of internal defeat and victimization were used to justify imperious calls for a renewed campaign of national regeneration through martyrdom and the annihilation of enemies. Radical nationalists rejected the slow pace of "nationalizing the state"[2] promoted by democratic parties, and called for policies of *numerus clausus* or, in more extreme versions, of *numerus nullus* against ethnic minorities, meant to accelerate the nation-building process.

In this political context, Chapter 2 explores the emergence of the Legion "Archangel Michael" from the ranks of the nationalist student movement; and the reinterpretation of the sacred foundations of nationalism as a collective belief system in Legionary ideology. Chapter 3 focuses on the creation of Codreanu's charismatic cult, and the "technologies of the self" employed by the Legion to reshape the identity of its followers. Building on recent works on charismatic authority, I employ the concept of charisma to denote not simply Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu's "capacity of attraction," but also an explicit form of legitimizing and organizing the Legion's totalizing power. To illustrate the way in which charismatic authority shaped the movement's structure and organization, Chapter 3 discusses three leading laboratories for the creation of the new fascist man: the nest, the prison, and the work camp.

Chapter 4 looks at self-sacrifice in general, and terrorism, in particular, as the leading modes of combat and mechanisms of regeneration employed by the Legion. It argues that, in order to achieve their declared goal of national salvation, the Legionaries promoted practices of violent sacrifice leading to a redemptive transfiguration of the country through moral "purification." Their ultimate goal was to conquer the state and to reshape it in a totalitarian fashion. The chapter also explores the Romanian state's response to terrorism, its failed attempts to de-radicalize the nationalist student movement, and its employment of violence to curtail fascism. Chapter 5 discusses the social impact of the fascist faith on society at large. It explores techniques of disseminating Legionary ideology and assesses the social support and electoral impact of the Legionary faith among various social strata.

Notes

1 Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003). See also Jenny Macleod, ed., *Defeat and Memory: Cultural Histories of Military Defeat in the Modern Era* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

2 For this term, see Rogers W. Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 4–5.

1

NATIONAL UNIFICATION, CLEAVAGES, AND CHARISMATIC NATIONALISM IN GREATER ROMANIA

Post-War Reorganization: From "Elaborative" to "Totalizing" Political Projects

At first glance, the emergence of a strong fascist movement in interwar Romania might come as a surprise. After all, Romania emerged from World War I as a net winner. The incorporation of the historical provinces of Transylvania, the Banat, and Bukovina from Austria-Hungary, and of Bessarabia from the former Russian Empire into the Old Kingdom more than doubled Romania's size (from 130,177 km^2 in 1914 to 295,049 km^2 in 1919) and population (from 7,771,341 inhabitants in 1914 to 14,669,841 in 1919), considerably strengthening its economic potential. Thus, while Germans and Hungarians experienced the bitterness of defeat and Italians obtained a "frustrated" victory, the creation of Greater Romania (1918–1940) fulfilled the maximal ambition of the national program: the union of all ethnic Romanians within a single state. In addition, following the socio-political upheaval of the war, comprehensive reforms such as universal male suffrage (1919), massive land redistribution (1921), and a new liberal constitution (1923) remodeled the political system into a parliamentary democracy. Greater Romania's developmental prospects looked therefore brighter than ever, especially for the young generation. While universal male suffrage abolished class and educational (but not yet gender) barriers to political participation, the administrative imperative of consolidating the unified Romanian state required an expansion of the bureaucratic apparatus with young cadres.

As elsewhere, the emergence of fascism was, in fact, intimately linked to the process of nation- and state-building, the country transiting from the prewar *Risorgimento* type of nationalism, which led to national unification at the end of the Great War, to *integral nationalism*[1] aimed at national integration and cultural homogenization. This development bore similarities with analogous processes

DOI: 10.4324/9780429428043-3

that took place in Germany and Italy, two countries that managed to achieve territorial unification at roughly the same time with Romania and experienced a similar series of socio-political crises. Likewise, despite the liberal political reforms described above, Greater Romania's post-war consolidation was hampered by multiple regional, ethnoreligious, and socio-political cleavages.[2] First, the country came into being as an aggregate of different historical provinces. To the Principalities of Moldova and Wallachia, unified in 1859, and the former Ottoman province of Dobrudja, annexed in 1878/1913, were added the province of Bessarabia, occupied by Russia in the period 1812–1918; Bukovina, formerly part of the Austrian part of the dual, Austro-Hungarian monarchy; and Transylvania, the Banat, Maramureş, and the Partium, which had been part of the Hungarian half of Austria-Hungary. The first two stages of the state-building process, the union of the two Principalities and the annexation of Dobrudja, generated "structural crises" relating to the establishment and legitimization of a new political order, conflicts among regional political groupings in the process of state unification, the expansion of a bureaucratized state-administration, the integration and assimilation of ethnic minorities, and dilemmas of collective identity.[3] These crises could be overcome only gradually, through policies of national integration and cultural homogenization.

The challenges of integration faced by the Romanian state in the prewar period extended and even increased in the interwar period. Although dominated numerically by ethnic Romanians, Greater Romania was a "nationalizing" rather than a fully integrated national state.[4] After succeeding in political unification, Romanian political elites still faced the difficult challenge of fostering the administrative integration, cultural assimilation, and legislative harmonization of a highly complex assembly.[5] As in the case of other East-Central European states (see Greece and Serbia before War World I, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in the interwar period, and, more recently, the post-communist process of German unification), the incorporation of new historical provinces—each shaped by different imperial legacies—occasioned an arduous process of elite negotiation, administrative unification, and cultural homogenization.[6]

Second, ethnic-religious cleavages added to the problems of administrative and cultural integration. Prewar Romania was a homogeneous country, both in ethnic and religious terms. In 1899, even after the incorporation of the multiethnic province of Northern Dobrudja, ethnic Romanians formed 92.1 percent of the country's general population of 5,956,690 inhabitants, while Orthodox believers represented 91.5 percent.[7] The Jews were the most important ethnic and religious minority, representing a share of 4.45 percent of the general population.[8] They were concentrated mostly in Moldova (making up 9.71 percent of its population) but were less present in the Wallachian provinces of Muntenia and Oltenia (2.26 and 0.41 percent of the population, respectively), lived in cities, and were predominantly engaged in trade and liberal professions.[9] Greater Romania encompassed a much higher ratio of minorities as compared to the Old

Kingdom, making up 28.1 percent of the population. The first official census of Romania taken in December 1930 registered 20 major ethnic groups living in the country, the most numerous being the Romanians (12,981,324 inhabitants, or 71.9 percent of the population), Hungarians (1,425,507, or 7.9 percent), Germans (745,421, or 4.1 percent), Jews (728,151, or 4.0 percent), Ruthenians (582,115, or 3.2 percent), Russians (409,150, or 2.3 percent), Bulgarians (366,384, or 2.0 percent), Roma (263,501, or 1.5 percent), Turks (154,772, or 0.9 percent), and Tartars (22,141, or 0.1 percent) out of a total population of 18,057,028.[10]

Socio-political cleavages among ethnic groups increased within Greater Romania. As Graph 1.1 shows, even by 1930, there were still great discrepancies in the levels of development of the country's historical provinces: the former Austrian-Hungarian provinces of Transylvania and Bukovina were ethnically more diverse and exhibited superior levels of literacy, urbanization, and general economic development, as compared to the former Tsarist province of Bessarabia, but also to the Old Kingdom: thus, the urban population made up 26.7 percent of the total population in Bukovina as compared to only 13 percent in Bessarabia; likewise, literacy rates amounted to 67 percent out of the total population in Transylvania and 65.7 percent in Bukovina, as compared to 54.7 percent in the Old Kingdom and only 38.2 percent in Bessarabia. In addition, in all the newly acquired provinces, ethnic Romanians were generally less urban (and literate) as compared to other ethnic groups, making up only 31 percent of the urban population in Bessarabia, 33 percent in Bukovina, and 34,7 percent in Transylvania, net inferior to the rate of 74.3 percent of ethnic Romanians out of the total urban population of the Old Kingdom (and a national average of 58.6 percent in Greater Romania).



GRAPH 1.1 Ethnic Romanians in the general population; level of urbanization; urban Romanians; and literacy rates in Greater Romania by historical provinces, 1930

Source: Charts 1–3: Institutul Central de Statistică, *Anuarul Statistic al României, 1939 şi 1940* (Bucureşti: Imprimeria Naţională, 1940): 44–45, 58–65, 92–99; Chart 4: *Enciclopedia României*, vol. 1 (Bucureşti: Imprimeria Naţională 1938): 142–143.

Romanian nationalists perceived the ethnic minorities' domination of socio-economic life in the annexed territories as an obstacle in the process of Romanian national consolidation. They accused that fact that the Jews, Hungarians, and Germans in Transylvania, the Banat, and Bukovina had enjoyed certain advantages under the various pre-1918 Austrian-Hungarian imperial socio-political order—and thus fell into the category of so-called "high-status minorities"[11]—while the Romanians had been forcefully relegated to the bottom of that former order. Romanian nationalists further accused the fact that, despite the dissolution of multi-national empires, members of these minority groups continued to dominate cities, liberal professions, and state bureaucracy in those historical regions within Greater Romania, as well. The most imperious issue was the "question of the cities," as the nationalist press called it: the "apostles" of Romanian nationalism, such as Nicolae Iorga in the Old Kingdom and Octavian Goga in Transylvania, alerted public opinion to the threat of "foreign domination" of cities in United Romania, calling them "unconquered fortresses" still bearing signs of the "Habsburg stigmata," which consisted, in their view, of "spots of foreignism" (*pete de străinism*), inhabited by a "parasitic stratum" of exploiters.[12] To counter this alleged danger, these politicians formulated a new program of "national defense" oriented toward "conquering the cities" through vigorous nationalist actions. Their campaign brought the "nationalizing nationalism" of the ethnic majority to the forefront of political life, having at its spearhead the emerging post-war student movement.[13]

The third major challenge to the process of national consolidation was the fragmentation of the Romanian socio-political elites in regional groupings. If Moldovan and Wallachian elites in the former Old Kingdom had a long history of political cooperation and amalgamation, in the first interwar decade political elites of the newly joined provinces of Greater Romania were still regionally segregated. While these elites were animated by common nationalist goals, they differed significantly concerning the means chosen to achieve national integration and unification. Not surprisingly, therefore, the post-war organization of Romania led to sharp debates among various factions of the political elite in the various historical provinces of the country, who advanced rival institutional "projects" vying for political dominance. Employing Paul Colomy's theoretical framework on institutional change, we can differentiate among three types of political projects in interwar Romania: (1) "elaborative," promoting only minor reforms of the existing institutional framework with the aim of rescuing practices that functioned in the Old Kingdom of Romania, and thus protecting their traditional interest groups; (2) "reconstructive," arguing for ample post-war institutional reorganization leading to the creation of new bureaucratic agencies and roles, in favor of new political interest groups; and (3) "totalizing," working for a radical reorganization of the existing institutional order, either in the form of a communist revolution or of rightist charismatic "ethical prophecies."[14]

The political differences among these three types of political projects were clearly evident in their divergent views on the process of national integration

in Greater Romania. Political elites of the Old Kingdom, represented mostly by the National Liberal Party (NLP), promoted an *elaborative* institutional agenda. Arguing that Greater Romania was essentially a continuation of the Old Kingdom, they advocated the *extension* of that country's prewar legislation to the newly incorporated provinces as a means of unifying the country.[15] In contrast to this dominant view originating from the political center of the Old Kingdom, Bucharest, regional elites from the newly annexed territories—represented primarily by the National Party, led by Iuliu Maniu in Transylvania—promoted a "reconstructive" political project. They argued that Greater Romania was a new state that had to establish its new socio-political organization through post-war negotiations among the political elites of all historical regions, leading to forms of territorial devolution of the decision-making processes. The political terminology employed by proponents of these competing perspectives on national unification was also different: while regional political elites spoke of "unification," political elites of the Old Kingdom demanded the "integration" of the new provinces through "legislative extension."[16]

Due to the confrontation among these political visions, the process of post-war reorganization was characterized by social and political unrest. In the immediate post-war period, regional affairs in Transylvania, the Banat, and Maramureș were managed by the Ruling Council (*Consiliul Dirigent*), a temporary executive organ of the Great National Council (*Marele Sfat Național*), the legislative body established by the Great National Assembly of the Romanians convened on December 1, 1918, at Alba Iulia. Made up of representatives of the leading political organizations of the Transylvanian Romanians, the National Party, and the Social Democratic Party, the Ruling Council, had the mandate of preparing the gradual integration of these territories into Romania until the adoption of a new Constitution by a future unified national parliament. The Council was in charge of local affairs, while more significant issues concerning military affairs, as well as economic and foreign policies, were transferred under the jurisdiction of the central government.[17] Three representatives of Transylvania were included in the national government with the task of initiating decrees and regulations that would respond to local needs. A similar solution was implemented in Bukovina, where two ministers without portfolio temporarily managed local affairs, one based in Bucharest and the other in Cernăuți. These ministers made up an Administrative Council, having its budget and local sub-ministries, while more substantial issues such as the army and communication services were integrated into the national system and managed by the government.[18]

The first national general elections organized in post-war Romania, and based on universal male suffrage, were won by the National Party of Transylvania, which, on December 9, 1919, formed a government under the leadership of Alexandru Vaida-Voevod as part of a broader coalition of regional parties. The instant political triumph of regional elites was short-lived, however; the external complications of the Paris Peace Conference and the internal maneuvers of the NLP led to the demise of the government on March 19, 1920.

Moreover, the activity of the Ruling Council of Transylvania came to an abrupt end in April 1920, when the new government led by General Alexandru Averescu (March 1920–December 1921), an ally of the NLP, decided to dismiss it in favor of a Central Commission of Unification that was to work under the aegis of the government toward legal unification in Greater Romania.[19] Similarly, the Administrative Council of Bukovina was abolished at the same time, the administration of the province being fully taken over by the national government.[20] Although the temporary nature of these Ruling Councils was consensual and predetermined, the unilateral manner of their abolition was strongly contested by the National Party of Transylvania, who sensed that the act opened a new stage in the process of national unification that was to be tightly controlled by the NLP of the Old Kingdom. A similar resistance against centralization occurred in Bukovina, where Iancu Flondor, a prominent leader of the national movement, pleaded for regional autonomy. He lost the local political competition to another major local leader, Ion Nistor, who backed the Bucharest-based agenda of centralization (and was soon to join the NLP).[21]

The National-Liberal Project: National Integration through Centralization

After a short interregnum of upheaval and confrontation (1919–1921), in January 1922, the NLP of the Old Kingdom returned to power and, over the following six years (1922–1928), managed to shape the process of national integration within Greater Romania. Benefiting by the strong personality of its leader, Ion I. C. Brătianu, his influence over King Ferdinand, and the patterns of state continuity between the Old Kingdom and Greater Romania, the NLP was able to implement its strategy of national integration through administrative centralization, legal unification, and cultural homogenization. It is telling in this respect that all major post-war political founding acts in Greater Romania—such as the coronation of King Ferdinand and Queen Maria in Alba Iulia on October 15, 1922, the adoption of the new constitution in 1923, and the administrative reorganization of the country in 1925—were overseen by the NLP.

Led by the National Party of Transylvania, regional political forces accused the National-Liberals of massive electoral frauds and contested their rule as a departure from democracy. Moreover, imputing the NLP the lack of genuine political consultations over the new organization of the country, the National Party went as far as to boycott the 1922 coronation festivities and to vote against the 1923 Constitution, regarding them as no more than tools enabling the political hegemony of the National-Liberals. Another major controversy concerned the administrative organization of the country. The National Liberals argued for a centralized, unitary administrative system in Greater Romania, while rival constitutional projects authored by the National Party of Transylvania and the Peasant Party of the Old Kingdom envisioned the establishment of large historical-administrative regions.[22] Ultimately, the National Liberal view

prevailed: in 1925, the new Law on Administrative Unification reorganized Romania into 71 new counties.[23] Although the statement of purpose accompanying the law defined decentralization and local autonomy as its main goals,[24] the new administrative organization extended, in fact, with minor modifications, the French-type centralized administration that had existed in the Old Kingdom into Greater Romania, with the exclusion of historical regions.

Resenting also the loss of its monopoly over Transylvania's regional affairs and forced to expand its branches at the national level, in 1926, the National Party fused with the Peasant Party of the Old Kingdom to form the National Peasant Party (hereafter NPP). Soon, the NPP evolved as Romania's strongest oppositional party to the National Liberals' domination. On the one hand, the new party managed successfully to merge the National Party's strong electoral basis in Transylvania and the Banat with the vibrant post-war peasant movement established by the Peasant Party in the Old Kingdom. On the other hand, it also managed gradually to penetrate other regions of the country, channeling regional elites' resistance against the Bucharest-based centralization.

NPP also articulated an alternative vision of Romania's economic policy and the role of the state in fostering development. Traditionally, the NLP promoted a policy of sheltered industrialization; under the motto "by our own means," they favored local capital and initiatives over foreign financial capital.[25] In contrast, the NPP promoted the idea of a "peasant state" based on independent farmers, and pleaded for a policy of "open gates" to foreign investments.

On May 6, 1928, the NPP organized a major public demonstration against the political 'hegemony' of the National-Liberals, attended by approximately 100,000 people. The demonstration signaled the impatience of regional elites in acquiring political power. Scheduled in the wake of the tenth anniversary of the union of Transylvania with Romania, and held in Alba Iulia (the city where the union was proclaimed on December 1, 1918), the demonstration also conveyed NPP's strong determination to promote an alternative organization of the country, based on the principles proclaimed in the 1918 Resolution of Alba Iulia. This energic opposition bore fruits: in November 1928 NPP was brought to power by the King and entrusted with organizing new national parliamentary elections in December. Benefiting from the widespread popular discontent against the National Liberals, the NPP gained a crushing victory, obtaining 77.76 percent of the total number of votes.

After almost a decade of National-Liberal supremacy, the NPP was finally in a position to implement its own view on the country's organization. During its stays in power (1928–1931 and 1932–1933), the NPP attempted to reorganize Romania's administrative system by promoting forms of administrative devolution. Thus, the Law on the Organization of Local Administration—enacted on August 3, 1929, by the first NPP government headed by Iuliu Maniu (Nov. 1928–June 1930)—provided measures for the de-centralization of the central administration. Most importantly, it also grouped the existing counties into seven administrative regions called "ministerial directorates" (Bucureşti,



MAP 1.1 New administrative organization of Greater Romania in regions, 1929

Source: Radu Săgeată, "Reformele administrative din România - între raţiunile politice şi realităţile geografice," *Geograful* 3, no. 2 (Jan.–June 2011): 13.

Cernăuţi, Chişinău, Cluj, Craiova, Iaşi, and Timişoara), corresponding, by and large, to historical regions (see Map 1.1).[26] This experiment lasted for only two years (1929–1931), being abolished soon after the NPP's loss of power by the new Prime Minister Nicolae Iorga, on the count that it undermined national unity.[27]

The political experiment of the NPP was, however, not only short-lived but ultimately also conciliatory to the existing status quo, despite its inflated populist, and at times even revolutionary, rhetoric. It is very telling in this respect that, although in opposition, Iuliu Maniu declared that he regarded the Constitution passed by the National Liberals as no more than "a piece of paper"; once in power, the NPP did not pursue its plans of amending the country's basic law. Its "accommodating turn" was due to a combination of structural and contingent factors. First, despite calls for a local multi-ethnic cooperation on a regionalist platform (see the slogan "Transylvania for the Transylvanians"; in Romanian, "*Ardealul ardelenilor*"), Romanian, Hungarian, and Jewish regional elites in Transylvania, Bukovina, and the Banat remained divided along ethnoreligious lines. The deep social-economic and political cleavages among these groups preventing them from cooperating against centralization. Alone, the Romanian local elites were too weak and divided to resist Bucharest as the state-building center, on which they were actually dependent for support and resources to prevail in the local

competition against other ethnoreligious groups.[28] Second, the implementation of the NPP's alternative vision of development was inhibited by the dramatic impact of the Great Depression that was felt in Romania from 1929 to 1933. The popular enthusiasm accompanying their power takeover in 1928 thus soon gave way to disillusionment and unrest.

Overall, after more than a decade of confrontation but also cooperation in new national institutions, regionalist political tendencies gradually faded away. Despite continuous frictions between the two rival elite factions grouped in the NLP and the NPP, the process of legislative unification and administrative integration within Greater Romania progressed steadily. The most important landmarks in this respect were the adoption of a new constitution in 1923, the unitary administrative organization of the country in 1925, the extension of regional parties at the national level during the first post-war years, and the peaceful transition to power from the National Liberals to the National Peasantists. In terms of legal unification, the most far-reaching achievement was the adoption of a unitary civil code in 1932, which further eliminated regional disparities.[29] Together, Romania's main political parties, the NLP and the NPP, were the pillars of the new parliamentary political order. Although the two parties called for the implementation of different social projects—the NLP favoring the consolidation of a native "statist" bourgeoisie through policies of sheltered industrialization, while the NPP called for the creation of a peasant state through the development of agriculture and cooperation with foreign capital—they both defended a multiparty constitutional system, and promoted moderate state-building measures that safeguarded—at legal-formal level, at least—the standard rights of ethnic minorities as stipulated in Romania's domestic legislation and international commitments.

From Integral Nationalism to Fascism: Nation-Building and Student Rebellion

In contrast to the democratic political parties committed to the multiparty parliamentary regime, new types of mass political movements—originating from the radical right as well as from the radical left—advanced "totalizing" projects of radical social-political transformation. These two political trends had their distinct roots and political traditions; however, their evolution was tangled to a certain extent, fueling each other at an ideological level but also at the level of grass roots activism. In the immediate post-war years, the main challenge to socio-political stability was the radicalization of the socialist movement, marked by a general workers' strike (October 20–28, 1920) and the emergence of the Comintern-controlled Communist-Socialist Party of Romania in May 1921. Following a bloody terrorist attack in the Romanian Senate by an anarchic-communist group led by Max Goldstein on December 8, 1920, which killed two senators and a minister, Communist leaders were sent to trial for terrorism (1921). In 1924, the Communist Party was outlawed, due to its adoption of

the Comintern thesis according to which Greater Romania was a multinational imperialist state. Its leaders sought refuge in Moscow, where they continued to conspire for the dismemberment and revolutionary transformation of Greater Romania. In Romania proper, however, their underground movement was weak and largely neutralized by the secret services.

If the use of force successfully silenced the communist movement, the emergence of an extreme-right movement animated by the doctrine of integral nationalism was to pose a more complicated, long-term internal challenge to the interwar political regime. The doctrine of integral nationalism was inherited from the nationalist thinkers of the turn of the century but invested with new connotations in the interwar period. The central tenet of integral nationalism was the ethnic nationalization of the state under the slogan "Romania to the Romanians." Its main goal was the removal of "foreigners"—that is, of the non-ethnic Romanian members of society—from positions of power, economic influence, and political representation, and their replacement with ethnic Romanians. In the Old Kingdom, the main grievances of the Romanian nationalists focused on the Jewish question in Northern Moldova. Due to political resistance against emancipation in the parliament, Jews were classed as non-citizen residents: an elaborate system of segregation and discrimination made up of around 250 laws, defined the Jews living on Romania's territory as subjects, but not citizens, of the Romanian state. This status implied key duties (most importantly, the duties of taxation and military service) but denied them full civil, economic, and political rights. The legal justification for this system was the doctrine of the 'Christian state;' the economic justification was the alleged Jewish "domination" of certain lucrative activities and liberal professions. The enemies of Jewish emancipation portrayed, in alarming terms, the geographical concentration of Jews in certain areas, most notably Northern Moldova, as a genuine "invasion." This hostile state policy forced Jews to emigrate, their share of Romania's general population dropping from 4.45 percent in 1899 to 3.3 percent by 1912. The proportion of Jews out of Moldova's population also diminished from 9.71 percent to 7.8 percent. [30] Through restrictive citizenship policies, Romanian elites were thus successful in holding back the demographic and socio-economic growth of the Jewish community.[31]

This system of discrimination was partially dismantled, under pressure from the international community in 1878, and fully abolished in 1919 under the terms of the Minorities Treaty. Yet, the emancipation of the Jews was bitterly contested during the interwar period by the radical right, which pleaded for the reinstatement of the prewar regime of constitutional nationalism in Greater Romania. Although there was, by and large, a nationalist consensus in Romanian society over the imperative of "nationalizing the state," the process was differently conceived by various factions of the political elite, due to their different nationalist visions. As discussed above, center-right parties, such as the NLP and the NPP, saw the process of nationalizing the state as the end-result of a gradual process of socio-political transformation implemented from above through

legal-bureaucratic means and in formal accord with internal and international norms on minority rights (even though, in practice, they often deviated from those norms). In contrast, an emerging authoritarian political pole advocated an accelerated pace of nation- and state-building and cultural homogenization through the elimination of foreigners, and a radical socio-political transformation leading to the consolidation of the Romanian middle class. This "family of authoritarians," as Michael Mann called it, was very heterogeneous, being divided between the conservative right, the radical right, and fascism. The radical right, represented mostly by the National Christian Defense League (*Liga Apărării Național-Creștine*, hereafter LANC), established in 1923, and later by the National Christian Party, set up in 1935 through the fusion of the League with Octavian Goga's National-Agrarian Party, focused almost exclusively on "solving" the Jewish question through discriminative measures implemented from above.

In contrast, the most radical grouping of this political family, the Legion "Archangel Michael," created in 1927, conceived of the process of nation- and state-building as a rapid, bottom-up campaign, implemented through a violent revolution at the grass roots level. Although its project was apparently close to the "reconstructive" project proposed by regional elites, the Legion was, in fact, antisystemic in its orientation, as it aimed at seizing the state by violent means, reconfiguring it along totalitarian lines, and forging a homogeneous ethnic entity. Its vision of the country's regeneration entailed the purification of the political body of all "foreign," "unhealthy," or "corrupt" elements through denaturalization and deportation. This political project was directed not only against 'high-status' minorities—most notably the Jews and the Hungarians—but also against Romanian political elites, who allegedly betrayed the national cause, thus leading to intra-ethnic ideological strife as well.

The origins of the Legion "Archangel Michael" were not rooted in a movement of war veterans, who had been successfully demobilized in Romania due to the implementation of comprehensive agrarian and electoral reforms,[32] but in the antisemitic and nationalist student movements that swept Romania's post-war university life. Student movements were not a new phenomenon. The first modern universities were established soon after the creation of the Romanian nation-state, first in Iași (1860) and then in Bucharest (1864). Romanian students were soon at the forefront of the national movement for unification, as evidenced by the first student congress that took place at Putna in 1871, which also managed to mobilize the local peasantry. Moreover, the student movement did not only pursue irredentist goals, but also acquired an anti-establishment orientation, as shown by the student demonstration against the leadership of the National Theater in Bucharest in 1906, for representations in Romanian language rather than French, led by the young university professor Nicolae Iorga. In the post-war period, there occurred a new wave of student mobilization, unprecedented in its intensity, duration, and radicalism. In *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania*, Irina Livezeanu argues that the student movement was, in many ways, generated by

the strategy of national unification promoted by the NLP, which envisioned the expansion of the state-sponsored system of education as a means of rapidly producing a unified national elite in order to Romanianize the urban middle class. To this end, an exponential expansion of the educational system—a genuine "revolution"—increased the number of students to a record level. The number of enrolled students grew from 8,632 in the 1913–1914 academic year; to 22,379 in 1924–1925; and 37,314 in 1929–1930, scattered in numerous universities around the country: Bucureşti, Iaşi, Timişoara, Cluj, Cernăuţi, and Chişinău.[33] Students became the 'allies' of Romanian political elites in their efforts directed at nationalizing the state, since they represented the desired pan-Romanian and antiregional national elite, the "agents" of the state in urban environments.[34]

Nevertheless, the prospective alliance very soon turned against the political establishment, generating an additional cleavage between old elites and the "new generation." Romanian students were the first compact "Romanian contingent" sent from the rural world to the urban environment in the annexed territories. There, they experienced a "foreign" and hostile environment, significantly different from their home experience but also their expectations. In addition, in their post-university careers, university graduates strove to use the unprecedented opportunities provided by post-war political reorganization for upward social mobility. As 'products' of the state-sponsored educational system, students depended on positions in the bureaucratic apparatus, and considered their diplomas as 'certificates' of social success. However, the state administration had a limited capacity of absorption, which shrank even further under the impact of the post-war economic crisis (1929–1933). Also, the obsolete orientation of the university curricula and specializations, dominated by theoretical training and not by technical ones (as was the European norm), made it difficult for students to find jobs in the economic sector.[35] The general impression was that "Romanian society does not know what to do with its youth," as *Enciclopedia României* pointed out in a synthetic survey published in 1938.[36]

The material hardship of student life, accompanied by the prospects of job scarcity and intellectual unemployment, caused frustration and alienation, generating strong student protest movements. Discontent was directed against ethnic minorities, whose superior social status was found responsible for the pauperization of Romanian students and university graduates. Moreover, while before 1918 the superior social status of Jews in the Old Kingdom was "compensated" by their denial of state citizenship and substantive economic and political rights, in Greater Romania the citizenship emancipation of ethnic minorities by the 1919 Minorities Treaty granted Jews access to state jobs and resources, allegedly opening the way to their political domination. The Jews living in the annexed provinces of Transylvania, the Banat, Bukovina, and Bessarabia were also accused of nurturing Hungarian, German, or Russian sympathies, respectively. In the eyes of Romanian nationalists, these affinities added to the Jews' "antinational" orientation.

In response, an emergent nationalist student movement dominated universities in the period 1919–1923. Romanian nationalist students resented the fact

that, although—in their view—Greater Romania was the nation-state "of" ethnic Romanians as the "titular" nation,[37] in the newly incorporated territories, the new "Romanian order" was unconsolidated, in the sense that members of ethnic minorities continued to dominate prestigious social-cultural institutions, especially in cities. Nationalist students blamed the international community for the "forceful" and "premature" citizenship emancipation of ethnic minorities and criticized the slow pace of nationalizing the state promoted by traditional Romanian political elites and agitated for the implementation of a policy of discrimination against ethnic minorities. To justify their claims, nationalist students promoted an ethnic- and religious-based definition of national identity that discriminated between Romanian citizens "by blood" and "by papers" (e.g., those naturalized under pressure from "abroad") and attempted to exclude the latter from substantive socio-political rights by reverting to the nineteenth-century constitutional nationalist system of legal discrimination.

The nucleus of the nationalist student movement was located in regional universities, where the student body was still largely dominated by ethnic minorities.[38] Its main centers were Iaşi, the former capital of Moldova; Cernăuţi, the capital of Bukovina; and Cluj, the most important city of Transylvania. In the context of the arduous post-war processes of administrative, political, and social-economic reorganization, these regions were the scene of interethnic conflicts, manifest both in cultural and political life. Tensions became acute in universities because, in these educational institutions, students originating from various ethnic groups interacted daily and displayed a high degree of political mobilization. Regional universities were thus sensible barometers of social cleavages and interethnic tensions. To be sure, universities in the newly annexed provinces were soon taken over by the Romanian administration and nationalized: the German-language *Franz-Josephs-Universität* in Cernăuți turned into *Universitatea Regele Carol I*, while the Hungarian university in Cluj metamorphosed into *Universitatea Regele Ferdinand I* (a name given after 1927), both employing Romanian as the new official language of instruction. Despite these changes, the student body continued to predominantly consist of by members of non-Romanian ethnic groups in the first post-war years, which made Romanian students feel as though they were in a minority position. Early on, conflicts therefore focused on the rates of admission to universities of students of non-Romanian ethnic origin and their access to educational resources. At a time when universities were perceived as laboratories for the creation of the new national elite, Romanian nationalists demanded the implementation of a strict policy of *numerus clausus* in education and in the administration, which was to assure their numerical dominance and to curb the completion of upward social mobility on the part of other "rival" ethnic groups, as a way of compensating—in the nationalists' view—for the latter's former privileges under the previous imperial order.

In the first post-war years, unrest within the student body was chaotic. In addition to ethnic cleavages, students were also divided along regional, class, and ideological lines. These multiple splits made the collaboration of Romanian

students very difficult. Police reports drafted in June 1920 point out that the emerging nationalist student movement in Iași opposed concomitantly their Jewish colleagues as well as the Romanian students from Bessarabia, accused of pro-Russian attitudes and contamination with Bolshevism.[39] Gradually, nationalist activists increased their influence in the student body, managing to coagulate a cohesive movement, with a pronounced antisemitic character. Moreover, the various regional factions of the post-war nationalist student movement came together on December 10, 1922, when a *national* congress spelled out students' demands in ten points, including a policy of *numerus clausus*, restrictions against the admission of "foreigners" to the universities, respect for Orthodoxy (which included an express interdiction against Jewish medical students, who would have been forbidden to dissect corpses of Christians), and improved material conditions.

The government responded in a conciliatory manner and tried to address some of the students' material grievances at the expense of their ideological demands. This response led to a growing split within the movement between radicals and moderates. In this context, a nucleus of radical students expressed their determination to take the national fight to another level, "within a general nationalist political movement, aimed at conquering political power in the state."[40] The most combative leaders were Ion I. Moța (1902–1937), a law student at the University of Cluj; and Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu (1899–1938), a law student at the University of Iași (1919–1922). The two leaders had numerous things in common. Their families lived in the prewar period outside Romania, in multiethnic areas experiencing acute ethnic conflicts and high levels of nationalist mobilization. Their fathers were actively engaged in Romanian nationalist movements in Transylvania and Bukovina, respectively, and gave them a strong religious-nationalist education. Corneliu was the son of Iohan Zilinschi, a secondary-school teacher, and of the Bavarian immigrant Eliza Brauner. Originating in Austrian Bukovina, Iohan relocated in 1889 to Romanian Moldova, obtained Romanian citizenship, and changed his name to Ion Zelea-Codreanu. Father of seven children, Ion Zelea-Codreanu was animated by a militant nationalism, with powerful religious and mystical overtones. Ion I. Moța was the son of Ioan Moța, an Orthodox priest who had been active in the national movement in Austro-Hungarian Transylvania. The activity of the two fathers amply illustrated the intimate connection between the rise of nationalism and the spread of print capitalism, as highlighted by Benedict Anderson.[41] Before World War I, Ion Zelea-Codreanu, Corneliu's father, smuggled Romanian books across the border into Northern Bukovina, at the time under Austria-Hungary, and into neighboring Russian-occupied Bessarabia to contribute to the consolidation of the Romanian national movement in these provinces.[42] Likewise, the priest Ioan Moța, Ion's father, was a combative leader of the Romanian national movement in Transylvania, and served as editor of a popularizing gazette for the Romanian peasantry in the province, Freedom (*Libertatea*), published in Orăștie. The two students thus exhibit cases of ideological reproduction within the family.[43] Just

like their fathers, Ion and Corneliu displayed, early on, radical militant attitudes, informed by messianic and apocalyptic visions of politics and obsessively centered on the Jewish question. No wonder that, after their first encounter, the two shared a life-long friendship and political partnership.

In contrast to leaders who wanted to confine student protest to the university campus, Moţa and Codreanu intended to transform the student movement into a radical nationalist party, determined to employ political violence to reach its aims. Another novel feature of the two leaders, and more generally of their circle of radical collaborators, was their anti-establishment orientation. Significantly, in their earlier fight against leftist student agitations, the nationalists relied on the help and cooperation of state authorities: Thus, on April 13, 1921, Codreanu called on the nationalist students to "condemn the strike of the Bessarabian students and *to express their admiration toward authorities and the justice system which ensure order in this country, threatened by a bunch of anarchists*."[44] Nevertheless, after the establishment of the new Liberal government in January 1922, this collaboration turned into conflict. The firm intervention of the authorities to restore order in universities was perceived as a betrayal of Romanian students' interest in favor of "rival" student groups, mostly the Jews.

Aware that, in order to fulfill their goals, nationalist students needed to transform their rebellion into a *national political movement*, on March 4, 1923, Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu participated in the creation of the LANC, a new antisemitic organization led by the controversial politician A. C. Cuza, professor at the University of Iaşi, and having its regional basis mostly in Bukovina and Northern Moldova. The declared ideology of the new organization was that of "Christian-integral nationalism," as theorized by Cuza; its primary goal was "the integral elimination of the Kikes."[45] Corneliu was coopted into the movement by his father, Ion Zelea-Codreanu, who was a close collaborator of Cuza (the latter was also the godfather of Corneliu, so the three men were part of an extended political "family"). Corneliu was in charge of the youth section of LANC; during the debates over the adoption of the 1923 Constitution, Corneliu organized an active opposition to the emancipation of Jews, displaying antisemitic posters in Jewish districts of Iaşi.[46]

Arrested and then released, Codreanu continued his anti-emancipation campaign during a general student congress that took place in August 1923 in Iaşi. After the congress, a group of radical students convened separately and pledged to continue the struggle for national freedom initiated during the Great War by transforming it from a fight against external enemies into a struggle carried out with violent means against internal enemies. Born, in the majority, at the turn of the century, these youngsters had been unable to participate in the Great War, but wanted to take up the banner of national struggle and to transfer the fighting spirit from the trenches to post-war political life. The bond between the plot members was cemented by an oath-taking ceremony held at the battlefield of Mărăşeşti in August 1923, amid relics of the unknown soldiers who died in the war of reunification. According to priest Ioan Moţa, his son Ion returned from

the trip to Mărăşeşti (after the Iaşi congress) with a bag full of "saint relics": a deactivated grenade, a helmet, and fresh grass nurtured by the "heroes' blood."[47]

The determination of these youngsters to part ways with "the old world" was reflected in a series of grave terrorist acts, which remained unpunished but assured the radical militants instant notoriety and the leadership of the nationalist student movement. The first was a *collective terrorist plan*, namely an anti-Jewish plot initiated in 1923 by Ion I. Moţa. Deeply disappointed by the repression of the student movement and the adoption of the new liberal constitution of Romania, which consecrated the legal emancipation of Jews, Moţa initiated a desperate plot in order to revitalize the movement and to channel it into political practice. He argued that:

> Students can no longer carry on next fall, and rather than all of us accepting shameful capitulation following a year of struggle, it would be better to urge them to resume classes and we, who have led them, end the movement nobly by sacrificing ourselves and taking town with us all those we find most guilty of having betrayed the Romanian interest.
>
> Let us procure handguns and fire on them, giving a terrifying example to be long remembered throughout Romanian history. What will become of us after that, whether we shall die or whether we shall spend the rest of our days in prison, would no longer matter.[48]

His proposal received enthusiastic support from his group of close collaborators in various university centers, composed of Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, Ilie Gârneată, Radu Mironovici, and Leonida Bandac from Iaşi, Corneliu Georgescu and Alexandru Vernichescu from Cluj, and Tudose Popescu from Cernăuţi. In response to the legal emancipation of Jews, the plotters pledged to assassinate the most influential Jewish personalities (rabbis, bankers, media proprietors) as well as a number of Romanian politicians who "collaborated" with the Jews and were thus guilty of "national treason."[49] The authorities learned about the plot and arrested the group before executing their criminal plan, and imprisoned them at the Văcăreşti Monastery in Bucharest.

The plotters' trial took place on March 29–30, 1924, at the Bucharest Court with Jury and occasioned the first legal-political confrontation between the liberal state based on the rule of law and the integral nationalist student movement. The trials started under favorable auspices for the plotters, who benefited from a wave of public sympathy and press support throughout the country. Fearing student mobilization in support of the plotters, the authorities strengthened security measures in the city. Although numerous police units were dispersed around the Palace of Justice and, more generally, in the capital, student disturbances did occur, accompanied by street violence against Jews.[50] In the press, leading nationalist personalities presented the student acts as a legitimate, if desperate reaction to the unjust socio-political situation. They also argued, in a controversial fashion, that the students' violent plan "was not prompted by a criminal intention, but

was motivated by an intention to defend the nation."[51] The nationalist campaign achieved its aim: after only one day of deliberations, the plotters were swiftly acquitted by the court with jury on the count that, since the students did not set an actual date for executing their plot, from a juridical point of view their criminal plan was not a conspiracy but a mere *intention*, without legal consequences. The detained students were subsequently released, except for Moţa, who remained in prison an additional six months for shooting his comrade Vernicescu, whom he accused of treason.[52] Moţa planed his assassination attempt with external help, a student collaborator delivering him the pistol in prison, hidden in a loaf of bread.[53]

Although prevented by the authorities, the would-be terrorist plan contributed to the crystallization of a new ethos of political struggle through violent means, setting the new generation of nationalists "far away from our professors and our nationalist parents."[54] The legal investigation of the case established that the idea of employing violence in the service of the nationalist cause was born in the interaction between Moţa and Codreanu. None of them could specify who brought up the idea first, although Moţa acknowledged that he contemplated this possibility before meeting Codreanu.[55] The latter also confessed that, soon after agreeing with Moţa on the use of violence, he had some hesitations due mainly to his father's opposition and his warning that, as history shows, in the end, violence is detrimental to the political movements that employ it.[56] As a matter of principle, the two young activists agreed that violence would serve as a last resort, in case all other legal or softer means of pressure (such as student strikes or a virulent press campaign) failed to yield satisfactory results (it was, of course, up to the two protagonists to appreciate if and when that was the case).[57] Moţa and Codreanu thus argued that they professed a "defensive" form of violence, upholding their national rights: allegedly, it was only the exhaustion of legitimate forms of activisms that led them into what they called the "violence of desperation."[58]

The plot was also instrumental in channeling the student movement into a nationalist *political* organization. First, the plotters' experience of common detention strengthened their ties and reinforced their collective identity based on political radicalism. Benefiting from national press coverage, the group of leaders, subsequently called the *Văcăreşteni*, became notorious and served as the nucleus of the future movement. Second, the group took the decision to militate for "the transformation of the university student movement into a great post-university National Movement, because our fight concerned the entire Nation."[59] As Codreanu later recalled, the mystical atmosphere of the monastery inspired their first plans for creating an "army of youngsters educated in the love for the country and fatherland" following the example of the *Action française*. The new organization had to fulfill three roles:

1. To educate the entire Romanian youth in a military spirit.
2. To be an army of propagandists of the League.
3. To be the fanatical element of sacrifice for the national movement toward the solving of the Jewish Question!

This army would be dedicated to Archangel Michael—the one with the fire sword.[60]

The fascination of the young students with the principles of "integral nationalism" preached by Charles Maurras was due to the general orientation of Romanian intellectuals toward French culture and politics—to which they looked for inspiration—but also to their sincere adherence to the leading principles of the *Action française*, most notably antisemitism and xenophobia. The Catholic militantism of the *Action* also had a strong influence on the Legion, partially accounting for the emergence of a political movement of religious inspiration in a predominantly Orthodox country. Italian Fascism and German National Socialism provided sources of inspiration, as well. In his personal letters to Cuza, Codreanu praised Mussolini for his political action and vision; equally important, between November 1922 and February 1923, Codreanu underwent doctoral studies at the Faculty of Philosophy, Section on Political Economy, University of Berlin, followed by a short stay in Jena. This study trip was made possible through a grant covered by the National Student Union; its main aim was to try to internationalize the struggle of the Romanian nationalist movement. Although Codreanu was unable to establish useful political contacts in Germany, he learned about National Socialism and acquired the most recent antisemitic literature of the time. In addition to books, Codreanu came home with a bag full of insignia in forms of *swastika*, which were distributed to nationalist students in Iași.[61]

On October 25, 1924, encouraged by his earlier acquittal in the student plot, Codreanu assassinated Constantin Manciu, the police prefect of Iași, as revenge for acts of "repression" and "humiliation" conducted against the local nationalist student movement. The assassination took place on the stairs of the Iași Court of Justice, where Manciu sat in the first hearing of a trial opened against him by nationalist students. Codreanu attended the trial and, after deliberations, awaited Manciu at the exit of the Court and shot the prefect in the head, killing him instantly. According to the ballistic expertise, the victim and the aggressor did not make eye contact, since Manciu was turned toward police inspector Eugen Cios, with whom he was engaged in a conversation, being thus killed from behind. Inspector Cios and sub-commissar Huşanu attempted to arrest Codreanu, but they were wounded in action by the aggressor, who eventually gave himself up to the police. After another controversial trial, Codreanu was yet again discharged, against the recommendation of prosecutor Titus H. Constantinescu, who warned that an acquittal would mean to return Codreanu to society "full of glory" and "to proclaim him the future pontiff of national conscience."[62] Indeed, this legal "victory" assured Codreanu immediate fame, projecting him as a national leader of integral nationalism.

Moța and Codreanu's violent actions led to the *gangsterization of nationalism*. This new development precipitated the rupture between the more moderate LANC and the radicalized student activists. A report of the Ministry of the Interior pertinently pointed out that "the assassination and the trial brought

C. Codreanu an unexpected popularity, prompting him to contemplate the establishment of a nationalist organization led by himself, with means and visions that would correspond to his own character."[63] In Codreanu's initial plans, the new Legion of nationalist fighters conceived in the prison of the Văcărești Monastery was to serve as "the youth section" of LANC, "having as its aim the education of this youth."[64] Codreanu played a central role in the paramilitary organization of the youth section of the new party. "For us, this program, conceived within the Văcărești prison walls, was a beginning of a new life; it represented something complete in inspiration, organization, and plan of action, different from anything else we had thought of earlier. It was the beginning of a new world, a foundation on which we could build for years to come," confessed Codreanu in his autobiography.[65] For a few years, LANC served as a useful laboratory for the crystallization of fascist ideas and ritual practices, given its rabid antisemitism, the violent acts of its blue-uniformed paramilitary groups (*lăncieri*, or spearmen), and its emerging anti-establishment orientation. Nevertheless, the new radical orientation of the student activists and their employment of violence increased the gap between them and the LANC's conservative leadership, setting them apart within the larger "family of authoritarians." Although sharing LANC's nationalism and antisemitism, the radical group gradually distanced itself from Cuza's conventional methods and old-fashioned style of leadership, considered obsolete.

The first divergences between Codreanu and A. C. Cuza emerged in 1924 but were not fully spelled out until 1925, as evidenced by their private correspondence. On November 30, 1924, Codreanu still assured Cuza, in a private letter sent from the Galata Prison, that "my thoughts are still with you, my mind lives in the luminous light of the truth you propagated during your lifetime and out of which I could also taste: the truth of nationalities."[66] Nevertheless, differences of opinion between the two leaders started to take a toll on their relationship. Embittered by the conflict over LANC's future development, Codreanu and Moța decided to continue their doctoral studies in Grenoble, France, where they stayed from September 1925 to May 1927. In a letter sent to Cuza from Grenoble on November 3, 1925, Codreanu refused to join LANC's Central Committee: invoking the fact "that we, the youth, differ from the views of the committee as far as the means of action are concerned"; Codreanu asked for "liberty of action" for the radical youth nucleus.[67] In the same vein, other young leaders, such as Ioan Istrate, former leader of the Cluj-based student association "Petru Maior" and former director of the newspaper *Apărarea națională* [National Defense], resigned from LANC's Central Committee. In a series of polemical articles, Istrate pointed out that "the young generation distances itself from LANC … due to its wrong method of organization."[68]

Although the rupture between the two parts was already a *fait accompli*, the plan for the creation of a new youth nationalist organization crystallized only in 1927, when the group decided to establish the Legion "Archangel Michael." They parted ways with the old generation's "mainstream" nationalism and put

forward messianic calls to generational solidarity under the banner of charismatic nationalism. The split of the nationalist movement into two rival organizations (the Legion and LANC) created confusion among students. To clarify the matter, the National Student Union organized an ad hoc congress of former and current student leaders at Piatra-Neamț on August 1–6, 1927. The congress focused primarily on the prospective role to be played by the newly formed Legion and its relation to the student movement, issues summarized under the label "Archangelists' Question" (*chestiunea arhanghelilor*).[69] At first, the charismatic sect of the would-be revengeful warriors was ridiculed for its religious bigotism, the Legionaries being pejoratively named "Christians of the Wood" due to their cult of the icon. In his report opening the debate, the student leader Elinor Usatiuc summarized the Legionary ideology as follows:

> In the mind of Mr. Codreanu arose—due to reasons that concern him, personally—the faith that the Archangel Michael is the protector of peoples, a fact which prompted him to establish a militant organization, under the protection of this mystical faith. In their center (at the Christian Cultural House Iași), they brought a blessed icon of the Archangel Michael, guarded permanently by a team made up by members of the organization (each serving shifts of three hours) […] The despotic leadership is exercised by Corneliu Z. Codreanu.[70]

A lively debate followed. Pro-LANC students argued that the Legion was "a dangerous organization, because it undermines the national movement." They accused Codreanu of opportunism, attributing to him the intention to manipulate the student movement for his own "personal ambitions."[71] Denouncing his "Mussolinian methods,"[72] they asked the student movement to distance itself from the Legion, arguing that they "should not tolerate those who speculate the status of the student, turning it into a lucrative occupation."[73] In contrast, pro-Legionary students pointed out that the aims of the Legion coincided with those of the student movement, differing only in methods, since the Legion "foresaw [the employment of] violence."[74] In a lengthy reply, Codreanu rejected all allegations and spelled out his apocalyptic vision of politics. He pointed out that the Legion was a militant nationalist organization founded on three main principles: "hierarchy, order, and action."[75] The latter feature was vital: while the old generation of nationalist activists was "one of thinkers," the new generation was, asserted Codreanu, "one of action."[76] Its final aim was the Romanianization of the country in all fields of activity, under the slogan "Romania for the Romanians" (*România a Românilor*). While acknowledging that the Legion did not hesitate to use violence to reach its aims, Codreanu argued that it professed "the violence of exasperation" against foreign exploitation. "Only national reasons prompted us to choose the way of the gun," added the Legionary T. Popescu.[77] Codreanu's discourse did not convince all students present, but the Legion was de facto accepted as yet another advocate of the students' nationalist cause.

In sum, post-war rebellion in Romanian universities generated a peculiar nationalist youth sub-culture. In sociological terms, this phenomenon was not anomalous, but a typical outcome. As Peter and Brigitte Berger pointed out, youth tend to forge counter-cultures, defined as "a social-cultural formation that exists as a sort of island or enclave within the larger society."[78] Invariably, youth counter-cultures emphasize communalism, honesty, sincerity, and authenticity, all "posited against the alleged 'hypocrisy' of the adult world."[79] Moreover, universities generally serve as a breeding ground as well as a battlefield for these counter-cultures, so that "the pattern of confrontation between the university and rebellious students [...] has become, in the minds of many (young and older), the major manifestation of the youth culture."[80] What was out of ordinary in the case of the nationalist youth subculture in post-war Romania was both its right-wing radicalism and its success in transforming this transitory phenomenon—this "way-station" in one's life, as Berger and Berger call it—into "a permanent settlement,"[81] in other words into a lasting and all-inclusive *counter-culture* open to individuals of all age groups or professions, outside the confines of the university. To understand that extension, we now turn to the establishment, nature, and main features of the Legionary ideology of national salvation, and its success in channeling youth protest and appropriating discourses on the "new generation."

Notes

1 The doctrine of *intégralisme* or *nationalisme intégral* was first theorized at the turn of the century by the French thinker and politician Charles Maurras, and was characterized by an aversion to democracy, the primacy of the nation understood in organicist terms, monarchism, and the fight for federalism and decentralization. For a brief encyclopedia presentation of Charles Maurras' view on integral nationalism, see Steve Bastow, "Integral Nationalism," in *World Fascism: A Historical Encyclopedia*, edited by Cyprian Blamires, vol. 1 (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2006), 338. In academia, the concept was employed by Carlton J. H. Hayes in *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism* (New York: R. R. Smith, Inc., 1931) to denote a specific type of radical nationalism, as distinct from humanitarian, Jacobin, traditional, and liberal nationalisms. The concept was further developed by Peter Alter in *Nationalismus* (Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main, 1985)—translated into English as *Nationalism* (London: E. Arnold, 1989)—who distinguished between *risorgimento nationalism* employed by nations seeking to establish a state, and *integral nationalism* employed by nations that have succeeded in establishing their national state and are ready to engage in projects of homogenization. In Alter's view, integral nationalism is characterized by statism, radical extremism, organicism, anti-individualism, and militarism. Although Alter regards Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy as epitomizing the doctrine of integral nationalism, I differentiate between statist forms of integral nationalism implemented *from above* and the fascist revolutionary ideology, promoted by anti-systemic, *grass roots movements of change*.

2 On the typology of possible cleavages within national political communities, based on region, class, religious denomination, and ethnicity, and relating to the particularities of the national and industrial revolutions, see Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction," in *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, ed. by Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (New York: The Free Press, 1967), 14. For charisma,

clientelism, and cleavages, with a focus on Greece, see George Th. Mavrogordatos, *Stillborn Republic. Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece, 1922–1936* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1983).

3 On the union of Moldova and Wallachia, and the annexation of Dobrudja, see Constantin Iordachi, *Liberalism, Constitutional Nationalism and Minorities: The Making of Romanian Citizenship, 1750–1918* (Leiden: Brill, 2019).

4 Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed,* 4–5.

5 For a comprehensive analysis of the process of unification in Greater Romania, see Irina Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building, and Ethnic Struggle, 1918–1930* (Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1995). For case studies on Bessarabia and Bukovina, see Charles King, *The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2000); and Mariana Hausleitner, *Die Rumänisierung der Bukowina 1918–1944. Die Durchsetzung des nationalstaatlichen Anspruchs Großrumäniens* (München: Oldenbourg, 2001).

6 For this argument, see Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics*, "The Generation of 1922: From Student Movement to Iron Guard," 245–297. For a comparison between processes of post-war integration in interwar Romania and Poland, focused on the Jewish question, see Irina Livezeanu, "Interwar Poland and Romania: The Nationalization of Elites, the Vanishing Middle, and the Problem of Intellectuals," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 22 (1998), 407–430. Livezeanu focuses on the genesis of the Legion in the 1920s, placing it within the context of nation-building in Greater Romania and linking it with the interethnic rural/urban social cleavage, most manifest in the educational system. My own argument builds on the ethnocultural cleavage between urban and rural areas highlighted by Livezeanu in *Cultural Politics* but integrates this issue into the broader spectrum of social-political, religious, and regional cleavages within Greater Romania.

7 Keith Hitchins, *Rumania, 1866–1947* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 164.

8 Leonida Colescu, *Analiza rezultatelor recensământului general al populaţiei României din 1899* (Bucureşti: Institutul Central de Statistică, 1944), 24–25.

9 Colescu, *Analiza rezultatelor*, 24–25.

10 Institutul Central de Statistică, *Anuarul Statistic al României, 1939 şi 1940* (Bucureşti: Imprimeria Naţională, 1940), 44–45.

11 See Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics*, especially her chapters on Bukovina, Bessarabia, and Transylvania, 49–188.

12 Octavian Goga, "Oraşele," in *Mustul care fierbe* (Bucureşti: [Imprimeria Statului], [s.a.]), 410, 411.

13 On the concept of "nationalizing nationalism," see Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, 4–5.

14 Paul Colomy, "Neofunctionalism and Neoinstitutionalism: Human Agency and Interest in Institutional Change," *Sociological Forum* 13, no. 2 (June 1998), 270.

15 For a view on the legal unification of Greater Romania through the extension of the legislation of the Old Kingdom to the new territories, see Alexandru Rădulescu, *Unificarea Legislativă* (Bucureşti: Curtea Naţională, 1927).

16 See Petre Marcu-Balş, "Autohtonia ordinei juridice (Concepţia rationalistă şi concepţia istorică a codificaţiilor)" *Gândirea* VIII, no. 6–7 (1928), 263–272.

17 See "Decretul-lege nr. 3632 din 11/24 decembrie 1918," *Monitorul Oficial,* no. 212, December 13/26, 1918, 3750. For the activity of the Ruling Council, see Gheorghe Iancu, *The Ruling Council: The Integration of Transylvania into Romania, 1918–1920* (Cluj-Napoca: Center for Transylvanian Studies, 1995).

18 Radu Florian Bruja, *Extrema Dreapă în Bucovina* (Târgovişte: Cetatea de Scaun, 2012), 29.

19 *Monitorul Oficial al României*, no. 4 (April 4, 1920), 1.

20 Bruja, *Extrema Dreapă în Bucovina*, 29.

21 Ibid., 29–30.

22 See for example *Ante-Proect de Constituţie întocmit de secţia de studii a Partidului Tărănesc* (Bucureşti: Tipografia Viaţa Românească, 1922).

23 *Legea pentru unificarea administrativă* (Bucureşti: Institutul de Arte Grafice şi Editură, s.a.).
24 Ibid., 19–21.
25 The chief architect of this policy was Vintilă I. C. Brătianu. See his *Scrieri şi cuvântări*, vol 1., 1899–1906 (Bucureşti: Imprimeria Independenţa, 1937). See also Ştefan Zeletin's defense of the political and economic dominance of the National Liberal Party in Romania, in *Burghezia Română. Orginea şi rolul ei istoric* (Bucureşti: Nemira, 1997).
26 *Legea pentru organizarea administrațiunii locale*, August 3, 1929.
27 See "*Legea pentru modificarea unor dispoziții din legea pentru organizarea administrațiunii locale și din Legea organizării administrațiunii Municipiului București*," July 13, 1931, in *Codul General al României*, vol. XIX: 1931, edited by C. Hamangiu (București: Alcalay, s.a.), 587–590. Nicolae Iorga's adverse view on regional autonomies was explicitly spelled out in a 1939 public lecture on the union of Transylvania with Romania: "Let me ask a question: would it have been worthwhile to sacrifice so many hundreds of thousands of people to take Transylvania if we were to only make it the third part of a Switzerland [e.g., part of a federation]? We [the Romanians] are the oldest population, the most numerous, we are the creators of the new Romania, we are Romanians from the old country, supported by the love and trust of our brothers from there [Transylvania]. This country includes nationalities, but it is *not a country of nationalities*." Nicolae Iorga, *Conferințe și prelegeri* (București: Institutul de Istorie Universală Nicolae Iorga, 1943), 73.
28 For a polemical work of a Transylvanian politician against the National Peasant Party's policy of regional administrative autonomy, see Ion Rusu Abrudeanu, *Păcatele Ardealului față de Sufletul Vechiului Regat. Fapte, documente, facsimile* (București: Cartea Românească, s.a.).
29 See the activity of the Legislative Council, the body entrusted with legal unification, in *Consiliul Legislativ. Zece ani de activitate 1926–1936* (Bucureşti: Institutul de Arte Grafice Luceafărul, 1936).
30 For 1899, see Leonida Colescu, *Analiza rezultatelor Recensământului general al populaţiei României dela 1899* (Bucureşti: Institutul Central de Statistică, 1944), 24-25; for 1912: Leonida Colescu, *La population de religion Mosaïque en Roumanie. Étude statistique* (Bucharest: Imprimerie Independenţa, 1915), 16.
31 For the legal status of Romanian Jews until World War I and in the interwar period, see mainly works by Carol Iancu: *Jews in Romania, 1866–1919: From Exclusion to Emancipation* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1996); and *Les juifs en Roumanie, 1919–1938: de l'émancipation à la marginalisation* (Paris: Peeters, 1996). For their citizenship status against the background of Romania's doctrine of citizenship, see Iordachi, *Liberalism, Constitutional Nationalism, and Minorities*, esp. 256–399.
32 See Constantin Iordachi and Blasco Sciarrino, "War Veterans, Demobilization and Political Activism: Greater Romania in Comparison," *Fascism: Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies* 6 (2017), 74–116.
33 Iosif I. Gabrea, "Statistică şi politică şcolară," *Buletinul oficial al ministerului instucţiunii, cultelor şi artelor* 2, no. 1 (April 1932), 28, cited in Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics*, 234. The term "revolution" should be taken with a grain of salt, however. Although the number of students tripled from 1913 to 1923, it should be noted that (1) the number of students in the Old Kingdom was low as compared to other European countries, and that (2) after 1918 the country doubled its territory and population, incorporating new universities. A comparison with developments in other European countries shows that, despite the expansion of its higher education system, Romania still lagged behind as far as the number of students was concerned: in 1932, Romania had 23,766 students, making up 0.14 percent of its population, as compared to a share of 0.22 percent in Czechoslovakia, 0.20 percent in Hungary and Bulgaria, and 0.15 percent in Poland. On average, in 1921–1932, Romania spent 12.5 percent of its annual budget on education, as compared to 25.47 percent in the USA, 15 percent in Bulgaria, 14.3 percent in Poland, and 14.2 percent in Hungary. See M. Popescu-Spineni, Iulian Peter, and Iosif I. Gabrea, "Organizația învățământului în România," *Enciclopedia României* (București: Imprimeria Națională 1938), vol. 1, 479, 476.

34 See Livezeanu, *Cultural Politics*, 28–48. For a comprehensive treatment of the process of student radicalization in interwar Romania, see also Dragoş Sdrobiş, *Limitele meritocraţiei într-o societate agrară: Şomaj intelectual şi radicalizare politică a tineretului în România interbelică* (Iaşi: Polirom, 2015).
35 Popescu-Spineni, Peter, Gabrea, "Organizaţia învăţământului în România," 478.
36 Ibid., 480.
37 See Rogers W. Brubaker's definition of the nation-state as "the state 'of' and 'for' a particular, distinctive, bounded nation," in *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 28.
38 This situation persisted into the post-war period. Thus, a statistical study published in 1938 pointed out that in the period 1921–1932, there were 218,281 Romanian students, representing a share of 1.5 percent of the total number of Romanian pupils who attended primary school. In the same period, there were 46,181 Jewish students, making up a share of 7.6 percent of Jewish pupils who attended primary school. The study concluded that, in proportional terms, "the participation of Jewish students to higher education is five times higher than that of the Romanians." Popescu-Spineni, Peter, Gabrea, "Organizaţia învăţământului în România," 480.
39 Ion Scurtu, Cristian Troncotă, Natalia Tampa, Dragoş Zamfirescu, and Ion Bucur, eds., *Totalitarismul de dreapta în Romania. Origini, manifestări, evoluţie 1919–1927* (Bucureşti: Institutul Naţional Pentru Studiul Totalitarianismului, 1996), 200–202.
40 Moţa, *Cranii de lemn*, 117.
41 Benedict Anderson, "The Origins of National Consciousness," *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 2006 [1983]), 37–47.
42 Ion Zelea-Codreanu, *Crâmpeie de amintiri*, 1936, available at http://www.miscarea.net/ion-zelea-codreanu-crampeie-de-amintiri1.htm.
43 On patterns of ideological reproduction, see Tamar Liebes, Elihu Katz, and Rivka Ribak, "Ideological Reproduction," Political Behavior 13, no. 3 (Sep., 1991), 237–252. The study argues that, while parents generally reproduce their political ideas in their adolescent children, hawkish parents are more likely to do so as compared to the dovish ones.
44 Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, "Nota Brigăzii de Siguranţă Iaşi despre o întrunire a studenţilor," in *Totalitarismul de dreapta în Romania*, edited by Scurtu et al., 236–237, my emphasis.
45 See electoral poster of LANC, August 1925, ANIC, Bucharest, Fond DGP, file 16/1923, 131.
46 ANIC, Bucharest, Fond "Ministerul de Interne. Diverse," file 1/1923.
47 See Ioan Moţa's narrative on the impact of the visit to Mărăşeşti on his son in A. Vântu, "Ion I. Moţa. Schiţă Biografică," *Cuvântul Studenţesc* XII (January–February 1937) 1–4, 6.
48 Zelea-Codreanu, *For My Legionaries (The Iron Guard)* (Reedy, West Virginia: Liberty Bell Publications, 1990), 162.
49 ANIC, MI, Diverse, File 1/1923, 2, 3.
50 "Procesul studenţilor dela Văcăreşti," *Renaşterea*, II, no. 14 (April 6, 1924), 2–3.
51 Goga, "După achitarea studenţilor," *Mustul care fierbe*, 74.
52 "Procesul studenţilor dela Văcăreşti," 2–3. Vernicescu survived the attack. According to the deposition of Nicolae Petraşcu, Vernicescu attended Moţa's burial ceremony in Orăştie in 1937. Impressed by his gesture, Codreanu removed Vernicescu from the list of the Legion's enemies. See ACNSAS, Fond Informativ, File Nicolae Petraşcu I 151086, vol. 1, 125.
53 See the depositions of Moţa and Codreanu in *Totalitarismul de dreapta*, 392–394.
54 Moţa, *Cranii de lemn*, 115.
55 Later on, leading Legionaries reinforced that idea that "Moţa was the theoretician of violence and not Codreanu, as it was believed." See ACNSAS, Fond Informativ, File Nicolae Petraşcu I 151086, vol. 1, 13.

56 See Codreanu's deposition in *Totalitarismul de dreapta*, 393–394.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid., 388.
60 Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, "Chestiunea Căminului," *Pământul Strămoşesc* II, no. 10 (May 15, 1928), 4.
61 Codreanu, *Totalitarismul de dreapta*, 311.
62 Titus H. Constantinescu, *Acuzarea in procesul Corneliu Zelea Codreanu. Rechizitor ţinut în audienţa dela 25 mai 1925* (Turnu Severin: L. I. Niculescu and Ion N. Bojeneagu, 1925), 4.
63 ANIC, MI Diverse, File 1/1923, 4.
64 Zelea-Codreanu, *For My Leginaries*, 134.
65 Ibid.,
66 ANIC, Fond A. C. Cuza, file 47/1924, 1.
67 ANIC, Fond A. C. Cuza, file 48/1925, 2.
68 Ioan Istrate, "Liga, D. A. C. Cuza şi Generaţia tânără," *Cuvântul* (July 20, 1926), 1, in ANIC, MI-Diverse, file 1/1924, 18.
69 ANIC, Fond "Ministerul de Interne. Diverse," 8/1927, 36.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid., 37.
72 Ibid., 39.
73 Ibid., 37.
74 Ibid., 38.
75 Ibid., 53.
76 Ibid., 60.
77 Ibid., 38.
78 Peter Berger and Brigitte Berger, *Sociology: A Biographical Approach* (New York: Basic Books, 1975), 243.
79 Ibid., 244.
80 Ibid., 249.
81 Ibid., 243, 250.

References

ACNSAS. Fond "Informativ," File Nicolae Petraşcu I 151086, vol. 1.
ANIC. Fond "Ministerul de Interne. Diverse," files: 1/1923; 1/1924; 8/1927.
ANIC. Fond "DGP," file 16/1923.
ANIC. Fond "A. C. Cuza," files: 47/1924; 48/1925.
Abrudeanu, Ion Rusu. *Păcatele Ardealului faţă de Sufletul Vechiului Regat. Fapte, documente, facsimile*. Bucureşti: Cartea Românească, s.a.
Alter, Peter. *Nationalismus*. Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main, 1985.
Anderson, Benedict, "The Origins of National Consciousness," *Imagined Communities*. London: Verso, 2006 [1983].
Ante-Proect de Constituţie întocmit de secţia de studii a Partidului Tărănesc. Bucureşti, Tipografia Viaţa Românească, 1922.
Bastow, Steve. "Integral Nationalism." In *World Fascism: A Historical Encyclopedia*, edited by Cyprian Blamires, vol. 1. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2006.
Berger, Peter, and Brigitte Berger. *Sociology: A Biographical Approach*. New York: Basic Books, 1975.
Brătianu, Vintilă I. C. *Scrieri şi cuvântări, Vol 1, 1899–1906*. Bucureşti: Imprimeria Independenţa, 1937.
Brubaker, Rogers W. *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Brubaker, Rogers W. *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001.

Bruja, Radu Florian. *Extrema Dreapă în Bucovina*. Târgoviște: Cetatea de Scaun, 2012.

Colescu, Leonida. *Analiza rezultatelor recensământului general al populației României din 1899*. Bucureşti: Institutul Central de Statistică, 1944.

Colescu, Leonida. *La population de religion Mosaïque en Roumanie. Étude statistique*. Bucharest: Imprimerie Independența, 1915.

Colomy, Paul. "Neofunctionalism and Neoinstitutionalism: Human Agency and Interest in Institutional Change," *Sociological Forum* 13, no. 2 (1998): 265–300.

Consiliul Legislativ. Zece ani de activitate 1926–1936. București: Institutul de Arte Grafice Luceafărul, 1936.

Constantinescu, Titus H. *Acuzarea in procesul Corneliu Zelea Codreanu. Rechizitor ținut în audiența dela 25 mai 1925*. Turnu Severin: L. I. Niculescu and Ion N. Bojeneagu, 1925.

Goga, Octavian. "Orașele." In *Mustul care fierbe*. București: [Imprimeria Statului], s.a.

Hamangiu, C, ed. *Codul General al României*, vol. XIX, 1931, București: Alcalay, s.a.

Hayes, Carlton J. H. *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*. New York: R. R. Smith, Inc., 1931.

Hitchins, Keith. *Rumania, 1866–1947*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.

Iancu, Gheorghe. *The Ruling Council: The Integration of Transylvania into Romania, 1918–1920*. Cluj-Napoca: Center for Transylvanian Studies, 1995.

Iancu, Carol. *Jews in Romania, 1866–1919: From Exclusion to Emancipation*. Boulder: East European Monographs, 1996.

Iancu, Carol. *Les juifs en Roumanie, 1919–1938: de l'émancipation à la marginalization*. Paris: Peeters, 1996.

Institutul Central de Statistică. *Anuarul Statistic al României, 1939 şi 1940*. Bucureşti: Imprimeria Naţională, 1940.

Iordachi, Constantin, and Blasco Sciarrino. "War Veterans, Demobilization and Political Activism: Greater Romania in Comparison," *Fascism: Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies* 6 (2017): 74–116.

Iordachi, Constantin. *Liberalism, Constitutional Nationalism and Minorities: The Making of Romanian Citizenship, 1750–1918*. Leiden: Brill, 2019.

Iorga, Nicolae. *Conferințe și prelegeri*. Bucureşti: Institutul de Istorie Universală Nicolae Iorga, 1943, 73

King, Charles. *The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 2000.

Hausleitner, Mariana. *Die Rumänisierung der Bukowina 1918–1944. Die Durchsetzung des nationalstaatlichen Anspruchs Großrumäniens*. München: Oldenbourg, 2001.

Legea pentru unificarea administrativă. Bucureşti: Institutul de Arte Grafice şi Editură, s.a.

Liebes, Tamar, Elihu Katz, and Rivka Ribak "Ideological Reproduction," *Political Behavior* 13, no. 3 (1991): 237–252.

Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Stein Rokkan. "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction." In *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, edited by Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan. New York: The Free Press, 1967.

Livezeanu, Irina. "Interwar Poland and Romania: The Nationalization of Elites, the Vanishing Middle, and the Problem of Intellectuals," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 22 (1998): 407–430.

Livezeanu, Irina. *Cultural Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building, and Ethnic Struggle, 1918–1930*. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1995.

Marcu-Balş, Petre. "Autohtonia ordinei juridice (Concepţia rationalistă şi concepţia istorică a codificaţiilor)." *Gândirea* VIII, no. 6–7 (1928): 263–272.

Mavrogordatos, George Th. *Stillborn Republic. Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece, 1922–1936*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1983.

Monitorul Oficial, no. 212 (December 13/26, 1918); no. 4 (April 4, 1920).

Moţa, Ion I. *Cranii de Lemn. Articole, 1922-1936*. Sibiu: Totul Pentru Ţară, 1936.

"Procesul studenţilor dela Văcăreşti," *Renaşterea*, II, no. 14 (April 6, 1924): 2–3.

Popescu-Spineni, M., Iulian Peter, and Iosif I. Gabrea, "Organizaţia învăţământului în România," *Enciclopedia României*. Bucureşti: Imprimeria Naţională 1938, vol. 1, 443–482.

Rădulescu, Alexandru. *Unificarea Legislativă*. Bucureşti: Curtea Naţională, 1927.

Schivelbusch, Wolfgang. *The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery*. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003.

Scurtu, Ion, Cristian Troncotă, Natalia Tampa, Dragoş Zamfirescu, and Ion Bucur, eds. *Totalitarismul de dreapta în Romania. Origini, manifestări, evoluţie 1919–1927*. Bucureşti: Institutul Naţional Pentru Studiul Totalitarianismului, 1996.

Sdrobiş, Dragoş. *Limitele meritocraţiei într-o societate agrară: Şomaj intelectual şi radicalizare politică a tineretului în România interbelică*. Iaşi: Polirom, 2015.

Vântu, A. "Ion I. Moţa. Schiţă Biografică," *Cuvântul Studenţesc* XII (January–February 1937) 1–4: 2–20.

Zelea-Codreanu, Corneliu. "Chestiunea Căminului," *Pământul Strămoşesc* II, no. 10 (May 15, 1928): 4.

Zelea-Codreanu, Corneliu. *For My Legionaries (The Iron Guard)*. Reedy, West Virginia: Liberty Bell Publications, 1990.

Zelea-Codreanu, Ion. *Crâmpeie de amintiri*, 1936, available at http://www.miscarea.net/ion-zelea-codreanu-crampeie-de-amintiri1.htm.

Zeletin, Ştefan. *Burghezia Română. Orginea şi rolul ei istoric*. Bucureşti: Nemira, 1997.

2

A NEW POLITICAL FAITH

National Authenticity and the Cult of the Ancestors

The Legion in Politics: An Overview, 1927–1937

The Legion "Archangel Michael" was established on Friday, June 24, 1927—the day of the religious feast of St. John the Baptist—by a nucleus of activists led by Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu and Ion I. Moța as an "alternative" organization of radical nationalists. The official magazine of the movement, called *The Ancestral Land* (*Pământul Strămoșesc*) was launched on August 1, 1927, printed with the help of Moța's father, who published the magazine *Libertatea* in Orașt ie. The first oath-taking ceremony of the movement took place on November 8, 1927, the religious feast of the Archangels Michael and Gabriel. The Legion was based in two rooms in the Iaşi Cultural House, and a chapel where Legionaries venerated the icon of the Archangel Michael.

The history of the movement in its first decade of existence can be divided into three main parts: 1927–1929, an incipient period of ideological clarification and organizational consolidation; 1930–1934, an interval of harsh political-ideological battles and violent confrontations with the authorities; and 1935–1937, when the Legion enjoyed political continuity and turned into a mass political party. From its inception, the Legion had a paramilitary structure and a conspiratorial nature. Codreanu described it as "an organization with an offensive character. It is a new army, with a new system of organization and with new principles of fight, which appeals to the combative elements of the people."[1] He recommended that the cells of the organization, called "nests" (*cuiburi*), act as machine-gun posts: they had to be secret and well camouflaged in order to surprise the enemy. Codreanu also affirmed, early on, the Legion's fascist nature and underscored its totalitarian goals:

> All these nests forming the Legion … are tasked with the mission to take control of the public spirit, of the national economy, of all directions of our public life, liberating them from the influence of the occult Jewish power,

DOI: 10.4324/9780429428043-4

> and working toward a new Romania through the implementation of vast reforms with a fascist character in all directions of our state life.[2]

Although the Legion demanded the abolition of the "corrupt" and "unrepresentative" parliamentary system, in July 1927, soon after its creation, Codreanu decided nevertheless to run in national parliamentary elections, thus taking advantage of the multiparty political regime he demagogically criticized. Lacking financial means, political experience, and extensive local networks of activists or sympathizers, the Legion obtained only 10,761 votes—0.39 percent of the electorate—clustered in several regional centers, most importantly in Northern Moldova, the Banat, Central Transylvania, and Southern Bessarabia.

Another turning point in the history of the movement occurred at the end of 1929 when, after a period of political passivity caused mainly by financial problems, Codreanu set as the Legion's new strategic goal "to go to the masses."[3] The first political rally of the Legion was organized on December 15, 1929, at Bereşti, Galaţi County, in Western Moldova, despite the hostile attitude of the authorities. The success of that initiative encouraged Codreanu to attempt a propaganda march in Bessarabia. That historical region was singled out for the action because it was close to the Legion's birthplace, but was also relatively isolated and not fully integrated into Romania's new political system. The Legion hoped to fill the political vacuum through new methods of political recruitment and activism. In addition, since Bessarabia had a sizeable Jewish population, the march enabled the Legion to claim that it directly confronted the "Judeo-Bolshevik" danger.

The Legion's march was set to start on January 20–21, 1930, with an electoral meeting at Cahul, but the authorities prevented the gathering. Following a personal audience between Codreanu and a sub-secretary of state in the Ministry of Interior in Bucharest, the government finally authorized the Legion to organize an electoral meeting in Bessarabia on February 2, 1930. On that day, an impressive column made up of 300 Legionaries, stationed in Oancea village, Galaţi County, crossed the Prut River and organized a popular gathering at Cahul, reportedly attended by approximately 20,000 peasants.[4] The success of the meeting convinced Ion Zelea-Codreanu, Corneliu's father, to join the organization. He subsequently played an important part in its development.

Codreanu's decision to enter active politics opened a period of violent confrontation with the authorities. The police and gendarmerie monitored the Legion's actions closely. Their reports from the territory emphasized not only the Legionaries' devotion and discipline, but also the strong impact of their style of politics on rural communities. Alarmed by the Legion's potential growth, the authorities used a combination of legal and repressive means to stop its marches in Bessarabia. To divert repression, on April 13, 1930, Codreanu established the Iron Guard as a new political section of the movement. In *For My Legionaries*, he confessed:

> There existed one great difficulty: How best to proceed so that the authorities would not oppose us, to avoid fighting the state, the army? It occurred

> to me that if I launched a new national organization for combating Jewish Communism, an organization inclusive of "The Legion of Michael the Archangel" and any other youth groups not affiliated with any political party, we might succeed in getting into Bessarabia. What name should we give this new organization? I debated this question with Legionaries, in the lobby of our Home. Some said: "The Anti-Communist Falange," others proposed other names. Crânganu said: "THE IRON GUARD!" "Let this be it!"[5]

Codreanu's strategy of forging a broad nationalist coalition under the banner of the Iron Guard did not pay off. On the one hand, no other nationalist party joined this new "umbrella" organization. As a result, the Legion and the Iron Guard became interchangeable labels for the same movement. Even their leadership and organizational distinctiveness faded away,[6] so that press *communiqués* or electoral materials were routinely issued in the name of both organizations. On the other hand, the authorities were well aware of the overlap between the Legion and the Iron Guard. They also grasped the radical, anti-establishment nature of the dual movement. A police report pointed out that the main feature of the Legion/Iron Guard was "the tendency to cleanse (*a curăți*) the Romanian state of all the elements dangerous for its natural development, in all fields."[7] The report underscored the Legion's "military structure," its dictatorial style of leadership, and its capacity to organize a sudden, well-orchestrated violent political action, such as a *coup d'état*.[8]

In July 1930, the Legion planned a second, much larger propaganda march in Bessarabia, one that would last for an entire month. Legionary units were convoked at Galați on July 20, and were to cross the Prut river to Bessarabia at seven different points and to march as far as the Dnister river.[9] In anticipation of this action, the Legion spread antisemitic manifestos in the province, urging the youth, regardless of their political affiliations, to enroll in the movement in order "to paralyze the action of paid adventurers of Bolshevism" and to counter their "criminal action of social disintegration and destruction of the Fatherland."[10] In the same vein, a manifesto of "Battalion I Covurlui," signed by Mihai Stelescu, the leader in charge of the Legionary organization in Bessarabia, stated unambiguously that "when the wealth of this country will not be in the hands of the foreigners, when there will be no Kikes in this country, then we will be happy."[11]

The prospective march created panic among representatives of ethnic minorities in Bessarabia, who appealed to the government to guarantee law and order. In reaction, authorities supplemented the troops in the province and increased political surveillance. On July 9, 1930, the Regional Inspectorate of Police in Bessarabia sent a circular letter asking all local units to determine "the real aim of the leaders of the Legion, in other words, the activity that will be conducted in Bessarabia, under what form and with what means."[12] Alerted by the reports from the territory on the Legion's paramilitary nature, and in view of the tense inter-ethnic situation in Northern Transylvania and Southern Bukovina, on

July 31, 1930, the Ministry of Interior forbade the Legionary march.[13] Firm police measures were taken to prevent the entry and political action of Legionaries in the province.[14]

On January 3, 1931, invoking the recurrent clashes between authorities and Iron Guard activists in the territory, the government of the National Peasant Party (NPP), led by Prime Minister G. G. Mironescu, issued a first decree outlawing the Legion "Archangel Michael" and the Iron Guard. Codreanu and six other leaders (namely Mile Lefter, Ion Banea, Mihai Stelescu, Nicolae Totu, Constantin Dănilă, and Amos Horațiu Pop) were arrested and sent to trial. At the same time, the police and gendarmerie took additional measures to paralyze the potential actions of the Legion at the local level.[15] The gendarmerie of Ismail County, for example, reported that "the inhabitants belonging to the Legion are identified and kept under surveillance."[16]

At the end of February, the Legionary leaders were acquitted by the court against the government's will and released from prison. The Legion capitalized on this success. An electoral call released on February 25, 1931, by the Legionary Senate and the Superior Council urged Romanians to enroll in the movement to fight the Jewish threat, "the communist terror," and "politicianism."[17] Tactically, the call portrayed the Legion as a "Christian, monarchist, national, constitutional, legal, and order-abiding" organization. In contrast, Minister of the Interior Ion Mihalache and his chief collaborator, Armand Călinescu, were denounced as national traitors and profaners of Christian and national symbols. Another triumphalist manifesto issued at the same time praised the justice system, admonished the leftist press for its hostile attitude, and pledged revenge. In a messianic fashion, the manifesto announced: "The sun of rebirth is continuously rising."[18]

The movement was quick to react, re-organizing its political activity under another camouflage label, the "Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu Grouping" (*Gruparea Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu*). As Codreanu pointed out, "the new designation, as expected, did not catch on. People, the press, enemy, the government, continued to call it the 'Iron Guard.'"[19]

Advantaged by intense publicity, even if for the most part negative, the "Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu Grouping" managed to triple its votes in the general elections held in June 1931, to a total of 34,000, but did not gain any parliamentary seats. On August 31, 1931, the party obtained its first major political success: Codreanu was elected deputy in the by-elections organized in Neamț County, against a National Liberal candidate. This event increased the movement's visibility. Although he was a rather poor speaker, lacking oratorical skills, once in parliament, Codreanu increased his public notoriety by attacking prominent members of the elite, publicizing massive loans they had received from the country's major banks, and calling for the death sentence in cases of abuse of government funds. Corneliu was soon joined in parliament by his father, Ion Zelea-Codreanu. The latter was elected deputy in Tutova County on April 17, 1932, after a "terrible" electoral fight, during which the National Liberals

committed—according to Argetoianu—"horrifying abuses" in order to avoid yet another defeat.[20]

The Legion experienced an electoral breakthrough in the national parliamentary elections held in June 1932, when it received 70,674 votes, representing a share of 2.37 percent of the electorate and five parliamentary mandates. Its political offensive was yet another piece of evidence that the multiparty system instituted under the 1923 Constitution entered a structural crisis, due mainly to the erosion of major parties but also to the destabilizing actions of King Carol II (r. 1930–1940), who—ever since his enthronement on June 8, 1930—undermined the multiparty system with the intention of establishing a regime of personal authority. On the one hand, the growing crisis of the legal-rational parliamentary system favored the emergence of new personalized forms of radical politics. On the other hand, dissatisfied with the outcome of the economic crisis, the electorate sanctioned the ruling parties, opting instead for radical organizations. The Legion was to be the most successful force among the plethora of new parties that mushroomed on the political scene in the 1930s. Indicative of the Legion's growth, its centers of power shifted from rural to urban areas. On November 8, 1930, the Legion transferred its political center to Bucharest, where it later built a principal seat called The Green House (*Casa Verde*), initiated on August 20, 1933,[21] and completed on November 8, 1936. The Legion's participation in elections and its advent to parliament also changed, to a certain extent, the nature of the organization. Although the Legionary deputies professed a form of anti-politics, they nevertheless entered mainstream politics, even if at the radical end of the spectrum.

On November 14, 1933, Carol II appointed a new National Liberal government led by I. G. Duca, with the task of organizing new parliamentary elections. The Iron Guard seemed to benefit from the ongoing political instability fully. It is telling in this respect that, in the new parliamentary elections scheduled for December 1933, the Iron Guard's list of candidates managed to cover, for the first time in its history, the entire territory of Romania. Alarmed by the Legion's growing popularity, but also its growing radicalism, the king demanded the government take firm measures to curb right-wing extremism. The National Liberal Party (NLP) was quick to act; while in opposition, the National Liberals had repeatedly expressed their concern that the consolidation of a home-grown fascist mass movement was a direct threat to the multiparty system established by the 1923 Constitution. I. G. Duca, the leader of the party, openly criticized the Vaida government for tolerating the Legion and pledged to take firm measures against right-wing extremism if in power. Externally, Romania's traditional allies, first and foremost France but also Great Britain, were concerned the country would derail within the Nazi sphere of influence, thus destabilizing the Versailles political order in Central Europe. Firm anti-fascist measures were also imperiously demanded by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nicolae Titulescu, who argued that a ban against the Legion would greatly facilitate Romania's ongoing negotiations for a governmental loan from the League of Nations. Last

but not least, Carol II seemed also to favor the adoption of anti-Legionary measures. Aside from foreign policy considerations, the king was also alarmed by the fact that, although the Legionaries declared themselves monarchists and appeared to be sympathetic to the new king, they were openly hostile to Elena Lupescu, the king's influential Jewish partner. By approving repressive policies, the king intended to send a strong warning to the Legionaries, in an attempt to ease their antagonism toward Lupescu and to force their cooperation with the monarchy.

On December 9, after intense deliberations, the National Liberal government issued a decree banning the Legion "Archangel Michael" and the Iron Guard.[22] Harsh police measures followed against the Legionaries but also the democratic political opposition. The government's tactics of silencing the opposition bore fruits, assuring the ruling party a crushing victory in the parliamentary elections. On December 19, the NLP won 51 percent of the votes (and 300 parliamentary seats out of a total number of 387), followed at a significant distance by the former ruling NPP, which captured only 13.9 percent of the vote. In retaliation, on December 29, 1933, a Legionary terrorist squad made up of three Macedo-Romanians assassinated the National Liberal Prime Minister I. G. Duca at Sinaia.[23] This event, and the repression that followed, marked another turning point in the evolution of the movement. The foremost Legionary leaders were arrested and sent to trial, and the activity of the Legion was effectively paralyzed. The trial ended on April 6, 1934, with life sentences for Duca's three assassins, but with the full acquittal of the Legion's leadership. The acquittal of the "moral authors" of the assassination exposed the hesitation of the political elite, which had neither the full legal means nor a direct interest to suppress the Legion completely. On the contrary, having learned that martyrdom serves the Legion's ascension, members of the establishment tried to channel the Legion into a clientelist direction, and to utilize it for their own transient political goals. While this strategy seemed to pay off in the short term, in the long run, it would prove inefficient in taming the Legion's radicalism.

After serving a political ban of one year, on December 10, 1934 Codreanu set up a new party called "All for the Country" (*Totul pentru Țară*). To mask its continuity with the Legion, Codreanu entrusted the leadership of the new party to the notorious but controversial General in Reserve Gheorghe "Zizi" Cantacuzino (1869–1937), the Legion's Captain claiming he would dedicate himself to educational activities.[24] "Evidently, it was still Codreanu acting in the shadow of the General," noted in his memoirs Father Dumitrescu-Borșa, the secretary of the new party.[25] A descendant of the prestigious Cantacuzino princely family, with roots in the Byzantine Empire, General Cantacuzino distinguished himself in Romania's military campaigns during the Second Balkan War (1913) and World War I (1916–1918). His heroism gained him the nickname *Grănicerul* (the Border Guard), the highest military medal "Michael the Brave," the rank of General (in reserve), as well as the reputation of being a staunch anti-communist.[26] After the Great War, capitalizing on his prestige, the General engaged in politics, as part of the nucleus of generals leading the People's Party.

With the decline of that party, he defected to the conservative "Vlad Ţepeş League." In 1932, dissatisfied with traditional parties, the old Conservative politician decided to link his political fortune to that of the Legion. In 1934, the eccentric and adventurous aristocrat accepted the task of leading the "All for the Country" party only on the formal condition "that we all recognize Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu as our superior chief."[27] The leading slogan of the new party was "All for the Country, the King and the Cross." Cantacuzino's contacts with high-ranking people and royal circles, as well as his political influence served the Legion well, protecting it in relation to the Royal Palace and other state institutions, and conferring it public prestige. The relatively wealthy General also supported the Legion financially, turning his Bucharest residence on Gutenberg Street 3 into the Legion's headquarters.

Once re-launched under a new political label, the Legion gradually re-inserted itself into Romanian political life. Benefiting from three consecutive years of legality (1935–1937), the Legion's membership thrived, the number of nests (groupings of at least seven members) grew from 3,495 in December 1934 to 4,200 in May 1935, to 12,000 in January 1937, and to 34,000 in December 1937.[28] The Legion's gradual but steady development posed a significant challenge to Romania's political establishment, which was deeply divided over parliamentarian, authoritarian, or totalitarian political options. Political life was again dominated by the NLP which, after five years of political opposition (1928–1933), re-instated its rule based on traditional methods of government (November 1933–December 1937). The party was, nevertheless, weakened by an acute internal confrontation between old and new leaders. To undermine its internal cohesion even further, Carol II appointed the leader of the "young" National Liberals, Gheorghe Tătărescu, as Prime Minister. Although unpopular and largely isolated within his party, Tătărescu proved a loyal servant of the king. He promoted a policy of forced industrialization, favoring the economic interests of the National Liberal elites and the royal *camarilla*, financed through heavy taxation of the peasantry. He also assisted the king's efforts to weaken major parliamentary parties and to subordinate right-wing movements as vehicles of Carol's personal regime.

In this context, the National Liberal government led by Tătărescu adopted an ambivalent attitude toward the Legion, trying to appease its anti-establishment radicalism and to re-direct its violence against the ruling party's rivals. These—inconsistent, as they were—efforts at *captatio benevolentiae* did not bear fruits. Once re-launched on the political scene under a new name, the Legion resumed its confrontation with the authorities. To increase the combative spirit of his movement, in 1934 Codreanu proclaimed December 10 as "The Day of Legionary Suffering," in commemoration of the repression inflicted by Prime Minister Duca in 1933. His circular letter included as its *motto* an oath calling for revenge: "We swear not to forget the horrors and crimes committed by the Liberal Party, the butcher of the Romanian youth and the Romanian people."[29] Since December 10 was also the anniversary of the first national student

congress (1922), the date symbolically linked antisemitism with the fight against the Romanian political establishment.

To weaken the Legion from within, the government also encouraged internal factionalism and defections. In 1934, Mihai Stelescu defected from the movement, with secret governmental support and encouragement, and formed a rival organization called *Cruciada Românismului* (the Crusade of Romanianism). The tactics were applied to divide major parliamentary parties, as well: in 1935, Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, former Prime Minister and a prominent member of the NPP, established a new right-wing political organization in the service of the king, called the Romanian Front (*Frontul Românesc*), agitating for *numerus clausus*. In the same year, Octavian Goga—who had previously defected from the People's Party created in 1919 by the war hero General Alexandru Averescu—united with A. C. Cuza's National Christian Defense League (*Liga Apărării Naţional-Creştine*, hereafter LANC) into a new antisemitic organization called the National Christian Party. This process of fragmenting the great parties was thus accompanied by an attempt to re-group nationalist parties to create an alternative radical right wing in Romanian politics, rival to the Legion. However, the assassination of Stelescu in 1936 by a Legionary squad and internal rivalries within the nationalist camp inhibited the process of coalescing Romania's "family of authoritarians," who remained divided between its fascist and radical right wings.

To diminish the Legion's influence, the government also attempted to countermobilize the country's youth in support of the monarchy. To this end, in May 1934 Carol II established the "Country's Sentry" (*Straja Ţării*) to promote "the moral, national-patriotic, social and physical education of the entire youth of both sexes, for boys between 7 to 18 years, and for girls between 7 to 21 years." *Straja* was designed as an independent state institution having its own leadership, patrimony, and network of subordinate institutions, such as the "Romanian Archers' Association," the "Romanian Falcons' Association," the "Christian Association of Youngsters," and the "Christian Association of Women." The king was proclaimed the Commander-in-Chief of the new organization; he was assisted by a Commander, a "Superior Guidance Council," and a "Permanent Council," made up of appointed dignitaries and ministers. In addition, the government sponsored a new student organization, called the Block of the Nationalist Generation of 1922 (*Blocul generaţiei naţionaliste din 1922*), made up of former student leaders with a critical attitude toward the Legion.[30] By way of these organizations, the authorities attempted to monopolize youth activism and to channel their energies into mandatory paramilitary activities.

Carol's direct involvement in *Straja*'s activities led to a battle over controlling the youth (for further details on the confrontation between Carol II and the Legion over controlling the youth in 1934–1937, see Sdrobiş, *Limitele meritocraţiei*, 207–219). Codreanu instructed the Legionaries to de-legitimize *Straja* as a dictatorial instrument of rule, stemming from the king's political ambitions. The Legionary propaganda portrayed the paramilitary training methods of *Straja* as merely "exterior forms," arguing that they lacked "a deep, vivid spiritual

content." Ion I. Moța, for example, pointed out the great gap that existed between the officially-enrolled youth and the nationalist youth who were animated by faith in a divine mission, and were led to victory by a truly charismatic leader: "On this path we have a brave Captain, an unmistakable guide toward the total victory of tomorrow, and we have the conviction that we serve the great mission of the Romanian youth."[31] "We, the nationalist youth," continued Moța, "are used to struggle for the ideal of Romanian redemption (*învierii românești*), and we are ready to die facing the enemies of this redemption." The Legionaries' ultimate goal was "the dream of a Romanianized Romania, brave, moral, and freed of the Jewish yoke, of immorality and cowardice."[32]

The Legion's style of politics based on the paramilitary mobilization of the youth had a strong impact on Romanian politics. *Straja*, but also the main political parties, including the democratic ones, emulated the Legion's paramilitarism. Not surprisingly, LANC was the first to form paramilitary "assault battalions" devoted to instruction, sport, propaganda, and excursions. Conceived as "an elite combative organization, organized militarily,"[33] these battalions covered the entire territory of the country. Their main aim was "to support unconditionally the political organization in promoting the Cuzist doctrine, through publication and demonstration and in electoral propaganda through sustained and organized activity."[34] Even the mainstream NPP organized its own "peasant guards," with the role of protecting the party from the right-wing menace. In reaction, Codreanu instructed the Legionaries to intensify their paramilitary training day and night, and to be ready for violent confrontations.[35] Fearing an escalation of political violence ahead of the parliamentary elections, in 1937 the government decided to ban paramilitary units throughout the country.[36]

Despite steady efforts, Carol's campaign to undermine the Legion's recruitment base yielded limited results. *Straja* and *Blocul* were no match for the Legion's proselytizing force among the youth and thus failed to make an impact on the student movement. On August 29, 1936, alarmed by the assassination of Stelescu earlier that year and the intensification of the Legionary terrorist threats against leading politicians, the king re-shuffled the government, who then adopted firmer measures against political radicalism. Although apparently signaling a new political orientation, these measures were too little, too late. Arguably, they were meant to put additional pressure on the Legion to cooperate with the king rather than try to eradicate it. Carol's ambivalent attitude was symptomatic of the public confusion over the Legion's alleged dual nature, which displayed a mixture of idealism, altruism, and criminality. In February 1937, under the strong impression generated by the funeral ceremonies of Moța and Marin, Carol II made a final attempt to subordinate the Legion. The secret negotiations conducted with Codreanu were nevertheless fruitless. Codreanu's account of the encounter with the king, recalled to the NPP politician Zaharia Boilă during a meeting that took place on March 11, 1937, illustrates the former's deep convictions over the charismatic nature of his leadership.[37] To the king's request to be proclaimed "the Captain" of the Legion, Codreanu opposed

the unique and non-transferable nature of his charismatic authority, replying that charismatic faith cannot be the object of a political transaction.

Codreanu's refusal led to an open confrontation with the king. In response, the government initiated a new wave of political repression, ordering the closure of all Legionary camps and restaurants under various pretexts.[38] In a manifest to students sent in April 1937, Codreanu accused the political establishment of betraying the national cause, arguing that these restrictions were imposed "only because you [the youth] live and grow in the Legionary faith."[39] The Captain was well aware of the gravity of the conflict, which entered a more acute phase. Sources from his entourage collected by *Siguranța* in April 1937, pointed out that the Captain was so obsessed by the fear that he will be assassinated by order of the king that he seemed to have "totally lost his calmness and rationality."[40] To counter the king's hostile campaign, Codreanu tried to re-position the Legion on the political spectrum, by forging alliances against Carol. His political prediction was that the NLP, the king's main political ally, would be unable to remain in power, eroded as it was by its long rule; the new elections would instead generate a center-right government, based on a coalition between Iorga and Vaida-Voevod's Romanian Front, endorsed by the king. In this context, Codreanu's political strategy was : (1) to avoid any provocations that would provide the government a pretext for engaging in anti-Legionary repression; (2) to maintain the collaboration agreement signed with Vaida-Voevod in May 1936; and (3) to try a rapprochement with Iuliu Maniu, a prominent politician of the NPP and a staunch opponent of Carol II. Since at the time the NPP was led by Ion Mihalache, and included numerous arch-enemies of the Legion—such as Armand Călinescu, Virgil Madgeau, and Dr. Nicolae Lupu, responsible for the previous bans on the Legion in 1931 and 1932—Codreanu tried to exacerbate internal splits within the party, supporting Maniu's anti-Carol faction to regain leadership. He also encouraged the reconciliation between Maniu and Vaida on a constitutional, regionalist, and anti-Carolist platform.[41] As the internal situation within the NPP was volatile, Codreanu used spies to monitor Maniu's actions.[42] In case the former were to decide to reconcile with the king, Codreanu was determined to reconsider his position toward Carol as well, but in a manner that would not appear as an abdication from his principles. Codreanu's alliance with Maniu and his formal renunciation of violence in the electoral campaign did not go uncontested, however. Gheorghe Clime, the new head of "All for the Country," thought the Legion should be on the offensive, responding to violent provocations, and asserting its political force in open confrontation with its enemies.[43]

On November 17, 1937, the king entrusted Gheorghe Tătărescu with the formation of a new government for organizing parliamentary elections. Failing in his endeavor to be nominated Prime Minister, Mihalache, the leader of the NPP, resigned in favor of Maniu. This change cleared the way for the alliance between Codreanu and Maniu. On November 25, the NPP signed an electoral pact of non-aggression with the Legion, in fact, a disguised alliance on an anti-Carlist platform. This alliance enhanced the image of the Legion as a respected oppositional

51 00085

PARTIDUL „TOTUL PENTRU ŢARA"

CAPITANUL

CORNELIU
ZELEA CODREANU

SF. ARHANGHEL MIHAIL

CE VOR LEGIONARII?

1) PEDEAPSA CU MOARTEA pentru toţi hoţii cari au furat banul public, trădătorii de Ţară şi spionii ;

2) REVIZUIREA şi CONFISCAREA averilor celor ce s'au îmbogăţit din munca cinstită a ţăranului ;

3) PÂINE pentru toată lumea : nu se poate ca unii să mănânce cozonac iar cei mulţi să nu aibă nici mămăliga şi să moară de foame ;

4) PEDEAPSĂ ASPRĂ pentru funcţionarii necinstiţi şi pentru acei cari obijduesc poporul sărac ;

5) SALARII ONORABILE pentru funcţionarii Statului, spre a nu fi siliţi să fure din banul ţării : funcţionarul va fi plătit omeneşte, ca să poată trăi o viaţă de OM.

Dacă însă va fi prins că FURĂ, va fi pedepsit cu MOARTEA ;

6) UNIRE INTRE TOŢI CREŞTINII pentru înălţarea Bisericii strămoşeşti şi alungarea lui IUDA, care vrea să ne strice credinţa noastră sfântă ;

7) STĂRPIREA POLITICIANISMULUI şi trimiterea la muncă cinstită a tuturor agenţilor electorali, cari sug viaţa satelor ;

8) ALUNGAREA CĂMĂTARILOR, jidani şi jidoviţi, cari sug de atâta amar de vreme munca cinstită a norodului.

Toate acestea vor fi legi în 24 ore după biruinţa legionară.

Şi se ştie că LEGIONARII nu glumesc. Ei când îşi iau angajamentul să facă ceva se ţin de cuvânt. Faptele lor de până acum o dovedesc.

LEGIONARII LUPTĂ PENTRU PÂINE ŞI DREPTATE, în credinţa lui Hristos.

Cine li se împotriveşte înseamnă că nu vrea pâine şi dreptate pentru neamul românesc şi Biruinţa oştilor Crucei împotriva Diavolului.

FIGURE 2.1 Electoral poster of the "All for the Country" Party (*Continued*)

FIGURE 2.1 (*Continued*)

Note: The poster illustrates the popularization, for electoral purposes, of the Legion's charismatic doctrine of messianic nationalism, based on a combination between the cult of the Archangel Michael as the bearer of divine messages and protector of the chosen people, and the cult of the "Captain" Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, proclaimed the new Messiah and invested, in the Legionary faith, with the divine mission of national salvation. It is important to note that in order to visually represent the Archangel, the Legionary propaganda did not employ Orthodox icons, but Baroque iconography: the poster reproduces a painting by Guido Reni entitled "St. Archangel Michael" (1635), located on the altar of a chapel at the church of *Santa Maria della Concezione dei Cappuccini*, Via Veneto, Rome, built by Pope Urban VIII in 1626. The church is also known for the approximately 4,000 skulls of Capuchin friars, on display in the crypt.

Source: *Arhivele Naţionale Istorice Centrale*, Bucureşti, Fond Ministerul de Interne, Diverse, file 28/1935, 51.Historicism and the Legionary Rituals

force, boosting its electoral support. "All for the Country" was, at least apparently, one of the main winners of the general parliamentary elections that took place in December 1937 (see Figure 2.1). Codreanu expected a maximum of 25–30 parliamentary mandates for the Legion, while Clime predicted 30 mandates (thus a score of approximately 7–8 percent of the votes).[44] Against these cautious predictions, the Legion received 437,378 votes, representing a share of 15.58 percent of the total electorate and 66 mandates (out of a total 390), becoming the third-largest political party of the country. Despite its impressive electoral score, the Legion's accession was a double-edged sword. The party rose to political prominence, but its incomplete "victory" and its isolation made it vulnerable to state repression.

In June 1937, during the celebration of ten years of the Legion's existence, Codreanu claimed that the Legion encompassed "one million souls of women, children, young and old men, *who have a new faith*, who live, fight, and sacrifice themselves under the Legionary flag."[45] In a triumphalist manner, the Captain promised the Legionaries "a decade of political victories"; as will be shown in Part II, what in fact followed were years of harsh repression at the hands of three distinct dictatorial regimes.

The "Saint Political Faith" of the Legion "Archangel Michael"

The Legionary ideology was not ready-made but crystalized gradually through its first decade of existence. Ever since its emergence on the political scene, the Legion claimed to be an organization of a different stock: in contrast to conventional parties, the Legion had no political program. Instead of pursuing a concrete plan of action, the Legion defined as its goal the salvation of the Romanian nation under Codreanu's charismatic leadership and through the sacrifice of the Legionaries as the "recipients of the saving force."[46] At the beginning, the new organization was animated by a "state of mind" or a credo, sketched mostly during the formative period from 1922 until 1927; later, in the first three years of the Legion's existence (1927–1930), that credo was further elaborated into a comprehensive doctrine of national salvation. The foundations of this doctrine consisted of the tradition of messianic nationalism and sacralization of politics in the Old Kingdom of Romania; the militant antisemitism of the National Democratic

Party led by Nicolae Iorga and A. C. Cuza, which was further developed in the nationalist creed of LANC; and prewar traditions of nationalist struggle in the multiethnic provinces of Transylvania, the Banat, and Bukovina. This core was enriched with new themes and a new ethos of student activism by the founding group, the *Văcărești*; and through the "teachings" of Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, the "Founder of the Legion," and Ion I. Moţa, his closest collaborator. In the first years of the Legion's existence, the primary vehicle of ideological expression was *Pământul Strămoșesc*, a journal that provides a window into the movement's early organization and political evolution. To these were added, during the 1930s and 1940s, other contributions in a plethora of new publications, authored most notably by the intellectuals belonging to the so-called *AXA* (Axis) group, such as Vasile Marin, Mihail Polihroniade, Vasile Christescu, Puiu Gârniceanu, and Alexandru Cantacuzino; and by other prominent leaders such as Ion Banea, Ilie Imbrescu, and Constantin Papanace, among others.

The first outline of this grandiose religious scenario of salvation was advanced in 1928 by Ion I. Moța. In a polemical exchange with a prominent member of the "old" generation of nationalists, Gheorghe Bogdan-Duică, professor at the University of Cluj, Moța put forward his understanding of Romanian society at the time as the scene of a truly apocalyptic war: affirming his belief that "our life is ruled by God's power and rules," Moța emphasized that the action-model of the Legion was "Jesus, whose teachings (synthesized mostly in the heavenly miracle of the Resurrection) we understand as following: No matter how powerful would Satan be, when you fight him by sacrificing your own life, heavenly omnipotence intervenes and makes you triumphant."[47] Moța defined the Legion as a community of predestined warriors, a "multitude of human forces aimed, through the struggle until the end of these forces, to prepare the coming of the other conquering forces which, if we are fated for salvation, must intervene in our favor … as they intervened on numerous occasions in the history of mankind."[48]

In the spirit of Iorga's nationalist teachings, the Legionaries claimed they were professing a religious faith: "We don't do, and we have never done a single day in our lives, politics … We have a religion, we are the servants of the faith."[49] In the same vein, Codreanu posited that movements such as the Legion "have more than a program, they have a doctrine, *a religion*," so that "the Legionaries are men of strong faith who are ready, they will serve to the last breath."[50] The Legionary political faith was not based on reason: it claimed a "revealed" nature, stemming from the Gospel, but was also rooted in the Romanian people's "genius," history, and soil.[51] The Legion put forward a charismatic scenario of divine salvation through violent struggle. Centered on the devotional model of *imitatio Christi*, this scenario had the following main components: (1) faith in an omnipotent but benevolent God who harbored divine plans for election and salvation; (2) the belief in the Romanian nation as the elect nation, able to bring about the salvation and redemption of humankind; (3) the belief in the Archangel Michael as the guardian angel of the elect nation; (4) Codreanu as the predestined charismatic commander leading the way to salvation; (5) the Legionaries as

God's chosen warriors and martyrs of the new creed for national salvation; and (6) the Romanian people—past and present—and humanity, in general, as the recipients of salvation.

This scenario had all the elements of apocalyptic politics but adapted them to the Romanian and European interwar contexts. Legionaries consciously emulated the behavioral model of Christian crusaders, especially of Christian military orders: they saw themselves as an earthly army bearing divine revelation, who guided the nations under the direction of the charismatic leader and alongside the heavenly army of God's angels against Satan; the Romanian people and humanity as the recipients; Jews, led by demons, and the Bolsheviks, were the enemies; Romanian politicians and the church leaders were the Judas and the traitors; and the interwar period was the apocalyptic battle scene, first in Romania but also in Europe (for instance, Bolshevik Russia and Spain during the Civil War). The ultimate, declarative goal of the Legionaries was the redemption of the people through the forging of a new man; the creation of a totalitarian state in Romania, and its corollary, the new Legionary man and woman, as part of a new international order dominated by new chosen people; and the end of history through the resurrection and salvation of humanity. Within this broad scheme, Codreanu, Moţa, Alexandru Cantacuzino, and other leading members of the *AXA* group articulated complementary or, at times, even divergent visions on the unfolding of this gigantic and highly complex charismatic scenario of salvation.

Legionaries continued to emphasize, time and again, the link between the 1922 student movement and the Legion. As Vasile Marin argued: "In 1922, the true students discovered the formula of its salvation and, after a decade of fight, this became the formula of salvation for the entire nation."[52] Therefore, it was from the student movement that "we expect the regeneration of our entire life," because "[i]t has a faith, it serves it with sacrifice, and it fulfills it with the risk of life itself."[53] The main features of Legionary ideology, as it evolved throughout the late 1920s and the 1930s, were revolutionary ultra-nationalism, populism, and social conservatism; taken together, these traits place the Legion into the fascist political camp. The Legion was, first and foremost, an ultra-nationalist organization: its ultimate aim was to consolidate the Romanian nation-state by cleansing it from the "unwanted others." Its discourse glorified the virtues of the Romanians as God's "chosen people" and the titular nation of Greater Romania and proclaimed them as the ultimate source of political legitimacy, sacrality, and justice. It also advanced a mythical vision of Romanian history, based on the Romanians' past glory but also their collective victimhood caused by historical sufferings and defeat at the hands of foreign enemies and internal traitors. The Legionaries condemned the alleged "decadent state" of the nation and projected its lost glory into the ideal of future salvation. The message of salvation was embedded into a populist discursive matrix, based on the confrontation between the homogeneous and virtuous people and a corrupt transnational elite.[54] The Legionaries argued that, as divine creations, peoples had the ethical obligation to

live according to God's rules; yet, the free arbiter led them either to the righteous path of salvation or the evil path of damnation.

Another dimension of Legionary ideology was social conservatism, based on a romanticized, backward-looking nostalgia for the ancient patriarchal organization of the family and, by extension, of society.[55] For the Legionaries, the ideal society was an idyllic rural community, allegedly based on traditional social norms such as customary mores, Christian values, and patriarchal order and hierarchy. The main threat to the perpetuation of this ancient social order were the Jews, accused of "invading" the Romanians' national territory and of corrupting their national elite. To express this Manichean vision of the world as a perpetual confrontation between the forces of redemption, identified with the good, and the forces of degeneration, identified with the evil, the Legionaries contrasted the "pure people" to the image of the Jews and of the "treacherous" Romanian elites, both demonized as mortal enemies that needed to be eliminated. They also adopted a highly bellicose language, having at its core religious concepts such as divine providence, damnation, and salvation through purification and cleansing. The Legionaries argued that, in order to overcome the forces of decadence, a radical systemic change was urgently needed, in the form of a national revolution conducted by violent means. The fight for national redemption took cosmic proportions: it engaged the Romanians, as the elect nation, but also Europe and the whole world.

Salvation Through Regeneration

Numerous scholars have pointed out that the myth of rebirth and regeneration constitutes the ideological core of fascism. However, the actual content of the myth of regeneration and the political actions and ritual practices associated with it have, to date, remained insufficiently explored. As the etymological and genealogical histories of the term clearly demonstrate, regeneration is a notoriously multivocal term, employed in various discursive traditions with at least four distinct, albeit interrelated, meanings. The verb "to regenerate" can mean (1) to form again, or become formed again; (2) to recover from decline, that is, to return from a state of decline to a revitalized state; (3) to replace lost tissue or a body part by new growth; and (4) to restore and renew somebody morally or spiritually.[56]

What was the meaning of the concept of "regeneration" in Legionary discourses, and what were the ritual practices associated with it? Fascist ideologues employed several concepts synonymous with regeneration—e.g., rebirth (*înviere*), purification (*purificare*), cleansing (*curățire*)—to refer to a variety of religious, political, or Eugenic meanings and practices leading to the ultimate goal of salvation (*mântuire*). The act of regeneration was to take place simultaneously at different levels, pertaining to different recipients: humankind; the nation, as "God's chosen people," bringing about the regeneration of humankind; and the fascist units as chosen warriors; and the individual who entered the fascist movement and underwent a spiritual and moral transformation. The salvation of these entities was described in view of different complementary, overlapping, or even contradictory

discursive traditions: religious-charismatic; political-ethic; medical; and individual-baptismal. The work of salvation was dependent on God's divine protection and miracles, on the leader's charismatic qualities, and on the fascists' "heroic" fight against decline and degeneration by military, moral, or even eugenic means.

As these concepts show, the utopian fascist project of regenerating the nation did not just encompass the idea of spiritual rebirth through an inner transformation of the followers "from within." The regeneration of the nation rested both on the pedagogical work of education and movement-building, leading to the creation of new men and women through conversion and training, and on cleansing and the exclusion of the unwanted Other. It invariably referred to the renewal of the "authentic living material" of the nation, on the one hand, and the removal of the infected tissues of the nation, on the other. The language employed by fascist texts was, at times, heroic-militaristic, arguing for the revival of the fighting spirit of the nation, while at other times it employed medical and even eugenics arguments, alluding to the regeneration of essential parts of the nation's "body."

The essence of Legionary ideology was a kenotic vision of palingenesis centered on the idea of regeneration through sacrifice, following the model of *imitatio Christi*. To this palingenetic ideological core, the Legionaries associated other components of Romantic theories of palingenesis, such as Christian eschatology, metempsychosis, and the idea of ecumenical redemption of humankind, the predestination and divine mission of the Romanian people, and heroic Christianity through the expiation of sins and martyrdom. Together, these interrelated ideas constituted the palingenetic core of the Legionary political faith.

First, the Legionary charismatic scenario of divine salvation was founded on the belief in the existence of a just and benevolent God who allows for the happiness and salvation of all peoples. Faith in God was one of the four supreme guiding principles of the movement, as defined by Codreanu: "All of us [the founders of the movement] believed in God. None of us was an atheist. The more we were alone and surrounded, the more our preoccupations were directed to God and toward contact with our own dead and those of the nation. This gave us an invincible strength and a bright serenity in the face of all blows."[57] Second, the Legion saw Christian salvation as the ultimate end of history, entailing "the resurrection of people from the dead" and the people's holiness and communion with God as the apotheosis of human collectivities. In line with Romantic visions of nationalism, the main actors and subjects of redemption were not individuals but nations. In the spirit of the universal ecumenism that characterized the Romantic Evangelical revival in Europe, salvation was granted to all peoples of the world:

> The final aim is not life but resurrection. The resurrection of peoples in the name of the Savior Jesus Christ … There will come a time when all the peoples of the earth shall be resurrected, with all their dead and all their kings and emperors, each people having its place before God's throne. *This final moment*, "the resurrection from the dead," is the noblest and most sublime one toward which a people can rise.[58]

Codreanu envisioned the people as an entity "whose life continues beyond earth." In doing so, he articulated ideas about metempsychosis, namely the belief that the soul is an independent and immortal entity that passes from the body to an inanimate state. Ideas about metempsychosis as a form of collective solidarity and redemption were widespread during Romanticism; however, while the Romantics spoke about the universal redemption of mankind, the Legion believed in the *rebirth of the nation, as an organic entity*. Connected with the understanding of the nation as a community of kin, this belief claims that individual souls come together into a unified, collective spiritual consciousness. In Codreanu's view, the nation possessed three main composing elements: "1. A physical, biological patrimony—her flesh and blood; 2. A material patrimony—the soil of her country and its riches; 3. A spiritual patrimony."[59] The nation's spiritual patrimony was made up of "her concept of God, the world and life," "her honor," and her culture, regarded as "the expression of national genius, of the blood."[60] For Codreanu, the national community was made up not only of the community of interwar ethnic Romanians, but meant all past, present, and future generations:

> When we say the Romanian nation, we mean not only all Romanians living in the same territory, sharing the same past and the same future, the same dress, but all Romanians, alive and dead, who have lived on this land from the beginning of history and will live here also in the future. The nation includes 1. All the Romanians presently alive, 2. All the souls of our dead and the tombs of our ancestors, 3. All those who will be born Romanians. A people becomes conscious of itself when it attains the consciousness of this whole, not only of its own aims.[61]

Legionary metempsychosis did not involve belief in the transmigration of souls or reincarnation, but belief in the return of long-departed ancestors. Although cast in a Christian matrix, Legionary metempsychosis also invoked the religion of the ancient Dacians and their leading God, Zamolxis, a former slave of Pythagoras,[62] thus adding a neo-pagan component to Legionary ideology. Legionaries also incorporated popular beliefs that the departed soul of a deceased person hovered around the place of burial at least for a certain time after death. These different streams of thought were amalgamated into a new doctrine of salvation and expressed in innovative forms of ritual practice.

The Main Axes of Legionary Ideology: The Earthly and the Divine

The core dimension of the Legionary faith was the cult of national authenticity. Expressed in many forms, this cult rested mainly on the idea of the existence of a predestined communion between the Romanians as the elect nation and their national homeland. To assure the salvation of the nation as an organic

physical, material, and spiritual entity, Legionary ideology and ritual practice encompassed two main axes originating from the process of sacralizing politics initiated in the mid-nineteenth century: the cults of the Archangel Michael and the ancestral land.

The first axis conferred upon Legionary ideology a transcendental dimension, linking it to the holy or the sacred. Codreanu explicated the origins of the Legionary cult of the Archangel in various ways, attributing it either to a divine revelation he had in prison or to a collective vision of the leading nucleus of activists, both inspired by an icon of the Archangel from the Văcărești Monastery (see Figure 2.2). In a first account put forward at a student congress in 1927, Codreanu claimed that a collective prayer in front of the icon of the Archangel in the church of the Văcărești Monastery helped the Văcărești group identify their traitor. "Seeing that the divinity helped us," recalled Codreanu, "we decided to proclaim Archangel Michael the protector of our youthful fight."[63] In his autobiography, Codreanu attributed the symbolism of the movement to a collective brainstorming of the leading nucleus of activists at the Văcărești Monastery.

To be sure, the cult of the archangel was very popular in the Eastern Orthodox Commonwealth, Michael being widely venerated as a saint fighting the infidels

FIGURE 2.2 The icon of Archangel Michael from the Văcărești Monastery, which allegedly inspired Codreanu's charismatic "revelation." Saint Michael is depicted holding a sword in one hand and the scale of justice in the other.

Source: ANIC, MI Diverse, 4/1929, 15.

and protecting the virtuous. The political utilization of Michael's cult had a strikingly similar precursor in Russia's League of the Archangel Michael led by Vladimir Purishkevich (also called the Union of the Russian People of the Archangel Michael), which split in 1907 from the Union of Russian People, a movement regarded by some scholars as "Europe's first fascist organization."[64] I contend that none of these movements had religious roots, but were linked to the process of sacralizing politics around the monarchy: Russia's League of the Archangel Michael was linked with the cult of the Romanov dynasty and the archangel as their divine protector, while the Romanian Legion's cult of the Archangel Michael was directly linked to the tradition of Romantic nationalism initiated by Heliade in the second quarter of the nineteenth century, further developed under Carol I, and institutionalized at the Dealu Military School in 1912. The movement's symbolism and genesis narrative suggest that Codreanu internalized the charismatic scenario of Heliade's *Mihaida*, having as main components the hero's prophetic dream, the icon of the revelation, and the cult of Archangel Michael linked with Michael the Brave's divine mission of bringing unity to the Romanian people. Although this link was never *openly* revealed by the Legionaries, the work of their leading ideologues contains *encoded* clues hinting to the continuity between the Legionary interwar cult of the Archangel Michael and the Romantic salvational dual cult of Michael the Brave and of his patron saint, Archangel Michael. Thus, in an article reviewing the "miracles" made by Archangel Michael, Ion I. Moța reiterated, in a veiled yet evident way, the symbolic bond between Michael the Brave and Archangel Michael that existed in the Romanian national ideology: "To us, the Archangel guards a grave recently laid down, *seemingly by chance*, right under a tombstone underneath his feet."[65] The direct allusion to the intrinsic link between the grave of Michael the Brave completed in 1920 in "St. Nicholas Church" of Dealu Mare Monastery (where Codreanu was a student), and the fresco depicting Archangel Michael on the wall opposite that tomb, is evident. This allusion, and the visits the founding members of the Legion paid to the battlefield of Mărașești and the Cathedral of the Coronation in Alba Iulia (see below), prove that they were well aware of the pre- and post-war genealogy and symbolism of the dual cult of Michael the Brave and Archangel Michael in Romanian national ideology. Yet this link remained "coded" on purpose, and thus hidden to the uninitiated.

Archangel Michael thus became the primary source of the Legion's ideology and symbolism and the object of a fanatic cult; the commemoration of Michael on November 8 was proclaimed the official celebratory day of the movement.[66] A large copy of the icon which allegedly inspired Codreanu's vision was proclaimed the sacred relic of the Legion and was permanently guarded by a Legionary team in the main headquarters of the movement in Iaşi. The icon was also reproduced on the cover of the Legion's official magazine; additional copies were dispersed to regional organizations, while a miniature was worn by Codreanu upon himself. This led to a Legionary cult of the icon of Archangel Michael as a symbol

of divine revelation and protection: "Our Patron Saint is the Archangel Michael, we ought to have his icon in our homes, and in difficult times we should ask his help, and he will never fail us."[67]

The second ideological axis of the Legion was the cult of the ancestral land of the nation. This cult inspired the name of the official magazine of the movement, *Pământul Strămoşesc* (The Ancestral Land). The etymology and meanings of this title are key to understanding Legionary ideology: The word *pământ* is of Indo-European origin and means earth, land, or soil; its derivate, *pământenire* or *în-pământenire* means becoming of the place, going native, later meaning also naturalized to Romanian citizenship;[68] another important derivate of the word is the expression *obiceiul pământului*, meaning the custom of the land (customary mores). The word "*strămoşesc*" is a derivate from the word "*moş*," a polysemantic word of Dacian origin.[69] Although the original meaning of the word *moş* is that of "old man," the term was extended symbolically to ancestors and forefathers in the form *strămoş*, meaning "blood relative in a direct line," the primordial forerunner or forefather of a family or people. Another derivate from the word *moş* is *moşie*, meaning landed estate but also "motherland," and *moşnean*, meaning free landowning peasant.

An expression of the phenomenon of the territorialization of nationalism, this ideological axis gave the Legion an "earthly" dimension, linking it to the cult of the ancestors and of the martyrs. Codreanu claimed that, according to a "God-given law," the land is the nation's basis for existence.[70] The Legion advanced its own views on the ideal territorial and ethnic borders of the nation, by claiming historical rights over a particular territory and declaring it an indivisible entity. The ancestral land was presented as the cradle of the ethnogenesis and Christianization of the Romanian people, with Legionary propaganda emphasizing the continuity of the Romanian people on the same territory, without interruption.

The cover of *Pământul Strămoşesc* (see Figure 2.3) illustrates, in a nutshell, the two main axes of Legionary ideology. In the center of the picture is the venerated icon of Saint Michael. Above it, there is a swastika, which was used in the iconography of the antisemitic LANC in the early 1920s and was adopted by the Legion as well. On the left side of the picture, there is a quotation from the Romanian poet George Coşbuc, glorifying sacrifice:

> Gods if we were descending from
> We would still be mortal
> It makes no difference if you die
> Young men or hunchbacked old
> But it is not the same to die
> A lion or a chained slave.

On the right side of the picture, there is a quotation from the Bible attributed to Saint Michael: "I mercilessly direct my sword toward the filthy hearts who come into the immaculate house of God." This quotation is taken from a

PĂMÂNTUL STRĂMOȘESC
ORGAN AL LEGIUNII „ARHANGHELUL MIHAIL"
PENTRU APĂRAREA PĂMÂNTULUI STRĂMOȘESC
„Din zei de-am fi coborîtori,
C'o moarte tot suntem datori,
Tot una e dac'ai murit
Flăcău ori moș îngârbovit,
Dar nu-i tot una leu să mori
Ori câne 'nlănțuit!"
Decebal către Popor.
(Gh. Coșbuc).
„Spre inimile cele necurate care vin întru preacurata casă a lui Dumnezeu, — fără milă întind sabia mea".
(Cuvinte ce se află pe icoana Sf. Arhang. Mihail din Biserica Încoronării dela Alba-Iulia).
IAȘI, 1927.

FIGURE 2.3 Cover of the official publication of the Legion "Archangel Michael," *Pământul Strămoşesc*

Source: *Pământul Strămoşesc*.

depiction of Archangel Michael on the door of the shrine in the Cathedral of the Union in Alba Iulia (written on the paper-roll depicted in Figure 2.4). Four of the founding members of the Legion—Ion I. Moța, Tudose Popescu, Radu Mironovici and Ilie Gârneață—visited the Cathedral in January 1924; in his memoirs, Gârneață recalled the strong impression the visit made upon them:

> In the evening of the New Year, 1924, we four went to spend few days with Moța's family, at Orăștie … With a car we visited Alba Iulia and the

FIGURE 2.4 The representation of Archangel Michael on the shrine of the Cathedral of the Coronation (*Catedrala Încoronării*) in Alba Iulia

Source: Photo by Constantin Iordachi.

> Cathedral of the Coronation, with its beautiful style. There, in the left side of the shrine, we found the figure of Saint Archangel Michael, which bore the inscription: "I mercilessly direct my sword toward the filthy hearts who come into the immaculate house of God," and we all copied it.[71]

This depiction of the Archangel from the Coronation Cathedral was subsequently venerated by the Legionaries as the symbol of national unification—or, in the words of Moţa, "the icon of the union"—and this explains why the Legionaries placed it on the cover of their leading journal.

The territorialization of nationalism in Legionary ideology was made evident by the fact that the cover of the magazine reproduced, under the icon of the Archangel, a map of Greater Romania indicating major Romanian cities; the black spots show the proportion of Jews to the total population of each city in an attempt to document the alleged "Jewish invasion" of Greater Romania. The "invaded" areas were regarded as "gangrenes" in the nation's ancestral land, in violation of God's laws. This representation was inspired by Octavian Goga's article "The Cities (*Oraşele*)," an influence that reveals the continuity between the old and the new generation of nationalists.[72]

The cult of the ancestral land was an attempt to re-root the national community in time and space, by presenting its habitat as the land of history and destiny of the chosen people. This attempt was expressed in two ways: The first one was to develop a form of ethnonature, by asserting the nation's right over a "predestined" and thus well-differentiated national homeland, bordered by rivers, mountains, sea and other natural demarcations, thus in effect ethnicizing and consequently appropriating that habitat. The second one was the naturalization of historical landmarks of the nation, presenting them as an organic, predestined part of the natural setting of the respective community.[73]

The sacralization of the national land was done, first and foremost, through the veneration of the ancestors' graves, but also through the cult of the peasantry and its "organic" link to the land. The cult of the earth in Legionary ideology, and its derivates, the cult of the fatherland and the cult of the ancestors and of heroes, were rooted in popular traditions. In the popular Romanian mythology, all significant rites of passage, such as birth, marriage, and death are directly related to. and thus strongly connected with the earth, as "three rites of one and the same cult of the earth."[74] In Legionary ideology, the cult of the earth was linked, first and foremost, with funeral rites and rituals. The national territory was symbolically marked by the graves of the Romanian national heroes: in Codreanu's words, "We are bound to this land by millions of graves." Another practice strongly connected with the cult of the earth, and widely used in Legionary ideology, was that of employing earth samples as witnesses for oath-taking (or, in the popular tradition, also for curses).[75]

Together, the two vertical and horizontal axes of Legionary ideology united, in a potent symbolism, the earthy and the divine: "Here we are with the borders of our movements firmly fixed: With one side implanted in our ancestral land, and with the other in the sky: the Archangel Michael and *The Ancestral Land*." The two axes were an expression of the Legion's *historicism*, with roots in Romantic palingenetic historical ideology: they were meant to unite the pre-Christian (Dacian), roots of the Romanian people with its Christianity and manifest destiny leading to redemption and salvation.

The founding ceremony of the Legion is representative of the manner in which the movement's main ideological axes shaped their ritual practice. The ceremony took place on November 8, 1927, the shared holiday of the

Archangels Michael and Gabriel. The main event of the day was the oath-taking ceremony and the awarding of leather bags containing earth samples from memorial sites connected with the "national" history of the Romanians, temporally spanning the second war between the Romans and Dacians (105–106 CE) to World War I. The events selected—which referred to glorious victories, tragic defeats, or martyrdom for the "national cause"—were representative of the Legionaries' historical imaginary. The most important samples originated from the grave of Michael the Brave in Turda (1601) and the battleground of Războieni, where Stephen the Great (Ştefan cel Mare), lost 10,000 soldiers fighting the Ottomans (1476). To these, the Legionaries added, following a chronological order, earth from Costeşti, the first fort conquered by the Roman army during its siege of Sarmizegetusa, the capital of the Dacian Kingdom (106); the battleground of Călugăreni, where Michael the Brave achieved his greatest military victory against the Ottomans (1595); Podul Înalt, where Stephen the Great won an impressive victory against the Ottomans (1475); the medieval Moldovan fortresses of Suceava, Neamţ, Soroca, and Hotin; and from Roşcani, commemorating the martyrdom of the Wallachian prince Ioan the Terrible (Ioan cel Cumplit). In Transylvania, samples were gathered from Alba Iulia, in memory of the martyrdom of Horea, leader of the 1784 peasant uprising, and the grave of Avram Iancu, leader of the Transylvanian Romanians in the 1848–1849 revolution. A third set of samples originated from the battlegrounds of the Romanian army during World War I, commemorating the defeat of Romanian forces in Turtucaia (Dobrudja); its heroic resistance on the Jiu River; the victories of Mărăşti, Mărăşeşti, and Oituz; and the bloody fights of Caşin.

Earth samples were accompanied by "certificates of authenticity" issued by the emissaries sent to these sites of memory. Their letters were published by Codreanu in *For My Legionaries*, together with descriptions of the historical events they evoked, taken from a secondary-school history textbook.[76] The earth samples were placed on a white tablecloth and mixed by two Legionaries in a profoundly solemn ceremony, during which participants saluted the flag of the Legion and sang its hymn, seen as the Romanian people's cry of desperation and appeal to bravery. According to Codreanu's recollection, the highly "elevating and emotional" ceremony symbolically linked the Legion with the "two-thousand-year-long" history of the Romanian people.

Each participant took an oath of allegiance to the Legion and received a leather sack. The oath bound the participants to unconditional and perpetual allegiance to the nation and the Legion. They committed themselves to fight ceaselessly for "defending, cleaning, and liberating the ancestral land" from Jewish domination. Thus, although the Legion claimed a form of "defensive" nationalism, its program was xenophobic and antisemitic. The leather sack was conceived as a "holy talisman" for the Legionaries, inspiring their heroism: "Let it be so that, by wearing at our heart the talisman of the holy earth of the ancestral land, we extract from it the heroic blood and spill it into our own veins." During that

time, the sack became a definitory element of the Legion. A police report from Câmpulung, dated January 12, 1933, pointed out that: "The leather sack is the size of a plum, has the sign of the swastika on it, and is held secretly." The sack is given "by the supreme chief of the organization only to their fanatical and well-known fighters."[77]

The symbolism of the sack illustrates the Legionaries' mythical view of Romanian history. To fully understand this ideological dimension, we need to explore the fascists' historical imagination, as well as their self-representation vis-à-vis history.[78] In the spirit of the Romantic pantheon of national heroes, the Legionaries celebrated as Romania's greatest heroes the princes Michael the Brave (Mihai Viteazul), Stephen the Great, Vlad the Impaler (Vlad Ţepes), Alexandru I. Cuza, and also Tudor Vladimirescu, the leader of the 1821 uprising. At the center of this pantheon stood Stephen the Great and Michael the Brave, the most glorious heroes of the Romanians' national history, one originating from Moldova and the other from Wallachia. The importance of the two historical figures for Legionary historical mythology is proven by the fact that Stephen the Great is mentioned 19 times in Codreanu's *For My Legionaries*; the name of Michel the Brave appears five times, second only to Stephen the Great.

The cult of Stephen the Great was an expression of Codreanu's Moldovan regional identity. In the context of Greater Romania, Stephen the Great was also able symbolically to re-unite Moldova with Bessarabia and Bukovina, thus better integrating them within Romanian national ideology. Although the two newly-annexed provinces were rather peripheral in the new state, they were important for the genesis of the Legion. For Codreanu, Stephen was the exemplary monarch, and the model of the fighting hero: "Stephan the Great has shone in history for 500 years and Romanians remember him because he identified himself perfectly with the destiny of his people."[79] In Codreanu's historical imaginary, the cults of the two princes were tied together, and their celebration interlinked with the cult of Archangel Michael:

> On the second day after Christmas we again took to the road. We had stopped at a church on our way to say a prayer in remembrance of Michael the Brave, Horea and his men, and lancu, so they would know too that we were treading today on the paths on which, out of their love for our people, their bodies had been tortured and ripped apart. it was the feast of St. Stefan; therefore I lighted a candle for the repose of Stefan the Great's soul; through him our people reached the greatest glory. I consider him equal in rank with Napoleon, Julius Caesar and Alexander of Macedon. No matter where my steps are going to carry me or into what battles I shall engage, if above me I feel the shadow of St. Michael the Archangel and below me those of our twenty beloved martyrs of the family of the Legionary movement, on my right I shall also feel the soul of Stefan the Great and his sword.[80]

Fighting Decadence: Antisemitism and Totalitarian Cleansing

To understand the Legion's ideology and practice, we need to explore not only the core concept of rebirth and regeneration, but also its dark side, that of murderous cleansing. An integral part of the fascist "regenerative" project was the idea of cleansing the nation by removing the unwanted elements that allegedly "invaded" the national land and affected the ethnic/cultural/racial purity of the nation. Legionary ideology is representative of other fascist movements in this respect, as it targeted an "Other" in their effort to restore the purity of the nation and to elevate it to the "dignified status" it deserved in regional or world affairs.

The Legionary palingenetic vision was based on Christian visions of apocalyptic eschatology. While emulating the language and symbols of the Old Testament—as adapted and interpreted by Romantic projects of societal-religious regeneration—Legionary eschatology also incorporated modern political themes, such as antisemitism and anti-communism, which were drawn from turn-of-the-century European literature and adapted to the local culture of interwar Romania.

The idea of regeneration was accompanied by its counterpart, fear of decline and degeneration. Ever since the nineteenth century, palingenetic visions of Romanian nationalism explained decadence in view of the decline of the traditional aristocracy and the loss of its militarist spirit. Ion Heliade blamed decadence on the harmful effect of upstarts or parvenus (*ciocoi*) who subverted the class of native boyars.[81] The Romantic poet Mihai Eminescu (1850–1889) attributed decadence to the disappearance of native boyars, replaced by a "superimposed" cosmopolitan urban class of foreigners, who mercilessly exploited the peasantry.[82] In their view, the regeneration of the nation was possible only by reviving the patriarchal order of the Middle Ages characterized by an organic alliance between the native boyar class and the peasantry. At the turn of the century, the conservative-militarist discourse glorified native boyars as the organic elite of the country, while the *semănătorist* discourse of Iorga hailed the idealized peasantry as the foundation of the nation and the repository of national values. At the same time, Iorga and his political ally, A. C. Cuza, opposed the peasantry to "foreign agents of degeneration"; if in the first half of the nineteenth century the main culprits of degeneration were the Greek Phanariots, in the second half of the century Romanian nationalists scapegoated the Jews, regarded as an invading alien middle class. An admirer of both Iorga and Cuza, Codreanu combined this legacy in an original synthesis. His ideas were imprinted onto the Legion, which put forward a multifold strategy of "purification." On the one hand, the national body had to be cleansed of alien elements, first and foremost, the Jews. On the other hand, the political class needed to be radically renewed by fighting "bourgeois politicianism" and reviving patriotic values and the militarist spirit under the leadership of the new fascist elites in close alliance with the last representatives of the Romanian nobility.

Codreanu invested antisemitism with new connotations and a renewed sense of urgency. He claimed that, in their attempt "to destroy the Romanian people,"

the Jewish anti-national attack concentrated on two main targets: conquering the Romanians' ancestral land, the material source of a nation's existence; and weakening the Romanians' religious faith, as the means of transcendental communication with God. The Jews thus acted against the two major axes of Legionary ideology, since atheism would sever Romanians' relation to God and the "holy," while the loss of the ancestral land would sever Romanians' relation to their dead.[83] Following the lines set by Heliade's cyclical philosophy of history, Legionary ideology identified two opposing trends of historical development: a descending one, leading to degeneration, and an ascending one, leading to redemption and regeneration (see Diagram 2.1). In Heliade's earlier vision, the two trends alternated cyclically, their tension eventually leading to progress on a higher level. In Legionary ideology, the two trends were mutually exclusive and could prevail over each other only by means of revolution. In the Legionary view, in the interwar period, humankind stood at a crossroads: individuals and peoples had to choose sides in the global confrontation between good and evil—identified with fascism vs. communism—and thus work either *toward* or *against* salvation. "If the country is not set on the path of resurrection envisioned by integral nationalism, she will choose the other path, of Communist reform," warned Moţa.[84]

Codreanu and Moţa employed the term revolution with two distinct meanings: (1) revolution as rapture, implying chaos, destruction, and the loss of traditional authority; and (2) revolution as a return to tradition and the restoration of a primordial idyllic state, in line with the original meaning of the term as a movement of rotation around an axis. The first acceptation of the term "revolution" as chaos was exemplified by the French Revolution and its "prolongation," the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. Codreanu condemned the "obsolete ideology of the French Revolution," blaming it for being based on "false abstractions" and for resulting in the loss of traditional values, such as religious faith. But he was



DIAGRAM 2.1 The Legion's apocalyptic view of the palingenetic cycle of decadence and regeneration leading to damnation or salvation

Source: Copyright Constantin Iordachi.

even more concerned with the contemporary Bolshevik Revolution, portrayed as a "devastating wave," an integral part of a universal "Judeo-Bolshevik" conspiracy. Carried on Romanian soil by the Jews, Bolshevism threatened to unfold into an "anti-Romanian revolution," aiming at "the dethronement of the king, the destruction of churches, and the massacre of the officers and hundreds of thousands of Romanians."

To counter the "anti-Romanian action of the Jews," the Legion proposed an elaborate plan of elimination on several levels. In the field of education, the Legion fought for the implementation of a policy of *numerus clausus*, but only as a "transitory solution, until the time will come for the implementation of the true solution: NUMERUS NULLUS, or the total elimination of the Jewish population from universities."[85] This anti-Jewish solution was only valid, however, concerning institutions of higher education. As for Romanian society as a whole, the Legionaries argued for "a series of 'preparatory and transitional' measures, to limit the enemy's mastery and to reduce it whenever possible, preparing at the same time the great, total purification."[86] In the economic field (although later the Legion was to launch a campaign in support of "Legionary trade" at the expense of "Jewish" trade), the Legionaries initially rejected the "theory of resolving the Jewish through economic competition."[87] Instead, they demanded "state measures, governmental measures, of public force," which were to operate "as a preparation for the radical salvation that will come at a later stage on the basis of such preparations."[88] An "Informative Memoir on the Relationship between Romanians and the Jews in Romania," signed by the leadership of the Legion and published in 1928, detailed the plans for a campaign of ethnic purification through the deportation of Jews in order "to eradicate the unusual influence of the Jews in the midst of other nations, through granting Jews a distinct territory where [they will] be forced to live, to work, to defend and create a civilization."[89] Pending the completion of those plans, the Legionaries declared a state of permanent war "between natives and the invading Jews,"[90] which justified, in their view, the use of violence against the latter.

The Legion's approach to "solving" the Jewish question was further detailed in January 1933 in Parliament by deputy Ion Zelea-Codreanu, who imbued it with overt racist connotations. Pointing out that, according to scientific findings, "the mixing of two distinct races yields disastrous results," the Captain's father argued that the Jewish question in Romania could only be solved through "elimination," meaning "your disappearance [i.e., of the Jews] from the country, pure and simple."[91] To this end, Zelea-Codreanu predicted that the Legion would come to power in approximately seven years (which, incidentally, meant 1940), and would adopt legislation meant to contain, with an iron fist, the Romanian Jewry, referred to as "the dragon with one million heads." He also demanded the adoption of a Nazi-inspired program of *Rassenhygiene* that would lead to the "purification of the race from the infiltration of Judaic blood." [92] This position was reiterated in the same year by Mihail Polihroniade, who went as far as to talk, in a cynical manner, about the "de-semiticization" of cities through a "forceful"

de-parasitization, stating unequivocally that "the Jews who came after 1914 shall be simply removed."[93] The xenophobic and antisemitic language of the Legion, with evident racist connotations, did not leave any trace of ambiguity regarding the fate of the Jewish population in a future Legionary totalitarian state.

The second meaning of the term revolution was that of spiritual rebirth and regeneration, exemplified in Codreanu's and Moţa's views of Legionary revolution. The post-1918 nationalist revolt of the Romanian students was presented as "a volcanic eruption rising from the nation's depths." Students "arose to battle," walking "on the great path of our national destiny, side by side with all those who fought, suffered, and died as martyrs for our land and its people."[94] As a direct continuation of the student movement, the Legion was a "great spiritual school"; its aim was to bring forward a "great spiritual revolution of the entire people" by transforming the Romanian soul. In the spirit of Romanticism, the fascist regeneration was seen as a restoration of medieval glory; but it was also a culmination of the historical development of the Romanian people: "The approaching Legionary victory will be the beginning of a great ascension and shine of the Romanian people in the world."[95] The Legion thus concomitantly promoted a 'regressive' and futurist political utopia based on the glorification of the Middle Ages but oriented toward forging the new man and the building of a totalitarian fascist state.

On the Way to Ideological Maturation: The Making of the Fascist Faith, 1930–1937

The first program of the Legion "Archangel Michael" and the Iron Guard, elaborated in December 1930 and presented by Codreanu to the Legionary Senate, provides a good indication of its ideological stance at that point in time. At first sight, the program seems closer to the radical right than to fascism.[96] The Legion defined itself as a "nationalist-monarchic organization," having as its main aim "the intact preservation of the situation won by Romania in the Great War." The driving force of the program was the principle of "the primacy and supremacy of the Romanian element on our land." The Jews were presented as the main obstacle in the process of national consolidation, together with the country's other ethnic minorities, classified according to their size and compactness, attitude toward Greater Romania, economic influence, and capacity and willingness to assimilate. The program proposed comprehensive measures meant to limit the Jewish presence and influence in Romania through the denaturalization and expulsion of recent immigrants, the denial of political rights to all Jewish inhabitants, and the implementation of a policy of *numerus clausus* in all spheres of life. These legal-political measures were to be accompanied by a protectionist economic policy meant to shelter the interest of the Romanian working class, to consolidate Romanian industry, and to create a strong Romanian middle class. The program did not advocate for the emancipation of women, but demanded the introduction of a multiple electoral vote by the male head of the

family, on behalf of all his legal "dependents." In a conservative-nationalist fashion, the program asked for the consolidation of national institutions, namely the School, the Church, and the Army, thus relying on the traditional triad that led the process of sacralizing politics in pre-World War I Romania. Yet the Legion's program also contained, in a nutshell, incipient fascist elements, such as demands for the reorganization of the parliament along corporatist lines; the fight against corruption and old-style politicianism and the need for a new elite; and calls for a spiritual revolution that would lead to a profound transformation of the soul of the nation.

During the 1930s, the Legion continued its process of ideological maturation, stimulated by the dynamics of its own internal development, by the ideological input of new converts of high intellectual reputation, and by external influences from Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. The most important events in this respect were the incorporation into the movement of leading intellectual circles such as the *AXA* group in 1932; part of the *Criterion* debating circle in 1932–1933; *Iconar* and *Însemnări sociologice* in 1935; and *Lumea Nouă*, mostly in 1935–1937. The cooptation of these intellectual groupings was facilitated by the mediating role played by four influential university professors and cultural figures: Nichifor Crainic, Nae Ionescu, Traian Brăileanu, and Mihail Manoilescu. All four directed influential cultural magazines and organized distinct intellectual youth circles around them, contributed to the elaboration of Legionary ideology of national salvation, proclaiming the primacy of faith over science and promoting an anti-democratic form of charismatic politics, and had high political ambitions, each trying to use the Legion to build a totalitarian-corporatist state under their leadership. Under their spiritual patronage, the Legion benefited from three major waves of intellectual enrollment: 1932–1933; 1935–1937; and 1940–1941. These infusions of intellectuals were landmarks in the history of the movement, as they contributed to the further elaboration of the Legion's ideology, also spelling out its similarities and differences to Italian Fascism and German National Socialism. Although these groups of intellectuals brought expertise from different academic fields (arts and literature, social sciences, theology, etc.), they all put their knowledge in the service of the new *Legionary faith*, defined as the most original and integrative collective belief system of the time.

Nichifor Crainic and the *AXA* Group

In the early 1930s, the steady growth of the Legion attracted the attention of nationalist politicians of various orientations who intended to shape the organization according to their own political visions. The first such attempt came from the multifarious poet, journalist, and theology professor Nichifor Crainic (1889–1972). Born as Ion Dobre in Bulbucata (Vlaşca County, Southern Romania), Crainic studied theology at the Central Theological Seminary in Bucharest, and at the University of Bucharest (1912–1916). Against his initial intentions,[97] Crainic failed to be ordained as a priest within the Romanian Orthodox Church,

and instead engaged in a teaching career in theology at the Universities of Chişinău (1926–1932) and Bucharest (1932–1944), accompanied by prodigious literary and journalistic activity in the leading cultural magazines of the time. In the 1920s, Crainic emerged as the leading animator of a distinct religious-nationalist cultural trend, generically called *orthodoxism*.[98] The first vehicle of this new cultural orientation was the magazine *Gândirea*. Launched in Cluj in 1921 (but transferred to Bucharest in 1922), the journal was gradually taken over by Crainic in 1922–1926 and turned into one of the most influential nationalist magazines of the time, centered on a conceptual triad of *isms*: *autochtonism–traditionalism–orthodoxism*. During the time, other influential texts were published by Crainic in *Calendarul*, *Vremea*, and *Sfarmă Piatră*.[99]

At its origins, *Gândirea* functioned as an eclectic forum of cultural expression and confrontation between modernists and traditionalists, "a bouquet of centrifugal tendencies, and almost ostentatious without a program."[100] Later, under Crainic's leadership, *Gândirea* increased its cohesion in favor of traditionalist-orthodoxist approaches. Crainic promoted a theological vision of the nation-state, having at its core the concepts of autochthonism and authenticity, heroism, the cult of the fatherland, the figure of Jesus Christ as a behavioral model, orthodoxy, and nationalism. The salient feature of his cultural agenda was the reevaluation of the relationship between orthodoxy and nationality under the form of religious nationalism. This orientation became the ideological mark of *Gândirea*, generically called *gândirism*.

Crainic defined the new traditionalist orientation in several programmatic articles published in 1924–26, in polemics with the modernist orientation of the literary critic Eugen Lovinescu, who promoted the "Europeanization" of Romania through imitation.[101] Crainic was deeply influenced by Oswald Spengler's *Decline of the West*.[102] He adopted Spengler's distinction between culture and civilization, his organic view of culture, his idea that civilization is the "fulfillment and finale of a culture,"[103] and his theory of the decline of the West. In line with Spengler, Crainic argued that the Occident entered the "civilizational phase of old age."[104] Fortunately, in Romania, the process of Westernization was superficial, and only touched the aristocracy; at the same time, the "patriarchal" Romanian peasantry managed to preserve its ancient soul, while "the ritual Orthodoxy protected this magic mentality of the peasantry."[105] If Romania wanted to avoid decline it had to reject imitation and instead return to its traditional, Oriental roots: "Following ourselves or Europe? Following the discipline of traditionalism or the law of imitation? … One means life in continuous creation; the other—abdication, cancellation, syncope, death."[106] That was because "[i]f in material civilization, imitation is a necessity, in culture it means the spiritual death of a people."[107]

Crainic set the new traditionalist orientation of Romanian culture on orthodox theological foundations. He promoted a Christian vision of the world based on the Gospel and centered on the figure of Christ the Redeemer. Following the work of Dionysius the Areopagite, Crainic argued that Jesus Christ promoted a

theandric or divine-human mode of salvation: the advent of Christianity thus equaled a second recreation of the world, this time by associating man with divine work.[108] Crainic adhered to a palingenetic, cyclical view of history, arguing that mankind could overcome decadence by successive recreations of human communities, by emulating—in character—the sacrifice of Christ.[109] He also believed in national messianism, archangelism, and predestination, claiming that "every people has its own protecting angel and every person, his guiding angel."[110] Just like Heliade in the nineteenth century, Crainic asserted that the world will be redeemed by Eastern orthodox Christianity, due to the fact that the Eastern Church preserved "the integral Christianity, uncorrupted as a doctrine."[111] The saving Parsifal could only come from the East, "whose Christian chaos predicts the future."[112] Crainic encouraged interest in Russian orthodoxy, theology, and literature as well, lamenting that "the Russian religious spirit, so close to us and which primarily interests us, is little known."[113]

The religious conception of life was all-encompassing or, in Cranic's words, totalitarian in character: "The Christian vision of the world is totalitarian in the sense that all things are included in Jesus Christ and their ideal roots converge in the divine Logos."[114] From this perspective, culture could only stem from faith: "Faith is the power that generates culture."[115] Moreover, since culture and science were integral parts of religion and not distinct phenomena, the path of faith and the path of knowledge were congruent: "The way of faith, understood as the unshakable adherence to revelation, leads through God to the essence of the world and of life."[116] This Christian view of the world shaped Crainic's view of culture, defined as "the totality of the creations of the human genius." Geniuses were, according to Crainic, "natural prophets of God in this world," since they had the ability to "reproduce in the terrestrial order the sublime act of divine creation."[117] Culture thus had a prophetic meaning, because it worked in line with the "Christian doctrine on the finality of life in the eternal life." Writers and artists, just like charismatic politicians, were thus qualified to act as divinely inspired leaders, guiding the people to salvation through faith.

Crainic was mostly concerned with the regeneration of the national culture, which he defined as an expression of "the inner fatality of blood and of faith, of race and religion," but also as an outcome of the history and territory of a given people.[118] Arguing against philosopher Constantin Rădulescu-Motru, who defined Romanianism without Orthodoxism,[119] Crainic redefined Orthodoxy as the core of national specificity. He condemned the atheism of Romanian intellectuals, arguing that there was an "organic link between the new Romanian culture and the Orthodox tradition." He pleaded for a national culture "deeply enshrined in ethnic *autochthonism* and absorbing the spiritualist light of Orthodoxy."

For Crainic, this traditionalist-orthodoxist orientation was not simply a cultural trend, but had direct political connotations. Crainic criticized democracy as an imported regime, foreign to the political tradition of the Romanian people. In his view, democracy was not only corrupt and inefficient, but also as an

instrument of de-nationalization, because it divested the Romanians of their national character and sovereign rights. To counter the danger of degeneration through denationalization, Crainic theorized the ethnocratic state (*etnocrația*). Stemming from the Greek words *ethnos* and *kratos*, this concept—first coined by Crainic in 1932—meant the power or rule of the *ethnos*, and not of the *demos*, since the latter encompassed all citizens of the country, regardless of their ethnic origin. The ethnocratic state was thus to be based on the primacy of the Romanians as the "titular ethnic group" in all spheres of social-economic and political life: "We call *etnocrație* the political will of the autochthonous race to make the State the expression of its properties but also the organ of its mission in the world." In line with its historical mission in the world, the Romanian people could save itself from decadence "only through a new kind of organization of their public life" under the form of a "corporative ethnocracy," based on "the reorganization of the autochthonous majority in a united block (*bloc solidar*), assuring the primacy of the ethnic principle in public life."[120]

Crainic was not only a declared adversary of democracy, but also of communism; he criticized the division of the nation into multiple political parties, specific to democratic regimes, but also the Marxist principle of class struggle, adopted in socialist systems: "*Etnocrația* cannot rely on the theory of classes, as well as it cannot be achieved in a multiparty system. The existence of classes and parties leads to a war of extermination opposing various parts of the nation," argued Crainic.[121] Instead, he argued militantly for the construction of a totalitarian corporatist state. An admirer of Mussolini—whom he praised as "the providential man, with a steel arm,"[122] and whom he met on two occasions, in 1933 and again in 1934—Crainic imported the concepts of corporatism and the totalitarian state from the political vocabulary and practice of Italian Fascism (whose values he assiduously promoted), but adapted them to the Romanian context.

Crainic was convinced that the corporatist-totalitarian state was the most suitable form of socio-political organization, since it prevented the division of the nation into rival factions, while guaranteeing at the same time the socio-political domination of the state by ethnic Romanians. Classes and "their political correlates, parties" were like drugs for the national body, claimed Crainic. In contrast, corporatist professional associations could play the vital role of physiological and anatomic organs.[123] However, the Italian corporatist model could be implemented in Romania only if coupled with the principle of *numerus clausus*. The adoption of corporatism "without taking into account the ethnic criterion would be a calamity even greater than the democratic regime," since it would perpetuate the economic domination of Jews, contended Crainic. "Consequently, in Romania there can only function an *ethnocratic corporatism*, which means a corporatism rectified with the principle of numerical proportions, along ethnic criteria."[124] The ethnocratic state was thus necessarily "xenophobic and antisemitic" because it advocated strongly for "the reduction of foreigners' influence, following, in the most modest case, the criterion of numerical proportion."[125] The most suitable

form of socio-political organization was thus the totalitarian state, defined as "the dynamic coordination of all the organic functions of the nation. Since its criterion is ethnic, this organization necessitates the elimination of all non-Romanians from the organic functions of the state and their reassignment in accordance with their numeric proportion in organic functions of society."[126]

In his political action, Crainic assigned paramount importance to the new nationalist student movement, which he regarded as the only political force "[that] could bring about the great movement of redemption."[127] In Crainic's view, the most important feature of the new generation was its religious orientation, due to the peasant origin of the Romanian students:

> If we were to look for an explanation for this truly wonderful fact of the spontaneous and autonomous orientation of the youth, to me, at least, it would seem easy to find: In their great majority, our students, and especially those who set the tone … of collective life, are countryside kids. They are sons of peasants or, when they are townsfolk, they are peasants' grandsons. Through their soul, in spite of all the temptations of high culture and urban civilization, gushes forth the moral health of our people. This mysterious patrimony is today the support for their entire collective life. It is not hard to discover through a summary analysis the peasant character of this patrimony.[128]

In many ways, Crainic saw himself as a continuator of Iorga's program of cultural nationalism, based on a *semănatorist* idealization of the peasantry and on a new ethos of political activism. Crainic aimed at replacing the historian-politician as mentor of the new generation, a role Iorga proved unable and also unwilling to play in the post-war period, thus leaving behind a void that had to be filled: "No 'Apostle' of the youth emerged after the war, whose personality to incarnate the new spirit of the time and to irradiate directives toward the horizon."[129] To bring the nationalist students in general, and the Legion, in particular, under his own influence, Crainic attempted to act as a leading "cultural animator" and "religious guide" of the young generation. In 1928, in a special issue devoted to the new generation, *Gândirea* hosted the manifesto of three "angry" young men—Sorin Pavel, Ion Nestor, and Petre Marcu-Balş—presumptuously titled "The Manifesto of the White Lily" [*Manifestul Crinului Alb*].[130] The manifesto was a vehement pamphlet against the old generation, "a generation devoid of faith and of creative élan, and which only deserves our billow and disrespect."[131] In contrast, as representative of the new generation, the While Lily Group promoted the cult of the state, a policy of national honor, and the primacy of collective over individual interests. More importantly, it was claimed that the "White Lily turns toward faith, toward the millennial Past, from which it collects lessons and axes."[132] The emphasis on the primacy of faith as the *differentia specifica* between the new and the old generation was reinforced by Crainic, who, in a supportive introductory article, argued that "[t]he doctrine

of integral nationalism, as professed either by Nicolae Iorga, by Charles Maurras, or, more recently, by Charles Benoist, attempted to subordinate the spiritual to the political and the ethnic. Our traditionalism pleads for an integral subordination to the spirit, following the Evangelical principle: he who is humble shall redeem himself."[133]

Crainic's attempt at inoculating his own political-religious vision into the Legion's program was partially successful. At the beginning of the 1930s, Crainic convinced Codreanu to collaborate on a common political platform, with himself acting as a backstage ideologue. In December 1931, Crainic authored Codreanu's first speech in Parliament. The discourse contained all the ideas previously advanced by Crainic in his political writings. Most importantly, Crainic lent his metaphor, that of the "cardinal points in chaos," to Codreanu's speech. The Captain denounced "the foreign invasion of Romania," and proclaimed the beginning of "a life and death struggle" in a country "threatened by storm," one "whose altars have been destroyed." Codreanu's discourse also provided a political answer to the crisis of orientation previously asserted by Crainic in the questions "Where is the salvation?" and "Where are we heading?"[134] "I set the cardinal points in God, Fatherland, King, Family, Property and the Army,"[135] claimed Codreanu. The Captain also advocated for the idea of the messianic mission of the new generation: "I hope that the actual leaders of Great Romania will make the effort of listening to me, too, the one who is an exponent of the young generation, a tortured generation—about which so much has been said—a *martyred*, in fact, I could say, a *crucified* generation."[136]

In January 1932, to facilitate the ideological merger with the Legion, Crainic launched another newspaper called *Calendarul*, with a more pronounced religious-nationalist orientation, targeting the Legionary youth.[137] Most importantly, Crainic facilitated the conversion to the Legion of a group of promising young intellectuals, made up of Vasile Marin, Vasile Christescu, Mihail Polihroniade, Ion Vojen, Alecu Constant, and Virgil Ionescu.[138] This merger proved very successful, the group growing roots into the movement (see below). Crainic was unable to take advantage of the cooptation of *AXA* with the Legion, however. His paramount influence over the Legion was soon lost in favor of another university professor, Nicolae (Nae) I. Ionescu (see below). The rift between the two mentors of the new generation became evident in January 1934, when both mentors were imprisoned at Jilava, after Prime Minister Duca's assassination, for collaboration with the Legion. Reportedly, Crainic openly criticized Nae Ionescu in Legionary circles as an impostor and a political opportunist.[139] Jealous of Ionescu's growing influence over the nationalist youth, but also resenting the Legion's precarious political position, Crainic moved away from the movement. In February 1935, he joined LANC, actively contributing to the creation of the National Christian Party led by Octavian Goga and A. C. Cuza. Crainic exercised a strong influence in the new party as leader of the youth section. However, in September 1936 he was expelled from the NCP following a conflict with old LANC cadres, such as Nichifor Robu.

Disappointed with this outcome, Crainic dissociated himself from A. C. Cuza's doctrine and political methods, which he characterized as "fundamentally wrong." He criticized Cuza's acceptance of parliamentarism and his theory of class struggle and denounced *Cuzism* as "a hybrid combination of nationalism and democracy, culminating with the childish solution to the Jewish question: 'the elimination of Jews [by deporting them] to Madagascar.'"[140] In February 1937, Crainic founded a new political organization, the "Christian Workers' Party," and endowed it with the ambitious political program of turning Romania into an ethnocratic state. This comprehensive but highly idiosyncratic political agenda consolidated Crainic's public prestige but also further isolated him in nationalist circles. After 1937, aware that he failed in party politics, Crainic collaborated with the ensuing dictatorial regimes, eager as he was to play a major political role and to implement, at least partially, his program. Under the royal dictatorship Crainic adhered to Carol's National Renaissance Front and, in the summer of 1940, he joined the short-lived fascist government led by Ion Gigurtu, as Minister of Propaganda (4 July–4 September).

In early September 1940, on the eve of Legionary rule, Crainic reiterated his nationalist credentials in a leading editorial in *Gândirea*, portraying himself as a prophet of the nationalist cause, a precursor of the fight against democracy and the king's abuses, the first promoter of corporatism and of the single party in Romania, and the earliest advocate of an alliance with Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. In return for these merits, he was "imprisoned, set to trial, ruined, forbidden, kept for more than a decade at the periphery, as a straying dog on a *majdan*."[141] In October 1940, Crainic criticized the failed royal dictatorship as "a hybrid simulacrum" which "caricatured doctrines and faiths with politicians having no doctrine and faith."[142] He praised the Legion's advent to power as a turning point in history, a miracle, or "a springtime of life"[143] and "the first genuinely revolutionary movement in our history," after Avram Iancu's 1848 liberation fight in Transylvania. Crainic identified as the main challenge of the new regime the "question of Legionary education, of the Legionarization of the country,"[144] meant to bring about "the regeneration of Romania." During the National Legionary State, Crainic acted as a useful if somehow marginal collaborator of the new regime. His political role was temporary enhanced during General Antonescu's dictatorship, when Crainic served as Secretary of State (27 January–1 April 1941) and Minister of Propaganda (1 April–26 May 1941) but was eventually purged due to the persistent Legionary sympathies of his daughter.[145]

Systematizing the Legionary Doctrine: The AXA Group

While Crainic's influence over the Legion proved temporary, the AXA group soon turned into a main ideological pole within the organization. Once converted to the movement, the *AXA* members experienced a charismatic "emotional seizure"; abandoning their initial reservations, they became devoted Legionaries, engaging in assiduous propaganda in intellectual circles. To engineer Virgil Ionescu, his meeting with Codreanu appeared as "destiny that had to

be fulfilled": "I realized from the first moment that this man will be for me more than an ordinary acquaintance, that he will play a role in my life, that he will maybe totally torment it, and I, *a priori*, understood to follow him, even if that would only bring sacrifices and losses."[146] In the same vein, Alexandru Constant confessed in 1937 that "for many of us, the enrollment into the Legion put an end to a severe spiritual crisis."[147]

Organized into its own nest, the *AXA* group had an immediate impact upon the Legion. Chaired by Ion I. Moța, who served as another mediator between the group and the Legion, and attended by the Captain himself, that nest became a leading Legionary debating circle. The members met at Virgil Ionescu's[148] or at Codreanu's house in Bucharest and debated paramount issues concerning the Legion's ideology and policy.[149] Equally important, on October 20, 1932, the *AXA* launched a new, eponymous journal *AXA*, turned into a leading Legionary publication. Its team of devoted collaborators systematized the Legion's creed into a comprehensive fascist ideology; they also spelled out the Legion's originality within the larger Romanian "family of authoritarians." In a first article published in November 1932, Mihail Polihroniade defined the revolutionary right not only in opposition to democracy and communism, but also to the radical right, especially to those parties that promoted similar values by different means, such as LANC.[150] In Polihroniade's view, the European right was characterized by two basic principles: the unlimited authority of the state in all fields, and care for the economic and social interests of the masses, leading to the achievement of a "superior national collectivity." If Romania wanted to reach these aims, it was necessary to implement a thorough reform of the state or, in other words, the creation of a new, modern corporatist state. Cuza had the merit of underscoring the importance of antisemitism but his methods were incoherent, anarchic, sporadic, and program was "primitive, from tactical and doctrinaire points of view" since it was limited only to the Jewish question and lacked the vision of modern state organization. Polihroniade argued that the Romanian right had to emulate the example of Italian Fascism in order to integrate and acculture the masses into the would-be new state. Polihroniade criticized LANC's obsessive fixation with the Jewish question, which hampered its recognition of the need for radical reforms in other fields as well. LANC's "unrealistic antisemitism," was held responsible for the inefficiency of its nationalist fight.[151] Polihroniade contrasted the moderation of Cuza's organization with the Legion's revolutionary pathos: "Cuzism means a passive, self-defensive attitude of negation, as compared to the nationalist attitude of impetuous buoyancy, of offense, of creation."[152]

In contrast to LANC, Polihroniade portrayed the Iron Guard as the true revolutionary force of the right; his aim was to help turn this movement into a mature political force, comparable to the contemporary revolutionary right in Europe. In a programmatic editorial entitled "*Sensul revoluției naționale*" (the "Sense of National Revolution"), Polihroniade pointed out that "[u]ntil now, the Iron Guard was in the phase of childhood and organizational empiricism."[153] Although, like every rightist movement, it was the result of an "instinctive reaction," the time was ripe for "its goal to be clearly defined and its target more

distinctly contoured. *It is the moment of maturing, the moment in which rational justification is necessary.*"[154] While Codreanu avoided developing a complete political program, Polihroniade defined seven main courses of action: (1) imperious moral reform of the country's political life; (2) reformation of the state; (3) ethnic purification; (4) state intervention in the economy and the achievement of economic autarchy; (5) social revolution through the elimination of major wealth differences and the protection of the "productive classes" and of intellectuals; (6) the culturalization of the masses; and (7) a new course for Romania's foreign policy based on "an alliance with Rome and Berlin."[155]

These directions were further elaborated on in *AXA*, often in polemics with leftist newspapers or with other, less revolutionary-minded, nationalist publications. During this period, *AXA*'s main collaborators specialized in certain policy fields: Ion I. Moţa dominated debates on antisemitism, minority relations, and the role of the League of Nations; Vasile Matei on economy and education; Constantin I. Papanace on colonization and ethnic policies; Vasile Marin on the totalitarian state; and Mihail Polihroniade on foreign policy. In line with the seven main courses of action, the main political reforms demanded by *AXA* were the eradication of corruption, "the delousing of foreign elements which threaten to suffocate us" (mostly the Jews), the abolition of economic monopolies, the elimination of "political clientelism (*politicianism*)" in administration, church, and army, and the punishment of those guilty of illicit enrichment.[156]

In a series of articles, Vasile Matei pleaded for a form of state-controlled economy as a solution to the global crisis of capitalism, making numerous references to the examples of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. The application of the principle of state-controlled economy in Romania led to a debate about corporatism and its political implications. Another collaborator, Vasile Christescu, presented the corporatist system as a positive "re-actualization" of medieval guilds. He favorably contrasted the fascist state "resulting from a normal evolution and totally integrated into the historical tradition of the west and of Italy" to the Bolshevik state, which was "incomplete, imprecise and international."[157] The debates on political, educational, or economic reforms converged toward the most important political aim of *AXA* intellectuals: the ethnic homogenization of Romania through ethnic colonization, population exchanges, and the elimination of minorities. In his above-mentioned programmatic article, Polihroniade demanded the implementation of "massive colonization and forced delousing" in multi-ethnic areas (called "the invaded territories").[158] Another important advocate of ethnic homogenization through colonization and population exchange was Constantin I. Papanace, an ethnic Romanian originating from Macedonia. Motivated by the specific concerns of Macedonian colonists in Southern Dobrudja, he authored a series of militant articles about the fate of the "approximately two million" ethnic Romanians leaving in the Balkans, Central Europe, Siberia, and the Caucasus. He demanded a strong diplomatic intervention of the Romanian state in order to prevent what he denounced as a harsh denationalization campaign.[159]

The overarching concept uniting these multiple directions of action was that of the totalitarian state. In the Romanian context, the main theoretician of totalitarianism was Vasile Marin, an intellectual who earned his doctorate in law with a monograph on corporatism in Italian Fascism.[160] Marin pointed out that, "[s]imilarly to Fascism and National Socialism, the Iron Guard fights for the creation of the totalitarian state, carved politically, economically, and socially out of the national substance, and led by the nation's elite, a state which embodies in itself the social, political, and juridical organization of the entire people, within which neither class interests nor the famous natural rights find justification to exist."[161] Marin rejected the claim that the Legion's ideology fell within the "extreme-right" or "extreme-left" political camps. Following Codreanu, he defined the Iron Guard as placed "neither right nor left, for the good reason that our movement encompasses the entire plan of national life, undifferentiated in its structure; our movement organizes to the same extent authority as well as liberty."[162]

Nae Ionescu, *Cuvântul* and "Generation '27"

An even more successful mediator between the Legion and the new generation of intellectuals was the influential journalist and university professor Nicolae (Nae) I. Ionescu (1890–1940). Ionescu studied philosophy at Göttingen and then Munich, where he earned his doctorate in 1919. Upon his return to Romania, Ionescu served as professor at, and shortly also as director of, the Dealu Military Secondary School, being later promoted assistant to Professor Constantin Rădulescu-Motru at the University of Bucharest. Ionescu led the independent daily *Cuvântul* as director (1926–1934; 1938) and, from 1926 onward, also as owner, transforming it into a platform for authoritarian politics.

Although Ionescu studied philosophy, he became especially interested in theology. In 1926, Ionescu took over the weekly religious section from Crainic in *Cuvântul* (until 1930) and, just like the latter, he pleaded for the transformation of Greater Romania into a theocratic Christian-Orthodox nation-state. Ionescu argued that the *history* of major established religions—such as Orthodoxy, Catholicism, or Judaism—was so deeply intertwined with the actual *history* of peoples that they ended up providing immutable cultural matrixes to modern nations. These confessional traditions were so enduring that they could not be fully transcended without provoking major mutations in individual or collective identities. The Romanians, in particular, had such an organic relationship to Orthodoxy that the "confession" and the "nation," as historical realities, could not be separated: "To be a Romanian—not a 'good Romanian' but simply a Romanian—means to be Orthodox. In the same way in which a horse, for example, is also a quadruped animal."[163] For this reason, Romanians could not change their church affiliation, by joining the Catholic Church, for example, without losing the main attributes of their national identity: "Here no third position is possible" asserted Ionescu: "or you stay Romanian and in that case your

Catholicism is not an actual reality, or you become a Catholic but then you are not Romanian anymore. Who thinks otherwise is mistaken."[164]

Ionescu developed political ambitions, as well, harboring plans for the radical reorganization of Greater Romania. In line with his theocratic view of the nation, Ionescu rejected democracy and party politics, and instead pleaded for the establishment of an authoritarian regime based on Christian nationalism and a charismatic-dictatorial type of political legitimization, He played an important role in the negotiations that brought Carol Caraiman to Romania's throne in 1930. After Carol's enthronement, he became a prominent member of the emerging royal *camarilla* (an informal and heterogeneous counseling body made up of mostly opportunistic figures gathered around the king), lobbying for the establishment of an authoritarian political regime. Ionescu hoped to play a central political role under the new king, as a reward for his devotion, but his plans suffered a bitter disappointment. In 1931, Carol II wasted the opportunity to establish an authoritarian regime occasioned by the political failure of the National Peasant Party. Moreover, instead of appealing to Ionescu for leadership, Carol opted for a government of national union led by Constantin Argetoianu and Nicolae Iorga (1931–1932). Failing to fulfill his personal ambitions and feeling that his loyalty was betrayed, Ionescu became an enemy of the king, looking for allies to undermine the latter's authority.[165] To this end, Ionescu took advantage of his influence over a group of brilliant university students and recent graduates and soon acquired a strong ascendency over the nationalist youth. The first contacts with the Legion were mediated by the *AXA* member Virgil Ionescu, following Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu's express request to reach out to other influential journalists, besides Crainic.[166] Although Ionescu did not formally join the Legion, he acted as a personal councilor of Codreanu and was soon acknowledged as one of the movement's spiritual leaders and ideologues. In December 1933, Ionescu criticized harshly the National Liberal government in *Cuvântul* for banning the Iron Guard. Following the assassination of Prime Minister Duca, he was arrested, together with Crainic and other right-wing intellectuals, and accused of instigation to crime. Ionescu was eventually cleared of all charges; yet his detention cemented his collaboration with the Legion. The alliance became obvious in 1934. Ionescu's public lectures on nationalism and Romanianism were always attended by massive audiences made up mainly of Legionary members and sympathizers.[167]

Ionescu's attachment to the Legionary cause intensified in 1937–1938, on the eve of and after the general parliamentary elections. Taking advantage of the contacts he established during his studies in Germany, Ionescu cultivated close political relations with Nazi officials, presenting himself as the spiritual leader of the Legion.[168] He was the leading representative in Romania of *I. G. Farben Industrie*, and was also in contact with the leadership of the *Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro GmbH*, particularly one of the members of this agency, C. Thiel, serving as a Berlin correspondent for *Cuvântul*. Reports from the *Siguranța* pointed out that Ionescu developed close political ties to Hitler's personal secretaries, and also with Alfred Rosenberg and the Reich Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels.[169]

The Legion and the "Generation '27"

Under Ionescu's spiritual patronage, the Legion benefited from a new wave of intellectual 'converts, with a strong impact on the evolution of the organization. Most of them were part of what has later been called the "Generation '27,"[170] made up of intellectuals such as Mircea Eliade, Emil Cioran, Mihail Sebastian, Constantin Noica, Mircea Vulcănescu, Petre Ţuţea, Traian Herseni, Anton Golopenţia, Ernest Bernea, Petru Comarnescu, Ionel Jianu, Alexandru Elian, Dan Botta, I. Biberi, Petru Manoliu, Dan Petraşincu, George Matei Cantacuzino, Alexandru Cristian Tell, Mihail Polihroniade, and Arşavir Acterian, among others. It would be an overstatement to attribute Ionescu the 'merit' for all these conversions; at a closer scrutiny, it appears that Ionescu himself was in fact drawn into the Legion by the enthusiasm shown by the early Legionary converts among his collaborators, most notably Eliade. Later on, the professor's attachment to the Legion undoubtedly attracted other youngsters, in majority followers of the controversial but adulated professor.

The evolution of these intellectuals toward the Legion took place gradually. In the late 1920s, these intellectuals developed the myth of the "new" generation united by exceptional qualities forged by common formative events (such as the Great War with its traumatic experience of death) and a special historical mission (to revitalize Romanian national values). The new cultural orientation was first crystalized by the young writer Mircea Eliade (1907–1986) in a programmatic manifesto entitled "Spiritual Itinerary" (*Itinerariu spiritual*), published in 1927 as a series of 12 articles in Ionescu's *Cuvântul*.[171] *Itinerariu spiritual* examined "all the crises and temptations through which I had passed," recalled Eliade in his memoirs; yet, "I did not speak now only for myself" but described "a decisive experience for any young man of my age," thus providing "a spiritual pilgrimage of the 'young generation.'"[172] Eliade pointed out that, with the achievement of Greater Romania, the new generation was the first in Romanian history without a defined national ideal to serve as a generational catalyst. He proposed the Orthodox heritage as the foundation of a "total conception of the world and existence," which would animate the mission of the new generation and to constitute "a new phenomenon in the history of modern Romanian culture."[173] The manifesto created a certain emulation among young intellectuals, contributing to forging a common cultural ethos.

The "institutionalization" of the new generation continued with the establishment of an elite debating circle, called *Criterion* (1932–1933).[174] Emulating (in antagonistic terms) the example of the prestigious prewar debating circle *Junimea* and of the "critical school" at the turn of the century, *Criterion* attempted to gain visibility by organizing a series of public conferences devoted to the ideological profile of major political leaders of the time, of diverse orientations, such as Lenin, Mussolini, and Gandhi. Mircea Eliade, writing under pseudonym, characterized the seminar, in its incipient phase, in the following way: "*Criterion* began to gain importance not so much due to the personal value of its members, through personalities, but especially through the new working method which it established:

collaboration, cooperation, common debates of problems, the harmony among various intellectual professions."[175] However, while *Criterion* gained a certain cultural prestige, the political options of "Generation '27" suffered a growing polarization. In an article written in 1934, philosopher Mircea Vulcănescu—himself a Legionary sympathizer—synthesized the post-1918 experience of the "new generation." He delineated seven acceptations of the term "generation," denoting a biological, sociological, statistical, historical, psychological, cultural-political or economic phenomenon. Based on a thorough analysis of each of these meanings, Vulcănescu defined a generation as "a bio-psycho-historical social group dominated by people of the same age who concomitantly and spontaneously manifest age solidarity."[176] The main features of a generation are shaped, in Vulcănescu's view, by people's "participation to a certain historical event influencing their intellectual formation," by the manner in which they take part "in the activity of the community," and by "their inclusion in or exclusion from the existing social hierarchy." Vulcănescu argued that the interwar "new generation" was the sixth in the history of modern Romania. It succeeded the post-war "generation of fire" animated by its belief in monarchism, orthodoxy, realism, and authochtonism. The "new generation" was made up of individuals aged 25 to 35, who were either too young to take part in the Great War or only experienced its last year in combat (1918). That cohort was shaped by three main factors: the experience and legacy of the war; the influence of Nae Ionescu, Nichifor Crainic, and Vasile Pârvan; and heterogeneous foreign influences, most notably the political thought of Charles Maurras, German and Russian mysticism, German Marxism, Russian Bolshevism, Italian Fascism, and German National Socialism. Although all members of the new generation had certain features in common, such as, for example, an acute feeling of crisis and a "need for spirituality," in the political field they were strongly polarized between two leading orientations, one nationalist and xenophobic, the other democratic and cosmopolitan. The former valued folk culture and autochthonous ethnoreligious roots, the latter modernization, urbanization, and cultural exchanges with the West. Vulcănescu presented this conflict over social and political values as a rural/urban cleavage.[177]

These ideological tensions were further exacerbated by the intrusion of the two nationalist professors turned anti-establishment politicians, Crainic and Ionescu, leading to the dissolution of the group and the enrollment of most of its members into the Legion. One of the most illustrious cases of conversion to the Legion is that of (the already-mentioned) Eliade. The young writer met Ionescu during his undergraduate studies at the University of Bucharest (1925–28) and emerged gradually as the professor's most intimate collaborator. After graduating in literature and philosophy with a thesis on Italian Renaissance philosophy, Elide held a research fellowship in Calcutta, India (1928–1930), after which he devoted himself, for six months, to the practice of yoga (1930–1931). Upon his return to Romania, Eliade resumed his collaboration with Ionescu, becoming redactor at *Cuvântul* and, from 1931, Ionescu's assistant at the University of Bucharest. In the early 1930s, Eliade enhanced his public prestige: he earned his doctorate in

philosophy with a dissertation on yoga (1933) and achieved literary fame after the publication of the novel *Maitreyi*. During that time, Eliade also developed Legionary convictions. He joined the Legion in 1935, becoming a member of the "Ceahlăul" nest, part of the *AXA* family of nests included in Group VII of the so-called Scattered Corps [*Corpul Răzleți*].[178] Subsequently, Eliade wore the green shirt and participated in Legionary propaganda activities. He was also part of the Legion's Center for Study and Documentation, participating in the group of writers and poets led by Radu Dumitrescu-Gyr.

Eliade's conversion to the Legion was greatly stimulated by his encounter with its charismatic leader. The young intellectual was—as many members of his generation—seduced by Codreanu's charismatic persona, being reportedly "subjugated by the physical presence of the Captain."[179] As a student of comparative religion, Eliade was also attracted by the Legion's doctrine of messianic national salvation.[180] He authored several seminal articles conceptualizing the Legionary faith, thus emerging as an important ideologue of the movement.[181] In 1937, Eliade confessed publicly his belief in the messianic mission of the Romanian people, and his conviction that "the Legionary movement was born under the sign of the Archangel Michael and will prevail through God's Holy Char."[182] He suggestively reaffirmed the Legion's unique religious-charismatic nature:

> The Legionary movement has a spiritual and Christian meaning. While all the contemporary revolutions set as their goal the conquest of power by a social class or by a man, the Legionary revolution aims, on the contrary, at the supreme redemption of the nation, the reconciliation of the Romanian nation with God, as the Captain said.[183]

Eliade's political convictions were also reflected in his literary works: in novels such as *Întoarcerea din Rai* (1934) and *Huliganii* (1935), the young writer provided a vivid yet tragic fresco of the existential anxieties and political dilemmas of the new generation.[184] Eliade pointed out that, as Greater Romania plunged into a socio-economic crisis, the optimism of the young generation was replaced by disillusionment; their *ressentiment* was mainly channeled into an anti-establishment but also anti-democratic direction. Alerted, the secret police monitored Eliade's political activism closely; they also portrayed his novels as veiled propaganda for the Legionary movement.[185]

Another equally famous and controversial convert to the Legion was the philosopher, writer, and essayist Emil Cioran (1911–1995).[186] Cioran imposed himself, early on, as one of the most talented writers of his generation. Following a lengthy stay in Berlin as a Humboldt Research Fellow (1933–1936), Cioran committed himself to an advocacy of German Nazism, Italian Fascism, and xenophobic nationalism. This attitude also led Cioran to an engagement with the Legion and an admiration of its leader, Zelea-Codreanu.

The main "evidence" in this respect is the writer's third and most controversial book, *The Transfiguration of Romania* (*Schimbarea la față a României*). Written

during the years from 1933 to 1936, and originally published in 1936, the book was fully debated in the Romanian press.[187] Denounced by several contemporary analysts as the most "cruel" book ever written about Romania, *Schimbarea la față* was in turn praised by Zelea-Codreanu as a wonderful catechism for national regeneration. *Schimbarea la față* is a book on the philosophy of history and the collective psychology of nations, combined with a sharp evaluation of Romania's interwar realities and a prophecy for its revolutionary social and political transformation. Drawing on Oswald Spengler's cyclical theory of the rise and decline of civilizations in history, Cioran portrays the history of humanity as an organic evolution of "high cultures," passing through successive biological stages. Unlike Spengler, Cioran is also concerned with the destiny of "low" or "small cultures" which—in contrast to "high cultures"—lack the inner vitality to overcome the first, "precultural" stage in their evolution. In Cioran's view, in order to become "creators of history," smaller cultures need to abandon their "organic" path of evolution and to jump ahead of time through cultural and political revolutions.

Romania was, according to Cioran, a small culture *par excellence*. The writer drew a "physiognomic portrait" of Romania, using an impressive repertoire of invectives. Although he blamed the country's "zoological" condition on the Romanians themselves, Cioran also denounced the "foreign domination" of the county, accusing Hungarian, and especially Jewish, minorities of hampering Greater Romania's historical evolution. Employing the Biblical symbolism of Jesus Christ's transfiguration, Cioran argued that, in order to overcome its "destiny" as a small country and to "enter history," Romania needed to undergo a profound social, cultural, and political revolution, concomitantly inspired by the revolutionary ferment of Fascist Italy and National Socialist Germany, but also of Bolshevik Russia. Rejecting liberal democracy for its "mediocrity," Cioran pleaded for the establishment of a right-wing dictatorial regime, supported by a mass movement of national regeneration. In Cioran's view, only a "permanent" national revolution could transform Romania from an immobile, agrarian, and corrupt country into an industrial, urban, and dynamic society, one aware of its historical destiny and thus able to play a hegemonic military role in the Balkans. To this end, he envisioned a Romania "with the population of China and the historical destiny of France," and claimed for Bucharest the political role of a "new Constantinople." Cioran's book was also symptomatic of the sharp ongoing political confrontations between fascism and communism. It addressed such themes as the impact and legacy of the French revolution, the nature of Marxism, Leninism, and Bolshevism, the political revolution brought about by Italian Fascism and German National Socialism, the mystique of "the leader," and ethnic minorities in Romania, in addition to assessing the role of religion, race, irrationality, and vitality for national awakening and regeneration. Cioran's eclectic political philosophy was an attempt to identify a "third way" between liberal democracy and capitalism on the one hand, and communism on the other. He imagined a regime of "national collectivism" able to both solve the "minority question" and to implement a socialist transformation of property relations without succumbing

to Marxist internationalism. Cioran also stressed the role played by religion in the liberation of the people's inner irrational forces, and valued violence and wars of aggression for their capacity to forge a powerful national spirit.

Schimbarea la față is much more than a "scandalous" incident in Cioran's early life. It is a window into the cultural milieu of Romania and Europe in the 1930s, documenting the dilemmas of identity facing this aspiring author in his mid-twenties, who was tormented by Romania's internal contradictions and haunted by her "stigmatic" traditions. In another controversial book entitled *Tears and Saints* (*Lacrimi şi sfinţi*), published in 1937, Cioran tackled key religious concepts debated at length in Romanian politics, such as faith, martyrdom, suffering, and sainthood.[188] Focusing on the lives of unconventional Christian saints, Cioran pointed out the role played by suffering in the techniques employed by saints for reaching communion with God, but empathized also the overt political connotation of their ascetic practices.

Despite his adherence to the Legion, Cioran was not much engaged with the movement in terms of actual political activism. Moreover, as already evident in *Schimbarea la față*, his personal views and convictions were not always fully in line with the evolving Legionary dogma. After a brief return to Romania, in 1937 the writer left for Paris with another fellowship and remained there throughout World War II. Nevertheless, Cioran continued to harbor Legionary sympathies. During the National Legionary State, he returned to Bucharest from November 1940 to February 1941 and, in a speech at *Radio România*, provided a passionate messianic eulogy of the dead Codreanu as an eternal charismatic leader of Romania.[189]

While the majority of *Criterion*'s members joined the Legion, those members of the debating circle who did not share the religious or ideological views of the nationalists were being marginalized. The most relevant examples in this respect are the playwrights Eugen Ionescu (1909–1994)[190] and Mihail Sebastian (1907–1945).[191] Born into a mixed Romanian-French/Jewish family, Ionescu debuted as a writer in the second half of the 1930s. Although he was part of the intellectual circle of "Generation '27," Ionescu managed to resist the temptation to convert to the Legion. However, this generational experience marked his life experience and literary career. In his play suggestively entitled *Rhinoceros* (*Rinocerii*), published in France in 1959, the creator of absurd theater captured the puzzling process of gradual but irresistible fascistization of an entire community.

The complex case of the Jewish writer Mihail Sebastian (1897–1945) (born Iosif Mendel Hechter) is even more relevant for the tribulations of the new generation. Sebastian met Ionescu as a secondary school pupil, during his baccalaureate exam. Engulfed by the professor's personality but also touched by his mentor's trust in his abilities as a writer, Sebastian started to collaborate with *Cuvântul* since 1927 and became part of Ionescu's group of followers. The young writer was so strongly attached, intellectually and emotionally, to Ionescu, that between 1929 and 1933 he even stated to share his mentor's antidemocratic political attitudes, as a deeply engaged but "moderate right-wing" journalist.[192] Yet, Sebastian did not become a Legionary; moreover, in the 1930s, he was

increasingly confronted with the growing antisemitism of Ionescu and his closest associates (most notably, his friend Eliade). This tension culminated with Ionescu's puzzling antisemitic preface to Sebastian's *De două mii de ani* (For two thousand years, 1934) a semi-autobiographical novel which narrates the systemic violence and discrimination experienced by a Jewish youngster in post-World War I Romania.[193] In addressing the protagonist's suffering, Ionescu argued that "Judas has to sufer,"[194] because although they were God's chosen people, Jews failed to recognize Jesus Christ as Savior. Since Jews have thus deprived themselves of salvation, "the Jewish drama cannot be resolved" and the Jewish people are destined to suffer till the end of time, while waiting for another, illusory Messiah. He went on to argue that since "nationality is an organic state," Hechter could not escape his fate: "Are you, losef Hechter, a man from the Danubian Brăila? No. You are *a Jew* from Danubian Brăila,"[195] decreed Ionescu, in order to disqualify Sebastian's sense of local identity and patriotism. Ionescu concluded by medicalizing the Jewish condition as perpetual inner suffering due to damnation: "Hechter losef, you are sick. You are substantially sick, because you can only suffer; and because your suffering is clogged."[196]

Although Sebastian had an enormous appreciation and gratitude for Ionescu, he was nevertheless deeply hurt by his mentor's preface, which he regarded as "a global act of injustice," characterized by a "cold, methodical, and indifferent cruelty."[197] He also disapproved of *Cuvântul*'s turn toward Hitlerism and antisemitism that occurred at the end of 1933. Even though Sebastian "boiled seven years in the cauldron with antisemitic pitch of *Cuvântul*," as one journalist of the time put it, [198] he nevertheless became a sober critic of totalitarianism. In a commentary to the public reactions to his book, entitled *How I became a Hooligan* (1935), Sebastian criticized both fascist and Bolshevik totalitarian ideologies for proclaiming the primacy of collectivity, of the masses, and of "men in uniform" over the individual and his/her critical spirit:

> Communists and fascists make 'the spirit of the barracks' the axis of their political action. More than that: their moral justification. 'The man in uniform" is the kind of human grandeur that right-wing and left-wing extremist experiences try to impose on our time. Black, brown, blue, and green shirts violently simplify ideas, attitudes, and feelings, reducing them to one color, one sign, one cry.
>
> This suddenly eliminates all possible doubts, while nuances are pulverized and personal thoughts are crushed under a formidable leveling pressure. There remain only two or three absolute and nebulous truths, which no one is allowed to question, but for which the world must die.
>
> Yes, no—white, black. Only that much. The rest is suppressed, obliterated from our consciousness, sterilized from our sensitivity. With a shirt, a hymn, a greeting, and a badge, you solve all the problems, you find all the answers. Do you want a religion? Here's a membership card. Do you long for metaphysics? Here is a hymn. Do you want a passion? Here's a chief. [199]

Sebastian's *Diary* (*Jurnal*), published posthumously, provides a dramatic account of the identity crisis he suffered, stirred by the inner conflicts between ideological estrangement and generational solidarity and his growing marginalization by friends and peers.[200]

Faith, Arts and Social Science: Traian Brăileanu, *Iconar*, and *Însemnări sociologice*, 1935–1937

At the regional level, another key mediator between the Legion and the young generation of intellectuals was Traian Brăileanu, the patron of two intellectual groupings in Bukovina centered around the journals *Iconar* (Iconographer) (1935–1937) and *Însemnări sociologice* (Sociological Notes) (1935–1938). Brăileanu studied philosophy at the University of Cernăuți (Cernowitz); in 1924, he was appointed professor of ethics, sociology, and politics at the same university.[201] Brăileanu entered politics in the 1920s, promoting a regional political platform. Animated by nationalist and antisemitic convictions, Brăileanu first joined Averescu's People's Party, later collaborating briefly with Nicolae Iorga before entering Cuza's LANC. Dissatisfied with traditional nationalist parties, in the late 1920s Brăileanu developed close personal ties with Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu and in 1930 became a member of the Legionary Senate. Brăileanu's collaboration with the Legion enhanced the latter's intellectual prestige and influence among students and young intellectuals in Bukovina, while his intellectual input consolidated Legionary ideology.

The two intellectual groupings presided over by Brăileanu, *Iconar*, and *Însemnări sociologice* had distinct yet overlapping orientations. The first one aimed at expanding Legionary ideology in the fields of arts and literature; the second intended to employ social scientific methods to design and build a fascist totalitarian state. As a literary circle, the *Iconar* group emerged, in an incipient form, in the early 1930s, being composed by writers such as Mircea Streinul (1910–1945), Traian Chelaru, Iulian Vesper, Gheorghe Antonovici, George Drumur, Ion Roşca, Neculai Pavel, Teofil Lianu, Ghedeon Coca, Liviu Rusu, Cristofor Vitencu, Mihai Cazacu, Sextil Dascăl, George Nimigean, and Neculai Roşca, among others. The circle revolved initially around the traditional magazines *Junimea Literară* and *Glasul Bucovinei*, under the patronage of Ion Nistor, the former leader of the national movement in Bukovina who, after the war, joined the NLP. The circle's main aim was to give a voice to a new generation of Romanian writers, who strove to emancipate themselves from the German culture of prewar Bukovina but also from the hegemonic culture of the old generation in Greater Romania. The group set up a regional revolt against the cultural domination of Bucharest-based elites; its main declared aim was to affirm new literary forms, in accord with the local specificity of Bukovina. During that time, *Iconar*'s regional literary agenda attracted leading young intellectuals from the Old Kingdom, such as Victor Măgură, Theodor Constantin, Panait Nicolae, Ovid Caledoniu, and Theodor Dragomirescu, but also from Transylvania, such as

Nicolae Cantonieru, Aurel Marin, Nicolae S. Ursu, and George Popa, among others. The group managed to enhance its visibility and outreach by launching its own book series, called *Iconar*, and a publishing house with the same name.

In 1935, personal conflicts and political tensions among leading members of the literary circle led to an internal split: Traian Chelaru and Iulian Vesper continued their collaboration with Ion Nistor at *Glasul Bucovinei*, while Liviu Rusu, professor at the Cernăuți Conservatory, and the writer Mircea Streinul joined Brăileanu on a nationalist platform. The latter were followed by a large group of collaborators, made up of Ion Negură, Vasile Posteucă, Gheorghe Drumur, Ion Țurcan, George Macrin, Barbu Slusanschi, Dragoș Vitencu, Cose Tarnavschi, Claudiu Usatiuc, Ion Potecașu, and the graphic artist Rudolf Rybiczka.[202]

The group's political realignment equaled in fact a conversion to Legionary ideology. Mircea Streinul was reportedly won over to the new faith by Rusu but also by a personal encounter with Mircea Eliade.[203] The group coalesced around *Iconar*, established at Brăileanu's initiative under the editorship of Sterinul and Rusu. Formally funded by a newly established "Sport Legion" and printed at Rădăuți, *Iconar* soon became "a camouflaged newspaper of the former Iron Guard organization," as a police report remarked.[204] The name *Iconar* was a metaphor with overt religious connotations: reportedly, it was suggested by Streinul, who—following the German poet Rainer Maria Rilke—asserted that, if they were to be converted into visual formats, literary creations (and poetry in particular) could be best conveyed aesthetically by icons.[205] In Romanian, the word *iconar* stood for an iconographer, but also for an iconostasis and for an icon book or an "illustrated holy book."[206] In Streinul's vision, the magazine was to function as a display window exhibiting the most remarkable artistic achievements of the Bukovinian literary youth, just as an iconostasis is adorned with divinely inspired icons meant to spread faith to the believers.[207]

Iconar encouraged the development of the Legionary arts and literature. In addition, the group further substantiated the Legionary faith, transforming it into an "ism," *Legionarism*, on a par with Italian Fascism and German National Socialism. For the *Iconars*, the most integrative political category was not that of doctrine, but that of *faith*:

> The living doctrine dwells in every true fighter, it is called *faith*. At the base of any new age lies a foundation of faith, not a doctrine. The fighter prevails through his faith. This leads him in battle, keeps him unto his position until the end, and instills in him rivers of energy. And after the enemies have been killed and the sky calmed, the fighters rememorize the phases of the battle, their movements, those of their enemies, and often, strange thing, they observe that those movements could fit into law, in doctrines.[208]

Iconar propagated the values of fascist heroism and martyrdom leading to salvational sacrifice. In their view, *Legionarism* was not a dry, abstract theory, but a living doctrine: "It's not necessary for us to have patented doctrines, but trained

fighters, full of faith, of spirit of sacrifice, of tenacity and perseverance for the Captain and the Legion."[209]

This discourse had a powerful impact upon the Legion, well beyond the confines of Bukovina. In a programmatic article published in *Iconar*, Nae Ionescu endorsed the group's religious-nationalist discourse. Ionescu argued that, following a process of dialectical development, interwar Romanian nationalism reached its period of maturation, as proved by the "flood of confessions of the nationalist faith manifest in our public life."[210] He criticized the old brands of nationalism still manifest in Greater Romania—classified as opportunist, liberal, or Cuzist—as obsolete and thus inadequate in the new world. Instead, Ionescu praised the new nationalist faith professed by the Legion as "a new formula of life, a new state of affairs in the world, a new era in history."[211]

If *Iconar* wanted to develop Legionary arts and literature, *Însemnări sociologice* aimed at putting social sciences in general, and sociology in particular, in the service of the Legion. The monthly journal was launched on April 5, 1935, and published until the establishment of the royal dictatorship in February 1938; a second series was re-launched between September 1, 1940, and January 15, 1941, during Legionary rule. Led by Brăileanu, the group of main collaborators was made up of Leon Ţopa, Barbu Sluşanschi, Ion Ţurcan, and George Macrin. Although the new journal defined itself as purely scientific, in his leading op-ed Brăileanu revealed the polemical and politically engaged nature of *Însemnări*, "born to struggle and for struggle."[212] The journal aimed at providing a right-wing counterpart to the "official" Bucharest Sociological School led by Dimitrie Gusti, and the Iaşi sociological circles of Marxist orientation led by Mihail Ralea and Petre Andrei.[213] As a "weapon of political struggle,"[214] the new journal had a quick impact, so that "[i]n a short time it earned its place among the Legionary publications," as Brăileanu noted.[215]

The orientation of *Însemnări sociologice* was shaped by Brăileanu's political ideas, as leading contributor but also the "great mentor and unsurpassed animator" of the group.[216] Brăileanu adhered to the doctrine of "integral nationalism" but reinterpreted it in a religious manner. He promoted a palingenetic vision of politics, having messianic nationalism at its core. In his view, nations were divine creations working toward God to accord with their mission and inner spirit. Brăileanu painted an apocalyptic view of interwar politics, arguing that Romania, and humanity in general, were at a crossroads. In the interwar period, humanity "entered the last phase of the establishment of communist dictatorship, Jewish, that is. Spain went through this phase, now France, and—caught up between Russia and France—Romania is next in line to fall in the hand of the red dictatorship."[217] Due to its decadence, Romanian society was not able to resist the Bolshevik pressure, being on the brink of extinction: "Lacking an elite of social technicians, tormented by the germens of psychic and biological dissolution implanted by the agents of the Jewish international organizations, the Romanian people struggles in the claws of death."[218] Its salvation could only come by means of a movement of regeneration led by a charismatic leader and supported by "the young generation, vigorous, sensitive to the refreshing spirit of a new epoch of national renaissance."[219] In dire

moments in history, claimed Brăileanu, there was a need for "the action of a great man, of the brilliant leader able to give the human substrate a new form, the form of the work of art of a genius."[220] He praised Codreanu as a predestined charismatic leader, and the Legion as the only genuine nationalist movement of the country. He also argued that "All for the Country," the party representing the Legion in the political life, "concentrates all defense forces against the communist, demagogic democracy leading to communist debauchery." The party's mission was the creation of a homogenous nation-state based on "Christian moral and religion" and organized along totalitarian lines. The new state had necessarily to "reject the principle of class struggle in the economic field, fight against corrupt and corrupting demagogic politicianism, and enshrine the principle of personal merit and moral and technical training for public positions." The means to implement this radical program of social transformation were "education in work camps and the formation of an ascetic political elite."[221]

What was the political role of social science, in general, and of sociology, in particular in the work of national regeneration? Brăileanu acknowledged upfront that social scientists are neither social reformers nor great statesmen. *Însemnări sociologice* aimed to provide the Legion with social science instruments to build a totalitarian state. Brăileanu made it clear that, however useful, science is not an end in itself, but only an instrument in the hands of social reformers:[222] "Natural sciences appear as an auxiliary element, no doubt necessary, because without science (knowledge) the doctrines would be one without fruit, they would be the expression of wishes and aims that could not be fulfilled." Their value, however, is "only instrumental not intrinsic," argued Brăileanu. In other words, the role of science was thus not to provide a normative value system, but to facilitate the implementation of Legionary ideology: "*Însemnările sociologice* have established their path right from the beginning: to give the Legionary doctrine the full support of social science and, at the same time, to contribute to the spread of the Captain's doctrine, being fully convinced ourselves that it constitutes a salvational teaching for the Nation and the Country."[223] Brăileanu emphasized the merits but also the limits of sociology as applied science: "Sociology studies the social substrate, the social reality, discovering static and dynamic social laws, but it can neither design the most suitable form of social organization nor predict what kind of political form will the political genius create."[224] Consequently, "Sociology can contribute, like any other science, to the improvement of the technical means of governance, of management, it can facilitate a more thorough technical preparation of the brilliant, creative leader. But it cannot turn a man without leadership skills into a Bismarck, Mussolini, Hitler, or Codreanu."[225] Despite these limits, sociology could be helpful in developing the leader's art of governing, based on a new class of technocrats:

> The political technique would have to take into account the research of sociology and many other sciences (not only social). Social engineers, technicians, have a well-established function in the completion of the work of

> art of a political genius, as well as in its conservation and reproduction. Through technicians one can preserve the style and manner in the art of politics and they can give birth to political organizations following the rules elaborated by the work of the genius.[226]

Însemnări endorsed and further legitimized the charismatic type of politics promoted by the Legion, centered on Codreanu: "The Legionary doctrine is the doctrine of the Captain; of the great reformer of our times. It tells us that for a Romanian the supreme value is represented by the Fatherland; and that no sacrifice is too great, when the homeland and the nation are in jeopardy."[227] In contrast to promoters of abstract theories, the Legion had the capacity to act as a laboratory for practically implementing the principles of social science: "The Captain indoctrinated the youth in this faith, but not only by speech and writing, but also through exemplary deed."[228]

To enhance the Legionary project of regeneration, *Însemnări* elaborated new theories of social change, accompanied by practical experiments meant to facilitate the Legion's work of national salvation. The most important contribution was Brăileanu's theory on the circulation of elites.[229] The university professor argued that the "Jewish invasion" of Romania, supported externally by "Judaic imperialism," hampered the organic circulation of elites in the country. The Jewish infiltration could be discontinued only by forging a new ascetic elite, recruited from the national youth and educated in Legionary values. To resettle the Romanian nation-state on solid *national* foundations, *Însemnări* envisioned an alternative program of fascist education of various social strata. Since the majority of the country's population were peasants, *Însemnări* launched the project of a peasant university, theorized by Brăileanu and Leon Țopa.[230] These universities were modelled on Scandinavian prototypes, functioning since the mid-nineteenth century. Brăileanu claimed that peasant universities were an imperious necessity in Romania because, unlike in Nordic countries, the urban class was "foreign" and the Romanian bourgeoisie had been subordinated by the Jews. Peasants' participation in the army and in Romanian politics was not enough to forge and maintain their national spirit. Unlike regular universities, peasant universities did not aim to prepare students to exercise a profession, but "to grant them political education, in line with the national interests," thus contributing "to the consolidation of national solidarity."[231] Peasant universities had to be organized at the grass-root level by students and intellectuals on a voluntary basis, and to evolve into "communities of work" based on national values. Another institution assiduously theorized by *Însemnări* was the work camp, designed to forge new fascist men.

Brăileanu and his group of collaborators were deeply involved on a personal level in these forms of activism, turning Bukovina into a powerful stronghold of the Legion. In addition to presiding the debating circles of *Iconar* and *Însemnări sociologice*,[232] Brăileanu disseminated Legionary propaganda among students at the University of Cernăuți, sent regular messages of support to student conferences,[233]

and supervised the activity of work camps, such as the Storojineț Brick Factory.[234] In return, Brăileanu was kept in high esteem within the Legion, as shown by the solemn meeting held in his honor on March 19, 1936, attended by over 400 Legionaries.[235] In December 1937, Brăileanu led the list of candidates for the Chamber of Deputies in Cernăuți County.[236] He was to play a key political role during the short Legionary rule between September 1940 and January 1941.

Mihail Manoilescu, *Lumea Nouă,* and Corporatism

Another thinker and politician who had a lesser yet significant impact on Legionary ideology and action was Mihail Manoilescu and his magazine *Lumea Nouă* (*The New World*).[237] Manoilescu was born on December 9, 1891, at Tecuci, into a lower aristocratic Moldovan family. In 1910, he graduated from the Iași National College, and in 1915 from the prestigious School of Bridges and Roads in Bucharest, where he was trained as an engineer. Manoilescu entered politics in 1919 in the service of the NLP, working in the leadership of the Industrial Recovery Directorate. In 1921, the young technocrat joined the People's Party led by General Alexandru Averescu, convinced that the fulminant accession of the new party would enable him to play an important political role. Manoilescu also emerged as a leading expert on political economy, with not only path-breaking contributions on the evolution of the Romanian economy,[238] but also on dependency and sheltered industrialization.[239] During the People's Party's short stays in power (March 1920 to December 1921, and March 1926 to June 1927), Manoilescu served as under-secretary of state, but in 1928 left Averescu for the NPP, whose political fortune was on the rise. A fervent supporter of Prince Carol Caraiman, Manoilescu's political career received an important boost with Carol's accession to the throne in June 1930.

After Carol II's enthronement, Manoilescu served as minister in three successive governments. On July 14, 1931, in the culmination of his public service, Manoilescu was appointed Governor of the National Bank. In the same year, he became professor of political economy at the Polytechnic Institute, Bucharest. At the end of November 1931, after only four months in office, Manoilescu was forced to resign from the leadership of the National Bank, following his refusal to save the Marmorosch Bank from bankruptcy, as Carol II requested. The rupture with the king ruined Manoilescu's political career, prompting him to reconsider his political orientation. In 1932, Manoilescu launched the magazine *Lumea Nouă* (1932–1942), promoting a corporatist reorganization of society. At the time, corporatist ideas were harbored, in various forms, by many political parties and organizations, from peasantist to conservative-nationalist and fascist, eager as they were to provide alternatives to the dominant yet allegedly "decadent" democratic system. Mihail Manoilescu managed to impose himself as the main ideologue—indeed a veritable champion—of corporatism in Romania, both in terms of theoretical contributions and international influence.[240]

In September 1933, Mihail Manoilescu set up his own National Corporatist League (*Liga Națională Corporatistă*), and an association called the "Friends of

the Corporatist Idea."[241] The League launched a comprehensive program, in 33 points, for the "National Corporatist Organization of the Country and the State." It was argued that: "The new commandment for all people is today the economic organization of national life. However, this organization cannot be carried out by the present State. It can only be created by the Corporatist State. That is why so many States today have become, or are becoming, Corporative States."[242] The main aims of the corporatist organization of the state were: (1) to solve "the economic, social and cultural problems of the present"; (2) to allow "a more equitable balance between Romanians and the Minorities in all fields of national activity and the maintaining of a predominantly Romanian character in all national corporations"; and (3) to facilitate "the evolution of the country toward new social forms, in which the individual interest of the employer would no longer constitute the unique basis of production and exchange."[243]

Aware that his Corporatist League would not become a major political player, in the late 1930s Manoilescu moved closer to the Legion, arguing that *Legionarism* was the perfect ideological companion for corporatism. His ideas on corporatism and the international exposure they received led to a major debate over the role of corporatism in the ultranationalist ideology of the extreme right. Was corporatism well suited to Romania's socio-economic situation? The leadership of the Legion polemicized with Manoilescu and his collaborators from *Lumea Nouă*. Following Crainic's earlier critique of corporatism, Ion I. Moţa approached the question from the perspective of integral nationalism, redefined in the local context as "integral Romanianism." While he did not oppose corporatism in principle, Moţa rejected "corporatism for corporatism's sake." In his view, such a system could be implemented in Romania only after fulfilling two main preconditions in a transitional precorporatist phase: the spiritual regeneration of the nation and its ethnic purification. For Moţa, Manoilescu's corporatism was "ethnically colorless" because "it limited itself to a problem of formal state organization, without examining and aiming for a modification of the state's ethnic structure."[244] In Moţa's view, strategic professions in Romania were monopolized by foreign elements—mainly Jews; thus, a corporatist organization based on "the current demographic situation" would have meant "the perpetuation of a nefarious ethnic structure."[245] Reacting to an article published in *Lumea Nouă* by Joldea Rădulescu, Moţa reproached the author for not taking into account "the gravest problem of the contemporary Romanian state, the Jewish question":

> When Romanians have almost completely lost their cities, industry, trade, liberal professions, the centers of cultural infusion and political influence being seized by Kikes and by those assimilated by them, we cannot regard as our comrades-in-arms those who are afraid to set this problem IN THE FOREFRONT of all other problems and not simply in the shadow of indirect allusions or general conclusions about the Romanian character of the future state.[246]

Moţa concluded that, although corporatism was "well-oriented," it remained an "incomplete nationalism."[247] In line with *AXA*'s ideological orientation, he refocused the debate over corporatism on three main, interrelated dimensions: the spiritual regeneration of the nation, its ethnic purification, and only then the implementation of a corporate mechanism favoring ethnic Romanians.

The polemics between *AXA* and *Lumea Nouă* had important implications for the parties involved. On the one hand, it helped *AXA* intellectuals further crystalize their political priorities. On the other hand, responding to criticism, Manoilescu radicalized his political agenda, inserting his corporatist scheme of state organization into a fascist ideological framework that encompassed also the idea of the totalitarian state, the unique party, and integral nationalism. To be sure, Manoilescu was already in close contact with Italian theoreticians and "practicians" of corporatism. He met Mussolini in 1926 and developed a personal relationship with the Italian dictator. Manoilescu participated as a guest expert at an international congress on corporatism in Ferarra in 1932, and was invited to Rome to deliver a personal report on the meeting to Mussolini.[248] Despite these political connections, the Corporatist League's initial program, published in 1933, asserted that, in order to build national corporatism in Romania, it was necessary to have "neither a dictatorship, nor Fascism, nor a coup d'état," but "a new Constitutional Regime," based on "the organizing of National Work and of the National Political Representation."[249] Moreover, as previously shown, the new corporatist organization did not require a totalitarian state, but would actually entail the withering away of the state.

Manoilescu revisited these initial ideas, growing even closer to fascism. First, in 1935 Manoilescu published an influential book pleading for a single-party dictatorship.[250] He argued that, in the new age, political parties were sectarian and thus anachronistic. Only a single party, representing the entire nation, could play the leading political role in the future corporatist state. Manoilescu glorified the role of dictators (most importantly Mussolini, Hitler, and Salazar), as artisans of the corporatist system, seen as a path-breaking innovation in history. Second, Manoilescu argued that corporatism was not divorced from the national idea but, on the contrary, provided the only practical solution to its implementation:

> Our constructive nationalism takes visible forms in the economic and social fields. … We do not speak, in the social field, about a vague solidarity of classes in support of the idea of the fatherland, but we provide a complete and detailed description of a social system—the corporatist system—which makes possible the collaboration of all classes and their solidarity … In contrast to political parties—except for the two nationalist parties of Mr. Cuza and Mr. Codreanu—we have precisely defined the means through which we can save by our own forces, without appealing to external help.[251]

Manoilescu's claims were further supported by his collaborators from *Lumea Nouă*, who presented corporatism as the most suitable practical solution for the implementation of the Legionary doctrine:

> [M]r. Manoilescu gave the nationalist movements the *only system of tools* meant to implement the national idea into reality. The corporation, an instrument and guarantee of the process of Romanization, is *our idea and only ours*, and the studies on the practical application of this idea are much more precisely detailed than one can imagine.[252]

"Corporatism is thus the essential means for the economic and political fulfilling of the ideal of organic collectivism," concluded Radu Luca, another *Lumea* collaborator.[253] The two streams of thought—*Legionarism* and corporatism—were thus to converge into an original doctrine of Legionary-corporatism (*corporatism Legionar*), different from both the Italian and National Socialist systems:

> Romanian corporatism, or what tomorrow should be called Legionary-corporatism … different from Fascism and National Socialism in its basic ideology, and thus in its ideal objective, will have a distinct structure as compared to Italian corporatism or German corporatism. … Legionary-corporatism will have to be a system of organization meant to implement, gradually, in our practical life, the *new Legionary man*. Thus regarded, Romanian corporatism is part of a national system of education for forging the Legionary Romanian. Above it there is a conception, an ideology.[254]

Finally, and most surprisingly, Manoilescu embraced Orthodoxism. Not only that he paraded his religiosity and piety for political purposes (e.g., building an Orthodox church in the mining colony of Șorecani), but he also repeatedly underscored the Christian foundations of *Legionarism*, and the primacy of faith over ideology. This new orientation of Manoilescu was most probably an attempt to imitate the theological discourses advanced by the other mentors of the Legion, Crainic and Ionescu, with whom Manoilescu was in competition for spiritual guidance. But it was also a way of emphasizing Manoilescu's adherence to Legionary ideology. His collaborators at *Lumea Nouă* were keen to contribute to the further elaboration of Legionary ideology, turning it into a distinct and original religious *ism*. Christian Petrescu, for example, defined *Legionarism* as a "new, specific Romanian phenomenon," one that manifested itself as "a true, piercing religion."[255] Petrescu pointed out that *Legionarism* identified itself with both nationalism and Christianism, but also superseded them in many ways.[256] As "a religion of new life," *Legionarism* was necessarily a "movement of political importance which could not limit itself to the action of Christian missionarism."[257] It order to succeed *politically*, the Legion had to adopt "an adequate institutional system" enabling the implementation of its vision through "collective deed."[258] Petrescu emphasized the complementary role played by

corporatism, as the most suitable *institutional* organization of the state and society that could lead to the *political* implementation of the Legionary prophetic vision *in this world*: "Between *Legionarism* and corporatism there are no differences of vision or purpose: they are fully identical as idealistic goals."[259] Therefore, "as a method of forging the 'new man' for which we all struggle, we conclude that one cannot speak of an alternance between *Legionarism* and corporatism, *but only of simultaneity*."[260]

This ideological rapprochement led to a closer political collaboration between Manoilescu and the Legion. Gradually, *Lumea Nouă* became an important mouthpiece of the Legion, a forum for the articulation of Legionary ideology. Manoilescu devoted his energy and prestige to furthering the cause of the Legion in public conferences and parliamentary speeches.[261] He supported the Legion materially, as well, transforming his private coal-mine of Şorecani (Aghireşu, Cluj County) into a Legionary production unit.[262] He also sponsored the newspaper *Buna Vestire* (*The Annunciation*), which was to play a key role in Legionary propaganda in 1937 and again in 1940–1941, when it was led and edited by his brother, Grigore Manoilescu. Manoilescu's successful candidacy on the lists of the "All for the Country" Party in the 1937 parliamentary elections consecrated the political collaboration between the two parts, but represented also its culmination. Manoilescu's ideas were to play an important part in the corporatist experiment in Romania during the royal dictatorship. Yet, despite his readiness to cooperate in the implementation of corporatist political plans, Manoilescu was to remain, however, a rather marginal political figure in the era of successive national dictatorships (1937–1944).

An Ideologue of the Legionary Faith: Alexandru Cantacuzino, the Prophet of the Legionary Superhuman

Legionary ideologues were always keen to assert the originality of their movement, as distinct not only from other nationalist and antisemitic parties in Romania (such as LANC), but also from German National Socialism and Italian Fascism. These efforts intensified in the mid-to-late 1930s, when the consolidation of the Nazi regime and its political offensive imperiously raised the problem of the Legion's relation to other fascist movements in Europe. Legionary ideologues saw themselves as an integral part of the family of nationalist-revolutionary movements that mushroomed in interwar Europe; they emphasized the common goals of these movements, and declared their firm intention to contribute to forging a new European political architecture, in alliance with Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy. At the same time, they pointed out that the Legion was not a movement of import or of imitation, but an original political phenomenon that sprang "from the depth" of Romania's history. Its goals were not subordinated to foreign parties or ideologies but stemmed from Romanians' divine mission. In the spirit of this universalistic ideology, the Legionaries claimed not only to be the precursor of revolutionary nationalism, but also the most genuine movement

of regeneration in Europe, different from, and also superior to, German National Socialism and Italian Fascism.

To be sure, there was no consensus within the Legion over its relation to these external models; some leaders were ideologically closer to Italian Fascism, such as Vasile Marin, and saw the Legion's future in close cooperation with it; others, such as Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, Ion I. Moţa, and Mihail Polihroniade emphasized the original features of the Legion. The latter thesis was best articulated by a lay aristocratic leader, Alexandru Cantacuzino (1901–1939).

Although less well-known due to his late accession into the Legion and his premature death, Alexandru Cantacuzino was in fact a major leader and ideologue of the Legionary faith. The scion of two of the oldest Romanian boyar families (Cantacuzino on his father's side, and Pallady on his mother's side), and proudly bearing the title of "Prince" to allude to his family remote Byzantine imperial origins, Alexandru Cantacuzino was born on June 22, 1902, and received an elite education, earning a doctorate in law from the University of Bucharest. After a short diplomatic career, in 1930 Alexandru engaged in journalism. He also started a regular collaboration with various right-wing journals, such as *AXA*. He enrolled into the Legion in 1933, and was active in the electoral campaign of that year, taking part in the violent actions in the Pascani. Later, he was commandant of the Legionary camaraderie at Triaj, and then commandant of the Legionary work camp at the Green House in Bucharest.[263] He had an important role in organizing the 1936 student congress in Târgu Mureş. Appointed "Commander of the Annunciation" in 1937, Cantacuzino took part in the Legionary team led by General Cantacuzino-Grănicerul which fought in Spain on General Franco's side. In recognition of the great prestige he gained through this participation, Cantacuzino was named the leader of the newly established paramilitary elite order "Moţa and Marin" in January 1938, meant to preach the "pedagogy of death and resurrection," in the spirit of the two Legionary martyrs who died in the Spanish Civil War. Alexandru Cantacuzino was arrested during the royal dictatorship and died on September 22, 1939, executed on the order of Carol II.

Cantacuzino inserted Legionary ideology into a global taxonomy of political systems, differentiating between oligarchic, democratic, authoritarian, and dictatorial regimes. In tune with pioneering contemporary political science approaches, he classified Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia, Kemalist Turkey, and Mussolini's Italy as related dictatorial regimes, characterized by an almighty totalitarian state, a planned economy, and lack of civil rights and liberties. Apparently, he thus subscribed to the theory of unitotalitarianism that was being elaborated in the 1930s, which highlighted the similarities between fascism and communism. Yet, in his view, these common features were superficial resemblances of form rather than substance. Dictatorship was the *sine qua non* condition of revolutions from above, but the foundations and final aims of these revolutions were significantly different. The communist revolution was centered on the external, material enrichment of the community; to this end, it annihilated the human personality in order to better fit collective aims. In contrast,

the Legionary revolution focused on the internal transformation of the soul and entailed a metamorphosis of the human personality through its physical and spiritual regeneration. Due to this orientation, the Legion was superior to all other revolutionary movements in Europe, including the fascist ones.

To further explicate this thesis, Cantacuzino argued that interwar political life was dominated by a gigantic "metaphysical, theological debate" between two antithetic forms of *political religion* represented by Legionarism, as the most superior form of revolutionary movement, and Marxism.[264] Cantacuzino described communism (and, by the same token, its closely associated movements, Francomasonry and Judaism) as "anti-clerical, anti-religious, and anti-Christian."[265] As a consequence, communism rejected the divine revelation, the Holy Spirit, and the salvation. Following Berdiaef, Cantacuzino treated communism as a new messianic religion of the proletariat which aimed at eliminating exploitation and material misery, but instead gave birth to a "mechanic society." "For Marx, the messianic people, the people elected by God, is the proletariat."[266]

By contrast, Cantacuzino viewed the Legionary movement as profoundly religious, Christian, and national. The two political religions were based on two radically different views on the human nature, "two different species": the atheist-materialist vs. the religious-idealist.[267] One was oriented toward heavenly fulfillment and happiness in the afterlife, the other toward earthy, material well-being:

> The religious and Christian man who believes in predestination, in mercy, in the divine power to intervene in world affairs and to protect and guide the elected ones is of a different essence than the man animated by the communist spirit who believes only in certain categorical imperatives stemming from the material needs of humanity.[268]

The major difference between the two anthropological types of human beings was their attitude toward death. Legionaries believed in transcendence and immortality:

> In the Legionary world, we boast not only of our indifference to death, we boast of our love of death. The Legionary conception of death is linked back over twenty centuries to the teaching of Zamolxis who propagated among Geto-Thracians the cult of the soul's immortality.[269]

In opposition, communism was anti-national; since it rejected the supernatural, it propagated class struggle and proletarian internationalism in order to account for the existence of suffering and destruction in the world. Cantacuzino argued that Legionarism was national above all; it promoted a unitary, solitary, monolithic national collectivity: "It promotes the idea of national will, power and expansion, military discipline and glorifies death and sacrifice for the common good," but also values the rights of other nations to exist in the spirit of

"national universalism."[270] Its expansionism is kept in check by the spirit of national justice and the territorial limits of race. Cantacuzino rejected theories of racial superiority, but posited the existence of a distinct Romanian race unmixed with foreigners and uncontaminated by hybridization with the Jewish race.[271]

Cantacuzino argued that there were three preconditions to forge a new man in history: (1) "an exceptional leader who can dream prophetically and lucidly conceive the Romanian of tomorrow";[272] (2) "a spiritual effervescence or blossoming of the Romanian substance"; and 3) "moments of social upheaval, of ebullition." In the spirit of Social Darwinism, Cantacuzino saw the interwar period as an arena of confrontation between dominant master races (*rase de stăpâni*) such as the Germans and the Italians, and slave races (*rase de robi*). Forging the Romanian people as a master race was a work of healing and cleansing the nation through "*merciless surgery*," as well as a work of vision and creation.

The first dimension entailed the removal of the alien from the territory, who brought with itself "the germs of decadence" (*germeni de moliciune*). The second was the creation of the new man as the foundation of a new, Legionary Romania. The new man not an accidental development, but a prophetic vision of a charismatic leader:

> The new men must be conceived in dream, need to be imagined. This dream is sometimes a divine revelation. I believe that at the foundation of a new type of human being is a prophetic vision, the dream of an exceptional human, a great human, [which] is the image a great man envisions about the human being, in accordance with the imperatives of his time.[273]

In writings imbued with a militantly nationalist, anticommunist, and antisemitic pathos, Cantacuzino combined Legionary revolutionary nationalism with Orthodox ethics.[274] As a lay intellectual, Cantacuzino openly declined for himself "any authority in deciphering the Christian dogmas"; in line with the Romantic tradition of "emotional Christianity,"[275] he argued nevertheless that his "religious feelings" enable him to plead for a new fascist theology of "heroic Christianity," leading to collective salvation through fascist combat and sacrifice for the national cause. Rejecting what he called a "communist interpretation of the Christian religion," Cantacuzino advanced a new fascist theology leading to salvation: "Legionaries have a supreme goal: the salvation of the Romanian people."

The path to salvation was not the holy religious life of Orthodox monks and nuns, but the heroic fight in the service of the nation. Influenced by Sorel, Cantacuzino valued violence for its positive, "purifying" effect, defining it as a "necessary sin" and a main "method of national education." "With violence and extremism to fulfill our mission to lift the Romanian nation among the dominant races."[276] Even if it went against the precepts preached by the Church, Legionary revolutionary violence was in line with the divine, charismatic mission of redeeming the Romanian nation: "Maybe God's servants will not have

the right to absolve you of your sins on earth; but trust God's grace to absolve you in the sky." While the Church was concerned with individual salvation, the Legion strove for collective salvation based on an organic view of the nation and the principle of ethnic solidarity: "I, a Romanian soul, will be redeemed together with the souls of the Romanians, with the soul of the nation. The Romanians' sins burden me, my sins burden them. To redeem the sins of my co-nationals is the most noble but burdensome mission granted to man." Cantacuzino was convinced that God predestined Romanians "with a mission and a destiny," in harmony with higher divine goals. "We, the Legionaries, we attribute man a collective mandate along the lines of the mission entrusted to his people by God."[277] Legionary actions had two finalities: "the physical regeneration of the Romanian people" and "the work of rebuilding the entire Romanian society on Legionary foundations." The Legionaries thus prepared "a revolution in two stages: the revolution of the soul and the revolution of the socio-economic state of affairs."[278] To attain the physical and spiritual redemption of the Romanian nation and to lift the country to be among the greatest powers of Europe, he advocated strongly for the creation of a Legionary "new man," defined as a superior type of "human being" shaped by "Christian conceptions and a new philosophy of life." Cantacuzino rejected the "Asiatic philosophy" of defeatism, slavery, and servility that allegedly characterized contemporary Romanians' attitude to life, striving instead to revive the dynamism of the nation.

The Legionary spirit had to include, in "an indissoluble spiritual totality," three basic elements: "1. the Christian spirit; 2. the nationalist spirit; and 3. the heroic revolutionary spirit," thereby combining fascist features with elements of the Christian doctrine. The new Romanian "of tomorrow" would necessarily be anti-liberal, intolerant, and antisemitic, and to exhibit the militarism and *élan vital* specific to fascist movements: "Legionary nationalism cultivates and magnifies the idea of will, of power and territorial expansion, promotes military discipline, glorifies sacrifice and death for the common good."[279] The specific Legionary path to redemption was the supreme sacrifice, symbolized by the graves of the nationalist fighters: "We believe in the redeeming virtue of graves." Cantacuzino's vision of the creation of the Legionary "superhuman" and the Romanian "super-nation" by virtue of divine intervention departed from the dogma of the Orthodox Church. Instead, it merged the Legion's charismatic nationalism with main Christian themes in a new doctrine of national salvation, called "heroic Christianity," synthetized in the formula "Totalitarian, Christian spiritualist nationalism."[280]

Notes

1 Arhivele Naționale ale Republicii Moldova, Chișinău (hereby ANRM), Fond 680/1, file 3433, 372.
2 ANRM, Fond 680/1, file 3433, 512–13.
3 Zelea-Codreanu, "Towards the Popular Masses," in *For My Legionaries*, 266.
4 Ibid., 274.

5 Ibid., 277.
6 Heinen, *Legiunea "Arhanghelul Mihail,"* 187.
7 ANRM, Fond 680/1, file 3433, 669.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., 182; see also Codreanu, *For My Legionaries*, 277.
10 ANRM, Fond 680/1, file 3433, 171.
11 Ibid., 370.
12 Ibid., 188.
13 Ibid., 347.
14 Ibid., 329–330.
15 Ibid., 519.
16 Ibid., 520.
17 Ibid., 610.
18 Ibid., 629.
19 Codreanu, *For My Legionaries*, 299.
20 Argetoianu, *Memorii*, vol. 9, part VIII (1930–1931), 428.
21 ANIC, DGP, 4/1933, 140.
22 Four years later, the circumstances of the Legion's 1933 ban were to become the subject of harsh polemics between Nicoale Titulescu and other former members of the Duca government. Eager to re-launch his political career, after his demise from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Titulescu published a brochure entitled *Eu şi Garda de Fier* (Bucureşti: Universul, 1937), in which he denied having played a decisive role in the Legion's ban, most probably in the hope of mending his broken relationship with the radical right, which was at the time on a political offensive. His claims were vehemently rebuked by former members of the cabinet.
23 For details, see p. x.
24 General Cantacuzino-Grănicerul, "Chemare," *Cuvântul Argeşului* I, no. 5 (August 10, 1935), 3.
25 Dumitrescu-Borşa, *Cal troian intra muros*, 136. Father Dumitrescu-Borşa took over the role of the secretary from Eng. Clime, who reportedly could not cope with the General's rude manners and pornographic language.
26 *Enciclopedia Cugetarea*, edited by Lucian Predescu (Bucureşti: Cugetarea, 1940), 165.
27 Cantacuzino-Grănicerul, "Chemare," 3.
28 Heinen, *Legiunea "Arhangelul Mihail,"* 262–263.
29 Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, *Circulări şi manifeste, 1927–1938,* 2nd ed. (München: Colecţia Europa, 1981), 23–24.
30 Heinen, *Legiunea "Arhangelul Mihail,"* 247.
31 Ion I. Moţa, *Scrisoare către "Tineretul cuminte." O.E.T.R., Străjeri şi Stăjerițe, Şoimi şi Şoimane, Premilitari. Cercetaşi şi Cercetaşe* (1937), 28.
32 Ibid., 16–17.
33 ANIC, DGP, 4/1933, 149.
34 Ibid., 21.
35 ACNSAS, Fond Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, vol. 8, 207–208.
36 Paramilitarism was to be officially revived during the royal dictatorship: The Front of National Renaissance organized by Carol II in 1938 adopted a paramilitary structure complementary to the party and characterized by the use of uniforms, military hierarchy, and training.
37 Boilă, *Amintiri şi consideraţii*, 49–50.
38 See "Lichidarea taberelor legionare," August 15, 1937, ANIC, Fond MI Diverse, 1/1937, vol. II, 34.
39 Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, "Comunicat no. 65: Către Studenţii Legionari," April 2, 1937, ANIC, DGP, 254/1937.
40 ACNSAS, Fond Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, P 011784, vol. 9, 234.
41 Ibid., 180.

42 Ibid., 103.
43 Ibid., 86–89, 144, 148.
44 Ibid., 128.
45 Ibid., 221.
46 Moţa, *Cranii de lemn*, 53.
47 Ion I. Moţa, "Răspuns (la invitaţia dlui Prof. G. Bogdan-Duică)," *Pământul Strămoşesc* II, no. 1 (Jan. 1, 1928), 8.
48 Ibid., 9.
49 Moţa, *Cranii de lemn*, 53.
50 Zelea-Codreanu, *The Nest Leader's Handbook*, points 87, 86.
51 Horia Sima, *Doctrina Legionară* (Madrid: Editura Mişcării Legionare, 1980), 9.
52 Vasile Marin, "Cele două studenţimi," *Cuvinte pentru studenţi* (Bucureşti, 1937), 24.
53 Ibid., 23.
54 On the main features of populism, see Cas Mudde, "Populism: an Ideational Approach," in *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, edited by Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, et. al., (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 27–47; Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy, "Populism: An Overview of the Concept and the State of the Art," in ibid., 1–24; and Eatwell, "Fascism and Populism," in ibid., 363–383. On the populist nature of the Legion, see Ghiţă Ionescu, "Eastern Europe," *Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics*, edited by Ghiţă Ionescu and Ernest Gellner (New York: Macmillan. 1969), 118. I argue that populism is a constitutive ingredient of fascism, but this discursive feature should be understood only in conjunction with revolutionary nationalism. I thus reject views that assert that the Legion was solely a populist but not a fascist organization, arguing instead that it was both fascist and populist.
55 On social conservative and the "strict father model" of governance, see George Lakoff, *Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).
56 A fifth meaning, unrelated to the issues addressed here, is to restore digital electrical signals. See http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/DictionaryResults.aspx?lextype=3&search=regeneration
57 Zelea-Codreanu, *For My Legionaries*, 216–217.
58 Ibid., 315.
59 Ibid., 314.
60 Ibid., 314.
61 Ibid., 313–14.
62 For the Dacian cult of Zalmoxis, see Mircea Eliade, *De Zalmoxis à Gengis-Khan; études comparatives sur les religions et le folklore de la Dacie et de l'Europe orientale* (Paris: Payot, 1970); and idem., *Zalmoxis, the Vanishing God* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972).
63 ANIC, Fond Ministerul de Interne, Diverse, 8/1927, 52.
64 See Geoffrey Brunn and Victor S. Mamatey, *The World in the Twentieth Century* (Boston: Hearth, 1962), 891.
65 See the final footnote in Ion I. Moţa's article "Sfântul Arhanghel Mihail: Voevodul Puterilor Cereşti," *Pământul Strămoşesc* 1, no. 5 Oct. 1, 1927), 5–12, republished in the 1936 volume of essays *Cranii de lemn*. My emphasis.
66 Moţa, *Pământul Strămoşesc*, 5, 11.
67 Zelea-Codreanu, *For My Legionaries*, 248.
68 Mihai Vinereanu, *Dictionar Etimologic al Limbii Române. Pe baza cercetărilor de indo-europenistică* (Bucharest: Alcor Edimpex, 2009), 549, 619. Others link it with the Latin word *pavimentum*.
69 Vinereanu, *Dictionar Etimologic*, 549.
70 Codreanu, *For My Legionaries*, 62.
71 Ilie Gârneaţă, *Amintiri nepublicate. Crâmpeie*, unpublished manuscript, 5.

72 Goga, "Orașele," in *Mustul care fierbe*, 409–411. For a discussion, see above, p. 54 and 72n12.
73 For these two strategies, closely linked with the cult of authenticity, see Smith, *Chosen People*, 134–137.
74 Romulus Vulcănescu, "Cultul pământului la români," *Mitologie Română* (Bucuresti: Editura Academiei, 1987), 446.
75 Vulcănescu, *Mitologie Română*, 446.
76 Ion S. Floru, *Istoria românilor pentru cursul superior de liceu* (Bucureşti: Socec, 1924).
77 ANIC, Fond MI, Diverse, 4/1933, 2.
78 For studies on ritual politics and imagery in Fascist Italy, see Simonetta Falasca-Zamponi, *Fascist Spectacle: The* Aesthetics *of Power in Mussolini's Italy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Luisa Passerini, *Mussolini immaginario: Storia di una biografia 1915–1939* (Roma: Laterza, 1991); and Claudio Fogu, *The Historic Imaginary: Politics of History in Fascist Italy* (Toronto, Ont: University of Toronto Press, 2003). The latter work focuses on the fascist politics of history in Italy of the 1920s and 1930s and the construction of what Fogu calls the fascist "historic imaginary," defined as "the ensemble of mental icons in which the historic essence of fascism was imagined and from which it was projected into visual and ritual representations that aimed at making the past present, rather than seeking legitimization from the past" (11–12). In Fascist Italy, these representations crystallized in the "unique balance between modernist aestheticization and popular-cultural sacralization" (5), best exemplified in the 1932 Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution (*Mostra della rivoluzione fascista*). Fogu argued that the historic imaginary of Italian Fascism delineates a deep rhetorical structure underlying fascist ideology.
79 Codreanu, *For My Legionaries*, 316.
80 Ibid., 270.
81 Ion Heliade Rădulescu, *Opere*, 2 vols. (Bucureşti, 2002), vol. 2, 339.
82 Dumitru Murărescu, *Naţionalismul lui Eminescu* (Bucureşti: ATOS, 1994 [1932]), 68–81.
83 Codreanu, *For my Legionaries*, 107.
84 Moţa, *Cranii de lemn*, 95.
85 Moţa, "Răspuns (la invitaţia dlui Prof. G. Bogdan-Duică)," 8.
86 Ibid., 9.
87 Ibid., 11.
88 Ibid.
89 *Pământul Stămoșesc* 2 (1928), 6.
90 Moţa, "Răspuns," 7.
91 Ion Zelea-Codreanu, *Monitorul Oficial*, no. 22, Part III, *Destaberile Parlamentare*, *Adunarea Deputaţilor, Sesiunea Ordinară 1932–1933*, Dec. 18, 1932, 485.
92 Ion Zelea-Codreanu, *Monitorul Oficial*, 485.
93 Mihail Polihroniade, "Sensul revoluţiei naţionale," *Axa* II, no. 15 (June 15, 1933), 1, 5.
94 Codreanu, *For my Legionaries*, 54, 50.
95 Moţa, *Cranii de lemn*, 196.
96 *Legiunea Arhanghelului Mihai, Garda de Fier. Programul și caracterul general* (Cluj: Cartea Românească, 1931).
97 Nichifor Crainic, *Dostoievski și crestinismul rus* (Cluj: Arhidiecezana; Bucureşti: Anastasia, 1998), 23.
98 On *Gândirea*, see mainly Dumitru Micu, "*Gîndirea*" *și gîndirismul* (Bucureşti: Minerva, 1975); and Ornea, *Anii treizeci*. For rich accounts of Crainic's editorial and political activities, see Roland Clark: "Nationalism and orthodoxy: Nichifor Crainic and the political culture of the extreme right in 1930s Romania," *Nationalities Papers* 40, no. 1 (2012), 107–126; and "Orthodoxy and nation-building: Nichifor Crainic and religious nationalism in 1920s Romania," *Nationalities Papers* 40, no. 4 (2012), 525–43. Clark argues that modern Romanian nationalism was predominantly secular in

character, and that the fusion between religion and nationalism was "relatively sudden." In disagreement over this point, I emphasize the religious roots of messianic nationalism in Romanian national ideology and the visions of religious nationalism promoted prior to World War One by George Coşbuc, Simion Mehedinţi, Nicolae Iorga, and Constantin Paulescu, and institutionalized in the educational experiment at the Dealu Monastery.

99 Crainic republished his main articles in two collections: *Puncte cardinale în haos* (Iaşi: Timpul, 1996 [1936]); and *Ortodoxie şi etnocraţie: Cu o Anexă: Programul Statului Etnocratic* (Bucureşti: Albatros, 1997 [1937]).
100 Lucian Blaga, "Începuturile şi cadrul unei prietenii," *Gândirea* XIX, no. 4 (April 1940), 225.
101 Eugen Lovinescu, *Istoria literaturii române contemporane* (Bucureşti: Ancora, 1926).
102 Oswald Spengler, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes: Umrisse einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte*, 2 vols, (Wien–Leipzig: W. Braumüller, 1918–1922).
103 Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West* (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1926), 31.
104 Nichifor Crainic, "Parsifal," *Gândirea* III, no. 8–9–10 (1924), 181.
105 Crainic, "Parsifal," 185.
106 Nichifor Crainic "A doua neatârnare," *Gândirea* VI, no. 1 (January 1927), 5.
107 Ibid., 3.
108 Nichifor Crainic, "Modul teandric," *Gândirea* XIX, no. 1 (January 1940), 2.
109 Ibid., 1.
110 Crainic *Dostoievski*, 23.
111 Ibid., 15.
112 Crainic, "Parsifal," 186.
113 Crainic *Dostoievski*, 24.
114 Crainic, "Modul teandric," 3. See also Crainic, *Dostoievski*, 13–14.
115 Crainic, "Modul teandric," 5.
116 Ibid., 3.
117 Ibid., 5.
118 Crainic, "A doua neatârnare," 1–6.
119 Constantin Rădulescu-Motru, *Românismul: catehismul unei noi spiritualităţi* (Bucureşti: Fundaţia pentru Literatură şi Artă "Regele Carol II," 1936).
120 Nichifor Crainic, "Spiritul autohton," *Ortodoxie şi etnocraţie*, 165.
121 Ibid.
122 Crainic, *Ortodoxie şi etnocraţie*, 230. For other articles praising Mussolini, see Nichifor Crainic, "Roma Universală," *Sfarmă Piatră* II, no. 13 (February 13, 1936), 3; Toma Vlădescu, "O ţară asediată de democraţie," *Sfarmă Piatră* II, no. 13 (February 13, 1936), 4.
123 Crainic, *Ortodoxie şi etnocraţie*, 168.
124 Ibid., 169.
125 Ibid., 107.
126 Crainic, *Ortodoxie şi etnocraţie*, 109–110.
127 Crainic, June 25, 1925, cited in Nichifor Crainic, "Scurta recapitulare," *Gândirea* XIX, no. 7 (Sept. 1940), 469.
128 Crainic, "Tineretul şi creştinismul," in *Puncte cardinale în haos*, 20–21. Originally published in *Gândirea* XIII, no. 3 (1934), 65–73.
129 Crainic, "Tineretul şi creştinismul," 69.
130 Sorin Pavel, Ion Nestor, Petre Marcu-Balş, "Manifestul Crinului Alb," *Gândirea* VIII, no. 8–9 (1928), 311–317.
131 Ibid., 317.
132 Ibid.
133 Crainic, "Spiritualitate," *Gândirea*, VIII (1928) 8–9, 311.
134 Crainic, *Puncte cardinale*, 21.
135 Codreanu, *Discurse la Mesaj*, December 3, 1931.

136 Ibid.
137 *Calendarul* enrolled youngsters who would play an important role in elaborating the Legionary ideology: Toma Vlădescu, Dragoş Protopopescu, Radu Dragnea, and Dan Botta. Due to its nationalist orientation, *Calendarul* was temporarily suspended in March–June 1932, and fully in December 1933.
138 Virgil Ionescu, "Memorii. 1. Pe drumul crucilor căzute," *Pământul Strămoşesc* no. 5 (1979), 6.
139 Constantin Papanace, "Cuvânt Introductiv," in Nae Ionescu, *Fenomenul legionar* (Cetatea Eternă [Rome]: Armatolii, 1963), 17.
140 Crainic, *Ortodoxie şi etnocraţie*, 167.
141 Crainic, "Scurtă recapitulare," *Gândirea* XIX, no. 7 (September 1940), 469.
142 Crainic, "Revoluţia Legionară," *Gândirea* XIX, no. 8 (October 1940), 522.
143 Ibid., 522–523.
144 Ibid., 524.
145 During the communist regime, Crainic served 15 years in prison for ultranationalist activity, for spreading antisemitic and fascist ideas, and for collaborating with Antonescu's dictatorship. In the 1960s, Crainic was integrated in the cultural policies of the communist regime as editor of the official magazine *Glasul Patriei* (The Voice of the Fatherland) targeting Romanians living abroad (1962–1968).
146 Ionescu, "Memorii," 6.
147 Al. Constant, "Aşa erau," *Cuvântul Argeşului* II, no. 28–30 (February 1, 1937), 3.
148 Ionescu, "Memorii," 7.
149 Constant, "Aşa erau," 3.
150 Mihail Polihroniade, "Dreapta Românească," *Axa* I, no. 2 (November 10, 1932), 1.
151 Mihail Polihroniade, "Naţionalism şi Cuzism," *Axa* II, no. 5 (January 22, 1933), 1. See also Ion I. Moţa, "Garda de Fier şi L.A.N.C.," *Axa* II, no. 19 (October 1, 1933),1.
152 Polihroniade, "Naţionalism şi Cuzism," 5.
153 Mihail Polihroniade, "Sensul revoluţiei naţionale," *Axa* II, no. 15 (June 15, 1933), 1, 5.
154 Ibid., 1.
155 Ibid.
156 Ioan Victor Vojan, "Soluţia crizei," *Axa* II, no. 5 (January 22, 1933), 1.
157 Vasile Christescu, "Actualizarea evului mediu," *Axa* II, no. 8 (March 5, 1933), 5.
158 Polihroniade, "Sensul revoluţiei naţionale," 5.
159 C. I. Papanace, "Schimbul de populaţii," *Axa* II, no. 12 (April 9, 1933), 7–8; C. I. Papanace, "Românii de peste hotare," *Axa* II, no. 8 (March 3, 1933), 2.
160 Vasile Marin, *Fascismul. Organizarea Constituțională a Statului Corporativ Italian: Teză pentru Doctorat în Științele Politice și Economice* (București: Serviciul şi Editura Colportajului Legionar, n.a.); new ed., (București: Editura Majadahonda, 1997).
161 Vasile Marin, "Extremismul de dreapta," *Axa* II, no. 21 (October 29, 1933), 1.
162 Marin, "Extremismul de dreapta," 1.
163 Nae Ionescu, *Teologia. Integrala publicisticii religioase* (Sibiu: Deisis, 2003), 397.
164 Ibid.
165 On this point, see Heinen, *Legiunea 'Arhangelul Mihail*,' 169.
166 Ionescu, "Memorii," 7.
167 CNSAS, Arhiva operativă, File Nae Ionescu, I 73552, vol. 1, 75.
168 CNSAS, Arhiva operativă, File Nae Ionescu, I 73552, vol. 1, 75.
169 Ibid., 64.
170 Dan C. Mihăilescu, "Generaţia '27, atunci şi acum," *Cuvântul* XI, no. 3 (March 2005), 12.
171 Mircea Eliade, *Itinerariu spiritual: scrieri de tinereţe 1927* (Bucureşti: Humanitas, 2003).
172 Mircea Eliade, *Autobiography*, vol. 1: *1907–1937, Journey East, Journey West* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 131.
173 Eliade, *Autobiography*, vol. 1, 132.

174 For a recent comprehensive analysis of *Criterion* and its members' relation to the Legion, see Bejan, *Intellectuals and Fascism*, esp. 25–57.
175 Ion Plăeşu [Mircea Eliade], "S-a încheiat un ciclu," *Credinţa* I, no. 11 (December 14, 1933), 4.
176 Mircea Vulcănescu, "Generaţie," *Criterion* I, no. 3–4 (1934), 3–6, republished in Mircea Vulcănescu, *Tânăra generaţie. Crize vechi în haine noi. Cine sunt şi ce vor tinerii români?* (Bucureşti: Compania, 2004), 61.
177 Mircea Vulcănescu, *Tendinţele tinerei generaţii* (Bucureşti: Editura Ţara Nouă, 1936), 18.
178 CNSAS, Arhiva operativă, File Nae Ionescu, I 73552, vol. 1, 377; File Mircea Eliade I 073557.
179 See H. H. Stahl's witness account, in Zoltan Rostas, *Monografia ca utopie. Inverviuri cu Henry H. Stahl* (Bucureşti: Paideia, 2001), 162.
180 For the most complete biography of Mircea Eliade to date, see Florin Ţurcanu, *Mircea Eliade. Le prisonnier de l'histoire* (Paris: La Découverte, 2004).
181 Mircea Eliade, *Texte "Legionare" şi despre "Românism"* (Cluj: Dacia, 2001).
182 Mircea Eliade, "De ce cred în biruinţa mişcării legionare?," *Buna Vestire* (December 17, 1937), 1.
183 Eliade, "De ce cred în biruinţa mişcării legionare?," 1.
184 Mircea Eliade, *Întoarcerea din rai* (Bucureşti: Luceafărul, 1934); *Huliganii: roman* (Bucureşti: Editura Naţională-Ciornei, 1935).
185 CNSAS, Arhiva operativă, File Mircea Eliade I 073557. Overall, Eliade's work provides both a primary source on the relation between fascism and religion, and a scholarly tool for exploring these issues in a historical-comparative perspective. For hypotheses on the relationship between the two in Eliade's work, see Ricketts MacLinscott, *Mircea Eliade: The Romanian Roots, 1907–1945* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1988); Daniel Dubuisson, *Mythologies du XXe siècle: Dumézil, Lévi-Strauss, Eliade* (Lille: Presses universitaires de Lille, 1993); and Tony Stigliano, "Fascism's mythologist: Mircea Eliade and the politics of myth," *ReVision* 24, no. 3 (2002), 32–38.
186 On Emil Cioran's life, work, and political convictions, see mainly Ornea, *Anii treizeci*; Petreu, *An Infamous Past*; Laignel-Lavastine, *Cioran, Eliade, Ionescu*; and Zarifopol-Johnston, *Searching for Cioran*.
187 Emil Cioran, *Schimbarea la faţă a României* (Bucureşti: Vremea, 1936).
188 Emil Cioran, *Lacrimi şi sfinţi* (Bucureşti: Editura Autorului, 1937); published in English as *Tears and Saints* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).
189 Emil Cioran, "Profilul interior al Căpitanului," *Glasul strămoşesc* VI (December 25, 1940) 10, cited in Zigu, *Anii treizeci*, 197.
190 Note that after his settlement in France, Eugen Ionescu's name is spelled Eugène Ionesco.
191 On inter-personal relations among Mihail Sebastian, Mircea Eliade, Nae Ionescu, and Eugen Ionescu, see Călinescu, "Ionesco and Rhinoceros," 393–434.
192 Marta Petreu, *Diavolul şi ucenicul său: Nae Ionescu - Mihail Sebastian* (Iaşi: Polirom, 2009), 201. Petreu's book stirred a passionate historiographical debate on the nature of Sebastian's political convictions. Petreu's findings were contested by other historians of ideas, who accused Petreu of a truncated reading of Sebastian's journalistic texts. For the purpose of our analysis, the contradictions highlighted by Petreu further underscore the tensions between the mentor's influence, generational solidarity, and personal identity and inner convictions.
193 Nae Ionescu, "Prefaţă," in Mihail Sebastian, *De două mii de ani* (Bucureşti: Editura "Naţională-Ciornei," 1934), 7-25. For the public debate on the book and the author's response, see Mihail Sebastian, *Cum am devenit huligan* (Bucureşti: Cultura Naţională, 1935); my citations originate from the joint post-communist edition *De două mii de ani… Cum am devenit huligan* (Bucureşti: Humanitas, 1990).
194 Ionescu, "Prefaţă," in Sebastian, *De două mii de ani…. Cum am devenit huligan*, 8.

195 Ionescu, "Prefaţă," 12, my emphasis.
196 Ionescu, "Prefaţă," 24.
197 Sebastian, "Prefaţa," in *De două mii de ani… Cum am devenit huligan*, 291.
198 Sebastian, "Cuvântul," in *De două mii de ani… Cum am devenit huligan* (Bucureşti: Humanitas, 1990), 262.
199 Mihail Sebastian, "Despre arta de a fi în acelaşi timp reacţionar şi bolşevic," in *De două mii de ani… Cum am devenit huligan*, 256-257.
200 Mihail Sebastian, *Jurnal 1935–1944* (Bucureşti: Humanitas, 1996). Published in English as *Journal, 1935–1944* (London: Heinemann, 2000).
201 On Traian Brăileanu's life and work, see Radu Florian Bruja, *Traian Brăileanu. Studii, documente. Încercări literare* (Iaşi: Junimea, 2011); Alexandru Ovidiu Vintilă, *Traian Brăileanu. Întruchipările raţiunii. Fapte, idei, teritorii ale realităţii din interbelicul bucovinean* (Bucureşti: Paideia, 2012); Radu Florian Bruja, "Traian *Brăileanu* În documente (I)," *Codrul Cosminului* 12 (2006), 223–231.
202 They were later joined by other collaborators, such as Teofil Lianu, Cicerone Mucenic, Pompei Atanasiu, and Gheorghe Iacob.
203 Vasile Posteucă, "Amintiri de la Iconar," *Drum* XI, no. 4 (November–December 1975), 15.
204 August 1935, Arhivele Naţionale Suceava, Fond Prefectura judeţului Rădăuţi, 88/1935, 9, in Bruja, "Traian Brăileanu in documents (III)," 299–300.
205 Posteucă, "Amintiri de la Iconar," 15.
206 Ibid.
207 Ibid.
208 George Macrin, "Luptători şi doctrinari," *Iconar* II, no. 9 (1937), 1.
209 Ibid.
210 Nae Ionescu, "Primejdia celor 'de pe urmă,'" *Iconar* 1, no. 12 (1935), 1.
211 Ibid.
212 Traian Brăileanu, "Ce vom 'însemna,'" *Însemnări sociologice* 1, no. 1 (April 1935), 1.
213 Ibid.
214 Ion Ţurcan, "Însemnări sociologice," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 46 (November 28, 1940), 1.
215 Brăileanu, "Cuvânt înainte, la ediţia a doua," 6.
216 Ţurcan, "Însemnări sociologice," 1.
217 Traian Brăileanu, *Sociologia şi arta guvernării: Articole politice* (Bucureşti: Cartea Românească, 1940), 175.
218 Brăileanu, "Sociologia şi arta politică," in *Sociologia şi arta guvernării*, 29–30.
219 Ibid., 30.
220 Ibid.
221 Brăileanu, *Sociologia şi arta guvernării*, 175.
222 Traian Brăileanu, "Doctrina legionară şi stiinţa socială," *Însemnări sociologice* IV, no. 8 (December 15, 1940), 1–5.
223 Ibid., 5.
224 Brăileanu, "Sociologia şi arta politică," 29.
225 Ibid.
226 Ibid.
227 Brăileanu, "Doctrina legionară şi stiinţa socială," 5.
228 Ibid., 5.
229 See the section entitled "Elitele" in Brăileanu, *Sociologia şi arta guvernării*, 86–152.
230 Traian Brăileanu, "Universitatea ţărănească," in *Sociologia şi arta guvernării*, 65–82; Leon Ţopa, *Universitatea Ţărănească. Teoria şi practica ei* (Cernăuţi: Editura Societăţii pentru cultura şi literatura română în Bukovina, 1935).
231 Brăileanu, "Universitatea ţărănească," 279, 281.
232 See ANIC Fond MI, DGP, 231/1936, 1, reproduced in Bruia, "Traian Brăileanu in documents (III)," 300.

233 Traian Brăileanu, "Trimitem salutul omagial al studenţimii române, adunate la Congres," Craiova, April 18, 1935, ANIC Fond Ministerul de Interne (MI), Direcţia Generală a Poliţiei (DGP), vol. I, inv. 2349, 232/1935, vol II, f.174, published in Radu Florian Bruja, "Traian Brăileanu in documents (III)," 299.
234 See police reports from 1935 and 1936: Fond MI, DGP, vol. I, inv. 2349, 232/1935, vol. II, 277; and Fond MI, DGP, 3/1936, 161, published in Bruja, "Traian Brăileanu in documents (III)," 299, 300.
235 Inspectoratul Regional de Poliţie, Cernăuţi Dare de seamă (March 1936), ANIC Fond MI, DGP, 4/1936, f.38–39, in Bruja, "Traian Brăileanu in documents (III)," 300.
236 Arhivele de Stat ale Regiunii Cernăuţi, Fond Chestura de Poliţie a oraşului Cernăuţi, inv. 38., d. 205, 3–7, in Bruja, "Traian Brăileanu in documents (III)," 302.
237 On Manoilescu's life, economic thinking and corporatist vision, see mainly Joseph Love, *Crafting the Third World: Theorizing Underdevelopment in Rumania and Brazil* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996); Ornea, *Anii treizeci*; and Matteo Pasetti, *L'Europa corporativa. Una storia transnazionale tra le due guerre mondiali* (Bologna: Bononia University Press, 2016), esp. 188–189, 191–199.
238 For Manoilescu's works on the Romanian economy, see mostly: *Politica producţiei naţionale* (Bucureşti: Cultura Naţională, 1923); and *Rostul şi destinul burgheziei româneşti* (Bucureşti: Cugetarea–Georgescu Delafras, 1942).
239 See Mihail Manoilescu, *Théorie du protectionnisme et de l'échange international* (Paris: Marcel Giard, 1929); English ed., *The Theory of Protection and International Trade* (London: King, 1931); Brazilian ed., *Teoria do Protecionismo e da Permuta Internacional: traducçao do Centro das industrias do Estado de São Paulo* (São Paulo: Escolas Profissionaes do Lyceu Coração de Jesus, 1931); Italian ed., *La teoria del protezionismo e dello scambio internazionale* (Milano, 1931); German ed., *Neue Auffassungen über den Gewerbeprotektionismus* (Bukarest: Impr. Naţională, 1931).
240 Mihail Manoilescu: *Le siècle du corporatisme: doctrine du corporatisme intégral et pur* (Paris: Alcan, 1934, republished 1936, 1938); Romanian ed., *Secolul corporatismului: Teoria corporatismului integral şi pur* (Bucureşti: Editura Naţională-Ciornei, 1934); Brazilian ed., *O Seculo do corporativismo: doutrina do corporativismo integral e puro* (Rio: Editora José Olympio, 1938).
241 ANIC, DGP, 4/1933, 163, 205–206, 232.
242 "National Corporatist League," in *Politics and Political Parties in Roumania* (London: International Reference Library Pub. Co., 1936), 208. See also *România - Stat National Corporativ (programul oficial al Ligei Naţional-Corporatiste)* (Bucureşti, 1938).
243 "National Corporatist League," 210.
244 Ion I. Moţa, "Faza precorporativă," *Axa* II, no. 7 (September 6, 1933), I.
245 Ibid.
246 Ion I. Moţa, "Sub povara remanenţelor," *Axa* II, no. 23 (December 7, 1933), 3.
247 Ibid.
248 Pasetti, *L'Europa corporativa*, 192.
249 "National Corporatist League," 209.
250 Mihail Manoilescu, *Le Parti unique: Institution politique des régimes nouveaux* (Paris : Les Oeuvres Françaises, 1936).
251 Mihail Manoilescu, "Naţionalismului nostru," *Lumea Nouă* II, no. 1 (1933), 19.
252 Victor Munteanu, "Continuarea naţionalismului nostru," *Lumea Nouă* V, no. 2 (1936), 36.
253 Radu Luca, "Colectivism organic," *Lumea Nouă* VI, no. 1 (January 1937), 20.
254 Christian Petrescu, "Fascism, national-socialism şi legionarism," *Lumea Nouă* VI, no. 7 (1937), 293.
255 Christian Petrescu, "Instituţionalim şi Spiritualitate. Legionarism şi corporatism," *Lumea Nouă* VI, no. 1 (Jan. 1937), 26.
256 "Legionarism has, thus, in its depths, points of total identification with Christianism." Petrescu, "Instituţionalim şi Spiritualitate," 25.

257 Ibid., 33.
258 Ibid., 26.
259 Ibid.
260 Ibid., 34.
261 See Mihail Manoilescu, *Românismul şi dreptul său: discurs ţinut în Senat la 3 Decembrie 1935* (Bucureşti: Universul, 1936); and *Generaţia nouă şi politica veche: discurs ţinut în Senat la 27 Noemvrie 1936* (Bucureşti: Imprimeria Centrală, 1936).
262 Ornea, *Anii treizeci*, 273.
263 ACNSAS, fond Operativ, Cantacuzino Alexandru, I 329937, vol. 1, 1.
264 Cantacuzino,. *Între lumea legionară şi lumea comunistă* (Bucureşti: Editura Mişcării Legionare, 1940), 11.
265 Ibid., 18.
266 Ibid., 11.
267 Ibid., 19.
268 Ibid., 19–20.
269 Ibid., 24.
270 Ibid., 35.
271 Cantacuzino, *Între lumea legionară*, 36–37.
272 Alexandru Cantacuzino, *Românul de mâine. Românismul nostru* (Bucureşti: Editura Mişcării Legionare, 1940 [1935]), 11.
273 Ibid., 9.
274 Alexandru's political views were influenced by those of his mother, "Princess" Alexandrina. The founder and president of the National Orthodox Society of Romanian Women (founded 1910), Alexandrina combined nationalism with Orthodox ethics and conservative feminism.
275 For Romantic visions of self-revelation and religious emotions as the sole basis of theology, see Schenk, *The Mind of the European Romantics*, 111, 113.
276 Cantacuzino, *Românul de mâine*, 32.
277 Alexandru Cantacuzino, *Cum suntem* (Bucureşti: Editura Mişcării Legionare 1940), 31.
278 Ibid, 12.
279 Cantacuzino, *Între lumea legionară*, 35.
280 Cantacuzino, *Românul de mâine*, 49.

References

ANRM. Fond "680/1," file 3433.
ANIC. Fond "Ministerul de Interne-Diverse," 8/1927; 1/1937, vol. II; 4/1933; 254/1937.
ACNSAS. Fond "Arhiva operativă," File Nae Ionescu, I 73552, vol. 1
ACNSAS. Fond "Arhiva operativă," File Mircea Eliade I 073557
ACNSAS. Fond "Arhiva operativă," File Cantacuzino Alexandru, I 329937, vol. 1.
ACNSAS. Fond "Arhiva operativă," File Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, P 011784, vols. 8, 9.
Argetoianu, Constantin. *Memorii. vol. 9, part VIII (1930–1931).* Bucureşti: Machiavelli, 1996.
Buletinul informativ, no. 2–5 (August-September 1940).

Secondary Sources

Bejan, Cristina A. *Intellectuals and Fascism in Interwar Romania: The Criterion Association*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.
Blaga, Lucian. "Începuturile şi cadrul unei prietenii," *Gândirea* XIX, no. 4 (Apr. 1940): 223–227.

Boilă, Zaharia. *Amintiri şi consideraţii asupra mişcării legionare*. Cluj-Napoca: Biblioteca Apostrof, 2002.
Brăileanu, Traian. "Ce vom 'însemna.' *Însemnări sociologice* 1, no. 1 (Apr. 1935): 1.
———. "Doctrina legionară și stiința socială," *Însemnări Sociologice* IV, no. 8 (Dec. 15, 1940): 1–5.
———. "Problema muncitorească în lumina doctrinei naționaliste (Schițarea problemei)," *Însemnări Legionare* I, no. 3 (1935): 23–25.
———. *Sociologia și arta guvernării: Articole politice*. Bucureşti: Cartea Românească, 1940.
Bruja, Radu Florian. "Traian Brăileanu în documente (I)." *Codrul Cosminului* no. 12 (2006): 223–231.
———. "Traian Brăileanu în documente (III)." *Codrul Cosminului* no. 14 (2008): 297–302.
———. *Traian Brăileanu. Studii, documente. Încercări literare*. Iaşi: Junimea, 2011.
Brunn, Geoffrey, and Victor S. Mamatey. *The World in the Twentieth Century*. Boston: Hearth, 1962, 4th ed.
Cantacuzino, Alexandru. *Cum Suntem*. Bucureşti: Editura Mişcării Legionare, 1940.
———. *Între lumea legionară şi lumea comunistă*. Bucureşti: Editura Mişcării Legionare, 1940.
———. *Românul de mâine. Românismul nostru*. Bucureşti: Editura Mişcării Legionare, 1940 [1935].
Cantacuzino-Grănicerul, Gheorghe. "Chemare," *Cuvântul Argeşului* I, no. 5 (Aug. 10, 1935): 3.
Christescu, Vasile. "Actualizarea evului mediu," *AXA* II, no. 8 (Mar. 5, 1933): 5.
Cioran, Emil. *Schimbarea la faţă a României*. Bucureşti: Vremea, 1936.
Clark, Roland. "Nationalism and orthodoxy: Nichifor Crainic and the Political Culture of the Extreme Right in 1930s Romania," *Nationalities Papers* 40, no. 1 (2012): 107–126.
Clark, Roland. "Orthodoxy and Nation-Building: Nichifor Crainic and Religious Nationalism in 1920s Romania," *Nationalities Papers* 40, no. 4 (2012): 525–543.
Constant, Alexandru. "Aşa erau." *Cuvântul Argeşului* II, no. 28–30 (Feb. 1, 1937): 3.
Crainic, Nichifor. "Parsifal," *Gândirea* III, no. 8–9–10 (1924): 181–186.
———. "A doua neatârnare," *Gândirea* VI, no. 1 (Jan. 1927): 1–5.
———. "Spiritualitate," *Gândirea* VIII, no. 8–9 (1928): 307–310.
———. "Tineretul şi creştinismul," *Gândirea* XIII, no. 3 (1934): 65–73.
———. "Roma Universală," *Sfarmă Piatră* II, no. 13 (Feb. 13, 1936): 3.
———. "Modul teandric," *Gândirea* XIX, no. 1, special issue titled "Nostalgia paradisului" (Jan. 1940): 1–7.
———. "Revoluția Legionară," *Gândirea* XIX, no. 8 (Oct. 1940): 521–525.
———. "Scurtă recapitulare," *Gândirea* XIX, no. 7 (Sept. 1940): 465–469.
———. *Zile albe, zile negre. Memorii*, vol. 1, edited by Nedic Lemnaru. Bucureşti: Gândirea, 1991.
———. *Puncte cardinale în haos*. Iaşi: Timpul, 1996 [1936].
———. *Ortodoxie și etnocrație: Cu o Anexă: Programul Statului Etnocratic*. Bucureşti: Albatros, 1997 [1938].
———. *Dostoievski și crestinismul rus*. Cluj: Arhidiecezana; Bucureşti: Anastasia, 1998.
Dubuisson, Daniel. *Mythologies du XXe siècle: Dumézil, Lévi-Strauss, Eliade*. Lille: Presses universitaires de Lille, 1993.
Dumitrescu-Borşa, Ion. *Cal Troian intra Muros. Memorii legionare*. Bucureşti: Lucman, 2002.
Eatwell, Roger. "Fascism and Populism." In *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, edited by Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser et al., 363–383. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.

Eliade, Mircea. *Întoarcerea din rai*. Bucureşti: Luceafărul, 1934.
———. *Huliganii: roman*. Bucureşti: Editura Națională-Ciornei, 1935.
———. "De ce cred în biruinţa mişcării legionare?" *Buna Vestire* I, no. 244 (Dec. 17, 1937): 1–2.
———. *De Zalmoxis à Gengis-Khan; études comparatives sur les religions et le folklore de la Dacie et de l'Europe orientale*. Paris: Payot, 1970.
———. *Zalmoxis, the Vanishing God*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972.
———. *Autobiography, vol. 1: 1907–1937, Journey East, Journey West*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.1988.
———. *Texte "Legionare" şi despre "Românism"*. Cluj: Dacia, 2001.
———. *Itinerariu spiritual: scrieri de tinereţe 1927*. Bucureşti: Humanitas, 2003.
Falasca-Zamponi, Simonetta. *Fascist Spectacle: The Aesthetics of Power in Mussolini's Italy*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
Floru, Ion S. *Istoria românilor pentru cursul superior de liceu*. Bucureşti: Socec, 1924.
Fogu, Claudio. *The Historic Imaginary: Politics of History in Fascist Italy*. Toronto, Ont: University of Toronto Press, 2003.
Gârneaţă, Ilie. *Amintiri nepublicate. Crâmpeie*. Unpublished manuscript.
Goga, Octavian. *Mustul care fierbe*. Bucureşti: Imprimeria Statului, s.a.
Heinen, Armin. *Die Legion "Erzengel Michael" in Rumänien: soziale Bewegung und politische Organisation. Ein Beitrag zum Problem des internationalen Faschismus*. München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1986. Romanian ed.: *Legiunea "Arhanghelul Mihail." Mişcare socială şi organizaţie politică. O contribuţie la problema fascismului internaţional*. Bucureşti: Humanitas, 1998.
Heliade Rădulescu, Ion. *Opere*, 2 vols. Bucureşti, 2002.
Ionescu, Virgil. "Memorii. 1. Pe drumul crucilor căzute," *Pământul Strămoşesc* no. 5 (1979): 6.
Ionescu, Nae. "Primejdia celor 'de pe urmă," *Iconar* 1, no. 12 (1935): 1–2.
———. *Fenomenul legionar*. Cetatea Eternă [Rome]: Armatolii, 1963.
Ionescu, Nae. *Teologia. Integrala publicisticii religioase*. Sibiu: Deisis, 2003.
Ionescu, Ghiță. "Eastern Europe." In *Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics*, edited by Ghiță Ionescu, and Ernest Gellner, 97–121. New York: Macmillan, 1969.
Kaltwasser, Cristobal Rovira, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy. "Populism: An Overview of the Concept and the State of the Art." In *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, edited by Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser et al., 1–24. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
Laignel-Lavastine, Alexandra. *Cioran, Eliade, Ionescu: L'oubli du fascisme. Trois intellectuels roumains dans la tourmente du siècle*. Paris: PUF, 2003.
Lakoff, George. *Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.
Legiunea Arhanghelului Mihai, Garda de Fier. Programul și caracterul general. Cluj: Cartea Românească, 1931.
Love, Joseph. *Crafting the Third World: Theorizing Underdevelopment in Rumania and Brazil*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1996.
Lovinescu, Eugen. *Istoria literaturii române contemporane*. Bucureşti: Ancora, 1926.
Luca, Radu. "Colectivism organic," *Lumea Nouă* VI, no. 1 (1937): 20.
MacLinscott, Ricketts. *Mircea Eliade: The Romanian Roots, 1907–1945*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1988.
Macrin, George. "Luptători și doctrinari," *Iconar* II, no. 9 (1937): 1.
Manoilescu, Mihail. *Politica producţiei naţionale*. Bucureşti: Cultura Naţională, 1923.

———. *Théorie du protectionnisme et de l'échange international*. Paris: Marcel Giard, 1929.
———. "Naționalismului nostru," *Lumea Nouă* II, no. 1 (1933): 19.
———. *Generația nouă și politica veche: discurs ținut în Senat la 27 Noemvrie 1936*. București: Imprimeria Centrala, 1936.
———. *Le Parti unique: institution politique des régimes nouveaux*. Paris: Les Oeuvres Françaises, 1936.
———. *Le siècle du corporatisme: doctrine du corporatisme intégral et pur*. Paris: Alcan, 1934. Romanian ed.: *Secolul corporatismului: Teoria corporatismului integral și pur*. București: Editura Națională-Ciornei, 1934; Brazilian ed.: *O Seculo do corporativismo: doutrina do corporativismo integral e puro. O Seculo do corporativismo: doutrina do corporativismo integral e puro*.
———. *Românismul și dreptul său: discurs ținut în Senat la 3 Decembrie 1935*. București: Universul, 1936.
———. *Rostul și destinul burgheziei românești*. Bucureşti: Cugetarea - Georgescu Delafras, 1942.
Marin, Vasile. "Extremismul de dreapta," *AXA* II, no. 21 (Oct. 29, 1933): 1.
———. *Fascismul. Organizarea Constituțională a Statului Corporativ Italian: Teză pentru Doctorat în Științele Politice și Economice*. București: Serviciul și Editura Colportajului Legionar, s.a.
———. *Cuvinte pentru studenți*. București, 1937.
Micu, Dumitru. *"Gîndirea" și gîndirismul*. București: Minerva, 1975.
Mihăilescu, Dan C. "Generația '27, atunci și acum," *Cuvântul* XI, no. 3 (2005): 12.
Moța, Ion I. "Faza precorporativă," *AXA* II, no. 17 (1933): 1.
———. "Garda de Fier și L.A.N.C," *AXA* II, no. 19 (1933): 1.
———. "Răspuns (la invitația dlui Prof. G. Bogdan-Duică)," *Pământul Strămoșesc* II, no. 1 (1928): 7–11.
———. "Sfântul Arhanghel Mihail: Voevodul Puterilor Cerești," *Pământul Strămoșesc* I, no. 5 (1927): 5–12.
———. "Sub povara remanenţelor," *AXA* II, no. 23 (1933): 3.
———. *Cranii de Lemn. Articole, 1922–1936*. Sibiu: Totul Pentru Țară, 1936.
———, ed. *Protocoalele înțelepților sionului*, trans. by Ion I. Moța. Orăștie: Tipografia și Editura Libertatea, 1923.
———. "La Icoană," *Pământul Strămoșesc* I, no. 1 (1927): 9–10.
Mudde, Cas. "Populism: an Ideational Approach." In *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, edited by Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, et al., 27–47. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
Munteanu, Victor. "Continuarea naționalismului nostru," *Lumea Nouă* V, no. 2 (1936): 36.
Murărescu, Dumitru. *Naționalismul lui Eminescu*. București: ATOS, 1994 [1932].
Ornea, Zigu. *Anii treizeci: extrema dreaptă românească*. București: Editura Fundatiei Culturale Române, 1995. English ed.: *The Romanian Extreme Right: The Nineteen Thirties*. Boulder: East European Monographs, 1999.
Papanace, Constantin I. "Românii de peste hotare," *AXA* II, no. 8 (1933): 2.
———. "Schimbul de populații," *AXA* II, no. 12 (1933): 7–8.
———. "Cuvânt Introductiv." In *Nae Ionescu, Fenomenul legionar*. Cetatea Eternă [Rome]: Armatolii, 1963, 1–20.
Pasetti, Matteo. *L'Europa corporativa. Una storia transnazionale tra le due guerre mondiali*. Bologna: Bononia University Press, 2016.
Passerini, Luisa. *Mussolini immaginario: Storia di una biografia 1915–1939*. Roma: Laterza, 1991.

Pavel, Ion Nestor, and Petre Marcu-Balş "Manifestul Crinului Alb," *Gândirea* VIII, no. 8–9 (1928): 311–317.

Petrescu, Christian. "Fascism, national-socialism şi legionarism," *Lumea Nouă* VI, no. 7 (1937): 293.

———. "Instituţionalim şi Spiritualitate. Legionarism şi corporatism," *Lumea Nouă* VI, no. 1 (1937): 21–34.

Petreu, Marta. *Un trecut deocheat sau "Schimbarea la faţă a României."* Cluj: Biblioteca Apostrof, 1999. English ed.: *An Infamous Past. E. M. Cioran and the Rise of Fascism in Romania*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee Publisher, 2005.

———. *Diavolul şi Ucenicul Său: Nae Ionescu - Mihail Sebastian*. Iaşi: Polirom, 2009.

Plăeşu, Ion, and Mircea Eliade "S-a încheiat un ciclu," *Credinţa* I, no. 11 (Dec. 14, 1933): 4.

Polihroniade, Mihail "Dreapta Românească," *AXA* I, no. 2 (Nov. 10, 1932): 1.

———. "Naţionalism şi Cuzism," *AXA* II, no. 5 (Jan. 22, 1933): 1.

———. "Sensul revoluţiei naţionale," *AXA* II, no. 15 (Jun. 15, 1933): 1–5.

Politics and Political Parties in Roumania. London: International Reference Library Pub. Co, 1936. *România - Stat National Corporativ (programul oficial al Ligei Naţional-Corporatiste)*. Bucureşti, 1938.

Posteucă, Vasile. "Amintiri de la Iconar," *Drum* XI, no. 4 (1975): 14–17.

Predescu, Lucian, (ed.) *Enciclopedia Cugetarea*. Bucureşti: Cugetarea, 1940.

Rădulescu-Motru, Constantin. *Românismul: catehismul unei noi spiritualităţi*. Bucureşti: Fundaţia pentru Literatură şi Artă "Regele Carol II, 1936.

Rostás, Zoltán. *Monografia ca utopie. Inverviuri cu Henri H. Stahl (1985–1987)*. Bucureşti: Paideia, 2000.

Schenk, H. G. *The mind of the European romantics: An essay in cultural history*. Doubleday: Garden City, 1969.

Sebastian, Mihail. *De două mii de ani... Cum am devenit huligan*. Bucureşti: Humanitas, 1990.

———. *Jurnal 1935–1944*. Bucureşti: Humanitas, 1996. English ed.: *Journal, 1935–1944*.

Sima, Horia. *Doctrina Legionară*. Madrid: Editura Mişcării Legionare, 1980.

Smith, Anthony D. *Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Spengler, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes: Umrisse einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte*, 2 vols, Wien–Leipzig: W. Braumüller, 1918–22. English ed.: *The Decline of the West*. New York: A. A. Knopf, 1926.

Stigliano "Fascism's mythologist: Mircea Eliade and the politics of myth," *ReVision* 24, no. 3 (2002): 32–38.

Titulescu, Nicolae. *Eu şi Garda de Fier*. Bucureşti: Universul, 1937.

Ţopa, Leon. *Universitatea Ţărănească. Teoria şi practica ei*. Cernăuţi: Editura Societăţii pentru cultura şi literatura română în Bukovina, 1935.

Ţurcan, Ion. "Însemnări sociologice," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 46 (Nov. 28, 1940): 1.

Ţurcanu, Florin, and Mircea Eliade. *Le prisonnier de l'histoire*. Paris: La Découverte, 2004.

Vinereanu, Mihai. *Dictionar Etimologic al Limbii Romane. Pe baza cercetărilor de indo-europenistică*. Bucureşti: Alcor Edimpex, 2009.

Vintilă, Alexandru Ovidiu. *Traian Brăileanu. Întruchipările raţiunii. Fapte, idei, teritorii ale realităţii din interbelicul bucovinean*. Bucureşti: Paideia, 2012.

Vlădescu, Toma. "O ţară asediată de democraţie," *Sfarmă Piatră* II, no. 13 (Feb. 13, 1936): 4.

Vojan, Ioan Victor. "Soluţia crizei," *AXA* II, no. 5 (Jan. 22, 1933): 1.

Vulcănescu, Mircea. *Mitologie Română*. Bucuresti: Editura Academiei, 1987.

———. *Tânăra generaţie. Crize vechi în haine noi. Cine sunt şi ce vor tinerii români?* Bucureşti: Compania, 2004.

———. *Tendinţele tinerei generaţii*. Bucureşti: Editura Ţara Nouă, 1936.

Zarifopol-Johnston, Ilinca. *Searching for Cioran*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009.

Zelea-Codreanu, Corneliu. "Chestiunea Căminului," *Pământul Strămoşesc* II, no. 10 (May 15, 1928): 3–9.

Zelea-Codreanu, Corneliu. "*Discurs la Mesaj*." *Monitorul Oficial, Part II*, no. 283, December 3, 1931.

Zelea-Codreanu, Ion. *Monitorul Oficial*, no. 22, Part III, *Destaberile Parlamentare*, *Adunarea Deputaţilor, Sesiunea Ordinară 1932–1933*, Dec. 18, 1932, 485.

Zelea-Codreanu, Corneliu. *Cărticica şefului de cuib*. Bucureşti: Tipografia "C. S. m. c.", 1933. English ed.: *The Nest Leader's Handbook*. London: The Rising Press, 2001.

———. *Pentru legionari*, vol. 1. Sibiu: Totul Pentru Ţară, 1936. English ed.: *For My Legionaries (The Iron Guard)*. Reedy, West Virginia, Liberty Bell Publications, 1990.

———. *Circulări şi manifeste, 1927–1938*. München: Colecţia Europa, 1981.

3

CHARISMATIC NATIONALISM, PATRIARCHALISM, AND SALVATION

The Cult of the "Captain"

The Making of a Charismatic Leader: Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu

In *The Body and the French Revolution*, Dorina Outram argued that the French Revolution succeeded in uprooting the monarchic and aristocratic legitimization of "political power through a sacral body,"[1] but failed to produce a new, hegemonic, and universally accepted public model of the body politic to serve as the basis of a wide consensus in the new emerging era of mass politics.[2] Instead, the Revolution established the body itself as a main site of political struggle: the destruction of the body of the king created a political void that was filled by the continuous creation and re-creation of the body by rival political ideologies.[3] Apparently, the new behavioral norm was embodied in what Norbert Elias called the *homo clausus*: rational, objective, and void of subjectivity.[4] This new male type symbolized the victory of the middle class over the feminine and the carnivalesque.[5] Yet this type of self-control through civilization as a repressive mechanism contained in itself the seeds of its own destruction,[6] since his repressed instincts could not be kept in check but erupted with vigor in multiple forms of communal violence. Thus, Outram points out "the darker side of the Revolutionary body-culture."[7] The political culture that emerged from the French Revolution was characterized by a schism between the desacralized body of ordinary people on the one hand, and the sacralized body of the charismatic leader, on the other, as the embodiment of the superhero.[8] Outram further argued that the emergence of the *homo clausus* paved the way for the appearance of the fascist political style in the era of mass politics, when a plethora of charismatic leaders demagogically claimed to possess all the characteristics that ordinary middle class citizens were not allowed to profess.

DOI: 10.4324/9780429428043-5

Outram's suggestion that the roots of fascist *charismatic leadership* in the 1930s is to be found in the experience and outcome of the French Revolution has not been substantiated to date. My research, focusing on fascism as a charismatic type of politics, aims at filling the gap between Outram's broad claim and her empirical study that focuses exclusively on the French Revolution, without venturing into the 1930s. Generally, following Weber's approach to charisma as a personal attribute of the leader, the existing literature on charisma tends to focus on the personal qualities or life-trajectory of the leader. In doing so, scholars run the risk of taking charismatic claims at face value, and looking for objective confirmation or refutation of these claims in real life (devising, to this end, various tests for distinguishing between genuine charismatic leaders and mere frauds). Departing from this approach, I suggest that, as a social phenomenon, charismatic authority is a form of behavioral or expectancy confirmation, namely a form of self-fulfilling prophecy in which people's political beliefs prompt them to act in ways that eventually lead to the (self-)confirmation of their expectations. This confirmation of expectations works in both directions: from the leader to the masses and from the masses to the leader, as an expression of what Eric Erikson named the "charismatic hunger of mankind."[9] From this perspective, this chapter concentrates on the emergence of the charismatic cult of Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu. I explore the construction of his cult by the followers, but also pay particular attention to autobiographical works as key elements of charismatic leadership, because they spell out the charismatic scenario according to which the prophecy is to be enacted. Internalized by his followers, the scenario of salvation promoted by Codreanu provided the basis of a collective belief system, the foundations of the fascist political faith as a distinct counter-culture.

The Legionary movement offers a powerful illustration of the charismatic nature of fascism, its ideology and ritual practice being centered on the cult of the "Captain" Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, proclaimed by the Legionary propaganda as "a new Messiah" sent by the Archangel Michael to fulfill his commandments in order to bring salvation to the Romanian people. In many ways, Zelea-Codreanu's biography is representative of the larger European gallery of radical interwar leaders of common origin who emerged in the era of mass politics. Codreanu was born in 1899 in Iași, in the contested borderland province of Northern Moldova, from an Orthodox father and an Orthodox German mother, as the eldest of seven children. His parents had immigrated to Romania from the Austro-Hungarian province of Galicia. Corneliu received his name after a Roman centurion celebrated by the Orthodox Church on the day of his birth, September 13. He attended the primary school in the Moldovan town of Huși and was subsequently educated at the military schools of Dealu (1912–1916) and Botoșani (1917–1918). In 1919, Corneliu enrolled as a student at the Faculty of Law, the University of Iași; despite the temporary discontinuation of his studies in 1921 due to his activism, Codreanu managed to graduate in 1922. He also undertook research stages at the Universities of Berlin and Jena in Germany (September 1922–February 1923), and then in Grenoble, France

(1925–1927), and managed to obtain his doctorate in law from the University of Paris in 1932.[10]

Codreanu's charismatic persona and leader cult developed gradually, as part of his transition from a pupil in elite military schools to a regional student activist and then to the leader of a national political movement. Imbued by his father with a highly nationalist education, Corneliu was animated, from an early age, by a highly combative attitude. In 1916, when Romania entered the Great War, the teenager Codreanu wanted to join his father's regiment in the military campaign against Austria-Hungary and could hardly be forced to return home. In 1917, at the age of 18, he intended to set up a clandestine organization for resisting an imminent Soviet invasion of Romania. During his studies, Codreanu was the source of continuous unrest. Active in the national student movement, he evidenced himself as a troublesome figure, due to his uncompromising nature, his anti-establishment stance, and his determination to use violence in his political struggle. In view of his violent and non-conformist behavior, in 1920 he was expelled by the university senate and re-admitted to classes only at the insistence of his godfather, A. C. Cuza, who was at the time the University Rector.

Although he emerged as a local student leader at the University of Iași, Codreanu had difficulties in gaining acceptance as a national representative, especially to Bucharest-based students.[11] It was the 1923 student trial that made Codreanu known at national level. In an attempt to project him as the leader of the national student movement, in 1924 the Văcărești group published Codreanu's prison letters in a propaganda booklet centered on the figure of the would-be charismatic leader, accompanied by a first standardized propaganda portrait of the leader (see Figure 3.1).[12] Codreanu's combative attitude during the trial imposed him as a prominent nationalist figure of the young generation, so



FIGURE 3.1 Portrait of Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu as a student in law, 1924

Source: Zelea-Codreanu, *Scrisori studențești din închisoare*, 4.

that in May 1924, in a statement to police, he could confidently claim "I am the de facto leader of nationalist students."[13]

It was, however, Codreanu's assassination of Prefect Manciu on October 25, 1924, and his subsequent acquittal by a jury court that assured Codreanu instant notoriety. As prosecutor Constantinescu predicted, Codreanu's "heroic" but criminal deed as well as his acquittal turned him from a regional into a national leader. During the trial, an impressive amount of laudatory literature presented Codreanu as a predestined popular hero, establishing the foundations of his charismatic cult. Here is a sample of the many pieces of poetry dedicated to the charismatic hero in the making:

> *To Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu*
>
> I bow to you, son of Rome and of Sarmizegetuza,
> To your Apostolic Call, to your iron arm.
> I feel my heart is calling you, and carried by the Muse
> I compare you to the light of the Morning Star in the sky.[14]

Codreanu's prestige was further amplified by a skillful 'marketing' strategy. On 14 June 1925, Codreanu married Ileana (Elena) Ilinoiu, a philology graduate from the University of Iași, the daughter of a modest employee of the national railway company. Organized by LANC at Focșani (where Codreanu's trial started), the wedding took the form of a grandiose *volkish*-nationalist celebration. Codreanu boasted that the event was attended by 80,000 to 100,000 people coming from all over the region, dressed in national costumes, while the procession column was made up of 2,300 wagons, carriages, and cars (for posters inviting sympathizers to the event, see Figure 3.2).[15] A month later, Codreanu became the godfather to more than 100 children born on the day of his marriage.[16] Alarmed by the event's scale and impact, the authorities disrupted the baptismal ceremony, instituted a state of exception in Focșani, and later destroyed the recording of the wedding. These mass religious ceremonies paved the way to Codreanu's charismatic cult.

In 1927, distancing himself from the conservative right represented by LANC, Codreanu created the Legion as an ultra-nationalist paramilitary organization. He assumed its leadership from the very beginning and took the unofficial military title of *Căpitan* (Captain), inspired by the mythology of the *haiducs*, popular outcasts fighting for social justice, and meant to confer on him a legendary aura of bravery and heroism. Codreanu ran in national elections and episodically represented his organization in Parliament, yet he did not feel at ease working in a bureaucratic-political structure and pluralist forum of debate. Although Codreanu received a military education, he was more of a mystically-inclined figure than a pragmatic man of action. Most importantly, despite the fact that he never held a position of power in the state apparatus, from 1927 to his death in 1938 Codreanu succeeded in building a voluntary nucleus of faithful followers, becoming the object of a fanatical cult of personality and acquiring the aura of an infallible leader.

Duminică 14 Iunie 1925 va avea
loc în Focşani căsătoria marelui erou
al neamului românesc
Corneliu Zelea Codreanu
cu Domnişoara
Ileana Ilinoiu
la care rugăm pe tot ce e bun român
să ia parte la această măreaţă sărbă-
toare a neamului nostru.
Focşani Iunie 1925.

FIGURE 3.2 Poster inviting all "good Romanians" to the wedding of Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu and Ileana Ilinoiu, June 1924. Codreanu is presented as "a great hero of the Romanian nation" and his wedding as "a grandiose holiday of our people." Note also the use of swastika, the symbol of LANC, for this religious event. The swastika was attributed by A. C. Cuza to the solar cult of the Aryans, but was mostly specific—according to him—to the ancestors of the Romanians, the Thracians, and the Dacians. Cuza claimed that, during that time, the swastika became a Christian cult, representing a primitive form of the Cross, symbolizing the victory of the Christians over the Jews. Together, the swastika and the cross were symbols of "our entire being, as Aryans and Christians." The swastika conferred on the Romanians "the mysterious power of a talisman of our most remote ancestors." See A.C. Cuza, "Svastica," *Apărarea Națională* 2 (Nov. 22, 1925), 1.

Source: ACNSAS, Fond Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, P 011784, Vol. 2, 21

Codreanu's cult was a conscious political construction promoted by the Legionary top leadership and then adopted and further developed at the grass roots level. The most active creator of Codreanu's cult at the political level appears to be Ion I. Moţa, second in rank in the Legion and generally regarded as the "gray eminence" of the movement, in ideological terms.[17] In August 1927, during a students' conference, Moţa openly confessed that "Corneliu is a saint to me: even if nobody follows him, I will do so, he will be the chief and me the soldier."[18] In his subsequent writings, Moţa articulated the steps of a messianic

scenario of salvation having Codreanu as the main protagonist. First, he endorsed Codreanu's leadership of the Legion from its beginning, based on a charismatic claim to dominance: "Thus our organization has a leader *whom no one elected* but who has the consensus of all those who, seduced by a mysterious force, have come to constitute, under the leader's direction, the disciplined nests of the organization. Our leader is Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu."[19] Secondly, he affirmed Codreanu's divine mission: "The Captain leads us with his fortune from God and with his intuitive, unique power. Nobody but God inspires him, because He is sent by God."[20] Thirdly, Moţa arrogated for himself the role of John the Baptist in relation to Jesus Christ, that of annunciator of Messiah: "If I have satisfaction in life ... [it] is that of being entrusted by God to discover the Captain in Corneliu…. I am happy and die blissfully because I had the capacity to feel your call, to understand it, and to serve you. You are the Captain."[21] Moţa's belief in Codreanu's leadership was reiterated in his will, entrusted in 1937 to Nae Ionescu and published posthumously:

> I have seen in this man a providential human being sent us by God to redeem our people from the destruction forced upon us by our centuries-old enemies. Choosing the title of Captain, I wanted to place him in the ranks of the world's famous captains, as was, for instance, Hannibal. I do not think that events will prove me wrong. Corneliu Codreanu will remain in the national and political history of the people over centuries, as its leading light: Codreanu.[22]

In the 1930s, Codreanu's cult grew in importance, becoming a main vehicle of the Legion's ideology and accounting for its proselytizing power. It is telling in this respect that, after the dissolution of the Iron Guard on January 3, 1931, the Legion was represented in the upcoming parliamentary elections by a new party named the "Corneliu Codreanu Grouping," in an attempt to transform the Captain's notoriety into political capital. The Legionary press at the national but also at the local levels focused almost entirely on Codreanu's charismatic aura, presenting him as a predestined leader. The Captain's prestige was further enhanced by the movement's first electoral victory: the Grouping managing to send five deputies in the parliament. The Legionary press made the apology of the leader, who after "climbing the Calvary of an apostolic life" managed "to receive the baptism of victory."[23] In an apocalyptic fashion, Codreanu proclaimed his electoral success as "the victory of Romanianism, resurrecting … like Christ from the tomb."[24] In the same spirit, in September 1931, the newspaper *Garda* greeted Codreanu in Brăila as a "divine messenger," a new Messiah of the Romanian people, who took upon himself "the destiny of the entire people."[25]

Codreanu's charismatic claims were first synthesized by Ion Banea in an article published in *AXA* in 1933.[26] Banea portrayed Codreanu in multiple charismatic roles, as a religious prophet, spiritual reformer, predestined hero and innovative political leader. Codreanu was celebrated as a revolutionary leader and was



FIGURE 3.3 The "Căpitan" Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, on an electoral poster, 1934. The caption reveals the messianic-charismatic self-idenitifcation of Codreanu: "I believe in the resurrection of my country and in the destruction of the forces of evil."

Source: Arhivele Naționale ale Republicii Moldova, Chișinău, Fond 680/1, file 3433, 141.

inserted in a panoply of heroic national figures, as the end-result of a teleological line of historical development of the Romanian people. He was compared to distinguished historical figures, most notably to Moldova's medieval prince Stephen the Great. In 1936, Banea futher consolidated Codreanu's cult in a substantial hagiographic work entailed *Căpitanul*, focusing on "the life, the actions and the main features of a man," who imposed himself as "The Captain of the Legionary generation."[27]

The Legionary propaganda focused mostly on Codreanu's charismatic capacity to bring salvation to the Romanian people (see Figure 3.3). Victor Puiu Gârniceanu claimed that the implementation of the Legionary salvific project depended on the activity of Codreanu as a predestined, exceptional leader (*conducător exceptional*).[28] Codreanu's main qualification was his divine capacity of love. "The personality of this man is unique" argued Gârniceanu, "in view of the endless richness of all his qualities." He portrayed Codreanu as a larger-than-life character:

> This man is cerebral and sentimental at the same time, he is rational and mystical, is gentle and severe, mild and unforgiving, voluntary and slow, proud and modest, tenacious without being rigid, idealistic without being

> utopian, visionary of great Romanian opportunities, with a high spiritual energy, and an equally high physical energy; pedagogue and leader, meek, calm, balanced but tumultuous in the structure of his temper, courageous and, most importantly, moral in the heaviest meaning of the word, which means free of personal imperatives or predestined to high collective goals.[29]

Codreanu's charisma was legitimized in view of his exceptional qualities, but also his physical appearance. A proof of divine election, his charismatic beauty worked hand in hand with his pedagogical qualifications:

> The Captain, that man beautiful as an archangel, with blue eyes, clear as the infinite sky, eyes full of love and kindness to all, but also of severity to scoundrels, that comrade noble and fair who shaped our souls as masterpieces of love and heroism.[30]

This propaganda affected not only followers but also more neutral observers. H. H. Stahl, who met Codreanu on several occasions, testified to the Captain's "effective charismatic power." Stahl argued that, although of "colossal stupidity," Codreanu was "a powerful man, a mountain of a man, big, impressive."[31] Due to his physical magnetism, the Captain "was among the few Romanians who managed to stir a trend of social mystique."[32]

Another major vehicle for the creation and dissemination of Codreanu's charismatic cult were his own writings. These consisted, in addition to occasional circular-letters and political memoirs, of a manual of salvation, two prison diaries, and a major autobiographical work covering his activity until 1936. Published at key moments in the history of the movement, these writings were central to the articulation of Codreanu's charismatic persona and to his efforts at shaping the movement. Most of these works are written for the use of the followers. In narrating his life story, Codreanu presented himself as a societal role-model: "I write for our Legionary family. [I write] [f]or all Legionaries: those in villages, in factories and in the university." The narration of his life is intertwined with the story of the Legion. Codreanu portrayed his journey as a story of emancipation, of overcoming social limitations. His success bestowed upon himself and the followers a sense of self-confidence fueled by a fighting spirit and trust in victory. Codreanu's self-identification, as documented in his writings, fulfills the subjective criteria generally employed for distinguishing a charismatic leader, namely power of vision, sense of mission and goal fixation, confidence in the movement and in himself as the chosen one, and faith in the possibility of deliverance.[33] Codreanu's belief in his charismatic mission transpired as early as his student years, in many of his personal letters and biographical writings. In a letter sent to A. C. Cuza on November 30, 1924, from the Galata Prison, Codreanu reported that he focused on his own thoughts and issues, "those given from above, by the Lord."[34] He expressed his conviction in the victory of the movement led by A. C. Cuza, based on a Manichean, apocalyptic worldview: "At the light of the lamp,

I pray to God every night, for Your health and victory, for that of all fighters, and for the victory of my people. This truth will prevail. And his victory will be brighter than sunlight. Then it will shake the Foundation of the Kingdom of darkness, of Satan. And it will scare those who are mastered by Satan. All those who suffer for the truth will rejoice, and those who live in the untruth, will suffer."[35] This belief was coupled with a commitment to the ultimate sacrifice for the national cause. In a speech delivered at a student conference in August 1927, Codreanu confessed: "From an early age I had my own plans—to devote my life to my country."[36]

The evolution of Codreanu's intimate belief in his charismatic mission is further documented in his first dairy, covering the period March 11, 1934, to April 16, 1934, while he was in hiding following the assassination of Duca.[37] The diary reveals Codreanu's superstitious and mystical character and his black-and-white worldview, having nationalism and antisemitism as main axes. The diary was prepared for publication by the Legionary Victor Dragomirescu in 1938, after Codreanu's death, and circulated clandestinely among the Legionaries, in limited copies. The intended aim was to add to the Captain's postmortem aura, at a time of a harsh anti-Legionary royal repression.

The publication of Codreanu's autobiographical work, *For My Legionaries*, in 1936—soon after his public image had been seriously diminished by Stelescu's defection, hostile press campaign, and horrifying assassination—was meant to uplift Codreanu's personal prestige and to consolidate his charismatic aura.[38] The book described Codreanu's life and nationalist struggle from the age of 19 to the age of 34. Yet, *For My Legionaries* is not a simple biography but a complex *bildungsroman*, at once a biography, a history of the Legion, a nationalist treatise, and a manual of salvation made up of commentaries on the Gospels, moral dissertations, and spiritual instructions, and a code of conduct governing the life of the followers. In this respect, the autobiography can be compared—*mutatis mutandis*—to books on *imitatio Christi*, such as *The Imitation of Christ* (or *De imitatione Christi*, 1418) by Thomas Kempis, the fourteenth century *De Vita Christi* by Ludolph of Saxony (1474), and the *Spiritual Exercises* of Saint Ignatius of Loyola (1522–1524). The production of the book was a truly collective enterprise, cementing the bonds between the leader and his followers: the manuscript was corrected and improved by many Legionaries,[39] while the production costs were covered by the rank-and-file members, who bought the book in advance in order to provide funds for printing.

For My Legionaries reveals Codreanu's view of politics. The Captain promoted a charismatic form of politics, professing his belief in the role of a great leader (*un mare conducător*) predestined to redeem the nation through his own sacrifice: "Not everybody can fill this function," he argued.[40] "A professional is needed, a man possessing inborn qualities, a connoisseur not only of principles of organization, but also of development and fighting."[41] To qualify as a great leader, one had to possess the following spiritual features: an interior power of attraction, capacity for love, spirit and knowledge of organization, good knowledge of people, power

of education, capacity for leadership, feeling for battle, courage, resistance, and strong commitment to a cause. The leader had to be not merely a theoretician, but an action-hero, and also "an imposing leader, to dominate and control the movement."[42] His authority stemmed from his "inner power of attraction," a sign of his predestined charismatic qualification:

> There are no independent, free people in the world, just as in the solar system each star follows its own orbit on which it turns around a greater power of attraction, likewise people, particularly in the field of political action, gravitate around some attracting personalities.[43]

The charismatic leader thus emerged "naturally" and did not need any formal or legal investment. The limits of his authority over his followers were determined by his own magnetism. Although Codreanu refrained from openly asserting his own charismatic qualifications, it was fully apparent that he internalized this charismatic behavioral model, based on his belief in magic and in his predestined divine mission. According to numerous witnesses' accounts, Codreanu wore on himself the scapular of his patron, the Catholic Saint Anton of Padua, used religious language, practiced ascetic rituals such as fasting and praying, and imposed on himself ascetism and a severe personal discipline. Codreanu legitimized his leadership by means of his charismatic vision:

> From the first moment I had a clear vision of the final victory and assumed the entire responsibility for the leadership. Since then we have passed through difficulties, dangers and innumerable risks, but that vision of victory has never once left me.[44]

Codreanu's belief in his manifest destiny survived until his death. Codreanu's prison diary, *Însemnări de la Jilava* [Notes from Jilava], written before his execution in 1938, documents the physical decryption of the charismatic leader.[45] *Însemnări* can be read as a prison diary and a trial account, but it is primarily an itinerary of sacrifice under the sign of *imitatio Christi*. The book is the final piece in Codreanu's charismatic scenario, completing his earlier autobiographical works. The diary re-confirms Codreanu's intimate belief in his charismatic mission. Following the behavioral pattern of *imitatio Christi*, he interpreted his suffering as Christ's Passion:

> Wednesday, June 15, 1938: When I had finished the reading of the Gospel, I understood that I was in this prison by the will of God, that however innocent I was according to human justice, he punished me for my sins and put my faith to test. I calmed down; serenity descended upon the agitation and the passions of this world. For, I have been cruelly tortured. My poor flesh has suffered much. I have not lost faith and love, but I felt at one moment that I had lost any tie with hope.[46]

This conviction led to a desire for martyrdom: "God, I pray in this Easter night, please receive my sacrifice. Take my life. Because you, oh, Fatherland, need not our energies, you want our death."[47]

Codreanu's self-identification, and the leader image constructed by the Legionary propaganda are important for understanding the role played by charismatic authority in the Legion's ideology. The Legionaries internalized and thus "socially validated" Codreanu's claims of divine election. They celebrated the Captain's autobiography as a holy script, "the fundamental book of the Legion … one of those books written one in a century: a book full of moral sanity, of heroism and of march to victory."[48] According to sociologist Traian Herseni, the greatest innovation introduced by Codreanu in Romania's political life was the militarization of politics, expressed in the Captain's "soldierly posture and commander vocation." With the publication of *For My Legionaries*, "the entire perspective on the political life of the country is transformed," claimed Herseni.[49] Sociologist Traian Brăileanu reinforced this view on the book's messianic mission, arguing that Codreanu's autobiography was proof that "the Legionary movement found, through the intuition of its leader, the Romanian nation's historical path." *For My Legionaries* thus opened up a new historical path "toward a Romania inundated by the light of the new spirituality, set on solid foundations, and organized on the eternal principles of life of peoples who carve their own historical destiny in perfect accord with the history of mankind."[50] Other reviewers pointed out that although highly doctrinaire, *For My Legionaries* was at the same time a "school of the deed," animated by "a fermenting spirit of vengeful and conquering heroism."[51]

The construction of Codreanu's cult was not only a discursive process, but a social-political one, as well. Codreanu's charisma was a mutual, interactive relationship, based on a constant exchange, negotiation and even confrontation between the leader and his "offer," on the one hand, and the followers, their needs and horizon of expectations, on the other. The response from the rank-and-file Legionaries was staggering. *For My Legionaries* turned into an instant bestseller: its first edition, printed in 10,000 copies, was sold almost overnight, followed by a new edition with a similar print run, but cheaper, to be accessible to the masses.[52] The Legionaries promoted the Captain's book by way of innovative methods: certain libraries, such as *Cartea Românească*, set up special window display cases devoted solely to Codreanu's autobiography; at the same time, the Legionaries spread false rumors that the authorities will soon confiscate the book, thus prompting sympathizers to purchase it without delay.[53] The book was indeed carefully reviewed by agents of the Secrete Police; yet, their reports concurred that, although the work is a piece of Legionary propaganda, it "does not constitute an attack on the public order, because it recommends legal means of action."[54] *For My Legionaries* generated a substantive revenue for the Legion, despite the fact that 2,500 copies were freely distributed to poor Legionaries.[55] On October 15, 1936, Codreanu instructed the Legionaries to capitalize on the favorable reception of his book among nationalist circles and the public at large, and "to intensify their propaganda campaign among all social strata."[56]

Codreanu's autobiographical writings thus attempted at molding the followers' personality through their internalization of a new ethnical code of conduct and through their identification with the leader and his life struggle. Thus established, this symbiosis was then symbolically re-created through rites and rituals of common socialization, which helped create an emotional bound between the leader and his followers. The leader's writings and biography were thus not only a call to mobilization; they were also a path to salvation through the fulfillment of the nation's divine mission. To this end, in 1933, at a time when the Legionary movement was expanding exponentially, Codreanu authored *The Nest Leader's Handbook*, a salvational handbook aimed at structuring the movement, at providing education role models for the followers, and at establishing distinct ethical codes of behavior. Through autobiographical writings, symbolic rituals, but also practices of micro-management within the Legion, Codreanu built a symbolic but also a personal relation to the rank-and-file Legionaries. Yet, while the Captain had the ambition to meet, however briefly, each and one of them, there also occurred during the time a process of social distancing between the Captain and his followers. Gradually, Codreanu turned into a more inaccessible and even mythical figure; these attributes further amplified his charismatic aura. First, although at the beginning of the Legion, Codreanu was formally presented as a *primus inter pares*, he soon assumed leadership, as an uncontested leader invested with full powers. Second, in October 1936, Codreanu acquired a personal guard, in response to fears of assassinations.[57] Third, the Legion bought the Captain an automobile through mandatory members' subscriptions and other voluntary contributions.[58] "How does the Legionary understand to defend its leader, the living icon of Archangel Michael?" "How can we shelter the life of that who will redeem us?" asked an internal document of the Legion, in order to mobilize grass roots members to contribute.[59] Fourth, although—as noted earlier—Codreanu was adamant in personally meeting most if not all Legionaries, strict rules of protocol were introduced governing the members' direct interaction with, and behavior around, the Captain.[60]

This multi-faceted leadership discourses and practices bore fruit. By 1937, Codreanu's charismatic cult was well established among the Legionaries, in the press, and in society at large, becoming the most defining mark of the Legion. Even the youngest converts were well aware of the personalized, charismatic nature of the organization, based on their total identification with the Captain: "In the evening, in the dormitory, I fell asleep with the Captain in my mind. I had become his soldier," revealed Valeriu Anania his state of mind after joining the Brotherhood of the Cross in 1935.[61] The identification of the followers with the leader reached fanaticism: On December 1, 1937, a rumor broke out that the Captain was assassinated; "soon," noted a police report, the news generated "a genuine pilgrimage of sympathizes" to the Green House. The report pointed out with great concern the presence of "a great number of workers and ticket sellers of STB [Bucharest Transportation Service], determined to take any action, if the rumor confirmed."[62] In a process of osmosis, the leader and the movement

became inseparable, the cult of the Captain constituting the main axis of the Legionary faith and its main source of sacrality. The victory of the Legion thus meant the conversion of the masses to the new political faith *through the internalization of the charismatic cult of the predestined leader.* As argued in *Buna Vestire*, "The Legionary victory will not be else but the presence of the Captain in the soul of each new man, of each new Romanian."[63]

The Nation as Paramilitary Brotherhood: Political Faith and Party Organization

The Legion "Archangel Michael" had a very complex structure, made up of teenage organizations called Brotherhoods of the Cross (*Frăţiile de Cruce*), a political section representing the movement in parliamentary elections (e.g., the Iron Guard, April 1930–January 1931; the "Corneliu Codreanu Grouping," April 1931–December 9/10 1933; and the "All for the Country" Party, 1935–February 22, 1938); and various supporting organizations, among which the most important was the National Union of Christian Romanian Students.

Created in 1924, the Brotherhoods were the first youth organizations established by the radical student activists, the *Văcăreşteni*. As the ideologue Nicolae Roşu pointed out, *Frăţiile* were "the precursors of the Legionary movement itself, established in 1927," and thus played "an overwhelming role in the articulation of the movement."[64] The first cell of the organization was created in May 1924 in Iaşi, followed in 1925 by similar cells in Galaţi, Bucharest, and Oraştie. The importance assigned by Codreanu to this youth organization is evidenced by the fact that he entrusted its leadership to his main collaborator, Moţa (who held the position from 1924 to 1934). *Frăţiile* played an important role in many foundational actions of the Legion, such as the first work camp at Ungheni, the public campaign of solidarity with Codreanu during the 1925 trial, and the 1929 march in Bukovina, led by Codreanu himself. The first cohorts trained within the ranks of *Frăţiile* played an important role in the leadership of the Legion ever since its establishment, including founding members such as Mihai Stelescu, Traian Cotigă, Nicolae Totu, and Nicolae Bordeianu, etc.[65] On November 30, 1934, Gheorghe Gh. Istate, at the time a student at the Commercial Academy in Bucharest, succeeded Moţa as the leader of *Frăţiile*. Istate re-organized *Frăţiile* as a subsection of the Legionary movement and inscribed its main new principles in a distinct handbook.[66]

The organization of *Frăţiile* was highly elitist (see Diagram 3.1). Entry into its ranks was allowed from the age of 11. From 11 to 14, teenage members were integrated into a first preparatory sub-section called the Little Crossbrothers (*Frăţiori de cruce*). When members reached 14 years of age, they entered a second preparatory sub-section called Clusters of Friends (*Mănunchiuri de Prieteni*). The transition from the Little Crossbrothers to the Clusters of Friends was not automatic, but occurred only after a period of training and verification. The initiation into the Clusters of Friends was equivalent to a conversion to the Legionary faith. It was conceived as a spiritual rebirth under the guidance of an older Legionary


National commander of the Brotherhood of the Cross
Group of Units (*Grupul de Frății*)
Brotherhood of the Cross (*Frăția de Cruce*)
Clusters of Friends (*Mănunchiuri de Prieteni*)
Little Crossbrothers (*Frățiori de cruce*, 11-14 y.o.)

DIAGRAM 3.1 The structure of the Brotherhood of the Cross

Source: Copyright Constantin Iordachi.

mentor, who played the role of "a godfather of the Legionary baptism."[67] Finally, the most virtuous "friends" were promoted into the main sub-section of the organization, called Brotherhood of the Cross (*Frăția de Cruce*). Membership in the Brotherhood of the Cross lasted until exit from secondary school, after which the former "brothers" became regular members of the Legion or entered the Legionary Student Corps if they became students. All the Brotherhood units in a county made up a Group of Units (*Grupul de Frății*), placed under the leadership of county and national commandants.

In August 1927, soon after its establishment, the Legion announced its organizational structure, made up of four sections: the first—and most important—was that of "the youth"; the second "protecting" section was composed of "mature men"; the third "assisting" section, encompassed women; and the fourth "international" section was made up of Romanians living abroad.[68] The Legion's leadership was to be exercised by a council composed of former or current student leaders, with the latter granted only a consultative vote; and by the Senate, made up of elected personalities over fifty years of age.[69] Originally conceived as the highest authority within the Legion, the Senate assembled for the first time in 1930, and had in fact a consultative and decorative role, its members being appointed by Codreanu, and not elected on a regional basis, as previously intended.[70] As a collegial body consisting of elders, the Senate was nevertheless

meant to provide symbolic legitimacy to the Legionary decision-making process, by formally guaranteeing "that the law which is applied is really authentically traditional."[71] These collective leading forums were meant to give the formal impression that the Legion was not a sectarian organization but a representative, collectively led movement of the Romanian youth. In practice, as shown in Diagram 3.2, the Legion had in fact an authoritarian structure based on the undisputed leadership of "the Captain" and a hierarchical line of command.

The organization of the Legon was comprehensively spelled out, in details, in *The Nest Leader's Handbook* (1933), which constituted the fundamental law of the movement, distributed to all members.

The building blocks of the Legion's structure were its grass roots cells called *cuiburi* (nests), defined as "a group of people united under the command of a single man." Members of the nests were selected either territorially (inhabitants of the same village or urban district, or in terms of professional or personal affinities, e.g., workers' nests, nests of intellectuals, etc.). There were several types of nests, belonging to the main sections of the Legion: nests of the Brotherhood of the Cross, composed of teenagers aged between 14 and 20; nests of the Legionary Corp composed of adult Legionaries, aged between 21 and 28; nests made up of female Legionaries; nests of workers, grouped in a separate corpus, created in 1936; nests of "mature men," responsible for the education of younger members, making up the political section.[72] The nest captured, in a nutshell,


Commander of the Legion
Senate of the Legion
Council of the Legion (Former student leaders)
Council of the 100
I. Youth Section
II. Protecting Section (Mature members)
III. Assisting Section (Women)
IV. International Section (Romanians living abroad)
Sub-section: Brotherhood of the Cross (Teenagers)

DIAGRAM 3.2 The structure of the Legion, 1927

Source: Copyright Constantin Iordachi

the quintessence of the social organization of the Legion. It was, according to Ion Banea, "the foundation of the Legion and of the Legionary movement."[73] Similarly to the Captain, the chief of the nest was a charismatic leader "emerging naturally": "The chief of the nest is the most apt, the best and most valuable among the members of a next. He makes himself listened to by the other due to his qualities, and his superiors then confirm his position as chief of nest."[74] A secretary, a cashier and a courier assisted the chief in his activity.

The flexible system of nests assured an exponential expansion of the Legion's membership. After completing his/her training, any member could leave his nest and initiate a new cell by bringing in new converts under his leadership, a practice called *roire* (swarming, similar to that of the bees). Cells stemming from a common original nest were considered part of a "family" of nests. Such related nests were organized hierarchically, the original cell being the "superior" one, its leader having authority over all other chiefs in that family. To avoid fragmentation, nests from the same locality were obliged to maintain strong organizational ties and to organize common gatherings and actions under the authority of the chief of the oldest nest in a family. After six months of existence, nests were granted the right to have their own flag representing the Romanian colors (red, yellow, and blue), with a Christian cross on the top. The main tasks of the nests were to: collect funds, conduct propaganda activities, recruit new members, initiate labors camps and carry out orders sent by the superior echelons of the Legion. Each Sunday, nests organized marches in the neighboring villages or regions. For exceptional merits, the most active ones were rewarded with stars on their flag, graded from one to seven. To further increase devotion to the cause, the activity of nests was attentively monitored, their activity being quantified and acknowledged through a system of internal rewards. Nests that had no activity were declared "dead."

Territorially, nests were grouped in garrisons, sectors, counties, and regions, led by chiefs appointed by Codreanu who were directly answerable to him. The organization in regions was an acknowledgment of the importance of local traditions and specific conditions. In 1937, at the peak of its strength, the Legion encompassed nine regions, including all historical provinces making up Greater Romania: Muntenia, Oltenia, Dobrudja, Moldova, Bessarabia, Bukovina, Ardeal, Crişana, and Timişoara. During the Legion's short rule, this territorial organization was further restructured to reflect its growing membership.[75] In every region there was separate leadership for the main sections of the Legion: the Brotherhood of the Cross, women's fortresses, the Legionary Corps, the Workers' Corps, the Student Corps, and the Political Organization. The latter was invested with authority over the leaders of all the other sections. [76] In addition, at the national level, above territorial regions, there were general headquarters of all Legionary sections. They were led by chiefs appointed by Codreanu, as the Commander of the Legion (*Conducătorul*), and placed under his direct authority.

The hierarchical structure of the Legion became further complicated with its growing membership. To prevent an unchecked expansion of membership numbers, in 1935 Codreanu instituted strict rules of recruitment, access, and advancement

within the Legion.[77] To be admitted into the organization, a prospective recruit needed the express recommendation of at least two Legionaries. Their recommendations had to be endorsed, following a hierarchical succession, by the head of the respective nest, then garrison, sector, and county. After a monitoring period of two to four months, the head of the county would recommend the new convert to the center for admittance. The decision was consequential, since this chain of command was to be held responsible for the subsequent behavior of the new recruit. Upon entering the Legion, a new convert was first considered a "member" of "All for the Country." To become a "Legionary," a member had to undertake a probationary period of three years, during which s/he had to pass a series of tests specifically related to the Legionary life: work camps, marches, and sentences in prison.[78] Exemptions from the probation period could be granted only for truly exceptional merits or proofs of devotion. Advancement to the status of a "Legionary" was only made with the express approval of Codreanu himself. The behavior of all Legionaries was strictly monitored by the chief of their respective nest, who had to file to the center detailed monthly activity reports. In addition, they also kept individual cards containing the personal data of all members, including their place and date of birth, name of parents, education, profession and occupation, address, civil and military status, rank and function within the movement, and their activity as measured in participation to labor camps, building yards, marches, campaigns, sentences to prison or other activities.[79] Thus, in addition to being highly centralized and hierarchically-organized, the Legion tended to become bureaucratic in nature, since the profile and activities of its members had to be thoroughly monitored and documented.

In addition to the title of "Legionary," new ranks of command were gradually established, emulating military hierarchy, such as "instructor," "deputy commandant," and "commandant." In parallel, there also existed specific organizational functions, such as: chiefs of garrisons, counties or regions; chiefs of working teams, labor camps or building-yards (see Table 3.1). Due to their importance,

TABLE 3.1 Hierarchies of Legionary membership based on age, status, and function

Age	*Rank*	*Function*
Elderly (over 50 y.o.)	Legionary Senator	Commander of the Legion (*Comandantul Legiunii*)
Mature Men	Commander of the Annunciation	Head of Region
	Legionary Commandant	Head of County
	Deputy Commandant	Head of Team Head of Working Camp Head of Legionary Corps
	Legionary Instructor	Head of Sub-County
Youth (20–28 y.o.) Legionary Students	Legionary	Head of Garrison
	Member (3-year stage)	Head of Nest
Brotherhood of the Cross (14–20 y.o.)		

these functions had priority over the Legionary military-like ranks.[80] To prevent the autonomous consolidation of high Legionary leaders, regional leaders could retain their posts for a maximum period of one year, and political leaders for up to two years.[81]After being released from their function, Legionary chiefs were advanced in rank and became part of the corpus of "charismatic commandants."

Membership growth, the territorial expansion of the Legion, and the diversification of its professional units (such as the Legionary Workers' Corps) led to a complex corporatist-territorial organizational structure. The tendency toward a corporate structure was already evident in 1936–1937, but it became more pronounced during the Legion's rule. To clarify the issue, in November 1940 Horia Sima reiterated the fact that the Legion "is not organized on the basis of professions, but on the basis of the nest, which groups all persons among which there is Legionary love, regardless of their social origin or profession."[82]

The organization of the Legion thus combined the principle of charismatic leadership at both grass roots and top central levels with appointed commandants named by Codreanu at intermediate levels; and the principle of geographical representation with that of central leadership. The essence of this structure was military hierarchy and unconditional devotion to the Captain, as the supreme Charismatic leader. The supreme leader of the movement was personally engaged, at least formally, in practices of micro-management, approving new recruits and monitoring their activity. These practices enhanced the personal bonds between the charismatic leader and his followers.

Forging the New Man, Building the Totalitarian Community

The political faith of the Legion shaped its social organization. Similar to Christian socialist utopian experiments conducted in the second quarter of the nineteenth century (the so-called "phalanxes"),[83] the Legion was organized as a would-be harmonious society, a large "family" based on the principles of fraternal love, cooperation, and common property. Drawing on recent studies on the psychology of nationhood, new social identity approaches to national attachment have highlighted the prevalence of family metaphors in nationalist discourses, arguing that their employment serves as "a rhetorical device anchoring the nation in filial qualities (e.g., belonging)," and as a tool for forging and disseminating an essentialized definition of the nation.[84] The Legion is a case in point: its discourses and practices of political mobilization as well as its communal organization were centered on the family as a key socio-political unit, and on a number of other associate or derivate concepts such as fatherland, forerunners, brotherhood, sisterhood, etc. Thus, if at its beginnings the Legion conceived of itself as a fraternity of elite male fighters, soon afterwards—in view of its mass expansion and diversification—Codreanu defined the Legion as "a great family of the Romanian nation," and started addressing the Legionaries not only as soldiers and fighters, but primarily as "comrades," "brothers," "sisters," and "children." The charismatic leader was the patriarchal head of this

great Legionary family: "Above all is the Captain, as a real parent. All members love him, and he loves all Legionaries. All members are comrades, which means good brothers."[85] This structure was replicated at the lower levels of the organization. Thus, if the Legion was conceived as a large family, the fundamental cell of the organization, the nest, was "a smaller family," or the Legion in local miniature, made up of three to thirteen members and led by a charismatic leader acting as a patriarchal head.

To consolidate the familial ties among the Legionaries further, Codreanu stimulated marriages among Legionary men and women which were to constitute fortress-families with the task "of conceiving heroes for the movement,"[86] encouraged non-Legionary couples to marry under the spiritual protection of the Legion, and established childcare centers in which orphans or children of poor families were educated to become the new commercial or military elite of the country. The Legion attempted also to function as an alternative social security net. In 1937, it created a "placement office" meant to provide jobs for unemployed Legionaries in companies sympathetic to the nationalist cause. Codreanu also decided to promote unemployed workers and intellectuals in leading positions, in an attempt to secure their loyalty and thus tie them more effectively to the Legion.[87] The final aim was to transform the Legionary community into a closed, self-sufficient, and self-sustainable social universe, functioning as an extended patriarchal family and maintained through an internal welfare scheme.

On October 17, 1935, Codreanu formally established the "Legionary family" as a new organizational unit or grouping, with between 10 and 50 members. The Legionary seat in Bucharest, called the Green House (*Casa Verde*), served as the main communal center of the Legion and hosted the first Legionary family. Organized around the Captain, his wife Elena, and his daughter Cătălina, the family of the Green House also encompassed the leaders of the various Legionary Corpses. During this time, the family was enlarged with Legionary couples and adoptive children. All members of this family were provided free accommodation, food, clothing, and communal services, secured through voluntary subscriptions.[88] For this purpose, comprehensive services were established at the Green House, including a cooperative, a tailoring atelier, a shoe-making atelier, and a hair salon. Roughly 70–80 children also lived at the Green House, many of whom had been taken from poor families from across Romania and entrusted to the female leader Nicoleta Nicolescu, "who adopted us at the order of the Captain," and helped by lawyer Bartolomeu Livezeanu in their education, as one such child remembered.[89]

The Green House was organized as a utopian "phalanx," similar in function to the Phalanstère buildings envisioned by Fourier. On the ground floor, there was the communal kitchen, the living room, a study and a reading room, and a library containing books of doctrine, but also photo albums on display with pictures of Legionary heroes and martyrs. On the first floor, there was the apartment of the Codreanu family. On the second floor there was a large meeting room used by the Legionary Senate and the leadership of the movement. On

the upper floor there was a common dormitory for the Legionaries undertaking various missions in Bucharest, and for the adoptive children and teenagers who worked for the various Legionary cooperatives and restaurants.[90] This model of organization was emulated, on a smaller scale, in other newly built regional centers, which were regarded as Legionary fortresses, such as the Christian Cultural Foyer, Iași, the Legionary Seat in Bucharest, and the Foyer "Legionary Transylvania," built in Cluj.[91]

To emphasize the communal way of life of the ideal Legionary community, on October 27, 1935, Codreanu ruled that the head of the Legion could not possess any personal wealth; at the same time, however, all Legionary properties were to belong formally to the head, "so that the unity of the movement will never be questioned."[92] In order to separate his own, natural family from the extended charismatic family of the Legion, Codreanu renounced his inheritance rights in favor of his brothers; donated his own personal wealth to the Legion (with the exception of his writer royalties, which he reserved for his wife and child); and asked all his family members to resign from the Legion on the basis that "it is not good for the head of a movement to have relatives inside it."[93] In this way, the Legion moved even closer to nineteenth-century Christian socialist phalanxes (*falangsters*), at least in theory if not fully in practice. The similarities between the Legion's organization and those socialist experiments are not surprising, in view of their common ideological roots in theories of social palingenesis, highlighted in this book. However, while the phalanxes were based on socialist principles, the Legionary "society" was built on paramilitary principles of organization, thus developing into a dystopian-totalitarian community.

The main goal of the Legion as a social experiment was the creation of the new man and the new woman and, by extension, of the new Legionary community as the foundation of the new fascist nation. The new Legionary man was to be mainly a product of education and common ritual socialization. The Legion utilized three main laboratories for forging the *new man and woman* and the *new nation*: the nest, the prison, and the working camp, all at work to produce "the great Romanian community."[94]

First, the creation of the new man and woman was a pedagogical endeavor. Codreanu assigned central importance to education. He conceived the Legion as a school for forging the new man and woman in the spirit of the *nouvelle pegadogie* program of character building. That is why the Legion did not focus on devising new political programs, but on changing people from within:

> Our Legionary movement has the character of a great spiritual school. It tends to illuminate unknown faiths, to transform, to revolutionize the Romanian soul. Announce in all corners that the evil, the ruin, originates from the soul. The soul is the cardinal point on which we have to work at this moment. The soul of the individual and the soul of the mass. … Call the soul of the people to a new life.[95]

The Legionary education was a complex process that took place in various forms: (1) indoctrination, based on the internationalization of the code of conduct elaborated by Codreanu and emulating the behavioral model of *imitatio Christi*; (2) the common socialization of the Legionaries based on their community life (*viața comună*); and (3) their specific paramilitary training based on army instruction and values.[96]

Second, Legionaries were subject to extended practical training and participated in a process of community socialization following detailed rituals centered on the cult of the Captain and aimed at emulating his personality. The Legion attempted to take complete control over the lives of the followers, from the cradle to the grave and even beyond it. The entire life cycle could be spent within the Legionary social universe. That life journey started with Legionary baptism ceremonies and the institution of Legionary Godfathers as spiritual patrons of children. The socialization of Legionaries started at an early age, with their enrollment in the subsection *Frățiile de Cruce* (Brotherhoods of the Cross) defined as "brotherhood until death around the cross, of those who feel in their hearts the spark of love toward the fatherland."[97]

The aim of *Frățiile* was to organize a parallel system of education and socialization in Legionary values. Its pedagogy focused on character-building, along the lines of *éducation nouvelle*: as the Legionary ideologist Nicolae Roșu pointed out, *Frățiile* were not "a cultural or sport association" but a "school forging characters (*școală creatoare de caractere*)."[98] The role model for these teenagers was the Captain's personality. *For My Legionaries* served as the main medium of initiation into the Legion, its reading being the first task assigned to the would-be brothers of the cross: "He [the applicant] is given the Captain's book. After he completes his reading, he meets his mentor and tells him what he felt. This is one of the most favorable moments for studying the eyes" of the applicant, recommended the Brotherhood's textbook.[99]

Valeriu Anania's recollection of his recruitment into the *Frățiile* confirms that the Legion's doctrine of national salvation was not an abstract theory, but a prime motivating belief of even adolescent members:

> I was only fifteen when I was recruited in the cluster of friends of the Brotherhood of the Cross at the Central Theological Seminar [in Bucharest], by an elder pupil who talked to me at length and tactfully about the terrible fate of our country, chewed to the marrow by rotten political parties, about the emergence of the Captain inspired by the Archangel Michael, about this saint's fight for the salvation of our people from the claws of the Jews and of those sold to the Jews (*jidoviți*) about the imperious need for a moral regeneration through the cultivation of faith in God, of honesty, of honor, and of continuous heroism and spirit of sacrifice, about the Legionary elite, selected among the very best of our nation, and about the messianic role of Romanianism among the peoples of the earth.[100]

The ceremony of entry into the Brotherhood was extremely solemn. At the express request of the Captain, the new members were given a little talisman bag of wormwood-tree leaves (*pelin*), a symbolic equivalent of the Legionary leather bag. Harvested at important *lieux des mémoires* in Romania, these leaves symbolized youth but also the organic link between people and the soil of the fatherland.[101] Here is how Anania describes his accession ceremony into the Brotherhood: "The promotion pledged never to betray the Legion and the Captain, each cross brother received the bag of wormwood-tree leaves to sew on his belt, as hidden as possible, then a meeting was held, with the entire prayer ritual, the evocation of the dead (more precisely the 'roll call of the dead' to which we answered in choir 'Present'), songs, readings, comments … and several other songs."[102]

Members of all subsections of *Frăţiile* met once a week for an intense session that lasted for an hour and a half. The meetings followed a pre-given format, structured in several "moments." They started with a "mystical moment": the members invoked the spirit of God, "united in their faith in the rebirth of their county in a Christian and national spirit," invoked the national heroes and martyrs, and then knelt for a common prayer. The mystical moment was followed by the "educational moment," the "friendship moment," and the "moment of reaching decisions." The brothers had to acquire the following qualities, "specific to the genuine Christian man": "Angelic qualities," relating to purity of soul; "Apostolic qualities," relating to devotion and relentless activity; and "qualities of martyrs," prepared to die for affirming their faith.[103] The main feature of the Brothers was their heroism, re-defined, in the spirit of the Legionary political faith, as "the continuous confession—day by day and hour by hour, regardless of its consequence—of a faith well-rooted into the individual, even if that faith was not shared by the majority [in society], but even persecuted by it."[104] In addition to character-building training, the Brothers were also prepared for full membership into the Legion through complex paramilitary training, which included military parades and even swordfighting.[105] To stimulate the spirit of adventure specific to teenagers, members of the Brotherhood were also called musketeers, Dumas's novel *The Three Musketeers* being one of their main assigned readings.

From the Brotherhood, young members advanced to the Student Corps or regular nest membership. Three years of active membership eventually led to full advancement to the rank of a "Legionary" by way of an oath-taking ceremony. Joining the Legion was equivalent to a conversion to a political faith; it did not simply mean adherence to a new political ideology, but entailed a profound change in a person's identity, status, role, and behavior. The accession ceremony consisted of a military-religious ritual, and required an oath of total allegiance to the Legion. Similarly, upon the creation of a nest, the common oath taken by the founding members began with a creed: "We believe in God and in the victory of the Legion." To reach victory, nest members pledged to walk "on the way of the Church of Christ and of integral nationalism," to which they also tactically added "within the framework of the existing laws of the country." The entire

activity of the Legionaries was to be dedicated to the cause of the movement: "We will fortify ourselves in the Legionary faith," with the conviction that "no matter how many hardships and sufferings we will go through, we will prevail." At the center of the Legionary activity were the values of discipline and obedience: "We swear before God and the people to stay tightly united around our chiefs, and to obey and execute exactly the orders received." The ultimate stated goal of the movement was not to conquer the political power but "to turn into Legionaries all those with whom we enter into contact," so that "Romania in its entirety will become Legionary." In the end, the nest members swore allegiance not to the king or the Patriarch, but to the Legion and its Captain: "Long Live the Legion! Long Live the Captain!"

Nests were primarily laboratories for the creation of the new man. Joining a nest was equivalent to baptism in the Legionary faith, similar to Christian baptism: "Entering the Legion constitutes a baptism, for us, as well. The acts of joining the nest and of taking upon the green shirt work like the [holy] water."[106] Yet, wearing the Legionary uniform was not enough to turn one into a true believer; new members had to act in accordance to the Legionary holy spirit: "You are a Legionary when you fulfill the Legionary laws and execute Legionary deeds in your entire life and work."[107] As the main cells of a movement professing a religious faith, nests were defined as Legionary "churches,"[108] the site where adult Legionaries received their Christian, national, sanitary, physical, and social education, on the basis of Legionary holy books, among which the most important were Codreanu's *For My Legionaries* and *The Nest Leader's Handbook*, Moţa's *Wooden Skulls*, and *AXA*'s series of conferences. Nest members convened each Saturday evening or at any time the leader deemed necessary. They discussed organizational aspects and debated various political subjects, including the life and teaching of charismatic personalities such as Mussolini, Hitler, or Lenin, the history of Italian Fascism, nationalism and socialism in France, Legionary art, etc. The program of education within nests focused on the following components: belief in God; unconditional devotion to the Legion; and the values of camaraderie, discipline, work, silence, and honor. The cult of the martyrs was also central to education in the nest. Members had to venerate the Legionaries killed for the cause. In addition, each nest was to bear "the name of a hero, a religious saint, a martyr, or of an important locality."[109] All these aspects were subsumed to belief and trust in the Legionary faith, based on the conviction that "out of the suffering and faith of each member will grow the Legionary resurrection. *The resurrection of the country*."[110]

How could salvation be achieved? In *The Nest Leader's Handbook*, Codreanu advanced a guide to collective salvation through sacrifice, a manual of devotion intended to assist the Legionaries in the pursuit of holiness and communion with God. He elaborated a code of conduct and a set of ideological commandments on the manner in which Legionary salvation was to be reached. The code of conduct combined military discipline with religious asceticism. It contained nine Legionary commands (referring mainly to faith in God, self-discipline,

dedication, rejection of politics, and love of Legionary death), and six fundamental rules:

> The Law of Discipline: Be disciplined, Legionaries, for only thus can you win. Follow your Leader through thick and thin.
> The Law of Work: Work! Work every day. Put your heart into it. Let your reward be not gain, but the satisfaction that you have laid another brick to the building of the Legion and the flourishing of Romania.
> The Law of Silence: Speak little. Say what is necessary. Speak when it is necessary. Your oratory should be deeds, not words. You should act: let others speak.
> The Law of Education: You must become another person: a hero. In the Nest you can be educated to this end. Get to know the Legion well.
> The Law of Reciprocal Help: Help your brother who falls into misfortune. Do not abandon him.
> The Law of Honor: Go along the roads only where honor leads. Strive and never be cowardly. Leave the path of infamy to others. Better to fail in an honorable fight than win by infamy.[111]

The practice of establishing behavioral "laws" to attain salvation through *imitatio Christi* was specific to palingenetic doctrines of anthropological orientation. In Romania, such laws were advanced, *mutatis mutandis*, in the mid-nineteenth century by the 1848 revolutionary leader Nicolae Bălcescu as well. However, while Bălcescu put these laws in the service of a democratic political program, Codreanu militated for the implementation of a totalitarian political project.

Proper Legionary conduct was to lead to Legionary salvation via two main paths: spiritual rebirth from within through sacrifice and the creation of the new man. In Codreanu's view, "The new man, or the renewed nation, presupposes a great revival: a great spiritual revolution on the part of the whole population, i.e. a resistance to the spiritual climate of today and a categorical offensive against this trend."[112] Through a significant mutation, the subject of spiritual rebirth and messianic salvation became the nation itself: "In the new man, all the virtues of the human soul must be resurrected, all the good qualities of our race. In this new man, all defects and evil tendencies must be overcome."[113]

The fundamental feature of the new man was his capacity for spiritual renewal through sacrifice. For this reason, the recruitment of members into the movement put the emphasis on the propensity to sacrifice of the prospective members. A questionnaire used by the Legionary Student Group of Bucharest for screening membership applicants reiterated the main articles of faith of the Legionary doctrine:

> Do you want to become a Legionary? Are you a man of sacrifice? Can you place the interest of the Country above your personal interest? Do you think you can be a man of action in our movement? Do you truly believe only the "Iron Guard" is able to create the new Romania that

> you desire? Do you know that the Iron Guard does not sell positions, does not buy consciences, and does not make deals with anyone? Do you know that it does not pay its fighters, but only rewards them with name and fame? Do you know that it is an organization persecuted by the entire Judeo-Masonic front and that by enrolling among its fighters, you will suffer?[114]

The questionnaire made it clear to prospective members that the Legionaries had duties without rights. Among their obligations, new members had to vow to "do what is asked from you," "not to betray the organization," to work "the way it is asked from you," "to take part, to the extent possible, to all meetings to which you are convoked," and "to fulfill all your obligations, *but absolutely all obligations* to the Legion."[115]

In order to attain the superior rank of a Legionary, a member had to pass a series of initiating tests, allegorically described by Codreanu as "the mountain of suffering, the forest of wild beasts, and the slough of despair."[116] These initiating tests were part of a blasphemous scenario of *Imitatio Christi*: the would-be Legionary had to "be ready to shoulder the yoke of his Reedemer, Jesus Christ: 'Take my yoke upon you.'"[117] The experience of suffering was therefore central to the training of Legionaries: "Every suffering is one more step toward redemption; towards victory. Therefore, we Legionaries will gladly endure suffering," argued Codreanu.[118] He warned that: "Those who have not passed through these perils cannot be named Legionaries, although they are enrolled in the organization, have their insignia and pay their subscription."[119]

To achieve their sacrificial missions, the Legionaries received a pronounced paramilitary training in nests and labor camps; gradually, the Legion acquired the character of a semi-clandestine paramilitary organization. Police reports pointed out that the Legion's recruitment strategy targeted preponderantly men with military training, preferably former conscripts who attained the rank of sergeant or corporal, possessed firearms and valid firearm permits, and carried some influence on the local authorities, to consolidate the Legion's position. For the purpose of paramilitary training, the Legionaries also planned to acquire uniforms and vehicles.[120] Following an express order dated September 5, 1933, all Legionaries had to procure themselves green uniforms with a belt and yellow buttons, and a revolver with a legal permit or a cold weapon.[121] Chiefs of nests had to instruct their members "militarily through individual training, with discipline and blind obedience."[122]

Prison Suffering

The second but most important Legionary site of redemption was the prison cell. Since, from 1930 onward, the Legion and the authorities were in a state of quasi-permanent confrontation, more and more Legionaries served prison sentences. The prison cell thus started to be valued as a prime site

of martyrdom; serving time in prison was seen as an important, even necessary part of the life experience of a genuine Legionary. The example of the founding leaders of the Legion, the *Văcăreşteni*, was paradigmatic in this respect, including the Captain and his closest collaborator, Ion I. Moţa, both kept in detention for certain periods of time. The prison was valued, first and foremost, as a site of martyrdom through suffering, since it involved not only privations and humiliation but also "beatings, mutilation, torture, and death."[123] After self-sacrifice, serving time in prison was therefore considered the most difficult but formative experience a Legionary could endure, superior to the participation to work camps and to ordinary activity within the Legion: "With detention starts the real Legionary trial: suffering and sacrifice," argued Puiu Gârniceanu.[124]

Second, since most Legionaries were arrested in groups and shared the same prison cells, prison provided a "community for the crystallization of the Legionary soul."[125] Arrested in December 1933 as part of the mass repression against the Legion following Prime Minister Duca's assassination, Nichifor Crainic witnessed the intense forms of common socialization in Legionary values that occurred in prisons, leading to a mimetic process of group radicalization:

> [T]he boys rend a complete order to prison life. Engineer Clime took command of the several hundred prisoners, combined the Legionary discipline with that of the military, formed teams for cooking and cleaning, and divided the day into hours of instruction, song, discussion, and entertainment. Nobody from the prison's personnel was interfering anymore. In the first days, it turned out that one [prisoner] was missing: he jumped out of the truck on the way to Jilava and disappeared. The boys sent word into the city for a prisoner to offer himself voluntarily from among the free Legionaries, so that the commander of the prison does not get in trouble with the superior authority! The immense cellar seemed like an oven afire: It was vibrating with Legionary songs. I was hearing most of them for the first time. It was the time when those glorifying assassinations did not yet appear. What heroic, seducing songs! And what words animated by the love of the country and of the Romanian people! It was difficult for a soul to resist this wave of creative enthusiasm, no matter how dry it was. The personnel of the prison knew them by heart. The songs were the great dynamic force of the Legionary movement—this bizarre mixture of sublime morality and of abjection. In stormy, innovating surges of unlimited sacrifice and of demonic criminality! These boys were all wearing the icon of Jesus Christ or of the Virgin Mary, prayed regularly in the morning and evening and still spoke with infinite tenderness of the "heroes" who killed! If recent years have revealed to me the creative will and impulse toward sacrifice of this youth, the prison revealed to me its most intimate elements, the black-and-white mixture of its good and bad instincts, unfortunately all equally disciplined, within their own line.[126]

Prison as a site of redemption was so emblematic for the movement that even the visual symbol of the Iron Guard itself was represented by the bars of a prison window, also regarded as the sign of a dual cross leading to salvation.

Redemption Through Work

Another important strategy of redemptive purification was work, especially physical work. "The salvation of the people comes through work. Think of the day when everybody, young and old, will work for the good of the entire people. Miracles could be possible," asserted Ion Banea in a propaganda booklet written for peasants.[127] Communal work activities were organized within nests and, most importantly, in work camps, cooperatives, and restaurants, which served as important loci of education and production. This activity was in line with the ethical "Law of Work" set by Codreanu in the 1933 *The Nest Leader's Manual* concerning "Legionary work."[128]

The first four work camps were organized by nationalist students out of necessity in 1924–1928, and were meant to produce bricks for building the Christian Cultural Foyer at Râpa Galbenă, Iași (the very first camp being set up at Ungheni in 1924). The practice was resumed in 1933, with two related initiatives: the failed construction of a dam in Vişani, followed by the building of the Green House in Bucharest (1933–1936). Between August 4 and November 9, 1933, over 580 Legionaries worked at the Green House in Bucureștii Noi, while 80 worked at a nearby brick factory.[129] The propagandistic success of these initiatives led to the creation of a growing network of working camps and smaller building sites throughout the country. According to specific regulations issued by Codreanu in May 1935, work camps were led by a commandant appointed by the Center, and a spiritual guide called a Legionary missionary (*misionar legionar*), entrusted with the inoculation of the fascist faith.[130] They had to be composed of approximately 30 Legionaries and were to last for at least one full month. Camps were conceived as training schools; they were mandatory for all members and issued certificates of attendance necessary for promotion to higher ranks within the movement. These were also gates into the Legion: non-members could become full Legionaries by attending a camp.[131] Building sites were smaller enterprises: they were made up of at least five Legionaries, lasted for at least three days, and were led by an experienced Legionary or a nest chief. Unlike the camp, building sites were not conceived of as training schools, but were voluntary initiatives for "the public good."[132] In establishing camps and sites, Legionaries concentrated mostly on projects that had propaganda potential, related either to church building or repairs or with public works with major impact on the life of local communities. They laid access roads to monasteries, built churches, crucifixes, wells, dams, and bridges in the countryside. The number of work camps mushroomed from four in 1934 to 10 in 1935 and 50 in 1936; in the same year, there also existed 500 other small-scale Legionary building sites.[133]

The prototype of the Legionary social universe was the work camp at Carmen Sylva, a sea resort at the Black Sea, led by Codreanu himself. In only the first year, from July 5 to September 10, 1935, the camp hosted approximately 800 Legionaries who built seven cottages, a road one kilometer long, three wells, water canals, etc.[134] Daily life in the camp revolved around the Captain, regarded as a messiah, a source of sacrality leading to redemption. Ilie Tudor, one of the 12 children of the Legion who served at Carmen Sylva, described in his memoirs life in the camp as a religious-like experience: "It was a new lived experience which stemmed from, developed out of, and was implemented by the genius and faith of this charismatic leader, himself animated by a great love for man, as I believe was the case only in the first Christian centuries."[135]

In mid-1935, this activity received a more scientific theorization in the writings of the Cernăuți sociological group led by Brăileanu, who defined working camps as sites for forging the new men and, by extension, the new fascistized nation. By engaging in these "constructive" propagandistic activities, the Legion wanted also to consolidate its image of being an educational, "positive" social movement. Large labor camps functioned as social cells of the Legion, as well: according to George Macrin, they were "the best school" but also an "ideal fortress" and "a state in miniature," prefiguring the future harmonious organization of the society, "where there is no antagonism among generations and social classes."[136] As Ion Țurcan, another member of the Cernăuți group argued, "the Spartan life in the camps, the voluntary work, the common life, similar for the physical worker and the intellectual, the life full of masculinity and self-confidence" had a powerful impact on the participants, paving the way toward "the germination of a new life."[137] This process of internal transformation was in fact a conversion to Legionarism: "The new life is based on faith; it is in itself a faith, a way of being."[138] Overall, the camps contributed to the enactment of the "miracle of the Legionary faith," argued Țurcan, working toward "the great Revolution of the Resurrection of the Romanian People."[139]

In addition to work camps, the Legion established its own production units—just like the phalanxes—consisting at first of canteens and restaurants where Legionaries served on a voluntary basis. The Legionary trade activity was conceived as an original response to "Jewish economic dominance." To reduce the "Jewish share" of the national economy, the Legion started to build its own ethnic economy, which was seen not only as a way of boycotting the Jewish economy but also as a way of competing with it. The Legionary economy focused on trade and services; it was reduced to a chain of restaurants with what we would now call Romanian ethnic food. At Codreanu's specific recommendation, the most basic ingredients of the cuisine were to be garlic and onion. The organization was simple and pragmatic; not only the products but also the entire chain of production, distribution, and consumption had necessarily to be Romanian. The atmosphere was to be sober and soldierly, in accord with the Legionary ideal of "social harmony" and way of life and in sharp contrast "to Greek coffee houses and Jewish taverns."[140]

The Legionary trade started with modest means, due to the lack of resources and training. Following the success of this initiative in 1935–1936, Codreanu planned to enlarge the production-base of the Legion with new activities such as trade with fabrics and timber.[141] Arguing that trade activities should be placed at the heart of the Legionary family, Codreanu declared his ambition of becoming "the leading merchant of the Legion."[142] However, the Legionaries were hampered in their efforts to expand their ethnic economy by the hostile attitude of the authorities, who finally decided to close down these units in 1938. The Legionaries bitterly contested this decision. They presented the Legionary trade as a first concrete action to end Jewish economic domination in favor of the Romanian middle class, and the authorities' hostile attitude as proof of their corruption.

Overall, the Legionary social universe served as a laboratory of radicalization, the participants' conversion to its political faith leading to a fanatical, life-long commitment. The way to radicalization was not only fast but felt irreversible. The worker Dumitru Groza (spelled also Grozea), who joined the Legion in 1932, and was to play an important role in the organization and leadership of the workers' section, compared this process of radicalization with a high-speed, no-return train journey: I entered the Legion "in 1932 ... and then stayed in touch with them, with this column and I have always marched together with them ... It's like I got on a train which left with a fantastic speed and I could not get off, because, if I jumped off the train, I would have broken my neck."[143]

Notes

1 Dorinda Outram, *The Body and the French Revolution: Sex, Class and Political Culture* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 159.
2 Ibid., 5.
3 Ibid., 162–163.
4 Ibid., 158.
5 Ibid., 16.
6 Ibid., 13.
7 Ibid., 162.
8 Ibid., 5.
9 Erik H. Erikson, *Young Man Luther. A Study in Psychoanalysis and History* (London: Faber, 1959), 16.
10 See Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, "*La Convention de porte-fort*. Thèse pour le doctorat," Faculté de droit de l'Université de Paris, 1932, In-8, 119. On his defense, see also "Thèses de doctorat soutenues devant la faculté de Droit de Paris en 1932," *Annales de l'Université de Paris* 8 (1933), 165.
11 ANIC, MI, file 8/1925.
12 Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, *Scrisori studențești din închisoare. Văcărești, 9 octombrie 1923–30 martie 1924* (Iași: Biblioteca Generația Junǎ, 1925).
13 Scurtu, et al., eds., *Totalitarianismul de dreapta*, 420.
14 Oct. P. Meguță, "Lui Corneliu Zelea Codreanu," in *Micul Dor și Marele Dor. Cântece poporale, strigături de joc, colinde de sfintele sărbători, doine, cântece frumoase de dragoste adunate de prin foi și publicații să le citească tot românul, de A.M.* (Iași, 1925), Biblioteca Generația Nouă, nr. 2. in National Central Historical Archives, Bucharest (*Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale*, hereafter ANIC), Fond DGP, file 49/1925, 20.
15 Zelea-Codreanu, *For My Legionaries*, 182; ANIC, fond DGP, 51/1925.

16 The practice of lay/political patronizing of religious ceremonies such as baptism or marriage has a long tradition in Romanian political life. It also held a central role in Legionary ritualism. The statute of the Legion stipulated that each male member had the obligation to become, in a maximum of five months after his enrollment, the Godfather of five young couples and to attract them into the Legion. See "Organizarea Legiunii 'Archanghelul Mihail,'" *Pământul Strămoşesc* I, no. 4 (Sept. 15, 1927), 1.
17 Among Ion I. Moţa's writings, besides *Cranii de lemn*, see *Memoriu Regelui Ferdinand. Scris în închisoarea Galata, 1924* (Iaşi, 1925); *Liga Naţiunilor (idealul, viciile şi primejdia ei)* (Bucureşti: Editura Institutului de Arte Grafice Bica, 1930); *La sécurité juridique dans la Société des Nations* (Bucureşti: Tipografia Biblioteca Centrului de Studii a Centrului Studenţesc Iaşi, 1932); *and Corespondenţa cu serviciul mondial (1934–1936)* (Salo: Colectia Biblioteca Verde).
18 ANIC, Fond Ministerul de Interne, Diverse, 8/1927, 57.
19 Ion I. Moţa, "La Icoană," *Pământul strămoşesc* 1, no. 1 (August 1, 1927), 10; see also *Testamentul lui Ion Moţa*, 16, in ANIC, DGP, 255/1937, 23.
20 Moţa, in Crăcea, *Dezvăluiri legionare*, vol. 2, 23.
21 *Testamentul lui Ion Moţa*, 22.
22 Ibid., 25.
23 *Garda de Fier* 1, no. 2 (Sept. 7, 1931), 1.
24 Ibid.
25 *Garda. Organ al Grupărei "Corneliu Zelea Codreanu*," (Oct. 9, 1932), 1.
26 Ion Banea, "Căpitanul" *Axa* II, no. 21 (October 29, 1933), 1.
27 Ion Banea, *Capitanul* (Sibiu: "Totul pentru ţară," 1937 [1936]), 2nd ed., 3.
28 Gârniceanu, *Din lumea legionară*, 6.
29 Ibid., 5.
30 Nicolae Roşu, *Ce este "Fraţia de Cruce:" origine, organizare, doctrină* (Timisoara: Gordian, 1996), 30.
31 Rostás, *Monografia ca utopie*, 162.
32 Ibid.
33 On these criteria, see Robert C. Tucker, "The Theory of Charismatic Leadership," *Daedalus* 97, no. 3 (1968), 731–756.
34 ANIC, Fond A.C. Cuza, dosar 47/1924, 2.
35 Ibid.
36 Usatiuc in ANIC, Fond Ministerul de Interne, Diverse, 8/1927, 49.
37 ACNSAS, *Jurnalul Căpitanului din prioana anilor 1933–1934, 11 II 1934–16 IV 1934*, edited by Victor Dragomirescu, P 011784, vol. 13.
38 According to a police report, the first title of the book was *Gândul meu* [My Thought], thus resembling Hitler's *Mein Kampf* [My Struggle]. See ACNSAS, Fond Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, P 011784, vol. 8, 219.
39 The Legionary Nicolae Pătraşcu confessed in 1962 that the first draft of Codreanu's *For My Legionaries* was "confusing and full of mistakes," and that he collaborated closely with the Captain to make the manuscript publishable. ACNSAS, file Nicolae Pătraşcu I 151086, vol. 4, 162.
40 Codreanu, *For My Legionaries*, 186.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Zelea-Codreanu, *The Nest Leader's Handbook*, Point 82, 70.
45 The diary was first published in Italy, not in Romania, thus adding a transnational dimension to Codreanu's cult: Eminerdo Salleo, ed., *Mussolini e Codreanu. Cornelio Z. Codreanu, Memorie inedite* (Palermo: Libreria Agate, 1940). Codreanu's diary was preceded by a comparison between the charisma of Mussolini and that of Codreanu. Interestingly, while Mussolini was critical of *Mein Kampf,* he favored association with Codreanu, which had the aura of a martyr for the fascist cause, highly religious and altruist. For a new edition of the diary, see Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, *Însemnări de la Jilava* (Bucureşti: Majadahonda, 1995).

46 Codreanu, *Însemnări*, 15.
47 Ibid., 17–18.
48 Traian Herseni, "Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu: Pentru legionari," *Gând Românesc* (1936), 623–629.
49 Ibid., 625.
50 Brăileanu, "În făgaşul istoriei," *Sociologia şi arta guvernării*, 191.
51 I. Al. Stefanovici, "Cartea Căpitanului," *Însemnări sociologice* 2, no. 9 (Dec. 1936), 9.
52 ACNSAS, Fond Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, P 011784, vol. 9, 64.
53 Ibid., vol. 8, 173.
54 Report, Oct. 23, 1936, in ibid., vol. 8, 168–170.
55 Ibid., vol. 8, 200–201.
56 Ibid., vol. 8, 187.
57 Ibid., vol. 8, 177.
58 Ibid., vol. 8, 199.
59 Ibid., vol. 8, 64
60 Ibid., vol. 9, 192.
61 Valeriu Anania, *Memorii* (Iaşi: Polirom, 2011), 20.
62 ACNSAS, Fond Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, P 011784, vol. 10, x.
63 "Căpitanul," *Buna Vestire,* July 8, 1937, in ANIC, Fond Ministerul de Interne, Diverse, file 1/1937, vol. 1, 204.
64 Roşu, *Ce este "Frata de Cruce,"* 14.
65 Ibid., 20–21.
66 See Gheorghe Istrate, *Îndreptarul Frăţiilor de Cruce*, republished in a revised edition as *Frăţia de cruce,* 2nd ed. (Bucureşti, 1937). This textbook of *Frăţiile* was to play an equivalent role for the Cross Brotherhood as Codreanu's *The Nest Leader's Handbook* for the Legion. See below.
67 Roşu, *Ce este "Frăţia de Cruce,"* 48.
68 "Legiunea Arhanghelul Mihail," *Pământul Strămoşesc* I, no. 2 (August 15, 1927), 3–4; and "Organizarea Legiunii Arhanghelul Mihail," *Pământul Strămoşesc* I, no. 5 (Oct. 1, 1927), 3–4.
69 "Organizarea Legiunii Arhanghelul Mihail," 3–4.
70 Heinen, *Legiunea "Arhanghelul Mihail*," 136.
71 Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, vol. 1, 274.
72 Codreanu, *The Nest Leader's Handbook*, Point 26, 39.
73 Banea, *Ce este*, 24.
74 Ibid., 23–24.
75 In September 1940, Horia Sima reorganized the nine regions, as following: Banat, Bucharest, Moldova de Nord, Moldova de Mijloc, Moldova de Sud, Constanţa, Muntenia, Oltenia, and Southern Transylvania. See Puiu Dumitru Bordeiu, *Mişcarea legionară în Dobrogea anilor 1940–1944 în documente* (Bucureşti: Ed. Enciclopedică, 2014), 49. In November 1940, Sima reduced these regions to eight, as following: Timişoara (I), Sibiu (II), Craiova (III), Bucharest (IV), Constanţa (V), Galaţi (VI), Iaşi (VII), Suceava (VIII). *Curierul Legionar* 1 (Nov. 1, 1940), 1.
76 Codreanu, *The Nest Leader's Handbook*, Point 27, 39–40.
77 See "Instrucţiuni. Orice nou înscris este membru în partidul: 'Totul pentru Ţară,'" ACNSAS, Fond Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, file P 11784, vol. 19, 178.
78 "Instrucţiuni," P 11784, vol. 19, 178.
79 "Fişă individuală," P 11784, vol. 19, 177.
80 Codreanu, *The Nest Leader's Handbook*, Point 39, 47.
81 Ibid., Point 28, 40.
82 Horia Sima, "Felul de organizare legionar," *Curierul Legionar* 1 (Nov. 1, 1940), 1.
83 For a classical prototype, see the phalanxe organized by Charles Fourier at Condé-sur-Vesgre (1833–35). For a precedent in Romania, see a similar experiment (*falangster*) established by Teodor Diamant—a disciple of Fourier—at Scăieni (1835–36). For details, see I. Cojocaru, Zigu Ornea, *Falansterul de la Scăieni* (Bucureşti: Editura Politică, 1966).

84 See Oliver Lauenstein, *From family metaphor to national attachment?: a social identity approach towards framing nationhood*, PhD Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2013; and Oliver Lauenstein, J.S. Murer, M. Boos, and S. Reicher, "'Oh motherland I pledge to thee. . . ': a study into nationalism, gender and the representation of an imagined family within national anthems," *Nations and Nationalism* 21 (2015), 309–329.
85 Banea, *Ce este*, 24.
86 Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, circular letter no. 86, August 18, 1936, in ACNSAS, Fond Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, vol. 8, 49.
87 ANIC, DGP, 27/1937, 12.
88 Zelea-Codreanu, *Circulări*, 56–59.
89 Ilie Tudor, *Un an lângă căpitan: amintiri sfinte din viața legionară* (Pitești: Editura Fundația Sfinții Închisorilor, 2013), 5th ed., 45.
90 Ibid., 74.
91 *Glasul Strămoșesc* IV, no. 9 (Nov. 1, 1937), 3.
92 ACNSAS, Fond Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, vol. 18, 104–106.
93 Ibid., vol. 18, 105.
94 Gârniceanu, *Din lumea legionară*, 6.
95 Codreanu, *For my Legionaries*, 2–3.
96 Codreanu, "Educația Legionară," July 10, 1936, in *Circulări*, 80–81.
97 Roșu, *Ce este "Frația de Cruce,"* 14.
98 Ibid., 52, 72.
99 Istrate, *Frăția de cruce,* 37.
100 Anania, *Memorii*, 19.
101 Roșu, *Ce este "Frația de Cruce,"* 52.
102 Anania, *Memorii*, 20.
103 Roșu, *Ce este "Frația de Cruce,"* 80.
104 Ibid., 97.
105 *Pământul Strămoșesc* IV (May 18, 1930), 3.
106 "La Botezul Domnului," *Libertatea* 39, no. 1 (Jan. 5, 1941), 1.
107 Ibid.
108 Codreanu, *The Nest Leader's Handbook*, Point 7, 27.
109 Banea, *Ce este*, 25.
110 Ibid., 28.
111 Codreanu, *The Nest Leader's Handbook*, Point 3, 24–25.
112 Ibid., Point 69.
113 Ibid., 32, Point 70.
114 ANIC, DGP, 4/1933, 25.
115 Ibid., 26. My emphasis.
116 Codreanu, *The Nest Leader's Handbook*, 59, Point 60. See also Faust Brădescu, *Cele trei probe legionare: elemente de doctrină* (Bucureşti: Majadahonda, 2000).
117 Ibid., 57, Point 56.
118 Ibid., 56, Point 55.
119 Ibid., 59, Point 60.
120 ANIC, DGP, 4/1933, 9, 9v.
121 Ibid.
122 Ibid., 149.
123 Gârniceanu, *Din lumea legionară*, 10.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid., 9.
126 Crainic, *Zile albe, zile negre*, 257–258.
127 Banea, *Ce este*, 32.
128 See also Dan Rădulescu, "Semnificația muncii legionare," *Glasul Strămoșesc* IV, no. 9 (Nov. 1, 1937), 1–2.
129 *Tabăra de muncă*, edited by Mihail Polihroniade (n.a.: 1935), 7.
130 Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, "Datoria studentului," May 31, 1935, in *Circulări*, 41.

131 Zelea-Codreanu, "Datoria studentului," 41.
132 Ibid.
133 George Macrin, "Taberele de muncă: Tabăra de la Carmen Sylva," *Însemnări sociologice* 2, no. 7 (1936), 15. See also Heinen, *Legiunea "Arhangelului Mihail,"* 260–262; Săndulescu, "Taming the Body," 85–94; and Haynes, "Work Camps, Commerce," 943–967.
134 *Tabăra de muncă*, 31.
135 Tudor, *Un an lângă căpitan*, 43.
136 George Macrin, "Taberele de muncă," 23.
137 Ion Ţurcan, "Tabere şi şantiere," *Însemnări sociologice* 2, nr. 9 (1936), 11.
138 Ibid., 21.
139 Ibid., 22.
140 Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, "Cuvinte către publicul restaurantului legionar," ANIC, DGP, 2/1937, 40.
141 ACNSAS, Fond Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, vol. 8, 94.
142 Ibid., vol. 8, 97, 118. How profitable were the Legionary restaurants? Judging from Codreanu's positive evaluation of Legionary trade activities, and from his intention to expand the system, we can infer that the restaurants were yielding profit, concretely evaluated by "the Captain" at approximately 20,000 lei per day (the equivalent of approximately 147 USD, the exchange rate being in 1936 approximately 135.95 lei per one dollar Yet, in February 1938, police sources claimed that the Legionaries were asked to collect the sum of one million lei in order to cover the budget deficit generated by the Legionary trade. This demand provoked discontent among Legionaries, who questioned the budget management. If the police informant is to be believed. some members did not shy away from accusing the Legionary leadership, Codreanu included, of embezzlement. ACNSAS, Fond Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, vol. 13, 329.
143 Mariana Conovici, Silvia Iliescu, and Octavian Silvestru, eds., *Ţara, Legiunea, Căpitanul: Mişcarea Legionară în documente de istorie orală* (Bucureşti: Humanitas, 2008), 39.

References

ACNSAS. Fond "Informativ," file Nicolae Pătraşcu I 151086, vol. 4.
ACNSAS. Fond "Arhiva Operativă," file Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, file P 011784, vols. 8, 9, 13, 18, 19.
ACNSAS. *Jurnalul Căpitanului din prioana anilor 1933–1934, 11 II 1934–16 IV 1934*, edited by Victor Dragomirescu, file P 011784, vol. 13.
ANIC. Fond "A.C. Cuza," file 47/1924.
ANIC. Fond "DGP," files: 49/1925; 51/1925; 2/1937; 27/1937; 255/1937.
ANIC. Fond "Ministerul de Interne-Diverse" (MI-D), files: 8/1927; 8/1925; 1/1937, vol. 1.
Anania, Valeriu. *Memorii*. Iaşi: Polirom, 2011.
Banea, Ion. *Capitanul*. Sibiu: "Totul pentru ţară," 1937. [1936].
Banea, Ion. *Ce este şi ce vrea Mişcarea legionară. Cărticică pentru săteni*. Sibiu: Curierul, 1937.
Bordeiu, Puiu Dumitru. *Mişcarea legionară în Dobrogea anilor 1940–1944 în documente*. Bucureşti: Ed. Enciclopedică, 2014.
Brădescu, Faust. *Cele trei probe legionare: elemente de doctrină*. Bucureşti: Majadahonda, 2000.
Brăileanu, Traian. *Sociologia şi arta guvernării: Articole politice*. Bucureşti: Cartea Românească, 1940.
Crainic, Nichifor. *Zile albe, zile negre. Memorii*, vol. 1, edited by Nedic Lemnaru. Bucureşti: Gândirea, 1991.
Cojocaru, I., and Zigu Ornea. *Falansterul de la Scăieni*. Bucureşti: Editura Politică, 1966.

Conovici, Mariana Silvia Iliescu, and Octavian Silvestru, eds. *Țara, Legiunea, Căpitanul: Mișcarea Legionară în documente de istorie orală*. Bucureşti: Humanitas, 2008.
Crăcea, Nicu, ed. *Dezvăluiri legionare*. Vol. 2, Bucureşti: Buna Vestire, 1997.
Erikson, Erik H. *Young Man Luther. A Study in Psychoanalysis and History*. London: Faber, 1959.
Garda de Fier 1, no. 2 (Sept. 7, 1931): 1.
Garda. Organ al Grupărei "Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu," (Oct. 9, 1932): 1.
Gârniceanu, Victor Puiu. *Din lumea legionară*. Madrid: Colectia Omul Nou, 1951.
Glasul Strămoşesc IV, no. 9 (Nov. 1, 1937): 3.
Haynes, Rebecca. "Work Camps, Commerce, and the Education of the 'New Man' in the Romanian Legionary Movement," *Historical Journal* 51, no. 4 (2008): 943–967.
Heinen, Armin. *Legiunea "Arhanghelul Mihail." Mişcare socială şi organizaţie politică. O contribuţie la problema fascismului internaţional*. Bucureşti: Humanitas, 1998.
Herseni, Traian "Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu: Pentru legionary." *Gând Românesc* (1936): 623–629.
Istrate, Gheorghe. *Îndreptarul Frăţiilor de Cruce, republished in a revised edition as Frăţia de cruce*. Bucureşti, 1937, 2nd ed.
"Legiunea Arhanghelul Mihail," *Pământul Strămoşesc* I, no. 2 (August 15, 1927): 3–4.
"La Botezul Domnului," *Libertatea* 39, no. 1 (1941): 1.
Lauenstein, Oliver. *From Family Metaphor to National Attachment?: A Social Identity Approach Towards Framing Nationhood*, PhD Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2013.
Lauenstein, Oliver, J. S. Murer, M. Boos, and S. Reicher, "'Oh Motherland I Pledge to Thee. . . ': A Study into Nationalism, Gender and the Representation of an Imagined Family within National Anthems." *Nations and Nationalism* 21 (2015): 309–329.
Macrin, George. "Taberele de muncă: Tabăra de la Carmen Sylva," *Însemnări sociologice* 2, no. 7 (1936): 17–23.
Micul Dor şi Marele Dor. Cântece poporale, strigături de joc, colinde de sfintele sărbători, doine, cântece frumoase de dragoste adunate de prin foi şi publicaţii să le citească tot românul, de A.M. Iaşi, (1925), Biblioteca Generaţia Nouă, nr. 2.
Moţa, Ion I. *La sécurité juridique dans la Société des Nations*. Bucureşti: Tipografia Biblioteca Centrului de Studii a Centrului Studenţesc Iaşi, 1932.
Moţa, Ion I. "La Icoană," *Pământul strămoşesc*1, no. 1 (August 1, 1927): 9–10.
Moţa, Ion I. *Corespondenţa cu serviciul mondial (1934–1936)*. Salo: Colectia Biblioteca Verde
Moţa, Ion I. *Cranii de Lemn. Articole, 1922-1936*. Sibiu: Totul Pentru Ţară, 1936.
Moţa, Ion I. *Memoriu Regelui Ferdinand. Scris în închisoarea Galata, 1924*. Iaşi, 1925.
Moţa, Ion I. *Liga Naţiunilor (idealul, viciile şi primejdia ei)*. Bucureşti: Editura Institutului de Arte Grafice Bica, 1930.
"Organizarea Legiunii 'Archanghelul Mihail,'" *Pământul Strămoşesc* I, no. 4 (September 15, 1927): 1.
"Organizarea Legiunii Arhanghelul Mihail," *Pământul Strămoşesc* I, no. 5 (1927): 3–4.
Outram, Dorinda. *The Body and the French Revolution: Sex, Class and Political Culture*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989.
Polihroniade, Mihail, ed. *Tabăra de muncă*, n.a.: 1935.
Rădulescu, Dan. "Semnificaţia muncii legionare," *Glasul Strămoşesc* IV, no. 9 (1937): 1–2.
Rostás, Zoltán. *Monografia ca utopie. Inverviuri cu Henri H. Stahl (1985-1987)*. Bucureşti: Paideia, 2000.
Roşu, Nicolae. *Ce este "Frata de Cruce:" origine, organizare, doctrină*. Timisoara: Gordian, 1996.
Salleo, Eminerdo, ed. *Mussolini e Codreanu. Cornelio Z. Codreanu, Memorie inedite*. Palermo: Libreria Agate, 1940.

Scurtu, Ion, et al., eds. *Totalitarismul de dreapta în Romania. Origini, manifestări, evoluţie 1919–1927.* Bucureşti: Institutul Naţional Pentru Studiul Totalitarianismului, 1996.

Sima, Horia. "Felul de organizare legionar," *Curierul Legionar* 1 (Nov. 1, 1940): 1.

Stefanovici, I. Al. "Cartea Căpitanului," *Însemnări Sociologice* 2, no. 9 (1936): 9.

"Thèses de doctorat soutenues devant la faculté de Droit de Paris en 1932," *Annales de l'Université De Paris* 8 (1933): 165.

Tucker, Robert C. "The Theory of Charismatic Leadership," *Daedalus* 97, no. 3 (1968): 731–756.

Tudor, Ilie. *Un an lângă căpitan: amintiri sfinte din viaţa legionară*. Piteşti: Editura Fundaţia Sfinţii Închisorilor, 2013), 5th ed.

Ţurcan, Ion. "Tabere şi şantiere," *Însemnări Sociologice* 2, no. 9 (1936): 10–22.

Zelea-Codreanu, Corneliu. "*La Convention de porte-fort*. Thèse pour le doctorat," Faculté de droit de l'Université de Paris, 1932,

Zelea-Codreanu, Corneliu. *Cărticica şefului de cuib*. Bucureşti: Tipografia, "C. S. m. c.," 1933. English ed.: *The Nest Leader's Handbook*. London: The Rising Press, 2001.

Zelea-Codreanu, Corneliu. *Circulări şi manifeste, 1927-1938*. München: Colecţia Europa, 1981.

Zelea-Codreanu, Corneliu. *Pentru legionari*, vol. 1. Sibiu: "Totul pentru ţară," 1936. English ed.: *For My Legionaries (The Iron Guard)*. Reedy, West Virginia: Liberty Bell Publications, 1990.

Zelea-Codreanu, Corneliu. *Scrisori studenţeşti din închisoare. Văcăreşti, 9 octombrie 1923–30 martie 1924*. Iaşi: Biblioteca Generaţia Junǎ, 1925.

Zelea-Codreanu, Corneliu. *Însemnări de la Jilava*. Bucureşti: Majadahonda, 1995.

Weber, Max. *Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*, 2 vols., edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978.

4

MANUFACTURING MARTYRDOM

The Cult of the Fallen Soldiers, Terrorism, and Salvific Sacrifice

This chapter analyzes the Legion's practices of political violence, with an emphasis on its self-sacrificial terrorism. I argue that the employment of terrorism by the Legion can be fully understood only if placed within the wider context of fascist self-sacrificial ideology and practices. If, in view of its "carefully choreographed violence," "terrorism is theatre," as Brian M. Jenkins argued,[1] fascist terrorist missions in general, and suicide missions, in particular, were a way of *manufacturing martyrdom*, in line with the messianic ideology of national salvation though violent cleansing. Their main role was not simply the destruction of the enemy, but the making of martyrs; to this end, elaborate rites and rituals and concerted propaganda campaigns glorified the fallen comrades as behavioral role models to be emulated in order to forge a charismatic community of sacrifice.

My approach to fascist sacrificial practices is in line with recent trends in studies of global terrorism. Until recently, theories of terrorism in general, and suicide terrorism in particular, have relied preponderantly on rational choice theory to stress the *strategic logic* of employing extreme forms of violence by insurgent organizations. Arguing that this approach is useful yet insufficient, new works on the topic combine "instrumental rationality" with "axiological rationality" and social network perspectives to produce a Weberian ideal-type model of the "social mechanisms underlying the use of suicide tactics."[2] The new approach, defined by Wintrobe as "rationality with a twist,"[3] pays attention to the terrorists' adhesion to specific values, but also stresses "the importance of group dynamics and social networks in recruitment."[4] Students of terrorism should therefore focus not simply on "the coherence of the belief itself" but also study the *culture of martyrdom* and its social effects, namely the way extremist groups can provide a sense of "solidarity and social cohesion."[5]

The Legion practiced an ethnonationalist type of terrorism whose declared aim was to restore the "rights" and "dignity" of ethnic Romanians in relation

DOI: 10.4324/9780429428043-6

to a perceived internal oppressor. It arrogated for itself the right to act on behalf of a dominant and "state-making" ethnic group; its aim was the consolidation of Greater Romania, as the Legionaries understood it, by removing ethnic minorities from positions of economic or sociopolitical influence and by channeling resources exclusively in the interest of ethnic Romanians. To do so, however, the Legion fought not only against the country's most numerous ethnic minority groups—the Jews and the Hungarians—but also against leading Romanian politicians, perceived as corrupt or "sellouts to the Jews," and thus held co-responsible for the subordinated status of ethnic Romanians "in their own home." The Legion's uncompromising fight against the old elites imprinted on it an anti-establishment orientation, while its aim of dismantling the democratic political regime and of building a totalitarian state granted it a revolutionary character.

I contend that the Legion employed a distinct type of sacrificial practices, which I define as *martyrdom-seeking operations*. These operations included a wide array of self-sacrificial practices, ranging from terrorist attacks against archenemies and punishing missions against traitors conducted by Legionary "death squads," to demonstrative death in armed combat in the Spanish Civil War, as seen in the previous chapter. The essence of the Legionary program of *imitatio Christi* was the idea that collective and individual salvation could only occur as a result of suffering: "Our Savior could not prevail without suffering and sacrifice. … How would the Legionary be able to prevail by leading a life full of serene, cloudless days, how would he be able to prevail by leading a life begot by luck and personal satisfaction?"[6] The engine of the new fascist political faith in the making was the idea of martyrdom through violent sacrifice. As Codreanu stated in March 1930:

> The norm of selection among Legionaries is neither intelligence nor science (as in scientific societies), nor physical force (as in sport associations), nor work. But much more: the sacrifice, the quantity of sacrifice each [of us] brings for the holy Romania, through the Legion. Analyze this word and you will see that to work is something [important] but to sacrifice oneself is much more. It is almost everything we need.[7]

As bearers of divine grace, martyrs were key actors in the process of national redemption of the nation though sanctification: "In periods of storm in the history of our people, the martyrs—which we have never lacked—sanctified through suffering and prison … the ancestral patrimony."[8]

The Legionaries were challenged to imitate Christ to achieve holiness. "The test of our inward, interior resurrection, the measure of our vivid Christianity, lies, as I see it, *especially in our personal sacrifice*, freely agreed, with love and enthusiasm … *Our sacrifice is the measure of our Christianity*," claimed Ion Moţa.[9] He went as far as to theorize suicide terrorism as a way of achieving sanctity through martyrdom: "The spirit of sacrifice is essential! We all possess the most formidable dynamite, the most irresistible weapon, more powerful than tanks and rifles: our own ashes."[10] Moţa did not simply allude here to the capacity of suicide terrorists to detonate dynamite and thus inflict heavy casualties on their enemies, but

to the highly subversive—indeed explosive—impact martyrdom for the fascist cause would have on the existing social order. The main aim of Legionary activities was that of manufacturing martyrdom through violent confrontations with the authorities. State repression served the movement well, as martyrdom was both an objectification of the Legion's faith and the springboard of its political ascension. In March 1933, Codreanu revealed in Parliament this political strategy, centered on the idea of the expiation of sins through "suffering": "We have a faith, we are ready to endure suffering, martyrdom, if you wish, for that faith of ours. Tomorrow you will come to cause us suffering; you are waiting for it. We are ready for battle, for sacrifice."[11] The authorities' harsh reaction to Legionary violence was to fulfill Codreanu's sacrificial expectations.

In the following, I focus on three main strategies of sacralizing the community and of manufacturing martyrdom: (1) the cult of the fallen soldiers; (2) violent self-sacrifice in terrorist missions; and (3) heroic death in battle. Using the burials of theology student Gheorghe Grigor, of Ion I. Moța, and Vasile Marin, and of General Gheorghe Cantacuzino as examples, I also point out the role played by public funeral ceremonies as effective means of commemorating and memorializing the Legionary martyrs.

Fighting over "Holy Bones": The Cult of the Fallen Soldiers

The Legion's first strategy to "re-sacralize" the nation was to appropriate and intensify the cult of the fallen soldiers. This action was conceived as a prelude to the movement producing its own martyrs for the fatherland, with the aim of inserting them into the national pantheon of war heroes. Together, the two campaigns were meant to place the Legionaries at the center of Romania's national history, as the most legitimate continuators of traditions of heroism and self-sacrifice. This conscious plan was revealed, among others, by the Legionary poet and Commandant Radu Demetrescu-Gyr. In a lecture delivered on May 23, 1936 at the Orthodox Theological Academy in Sibiu, Gyr argued that no ideal could be reached without sacrifice. In post-war Romania, he claimed, the only new sacrifices made were "the graves of the Legionaries, who placed themselves in line with the 800,000 dead" in the Great War.[12]

The Legion's attempt to "take over" the cult of the fallen soldiers was part of a long tradition of instrumentalizing sacrifice in warfare and its mourning for purposes of political mobilization. On the one hand, the Legion consciously emulated practices of politicizing death developed in modern Romania. On the other hand, its actions resembled similar campaigns conducted by other fascist movements and regimes in interwar Europe. The most elaborate policies of this kind took place in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany: both regimes exhumed the bodies of fallen soldiers in the Great War on a massive scale, placing them in new ossuaries (*Totenburgen*) built on former battlegrounds.[13]

The Legionary symbolic politics can be fully understood only against the background of official nationalism in Romania. The process of sacralizing politics promoted by the monarchy, the church, and the army in the Old Kingdom continued

and even increased in post-war Greater Romania. In order to forge a unified national consciousness and to consolidate the "Romanian order" in the new provinces, the authorities proclaimed December 1—the day of the Great National Assembly in Alba Iulia (1918)—a national holiday. They built churches and monuments across the country commemorating Romanian national heroes and removed statues and symbols reminiscent of Austro-Hungarian or Russian rule. As in the prewar period, the sacralization of politics was centered on the cult of Michael the Brave, which was extended in the new territories, as well, as a symbol of national union. In 1919, King Ferdinand I—"The Liberator"—went to Turda, in Transylvania, to pay homage at the site of Michael the Brave's tragic death; his visit was described by Corneliu Georgescu, a future leader of the Legion, as "a moment of high enthusiasm" of jubilant crowds.[14] In August 1920, the head of Michael the Brave (taken to Odessa during the war to prevent its desecration, and then to Iaşi) was carried back to the Dealu Monastery by train, in an unprecedentedly national pilgrimage. The lengthy pilgrimage started in the Iaşi Metropolitan Church, where the head was kept at the time, in a bronze shrine. With impressive ceremonial, the head was carried to the railway station on a symbolic itinerary through the Stephen the Great Avenue and the Union Square. By royal train, the relic was taken to important sites of memories, such as Ruginoasa, at the grave of Prince Cuza, and Mirceşti, at the grave of poet Vasile Alecsandri, the author of the "Union's Round Dance," being welcomed by officials and a large audience. The pilgrimage ended in Târgovişte, the head being carried to the Dealu Monastery, with a pompous ceremony attended by Ferdinand I, the leadership of the Academy, numerous politicians, military, civilian, and religious authorities, and a large crowd. The ceremony started and ended with a religious service; for the occasion, church bells pealed across the city.[15]

The sacralization of the political union culminated on October 15, 1922, with the coronation of Ferdinand I and Maria as sovereigns of Greater Romania. The ceremony took place in Alba Iulia, imitating Michael's triumphal entry in the city on November the 1st, 1599. For the occasion, in 1921–1922, Romanian authorities built a new Orthodox Church suggestively called the Cathedral of the Unification (alternatively known as the Cathedral of the Coronation). A symbol of the union, the church was dedicated to the Archangels Michael and Gabriel, as the heavenly protectors of the Romanians and the Monarchy. It was built in a "national" architectural style, combining elements of the Princely Church in Târgovişte, a former capital of medieval Wallachia, with the artistic style sponsored by the Wallachian Prince Constantin Brâncoveanu. The cathedral contained portraits of Michael the Brave and his wife Stanca, as well as of King Ferdinand and Queen Maria, painted by Costin Petrescu.

Another central component of the process of sacralizing politics in Greater Romania was the cult of the war dead. In pre-World War I Romania, this cult focused on the country's participation in the 1877–1878 Russo-Turkish War—dubbed in the Romanian context the "War of Independence"—and was meant to cultivate the spirit of blood sacrifice for the fatherland. In the interwar period, following Romania's heavy casualties in the Great War, the societal importance of the cult of the fallen soldier was greatly enhanced. Commemoration

ceremonies were shaped by the symbolic competition among a multitude of official and local actors, and by the tension between religious and secular symbols: in addition to the traditional trinity of "monarchy–church–army," political parties, veteran associations, and the families of the deceased were also highly involved in commemoration practices. To assert their control over the process, the authorities promoted an official version of the cult of the war, produced and reproduced through legislation, state-sponsored holidays, ceremonies, and monuments.[16]

These practices were centered on the main battlefields of World War I, having as their key symbol the village of Mărășești, the site of the most glorious victory of the Romanian Army against the Central Powers. It is important to note that, at the symbolic level, the cult of the fallen heroes was also intertwined with the cult of Michael the Brave and his patron saint, the Archangel Michael, an aspect neglected so far by scholarship on this topic. On August 19, 1920, Marshal Joffre visited Romania to hand out the French medal "War Cross" to the "martyr-localities" of Bucharest and Mărăşeşti. On that occasion, the Romanian Parliament raised the village of Mărăşeşti to the rank of a city; and for the coat of arms of the new city a representation of Archangel Michael fighting Lucifer was chosen, with the motto "They shall not pass!"[17] This symbol re-asserted the association between the cult of Michael the Brave, the idea of divine predestination of the Romanian people under the protection of the Archangel Michael, and the struggle for national unity, symbolized by Mărășești.

On May 17, 1923,[18] the Day of the Ascension, the tomb of the unknown soldier was inaugurated in Bucharest in an impressive ceremony attended by the king, church hierarchs, army leaders, politicians, and representatives of the allied countries.[19] For selecting the body of the Unknown Soldier, corpses of unknown dead soldiers were exhumed from major battlefields of the Great War in all provinces of the country, at Mărăşeşti, Mărăşti, Oituz, Tg. Ocna, Jiu, Prahova, Bucureşti, and Dobrudja in the Old Kingdom and also from Transylvania and Bessarabia. These corpses were placed at a church in Mărăşeşti, where a war orphan, Amilicar Săndulescu, chose one hero with the words: "This is my father." The chosen coffin was transported by train to Bucharest, while the other corpses were buried in the Heroes' Cemetery in Mărăşeşti. The mortuary train stopped at all railway stations along the way, where it was commemorated by authorities, church hierarchs, and numerous members of the public. The reburial ceremonies were intimately linked to the cult of Michael the Brave. The coffin of the Unknown Soldier was entrusted to the Knights of the Military Order "Michael the Brave," who acted as guardians of the hero throughout the entire ceremony. In Bucharest, the coffin was displayed at the Mihai Vodă Monastery, the Knight's seat, and then buried in a new mausoleum in Park Carol, on the terrace of the Military Museum. The emotional peak of the ceremony, meant to unite all social classes of the country, was the decoration of the hero by King Ferdinand followed by a royal speech and a national moment of silence to mourn the war dead. The religious ceremony was officiated by the Primate Metropolitan Miron Cristea. The tomb imposed itself as a main reference point for the commemoration of the "saint dead" of the fatherland, the *lieu de mémoire* "where Romanianism [*românismul*] will come to

rest his forehead for a moment and try to elevate himself toward peaks which can be reached only by self-sacrifice for the general good."[20]

The symbolic link between the cult of Michael the Brave, the cult of Archangel Michael, and the cult of the war heroes, was further enhanced by the construction of the Mausoleum of Mărăşesti, sheltering graves of unknown soldiers. The idea was first advanced in 1919 by the National Orthodox Society of Romanian Women led by Alexandrina Cantacuzino. The construction started in 1923 but was completed only in 1938, under King Carol II. Not surprisingly (in view of our analysis), the central fresco inside the mausoleum depicts the figure of Archangel Michael (painted by Edward Săulescu in neo-byzantine style), in view of his symbolic roles as patron saint of Michael the Brave, protector of the Romanians as the chosen people and, since 1920, patron saint of the town of Mărăşeşti (see Figure 4.1). I contend that the representation of

FIGURE 4.1 Representation of the Archangel Michael as guardian angel in the Cupola of Glory, the Mărăşeşti Mausoleum

Source: Picture: Constantin Iordachi

Archangel Michael in the mausoleum symbolized the divine predestination of the Romanians, and was meant to reiterate, at official level, the doctrine of national salvation through sacrifice for the fatherland, first articulated during the Romantic period, redefined at the turn of the century in a conservative-military key, and then appropriated and reinterpreted by the Legion in the interwar period. The bonds between the cult of Michael the Brave, the unifier, the cult of Archangel Michael, as symbol of divine protection, and the cult of the heroes in the Romanian national ideology—and the intense ideological competition for the appropriation and the reinterpretation of these symbols—escaped so far to students of the period. Maria Bucur, for example, noted the striking similarity between the depiction of Archangel Michael on the fresco of the Mărăşeşti Mausoleum and the name of the Legion "Archangel Michael." Bucur sensed, in a very perceptive way, that this common symbolism might not be a simple "coincidence" but she did not offer a scholarly explanation of the common symbolism.[21] My analysis highlights, for the first time, the organic link between these three cults and the complex meanings with which they were imbued.[22]

Resacralizing the Land: The Holy Dead

These official commemoration practices were closely emulated by the ultranationalist students, who were to adopt and reinterpret them within the Legion. The main artisan of the Legionary approach to the cult of the fallen soldier was Ion Zelea-Codreanu (see Figure 4.2). In a programmatic speech delivered in the Chamber of Deputies on July 19, 1920, Zelea-Codreanu praised the Romanian army, portraying it as "an eternal being, made up of suffering, blood and glory."[23] He went on to argue that the cult of the war dead was a sacred duty of the Romanian people. In this category, Zelea-Codreanu placed all past, present, and future generations: "our war dead, [is made up of] those who are alive today, and the future generations who will enroll under the flag of the country to defend the Romanian fatherland."[24] Zelea-Codreanu proposed the compilation of a golden book of martyrs, whose names were to be read out every week at the religious mass in their own community, at local level. More importantly, Zelea-Codreanu proposed the exhumation *of all war dead* seven years after the war—when according to the Orthodox custom, the corpse of the deceased has to be put to rest again—and their reburial, with national honors, "in two big graves, in two national mausoleums." These graves were to be placed in two realms of memory linked with the national history of the Romanians: "One to be built at the grave of Michael the Brave at the Dealu Monastery, and the other to be built at the grave of Stephen the Great at Putna."[25] With time, all war dead of Romania, regardless of the historical age they belonged to, were to be gathered at the graves of the two illustrious princes where they would receive full honors. "These two holy places," proposed Zelea-Codreanu, "would be places of continuous pilgrimages during the centuries, would be inexhaustible springs of national energy across time."[26] These places would also become complex national institutions, grouping asylums

FIGURE 4.2 The masterminds behind the Legion: Ion Zelea-Codreanu, his son, Corneliu, and his son-in-law, Ion I. Moța

Source: ANIC, MI Diverse, 12/1930, 137. Postcard sold to students, January 9, 1931.

for invalids, orphanages, and military schools, such as the one already existent at the Dealu Monastery (attended by his son, Corneliu Codreanu). Their main task was to "give a brilliant military education to the future generations."[27]

Ion Zelea-Codreanu's vision was first implemented within the National Christian Defense League (*Liga Apărării Național-Creștine*, hereafter LANC). Significantly, the founding ceremony of LANC in 1923 consisted of a religious service in the memory of the war dead; and of an oath-taking ceremony officiated in the Iași Metropolitan Church by high prelates. The founding members were student representatives from Romania's four universities: Iași, Bucharest, Cluj, and Cernăuți, thus symbolically representing the new unified nation. The participants pledged to serve the church, the king, and LANC. They were organized in paramilitary units, each having its own banner blessed by priests. The flags of the organization were adorned with the Romanian three-colors and the swastika, the latter being presented as "the symbol of our ancestral endurance, of our will to preserve intact our faith, our nation, and our fatherland."[28]

Ion Zelea-Codreanu's vision on the educative role of the cult of the war dead as the foundation of a combative national attitude shaped the worldview of his

son, Corneliu, and of his political associates. It was not a coincidence that the first collective oath of the core group of the future Legionary activists led by Codreanu and Moța was taken in August 1923 at Mărăşeşti, in the midst of the relics of unknown soldiers who died in the war of reunification. Through this covenant, the radical students pledged to continue the fight for national freedom, by redirecting the violent struggle against outside enemies toward inside enemies.[29] Four years later, in June 1927, the constitutive ceremony of the Legion "Archangel Michael" started with a commemoration of the historical heroes of Romania and of the soldiers fallen in the Great War (see pages 65–66). Moreover, the ceremony emulated rituals of the exhumation of the Unknown Soldier, earth samples being collected from major battlefields in Romania and placed in individual leather bags.

Soon after its creation, the Legion launched its own campaign of mourning the war dead. Although apparently this campaign was in line with the official state ideology, the Legionaries in fact developed an alternative framework for mourning the dead, challenging the state monopoly over commemoration practices. Gradually, the Legion engaged in a battle against authorities over the "holy bones" of the fallen soldiers. Due to the huge symbolic power of these ceremonies, the state reacted vigorously to restore its monopoly over war commemorations. The first confrontation with the authorities over this issue occurred in January 1933, when the Legionary Student Group (*Grupul Studențesc Legionar*) attempted to place a Christian cross on the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Bucharest. Invoking popular religious beliefs about a "proper" Christian burial, they argued that the grave of the Unknown Soldier without a cross was a blasphemy. Their undeclared aim was symbolically to appropriate this important site of national identity, imposing themselves as the most legitimate "curators" of the cult of the war heroes.

The ceremony was planned for January 24, to coincide with the celebration of the 1859 union of the Principalities of Moldova and Wallachia, thus linking the cult of war heroes with the fight for national union. Although police forbade the action on the basis that, according to the law, only the king and the government could modify the appearance of the tomb of the unknown soldier, the Legion decided to go ahead with its plans, "at all risk." To this end, its leadership ordered all Legionaries from Bucharest to be present at the St. Anton Church and to proceed to the tomb of the "Unknown Soldier" "even at the risk of violent clashes with police authorities."[30] The Legionaries produced assiduous propaganda for the event.[31] A manifesto urged students of all political persuasions to take part in the ceremony, arguing that "A grave which is the symbol of Romanian bravery can only be the grave of a Christian." The Saint Cross was presented as a most efficient way to fight "the Masonic influence over the holiest of our symbols."[32]

During the ceremony, a marble cross, blessed by Father Nicolae Georgescu-Edineț, was carried to the tomb by Father Ilie Imbrescu and the Legionary Traian Puiu. As expected, police intervened in force and prevented the placing of the cross. The Legion condemned the use of force against the priests and the

demonstrators.[33] Forced to abandon their plans, at least temporarily, on January 28, the Legion sent an official delegation to the Orthodox patriarch, asking for support.[34] Following the mediation of Patriarch Miron Costea, on January 29, the Legionaries placed the cross at the Palace of the Patriarchy in an impressive ceremony, in the hope of a future installation on the tomb.[35] In parallel, a delegation of priests discussed the issue with Prime Minister G. G. Mironescu.[36] In a press communiqué, the government condemned the Legion's "anarchic act of profaning a national monument"; yet, its conciliatory response was at best ambivalent if not fraught with contradictions. On the one hand, it pointed out that the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Bucharest "symbolizes the sacrifice of all nations and religious faiths in the interests of Peace." On the other hand, it argued that, since the tomb imitated the gravestone of Prince Matei Basarab, its heraldic coat of arms did in fact include a Christian cross, however small. In the end, the government declined its competence "on religious matters" (sic!), and appealed to the patriarch to identify a solution to the issue.[37] In his address to the student delegation, Patriarch Cristea saluted their determination to "preserve the Christian and Romanian character of the country," but also asked them to obey the law and to respect other religious denominations living "in the holy land of our common country."[38] Finally, in a purposely vague and non-binding manner, the patriarch pledged to come up with a solution to accommodate the students' demand.

Although ultimately unsuccessful, the Legion's action managed to politicize the cult of the Unknown Soldier, transforming the tomb into a site of ideological confrontation between two rival versions of the Romanian national identity, civic-secular versus religious ethnonationalist. The first view was defended by the ruling National Peasant Party (NPP), the official newspaper of the party, *Dreptatea*, deridingly calling the students "not Christians, but cretins." The second view was articulated by the Legion, in alliance with the Orthodox Church and with leading lay theologians, such as Crainic. The Legion was quick to capitalize on the favorable press coverage in the national camp, exploiting the incident politically. In a lecture delivered throughout the country and suggestively entitled "The Law of Sacrifice in the Christian Vision," Ion Zelea-Codreanu argued there was a direct line of continuation between the sacrifice of Christ meant "to redeem the mankind and reconcile it with God," the sacrifices of the Romanian people in fighting the Ottoman Muslims, the 800,000 Romanian soldiers who died in the Great War, and the Legion's struggle for Christianity, which culminated in the student action at the grave of the Unknown Soldier.[39] Pointing out that the Christian cross is the symbol of the Redeemer's sacrifice, the Captain's father condemned the violent action of the authorities against students and priests. In the end, Zelea-Codreanu directed national grievances against the Jews, arguing that "the viper that sucks our blood and poisons us should be crushed."[40] To support his claims, Zelea-Codreanu distributed a free brochure that presented the Legion's version of the events.[41]



FIGURE 4.3 Plans of the National Christian Party for a monument commemorating the war dead, Gâlma Mountain, Prahova. This plan illustrates the mimetic competition among nationalist parties for appropriating the cult of heroes. Note the swastika at the base of the cross.

Source: *Apărarea națională*, XII (Aug. 4, 1935) 31–32.

The second major confrontation with the authorities over the cult of the fallen soldiers took place in early September 1936 on the Susai Mountain, Predeal, at a Legionary labor camp established for building a mountain chalet. During prospection works for the project, the Legionaries discovered the bones of Romanian soldiers and officers fallen in battle against the Austrian-Hungarian army in World War I. "Terrified and ashamed" of the deplorable state of these "relics," the Legionaries decided to build a mausoleum "to honor the holy bones of our heroes, abandoned and forgotten for twenty years by our official authorities, alienated as they are from our people's glory and grievances."[42] Codreanu approved the plan for the sanctuary of heroes on June 18, 1936, entrusting the work to the painter Alexandru Basarab.[43] The Legionaries proclaimed the site "a holy place": they gathered the bones of the war dead into a shrine adorned with candles, the Gospels, and an icon, and started building the mausoleum and "a chalet for the use of pilgrims and sportsmen" (see Figure 4.4). The site was blessed by the Orthodox Metropolitan Gurie of Bessarabia in a religious ceremony attended by General Zizi Cantacuzino, the leader of the "All for the Country" party (created in 1935 to represent the Legion), and other leading Legionaries. In response, on September 5, the local gendarmerie intervened in

FIGURE 4.4 Legionary shrine for the veneration of fallen soldiers, Predeal, called "The Captain's Hut"

Source: *Cuvântul* (Dec. 1, 1940): 13.

force, arresting the Legionaries and destroying their shrine and the building yard. The gendarmerie claimed that the camp hosted 500 armed Legionaries who planned "a major revolution";[44] in reality, local authorities intended to enforce their monopoly over war commemorations.

Legionary propaganda exploited this incident heavily, following the pattern established in January 1933. In a public report on the events addressed to General Cantacuzino, Ion Dobre, the head of the Legionary camp, blamed the gendarmes for destroying "the cross, the Gospel, the Candle, and the icon."[45] He appealed to the king to help stop abuses; he also extended a curse on the perpetrators, "on behalf of the blood spilled by those whose bones are vandalized."[46] In an open letter to the Romanian public, Cantacuzino, himself a war hero decorated with Romania's highest medal, *Michael the Brave*, protested the brutal intervention of the gendarmerie, calling it an infamous, "unheard of sacrilege."[47] Cantacuzino argued that the incident was of national importance because "the holy bones belong to our nation."[48] In turn, in yet another public letter, Codreanu asked the king to punish all those involved in the *crime of profanation* and to disband the gendarmerie as an institution. He also called for a sacrifice of penitence (*jertfa de ispășire*) for redeeming the holy bones, warning that otherwise a terrible curse would affect the Romanian army and the nation.[49] Worried about the reaction of

the public, the gendarmes returned to the scene during the night, gathered the bones of the fallen soldiers and buried them in the local cemetery. This action did not satisfy the Legionaries, Codreanu pledging to his collaborators to punish exemplarily those who destroyed the Susai shrine.[50]

These actions highlight the ideological confrontation between the Legion and the authorities over the cult of the fallen soldiers. Although apparently defeated, in the long run the Legion managed symbolically to appropriate sites of mourning the war dead. The Legion continued to place crosses on the graves of war heroes, as a way of turning them into symbols of their political faith: for example, on May 1, 1936, members of the "All for the Country" party placed 150 crosses on the graves of war heroes in Vânători-Dumbrava Roșie, Neamț County. It is telling that, while monitoring this action closely, the authorities refrained from preventing it by force, fearing a new loss of symbolic capital in the Legion's favor.[51] On August 15, 1936, on the 20th anniversary of Romania's entry into the Great War, the Legion organized numerous ceremonies in major cities or in Legionary labor camps, made up of religious services, processions to cemeteries, and erections of crucifixes. These events ended with the invocation of the Legionary martyrs and the intonation of the "Hymn to the Fallen Legionaries," in an attempt to insert them into the gallery of national heroes. On the same occasion, Ion I. Moța, as Commander of the Annunciation, appealed to the Legionaries from the newly joint territories to show gratitude for the sacrifices of the Romanian Army of the Old Kingdom, pointing out that in the new provinces "too much regionalism" is propagated and public discourses only focus on the 1918 National Assembly of Alba Iulia.[52]

The Legionary cult of the fallen soldier was thus part of a larger campaign aimed at the re-sacralization and re-mythologization of the Romanian ancestral land. On the one hand, the Legionaries claimed to oppose the de-sacralization of the national territory, by fighting against the demolition of churches, the profanation of relics and graves, or the occupation of national territory by foreign people. On the other hand, they attempted to invest with renewed significance certain types of spaces as sources of sacrality, such as churches, monasteries, cemeteries and graves, battlefields, and fountains. In the Romanian mythology, the two actions, sacralization and de-sacralization, were part of the same "cyclical order of a dialectic palingenesis."[53]

In the Legionary ideology, the sacred lands were not only those spaces linked to the action of mythological creatures (*Fărtatul*, *Nefărtatul*), as in the folk traditions, or to the life of Christian saints,[54] but battlefields and sites connected to national heroes and martyrs. These realms were venerated as shrines of the new fascist faith, as sources of sacrality, making the symbolic link between the two fundamental constitutive elements of the Legionary ideology, the earth and the sky.

Just like the grave, the national territory had to be a closed, finite space,[55] marked by real as well as symbolic boundaries. To delimit the national territory, in addition to venerating the ancestral graves, the Legionaries populated it with

funerary monuments, such as pillars of life or triple crucifixes (*troiţe*). Among them, the most preferred monument was by far the crucifix. The *troiţa* is a "mythical" funerary monument joining three "pillars of the sky" into a triple cross. The symbolism of this triad was invested during that time with multiple pre-Christian, Christian, or national meanings, being regarded as representing the Holy Saint Trinity or, in the Romanian context, the three Principalities: Moldova, Wallachia, and Transylvania.[56] The most important symbolism associated with this triple crucifix was the placement of disputed spaces under Christian protection, against pagan spirits.[57] Crucifixes linked the cult of the sky and of the sun with the cult of the earth, alluding to a cosmic understanding of life and death cycles. The Legionaries built innumerable triple crucifixes around the country. Their inaugurations were festive ceremonies, with a formative role in the life of the Legion: for example, the erection of a crucifix in Azuga on October 25, 1936, was taken to mark the birth of the Legionary Workers' Corps.[58] *Troiţa* was to become emblematic for the Legion's symbolism. It is telling in this respect that the visual symbol of the Iron Guard, the prison bars, was also a codified representation of a triple cross (see Figure 4.5).

These practices of venerating the war dead and of marking the national territory were to culminate during the short Legionary rule. As will be shown in Part II, the Legion assembled their own cemeteries of the martyrs, strategically placed near sites for the commemoration of the fallen soldiers, oftentimes their graves—and even bones—being consciously mixed with those of the Legionaries. The Legionaries also conducted a frenetic campaign of building crucifixes and other funerary monument all over the country. These campaigns promoted an ethnic mythical history—a form of *mytho-history*—combining a textbook version of national history with Dacian, Daco-Roman, Christian, and popular mythologies in a peculiar *Legionary national epopee*.



FIGURE 4.5 The visual symbol of the Iron Guard

Source: *Garda. Organ al Grupărei "Corneliu Zelea Codreanu,"* (Oct. 9, 1932): 1.

Terrorism and Martyrdom: Creating Legionary Heroes

The next step in the creation of the Legion's political faith was to "manufacture" their own heroes and martyrs for the cause, by promoting violent sacrifice through suicide missions. Neo-martyrdom served as a strategy to "sacralize" the national community, being presented by Legionaries as proof of their divine election. It was also a means to forge the Legionary charismatic community of sacrifice, by providing exemplary models to be emulated by ordinary followers. Last but not least, violent self-sacrifice was employed as an instrument of nation-building, a way of re-making the nation through conversion to the fascist faith.

In its beginnings, the Legion did not develop a terrorist strategy of political combat that would go beyond street fights against police, the Jewish minority, or their other ideological enemies. Yet, the Legion's paramilitary organization and clandestine training, its bellicose rhetoric and style of politics encouraged the use of armed violence by its rank-and-file members, leading to terrorism. In the early 1930s, the first terrorist acts were spontaneous, grass root initiatives of Legionaries or would-be Legionaries who attempted to distinguish themselves by "working toward the Captain."[59] Reacting to the growing pressure from below, the Legion adopted an open terrorist rhetoric, establishing "death squads" (*echipe de moarte)* to conduct electoral propaganda in "hostile" constituencies. It should be noted that, despite their misleading name, these combative units were not execution squads; yet, their fanatical members were expected to promote the ethics of ultimate sacrifice for the cause. According to Codreanu, the death squads "expressed the Legionary youth's determination to go forward, through death."[60]

The first widely reported right-wing terrorist act occurred in July 1930 and was connected to inter-Balkan nationalist conflicts and insurgency methods. More precisely, the attack was stirred by the so-called "Aromanian" question, concerning the immigration to Romania of the Aromanian populations living in Macedonia, and its colonization in Southern Dobrudja, a province annexed in 1913 from Bulgaria. As is well known, the geopolitical reorganization of the Balkans that followed the collapse of the Ottoman Empire resulted in massive coercive or voluntary transfers of populations. Ever since 1859, Romania had taken an active part in the conflict, inaugurating a policy of diplomatic protection of fellow Aromanian populations in the Balkans in general, and in Macedonia in particular. In the interwar period, Romania intensified its policy of absorbing the Aromanian population, settling it in Southern Dobrudja. The effort of the Romanian authorities to control the immigration flow led to a conflict with radicalized representatives of the Aromanian community, who accused the government of national treason. In this context, in July 1930, the Aromanian George Beza attempted to kill Constantin Angelescu, undersecretary of state in the Ministry of the Interior, holding him directly responsible for the stalemate in the immigration process. Beza was a journalist for the newspaper *Epoca* and a member of the conservative Vlad Țepes League (*Liga Vlad Țepeș*), but was reportedly dissatisfied with that organization's lack

of radicalism and started to frequent Codreanu's circles, intending to join the Legion. On July 23, 1930, Beza, together with three Aromanian students, visited Angelescu on the pretext of handling in a memoir on the Macedonian question. While Angelescu was reading the report, Beza fired five bullets, three of which managed to hurt the dignitary superficially in the cheek, chest, and shoulder. The police arrested Beza. In his pocket, they found a written statement in which the attacker pledged to commit suicide if he failed to kill Angelescu.[61] The Romanian press instantly linked Codreanu to Beza's terrorist act, given the latter's political sympathies. In a first press communiqué on the issue, the Captain denied any involvement in the terrorist attack, but refused to condemn Beza's act, "because my past in which I had worn the same shoes precluded me from condemning others."[62] In a "second warning" to the press, he reiterated his lack of involvement in the matter, but stated openly that: "I will defend the young Beza and his cause with all my heart and all my power."[63] In parallel, the Society of Macedo-Romanian students started a vigorous press campaign in Beza's defense, portraying him as a true patriot and "a hero of the Romanian people."[64]

Beza's failed attack had deep consequences for the evolution of the Legion. First, Codreanu's public defense of Beza's act was a great embarrassment for the government led by Alexandru Vaida-Voevod (also spelled Voievod). The Prime Minister had been favorable to the Legion/the Iron Guard, going as far as to boast he was its "Godfather";[65] Codreanu's public statements put the government into an uncomfortable position, leading to a rupture between Vaida-Voevod and Codreanu. Second, Beza's gesture paved the way toward a future political cooperation between radical Aromanian nationalists and the Legion. Following the attack, Codreanu was arrested for alleged complicity and imprisoned for six weeks at the Văcărești prison, where he became acquainted with a group of radical Aromanian activists who were also detained there. In his autobiography, Codreanu recalls the encounter with the Aromanians and the alliance they forged on a radical nationalist platform:

> There, in prison, I got to know well these Aromanians who came from the mountains of Pind. They exhibited a high culture, sound moral health, were good patriots, built to be fighters and heroes, and willing to sacrifice. There I came to know better the great tragedy of the Macedo-Romanians, this Romanian branch which for thousands of years, alone and isolated in its mountains, has defended—weapons in hand—its language, nationality and freedom. It was then that I met Sterie Ciumeti whom God has chosen for his good soul, pure as dew, to become through his tragic torture and death, the greatest martyr of the Legionary movement, of Legionary Romania. There, our thought and hearts united forever. Henceforth we would fight together for our whole people from Pind to beyond the Dniester. No amount of complaining, petitioning or intervening before an administration which has been deaf to all Romanian problems here and

> abroad, will ever solve Romanian problems anywhere without a strong Romaniwi nation being in control of her own house. At that time, these Romanians, scattered outside our borders, shall be brought back into Romania. For the blood of all is needed here where Romanians are faced by death. And it is well to note that in this struggle the governments that opened the country's gates to thousands of Jews, at the same time, did not permit Romanians from abroad to come in.[66]

The Aromanian group converted to the Legion and was to play a paramount role in its future terrorist missions. Constantin Papanace, one of the leaders of the group who would emerge as a leading ideologue of the Legion, acknowledged but also deplored the fact that the Aromanians colonized in Southern Dobrudja earned for themselves the reputation of being "dangerous Iron Guardists," and of forming "the terrorist section within the Movement," responsible for introducing "Balkan methods into the country, 'alien to the Romanian soul.'"[67]

The second failed terrorist attack took place on December 30, 1930, when Constantin Dumitrescu, a teenage Legionary from Iași, made an attempt on the life of Emil Socor, the director of the daily *The Truth* (*Adevărul*), as punishment for his anti-Legionary stance and his "antinational" orientation. Dumitrescu visited the newspaper's headquarters and, after obtaining an appointment with Socor, took out his pistol and shot; the first bullet missed the target, while the second did not fire but blocked the gun. After a short fight, Dumitrescu was arrested.[68] The attack produced an uproar in Romania's political life. A few days later, on January 2, 1931, the Council of Ministers banned several "subversive organizations," such as the Legion "Archangel Michael" (and, as such, the Iron Guard), the Society of Macedonian Students, the Student Federation of the Polytechnic School, and the youth section of the LANC, with which Dumitrescu was associated. To curb youth deviance, the government mandated various ministries to enforce student discipline, to de-politicize secondary schools and universities, to monitor and discourage students' political engagement, and to expel or draft into the army politically engaged students.[69]

Although failures, these first ad hoc attacks demonstrated to the Legionaries the powerful political and propagandistic impact of terrorism. This realization paved the way toward the Legion's first major terrorist action: the assassination of Prime Minister I. G. Duca on December 29, 1933, in the Sinaia railway station. The attack took place in a highly charged political environment, characterized by grave political tensions between the government and the opposition ahead of the national parliamentary elections scheduled for December 1933, leading to violence and unrest. The electoral confrontations were very harsh, the use of petards, revolvers, and weapons "conferring on the electoral campaign the aspect of a war of exterminating the adversary."[70] In this context, on December 9, the government issued its decree banning the Legion's and the Iron Guard's activities and participation in the upcoming elections.

In its justification, the government argued that the Legion "aims, on the one hand, at changing by revolutionary means the legal order in the State and, on the other hand, at establishing a social and political regime contrary to the Constitution and the Peace Treaties." In addition, the Legion strove to reach its goals through "terror and violence": its terrorist acts were prepared in "conspiratorial, clandestine meetings," and executed by "armed paramilitary units, whose activity represents a permanent source of trouble, generating acts of rebellion against the state authority and leading to a state of anarchy in the country." Since, given its violent nature, the "illegal" activity of the Legion "constituted a danger to the public order and the existence of the State," the government affirmed its right "to employ supreme measures to defend the state" under Article 107 of the Constitution and Article 2 of the Law on Public Safety of December 1925.[71]

Following the ban, the government took comprehensive measures to paralyze the Legion's activity, ordering the closure of its centers, the confiscation of its archives, the cancelation of its electoral lists, and the arrest of its leaders and prominent sympathizers. Official sources mention 1,700 persons arrested all over the country by December 29, 1933. The Legion was quick to condemn the governmental repression, blaming the authorities for instituting a regime of terror.[72] According to Codreanu, the Legion was persecuted at the order of "the Judeo-Masonic bankers of Paris," for "no guilt at all" except its "work of constructive education."[73] He singled out as the main instigators of this unprecedented campaign of repression Prime Minister Duca, "the man with the soul of a beast," "alongside the other seller of our souls," the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Titulescu.[74]

Codreanu's ad hominem attacks radicalized the Legionary rank and file, an attempt on the Prime Minister's life thus becoming imminent. In mid-December 1933, manifests of the Legionary students called for mobilization against the "assassin government."[75] Grass root responses followed suit: a police report from Focșani dated December 13, 1933, informed that the Iron Guard organization in Putna County had elected six members in each constituency to make up a "death squad" (*echipa de moarte*). Its members took a vow in front of four Orthodox priests to fight until death for the cause and pledged to open fire in case they were discovered by authorities.[76]

The opportunity to strike arose fast. On December 29, one day after securing his electoral victory, Duca traveled to the king's residence in Sinaia for consultations on the new cabinet. Strangely, the details of the Prime Minister's train trip were leaked to the press, facilitating the assassins' job. So informed, a "death squad" composed of three Legionaries, Nicolae Constantinescu, Ion Caranica, and Doru Belimace, armed with guns, explosives, and firecrackers, embarked on the same train, not far away from the governmental car. Reportedly, the terrorists intended to attack Duca immediately upon his descent from the train, but since the Sinaia railway station was overpopulated at that time, they decided to wait until the Prime Minister's return. At 22:15, after seeing Carol II, Duca made

his return to the station. Uncharacteristically, the official automobile did not carry the Prime Minister straight to the train car, but left him at a considerable distance away from it. Unwisely, Duca declined the invitation to pass through the station chief's office, preferring to walk across to the platform, in relative darkness. Halfway there, terrorist Belimace exploded a firecracker at one end of the station, creating a stampede that blocked Duca's way. Seizing the opportunity, Constantinescu approached Duca and shot him in the head five times, killing him instantly. The terrorist used a 9 mm Melior Brevets, the possession of which was illegal without the approval of the Ministry of National Defense.[77] The terrorists were arrested, while Duca's corpse was transported to the king's residence.

Duca's assassination shocked the public opinion.[78] The psychological impact of the crime was tremendous, taking aback the Legion's enemy, who feared a generalized massacre against democratic politicians. The terrorist attack set the status of Macedo-Romanian and affected inter-ethnic relations into question. A police report pointed out that Bulgarians in Dobrudja hoped that Macedonian-Romanians would be punished for their deed, and their own grievances in Cadrilater would thus be favorably answered.[79] To paralyze the Legion, the government arrested 50 major leaders and put them on trial, together with the three captured terrorists. To avoid being arrested, Codreanu disappeared from his domicile in Bucharest. The police initiated a "full intensity" search for the Captain, considering him "the moral author of the assassination of Prime Minister Duca."[80]. The police issued an arrest warrant and sent his photo and physical description to all regional inspectorates and frontier checkpoints in the country.[81] Among the hideouts checked by police was the house of General Cantacuzino in Bucharest,[82] the cottages of engineer Greceanu in Ciocănești and Vlașca,[83] the Lozovi forest, in Lapușna, Bessarabia,[84] and Nicorești, where he was allegedly seen wearing "a rubber mask on his face."[85] During this time, Codreanu was, in fact, being sheltered by a cousin of Elena Lupescu, the king's mistress.[86]

Aware of the sympathy enjoyed by the Legion in nationalist circles and among the public at large, the liberal government did not set up a trial by jury but subjected the suspects to a military tribunal. Although this strategy seemed to guarantee a fair judgment, it was not without complications since several defendants, most notably Gheorghe Cantacuzino, were high-ranking military officers. During the trial, it became evident that the National Liberal Party (NLP) was largely isolated in its attempt to eradicate the Legion from Romania's political life. Not only did its political adversaries condemn the many abuses and lawless measures taken against the opposition, but major politicians did not hesitate to speak in favor of the Legion at the trial, accusing the government of instituting a *Polizeistaat*.

As shown above, the trial resulted in the conviction of the three assassins, sentenced to life imprisonment. After the infamous acquittals of the 1923–1924 assassinations committed by Codreanu and Moța, this verdict could be regarded

as a first—if partial—government legal victory over the Legion. Nevertheless, the government was unable to prove the existence of a broader Legionary conspiracy for Duca's assassination: the blame rested solely with the terrorist team, while Codreanu and the other leaders were exonerated. More importantly, the anti-Legion press campaign was not the decisive propaganda victory the government hoped it would be. The Legion and the governmental press disputed the meaning and political connotations of key notions such as patriotism, sacrifice, terrorism, and "legitimate" versus "illegal" violence. The communiqué of the government and numerous leading articles in the official newspaper of the NLP glorified Duca as a hero killed in the line of duty, pledging that "his memory will be kept alive forever in the Romanian people's consciousness as a supreme example of abnegation of patriotism and sacrifice."[87] At the same time, the official press condemned the Legion's acts as abominable terrorist crimes, and called for a "wall of defense against those who through terror and murder aim at suppressing the country's leaders, at the destruction of the State and at the collapse of the country's borders."[88]

Against these claims, the Legion was largely successful in presenting itself as the *victim* of abusive governmental policies. First, Legionary propaganda denounced Duca as a traitor, accusing him of plans to sell Romania out to international finance; subsequent allegations claimed that Duca intended to allow massive immigration of foreign Jews to Romania. Second, Codreanu rejected the accusations of terrorism advanced in the press;[89] instead, he instructed the Legionaries to promote the idea of Legionary martyrdom.[90] Invoking the case of Sterie Ciumetti, killed in a police action during the night of December 29–30, 1933, the Legionaries argued that their organization was not the aggressor but the victim of lawless state violence. Third, the Legion claimed that its terrorist acts were "heroic acts of sacrifice," leading to the redemption of the nation. A police report from Chișinău, dated January 16, 1934, noted with alarm that the Legionaries conducted oral propaganda "to bestow on the members of the Iron Guard an aura of martyrs of the nation"; this propaganda found fertile ground among the peasantry who "take interest, at present, in the program and action of this political organization."[91] The Legionaries intended to compile a "book of Legionary sufferings" comprising all the "Iron Guard's martyrs for the national ideal."[92] Codreanu also planned to send Carol II a petition listing all Legionaries who suffered repression at the hands of the authorities.[93]

Legionary propaganda was centered on the figures of the three assassins, proclaimed heroes of the national cause. The terrorist team was referred to with the acronym of NICADORI, composed of the first syllabi of their names (*Ni*colae Constantinescu, Ion *Ca*ranica, *Do*ru Belimace) and thus acquired a collective identity. Their biographies and "heroic" deeds were glorified in innumerable songs and press articles, and presented as exemplary behavioral models and embodiments of Legionary values. Postcards with their images in the Jilava prison were sold as souvenirs to members and sympathizers (see Figure 4.6).[94]

FIGURE 4.6 Postcard of the Nicadori, a souvenir sold to heroize the Legionary terrorists

Source: ANIC, MI Diverse, 1/1923, 157.

A Legionary song underlined the *Nicadori*'s capacity of sacrifice and the importance of their martyrdom, leading to salvation through violent revenge:

> So many innocent deaths,
> Were asking for revenge,
> An entire people was bleeding,
> We could not endure anymore.
> All three united we started,
> And tied ourselves in a vow
> To revenge our comrades
> And to save our country.
> The Archangel helped us,
> To punish the guilty,
> No suffering scares us,
> We are even ready to die.[95]

The campaign for the glorification of the *Nicadori* achieved a "formidable success," as General Cantacuzino remarked.[96] But the *Nicadori* could not keep up with the tremendous psychological pressure and experienced emotional distress generated by feelings of uncertainty and exploitation by the organization. The intimate resort of the terrorists' criminal action was their fanatical belief in the Legionary faith and in Codreanu's charismatic mission. Niki Constantinescu, one of the Legionary assassins, confessed: "To feel good, you need a moral support, an equanimity. My moral support? The faith planted it my soul by Corneliu

Zelea-Codreanu. Even in hell I would feel comfortable with this faith. That's why I don't care about what's around me, hostile to me."[97] In detention, however, camaraderie and ideological certainties were put to the test by a major crisis in the interpersonal relations among the terrorists. In 1935, a conflict erupted in the Aiud Prison between the three inmates, which threatened to degenerate into a violent confrontation. Constantinescu and Belimace accused Caranica of treason and went as far as to contest the latter's participation in the assassination (blaming him for "cowardly" running from the scene during the attack). They also requested that all propaganda materials of the Legion, including the official postcard of the *Nicadori*, be purged of Caranica's image. Moreover, they demanded that Caranica be moved to another prison to prevent his assassination at their own hands, as an act of retaliation. The conflict "shamed the entire organization," the Legionary leadership being concerned that the intestine fight between the terrorists would be revealed to the public and the propaganda edifice built on their public image as exemplary, altruist fighters would thus be gravely undermined. To prevent such an outcome, Cantacuzino visited the Aiud penitentiary as the envoy of the Captain, and tried to appease what appeared to be an irreconcilable conflict. The General reiterated the Legion's full support, "greatest love and gratitude" for the terrorists' cause, reassuring them that "we will prevail and take you out of here in triumph."[98]

From "Purifying Atonement" to "Redeeming" Punishment: Ritual Execution for Treason

After the assassination of Duca in December 1933, the terrorist mode of action became the main feature of the Legion's activity. Aware of the danger, authorities remained on high alert. Throughout 1934, police reports from various parts of the country (Cluj, Brașov, Constanța, Chișinău, Câmpu Lung, and Iași) warned the government that the Legion had decided to launch a violent campaign against the Liberal government, aiming to replace it with a cabinet led by Marshal Averescu. In August 1934, the police reported that the Legion "seeing that the government resists, is considering starting a terrorist action" with the aim of assassinating members of government,[99] most notably Prime Minister Tătărescu, Minister of the Interior Victor Iamandi, Ion Inculet, and Elena Lupescu, among others.[100] A report from Constanța asked for measures against "Macedo-Romanian students and against all elements capable of acts of terror," who were suspected of planning the assassination of the prefect of Constanța County.[101]

Especially in October 1934, police units throughout the country reported a great intensification of the Legion's activity, "with an inclination toward acts of violence."[102] On October 29, 1934, a meeting of the leadership of the movement contemplated the creation of two death squads to conduct terrorist actions in case of necessity. The majority believed that a generalized revolt was preferable, since an isolated terrorist attack would provide the government with a pretext to use disproportionate force against the Legion, including rifles, as in

the Soviet-sponsored terrorist attack in Tatar-Bunar.[103] Yet, a later police report noted that, in a top secret operation, Codreanu decided to create four death squads, each composed of two Legionaries, with the task of assassinating the Minister of the Interior and Prime Minister Tătărescu.[104]

A first open crisis between the Legion and authorities occurred in April 1936, during the government-sponsored national congress of the National Union of Christian Students, organized in Târgu Mureş. Hoping to capture the sympathy of the student movement, the authorities financed much of the organizational costs and offered special trains for transporting the participants. These favors turned against the government: dominated by Legionaries, the congress took an anti-establishment orientation. Participants created death squads with the task of murdering the "traitors" of the nation. Their blacklist included defectors from the Legion, such as Mihai Stelescu and his collaborators; well-known political enemies, among which were two leading NPP politicians, Armand Călinescu and Virgil Madgearu; and notorious members of the royal *camarilla*, such as Virgil Marinescu and even the king's Jewish mistress, Elena Lupescu.

Alarmed, on August 29, 1936, the king reshuffled the government, which then took firmer measures against political radicalism. Despite the exacerbation of the violent conflict with the authorities, the third major terrorist act of the Legion concerned the assassination of Mihai Stelescu, a former Legionary. His elimination was directly linked to internal conflicts within the movement. The expansion of the Legion's membership in 1932–1933 made imperious the reorganization of its leadership and structure of command. Inevitably, this process diminished the power and influence of the founding group, resulting in factional competition. In 1934, four main factions were vying for influence within the Legion: one led by Moţa, a second one led by Stelescu, a third led by Ion Dumitrescu, and a fourth made up of intellectuals grouped around the journal *AXA*.[105] The balance among these factions was maintained by Codreanu in a deliberate policy of "divide and rule."

Stelescu was a young and dynamic product of the Legion with a stunning accession into the movement: a former member of the Cross Brotherhood, he became a Legionary deputy in the parliament at the age of 25. Animated by high personal ambitions, Stelescu opposed the accession of the intellectuals of the *AXA* group within the Legion, fearing that their growing influence would undermine his position. He also attacked Moţa, their alleged "protector," accusing him of "becoming a bourgeois and protecting the parvenus." Reportedly, Stelescu tried to win over the *Nicadori* and the Aromanians to his protest,[106] but was unable to enlarge support for dissidence within the Legion beyond his circle of intimate followers. Moreover, his disagreements with Codreanu over the membership strategy of the Legion grew rather than fading away. On September 25, 1934, Stelescu and his collaborators were accused of high treason and excluded from the Legion by its "Council of Honor."[107]

In response, Stelescu founded a rival organization called the "Crusade for Romanianism" (*Cruciada Românismului*). In a newspaper with the same name, he

started a vigorous press campaign against Codreanu, in order to undermine his influence on the youth. First, *Cruciada Românismului* denounced the gap between the Legion's professed Christian political faith and its violent political practice as a blasphemy: "Christianity has brought into the world the greatest virtue: love. And if you, as a pagan politician, now come and, in the name of our Savior, claim to fight … for the cross by killing and by elevating hatred, murder, and vengeance to the rank of virtue, it means that you want to destroy the very essence of Christianity by bringing to earth the kingdom of Satan," claimed the student of theology Șt. Constant.[108] "You gentlemen [who claim to be rightful] 'owners of nationalism,' do not defy our religion because the curse of God will come upon you," continued Constant.[109] "Devote yourself to the cause of Christ and do not allow, in His name, the policy of hatred and discord among people," concluded Constant in his vehement plea against the Legion.[110]

Second, in a series of open letters and defamatory articles published in *Cruciada Românismului*, Stelescu waged a violent defamation campaign against Codreanu, trying to turn his charisma into negative anticharisma. Stelescu contested Codreanu's capacity of leadership and his moral integrity, calling him "the gangster of the Romanian integral nationalism."[111] To discredit Codreanu as an illegitimate leader of the nationalist movement, *Cruciada Românismului* "denounced" the Captain as having a Polish-Hungarian-German ethnic origin and thus being of foreign stock: "There is not even a drop of Romanian blood in your veins, you alien. And you have the audacity to speak on behalf of the Romanians?"[112] These "revelations" concerning the Captain's ethnic origin were accompanied by his denunciation as an impostor and a criminal and his symbolic excommunication from the national community: "Of foreign stock is the hero(!) who pretentiously and majestically arrogates for himself the title of 'Captain.' … A criminal and dangerous *heimatlos*. He killed Manciu out of cowardice and not of heroism, and he assassinated Duca, he buried Teodorescu, Ciumeti, Constantinescu, Dorul, Caranica, and many others," imputed another collaborator of *Cruciada*, Ion Catoali.[113] The article aimed at re-defining and thus appropriating the professed values of the Legion—such as the cult of the martyrs—in order to turn them against Codreanu: "Our heroes are saints who respected their honor, their people, and the fatherland for which they sacrificed themselves. Pathetic knight, do not forget that Archangel Michael will crash you one day for all your wrongdoings. Your dead are chasing you, their blood demands revenge."[114] Beside extending curses of divine punishment, Stelescu went as far as to threaten Codreanu's physical integrity:

> Go Away Zilinschi-Brauner! We do not allow you to offer guidance to this people, you are a foreigner, you are a Pole, you are a German. That's why you demand alliance with the Germans. It is the voice of your blood. Go to Germany and worship Hitler! Go away from this holy country, the youth of which you mock. Go away before you are lynched.[115]

Despite his audacious tone, Stelescu was aware that his confrontation with Codreanu was unequal and that his fate was, in fact, sealed: "And now come and shoot me, you rascal. Come, you alien," instigated the former Legionary.[116] Indeed, as a reaction to this bold campaign, in April 1936 Stelescu was placed, by a decision of the Legionary-dominated student congress in Târgu Mureş, on the blacklist of the Legion's greatest enemies, a death squad being assembled for his assassination. On July 16, 1936, while interned in the Brâncoveanu Hospital in Bucharest, Stelescu was attacked by the squad and executed with 40 bullets;[117] his corpse was then cut into pieces with axes. The death squad was made up of ten Legionaries, all students of Orthodox theology, led by the Aromanian Ion Caratănase. In line with the Legionary "ethics," the death squad (subsequently called the "*Decemviri*," or "Ten Men") handed themselves in to the police.[118] To justify the assassination, the Legionaries engaged in a strong defamation campaign against Stelescu, accompanied by the glorification of the *Decemviri*.[119] On July 17, a manifesto of Legionary students announced publicly that Stelescu "committed treason and, as every traitor, fell under the bullets of an execution squad." Affirming the redeeming quality of violent punishment, the manifesto appealed to other volunteers to "chop with axes the traitors and their descendants," and went as far as to place Stelescu's assassins in the gallery of Romanians' greatest historical figures, together with Horea and Tudor Vladimirescu.[120]

In April 1937, after a summary trial, eight of the ten assassins were sentenced to forced labor for life, while two of them were sentenced to ten years of forced

DECEMVIR II
Trandafir Ion, Bozântan Iosif, Atanasiu Ion, Georgescu Ştefan,
Vlad Radu; *al doilea plan:* State Grigore, Pele Ion, Caratănase Ion, Bogdan Gavril, Curcă Ştefan.

FIGURE 4.7 The *Decemviri* death squad, 1936

Source: Cover, *Buna Vestire* I (Dec. 15, 1940): 3.

labor. Unlike in the terrorist trials concerning the assassination attempts on Socor, Beza, and Angelescu, the authorities did not even attempt to prove the existence of a larger murder conspiracy but charged only the execution squad. This legal approach intrigued antifascist politicians, who were themselves targets of Legionary violence, and wondered if this was due to state weakness or to a conscious plan of the royal *camarilla* to utilize the Legion to silence democratic parties. Armand Călinescu, for example, interrogated Gabriel Marinescu, the prefect of Bucharest Police and a close collaborator of Carol II: "complicities were not uncovered, the assassins were not delivered to the Council of War, Legionaries in uniforms are allowed to bring food to the assassins at Văcăreşti, no prevention measures were adopted. … This means protection for the Iron Guard. What is the significance of this fact? Do the government and the king want to suppress us (politicians)?"[121]

Blood Atonement: The Burial of Gheorghe Grigor

The brutal assassination of Stelescu made a highly negative impression on public opinion. To counter the accusation of terrorism, and to overshadow the assassination of Stelescu, the Legion intensified its campaign of victimization, portraying its members as martyrs for the national cause. The assassination of the theology student of Bessarabian origin Gheorghe Grigor by a communist militant of Jewish origin, Eduard Wagner, on August 5, 1936, in a public garden in Czernowitz, provided the Legion with an unexpected occasion to try to "redeem" its public image. Grigor and Wagner had had a first altercation few days earlier. As retaliation, Wagner organized a gang that attacked Grigor and his companion in the park, stabbing the former to death and gravely wounding the latter. Captured by police, Wagner committed suicide by jumping out of a second-floor window in the police headquarters. These dramatic events revealed the intense politicization of society and the polarization of the university youth along sharp ideological lines. It also highlighted the intertwined processes of radicalization of the extreme right and the extreme left, leading to political violence.

Legionary propaganda covered this tragedy fully, arguing that Grigor was the 28th Legionary martyr. At a time when the Legion was in a full terrorist offensive—as shown by the assassination of Duca in 1933, the set-up of death squads in 1935, and the killing of Stelescu in April 1936—*Iconar* developed a discourse on the victimization of the Legion, centered on the ideas of self-defense, innocence, and Christian virtue: "we are killed, cowardly, without guilt and without trial, only because we want our land to be adorned exclusively by crosses, not by the hammer and sickle of the Red Satan."[122] *Iconar* reversed all the anti-Legionary stereotypes that circulated in the media, calling the Jewish communists beasts who "terrorize the peaceful population with assassinations," and the journalists sympathetic to the Communists "sinister pigs with whiskers." In contrast, the magazine portrayed the Legionaries as innocent, law-abiding victims, and appealed to the authorities to arrest the killers and to bring them to justice. To

emphasize the contrast between "Christian charity" and "communist terrorism,"[123] the Bukovinan Legionaries also appealed to the Orthodox Metropolitan of Bukovina, Visarion, to provide material support to Grigor's helpless mother.

Grigor's burial on August 9 occasioned a massive Legionary manifestation of solidarity, with a strong public impact.[124] The funeral convoy started at the chapel of the "King Carol II" Hospital and reached the Czernowitz Cathedral, via the main avenues "Transylvania" and "Stephen the Great." The convoy stopped in the Square of the Union, in front of the Monument for the Union of Bukovina with Romania. Professors Constantin Zoppa, Filon Lauric, and George Macrin delivered incriminating speeches in front of a large crowd estimated at approximately 15,000 people. The religious ceremony was officiated by a group of priests led by Prof. Dr. Vasile Gheorghiu. At the end, the participants attended a blood atonement ceremony and took a collective oath of vengeance, pledging: "We will not demobilize until we create a law whereby we extirpate all traitors, all Communists, and all those who, through freemasonry, undermine the foundations of the fatherland and of our Christian Church and harmed the Legion." Another ceremony took place at the cemetery, with passionate speeches delivered by Professor Traian Brăileanu, Vasile Posteucă, the president of "Arboroasa Association," Vasile Iasinschi, the Bessarabian student Dovgan, and Father Dimitrie Onciulescu.

The burial ceremony contributed to the exacerbation of ethno-ideological conflicts in Bukovina, the Legionaries calling for a violent uprising against "the Judeo-Bolshevik menace": "The provocation has arrived," concluded Barbu Sluşanshi. "The exact timing of our unique and definitive answer will be chosen by us," warned the Legionary intellectual.[125] The process of radicalization reached a new peak, the Legionaries arguing that the horrible crime gave them the right to kill: "If the red beasts started to kill Christians and to break all divine and human laws, the Christian people can defend themselves only by placing them [the Communists] outside the law and treating them as wild beasts." These discourses created a messianic horizon of expectations, projecting the Legion's action as Christian martyrdom inspired by divine revelation, leading to salvation. "What is our guilt, God, for we, the Romanians, fall as your holy martyrs under the daggers of the Kikes and pagans?" This messianic lamentation was turned into mobilizing appeals: "Shake yourself and wake up! Join the Legion and save your soul! … So: where do you see salvation, if not in the holy Legion of the Captain?"[126] The funeral was followed by an intense campaign of memorialization through the erection of crosses and wells throughout the country to commemorate the martyrs.

Neo-Martyrdom and Community-Building: The Sacrifices of Moţa and Marin

Another form of bestowing sacrality on the Legion as a chosen community and, by extension, on the Romanian nation, was *voluntary self-sacrifice through heroic death in battle*. The most important action in this respect was the propaganda

mission sent to Spain in November 1936 in order to present a sword to Colonel José Moscardó, the "legendary" defender of Alcázar against the siege of the Republican forces, at the beginning of the Spanish Civil War (July 22 to September 27, 1936). In Legionary propaganda, Colonel Moscardó was hailed as a providential hero, due to the symbolic importance of the nationalist victory of Toledo, but also to his dedication, which led him to sacrifice his own son for the nationalist cause. Headed by General Cantacuzino, the leader of "All for the Country" Party, the Legionary delegation was made up of six other prominent figureheads: lawyer Ion I. Moța, Commander of the Annunciation; priest Ion Dumitrescu-Borșa, General Secretary of "All for the Country" Party; Alexandru Cantacuzino, Commander of the Annunciation; engineer Gheorghe Clime, the commandant of the Legionary Workers' Corps; lawyer Nicolae Totu; economist Bănică Dobre; and lawyer Vasile Marin, Legionary Commandant and head of the Bucharest organization.

This symbolic action allowed the Legion to transcend the national scope of its political action and to contribute to the making of a new fascist European order, by joining the global "crusade against communism." The action was in line with the Legion's apocalyptic vision of international politics as an arena of confrontation between the divinely protected forces of regeneration fighting for God and Christianity, on the one hand, and the forces of degeneration, fighting on behalf of Satan and secularization, on the other hand. In the first camp were the "countries of national revolutions," who "defended the Christian civilization, defend Churches against demolition, holy relics and the graves of heroes against profanation"; on the other, the Jews, the freemasons, and their acolyte states, Soviet Union and Republican Spain, "who fight for the extinction of people and the collapse of the Christian civilization."[127]

The Legion's discourse on foreign policy was linked to its rabid antisemitic view of domestic policy. Codreanu claimed that Romania's foreign policy was a continuation of the Judaic and Masonic policy of the Liberal Party, and thus turned into "the most infamous tool of the Freemasonry and Judaism,"[128] working "against the national and Christian idea."[129] The Legion's main target was Foreign Minister Nicolae Titulescu, who allegedly inspired the ban against the Legion in 1933. The most important issue of contention was the policy of rapprochement with Soviet Russia initiated by Titulescu in 1936. In a circular letter dated May 30, 1936, Codreanu characterized Titulescu's policy as "an act the Romanian people commits against God, against the moral order of the world and against the people who fight for that order against the devastating forces of the evil."[130] Codreanu believed that Romania's collaboration with the USSR placed the country in a dangerous position. If Romania allowed Russian troops to pass through its territory to intervene in the Spanish Civil War, it would secure Soviet victory "in the name of Satan" which would also result in the Bolshevization of Romania. If, on the contrary, Christian armies managed to overcome the Soviet forces of evil, they would unavoidably punish Romania for its treason with dismemberment. In Codreanu's view, Romania could redeem its

honor "only with blood, with much blood."[131] Applying the blasphemous logic of redemption through violent revenge, Codreanu argued that the only way out of Titulescu's policy was a range of political assassinations, followed by suicide: "We will shoot all those who brought us there and, because we will not be able to quit [the fight], in order to avoid committing an act devoid of honor, we will commit suicide." Codreanu's discourse reconfirms the punishing nature of the Legion's dogma but also its defeatism and drive toward self-destruction. The resurrection of the nation was to be an act of cleansing its honor by redeeming its past "sins" through sacrifice.

The Legionary delegation sent to Spain to fight on Franco's side implemented in practice two main principles stated in Codreanu's circular letter: the idea that the Legion could prevail only through violent sacrifice; and that its blood sacrifice was to redeem the sins caused by Romania's foreign policy. The delegation left Bucharest on November 24, 1936. Due to the refusal of the French government to issue travel visas, the team traveled by train to Hamburg, via Poland and Germany. There, the Legionaries embarked on the "Monte Olivio" ship and arrived in Lisbon on December 2, heading to the general headquarters of the nationalist forces in Salamanca. The sword-awarding ceremony took place on December 6 in the town of Soria; the sword, made of Toledo steel, was endowed with a new handle crafted by the Legion and displaying the symbol of Archangel Michael. The sword belonged to General Cantacuzino, who wore it in the Great War. Its passing to Colonel Moscardó symbolized the community of values and continuous struggle of nationalist forces in Europe. After the ceremony, General Cantacuzino (then aged 67) returned to Romania, while the Legionary team members enrolled as simple soldiers in the Spanish Foreign Legion. Alexandru Cantacuzino claimed that this happened at the express desire of the team, being meant as proof that the Legionary elites "renounced their families, their comfortable lives, their friends, temptations and ambitions, and searched for the rough lesson of misery and death for the resurrection of the Romanians."[132]

After a summary military instruction, the team engaged in military confrontations against communist forces near Madrid. On January 13, 1937, two members of the delegation, Ion I. Moţa and Vasile Marin died in a battle at Majadahonda, killed by the same bombshell. According to the heroizing yet fabricated reports published in the Legionary and Spanish nationalist press, Moţa died shouting "Roumanie, Espagne, Latinité, Crist."[133]

In retrospect, Moţa's death appears to have been a premeditated act, a *choreographed martyrdom* according to a well-prepared scenario of "dying for the Cross." Before leaving for Spain, Moţa publicly announced his "imminent" death and bade farewell to his family. Alexandru Cantacuzino, a close confident of Moţa, later revealed that the former "wanted, with determination, to give an example of martyrdom."[134] He "prophetically understood his destiny" and "went to die in Spain, without hopes to escape" his fate.[135] In his political will, entrusted to Nae Ionescu to be published upon his prospective fall in

battle, Moţa expressed his conviction in the charismatic victory of the Legion, under Codreanu's leadership:

> I die, Corneliu, full of vivacity and happiness for Christ and the Legion. I ask neither reward, nor anything else, only victory and you showing kindness to my children. And because this is a farewell, I wish you to be under God's protection and to attain victory soon. I am happy and die blissfully because I had the capacity to understand you and to follow you. Because you are the Captain. I haven't done enough for the Legion in the last years, but I have believed in you and I have never betrayed this faith. Make, Corneliu, our country as beautiful as a sun and strong and obedient to God.[136]

Moţa's actions were part of a conscious campaign of heroizing the Legionaries fighting in Spain, by mythologizing their own experience. The other members of the team participated in this effort, keeping diaries and sending regular articles to nationalist newspapers, detailing their experience. In addition, Legionaries sold postcards with autographed portraits of Ion I. Moţa and Vasile Marin to the rank-and-file Legionaries and the general public.[137] This form or (self-)marketing was another way to establish these fighters as role models for other Legionaries, in order symbolically to re-create the Legion as a community of sacrifice.

To enhance Moţa's political position within the Legion further, on January 1, 1937, Codreanu promoted him to the rank of vice-president of the "All for the Country" Party. On January 13, 1937, the day Moţa and Marin died in the Spanish Civil War, Codreanu appointed the three *Nicadori* imprisoned for terrorism as members of the newly established Legionary elite order "Commanders of the Annunciation" (*Buna vestire*), to replace the dead leaders. In this way, Codreanu conflated the two, internal and external, streams of political militancy (made up of terrorism and foreign armed combat) into one single category of Legionary heroism.

Fascism and the Aestheticization of Politics: The Burial of the Martyrs

In early February 1937, the Legion organized the transportation to Romania of Moţa and Marin's corpses and their burial. Due to the fact that the death of the two Legionaries occurred approximately 3,500 km from Bucharest, the dual funeral was a complex operation, lasting for a full month (January 13 to February 13). The transfer posed multiple challenges. First, the Legion engaged in painstaking negotiations with Romanian and foreign authorities in order to obtain transit permissions for the dead bodies. The travel preparations were undertaken by the surviving members of the Legionary delegation to Spain; in addition, General Cantacuzino traveled back to Spain and assumed leadership of the transfer, together with engineer Virgil Ionescu. The team stayed in close contact with the leadership back home, reporting directly to Codreanu. Initially, due



MAP 4.1 Itinerary of the funeral train of Ion I. Mota and Vasile Marin, Jan.–Feb. 1937

Source: Copyright: Constantin Iordachi

to the uncooperative attitude of the Léon Blum government in France (June 4, 1936–June 22, 1937), Codreanu intended to accept an offer of the Italian state to transport the corpses by sea from Cádiz to Genova, and from there by mortuary train to Romania, following the itinerary Brennero–Munich–Dresden–Krakow–Grigore Ghica Vodă.[138] After some hesitation, the Legion organized the transportation of the bodies over land, via France, Belgium, Germany, and Poland (see Map 4.1).

Second, Codreanu initiated a fundraising campaign meant to procure the financial means to cover the high transportation and commemoration costs, urging the Legionaries and unenrolled friends of the movement to contribute. Third, the leadership started the mobilization of the Legionary community and of the general public for the event. Codreanu conceived of the burial as a grandiose exercise in the aestheticization of politics as well as a display of the Legionary political strength. He envisioned the participation of approximately 90,000 to 100,000 Legionaries to the funeral, in black uniforms but also wearing green shirts.[139] In Bucharest, the funeral was to be attended by all "Commanders of the Annunciation," all Legionary commandants, deputy commandants, instructors, heads of county organizations, and their deputies. Each territorial organization was to send at least ten members to Bucharest,[140] preparations being made for accommodating these large delegations in the capital.[141] The Legion also intensified its work for completing a small mausoleum at the Green House in Bucharest to store the deceased.[142]

Upon death, the corpses of Moța and Marin were loaded in a truck, together with the fallen fighters of the day in Majadahonda. The two corpses became objects of religious reverence. The Legionary team had the difficult task of keeping track of the bodies and of assuring them the proper treatment they deserved as sacred Christian relics ennobled by sacrifice. Aware of the utmost political importance of the two corpses, Alexandru Cantacuzino, Clime, and Dumitrescu oversaw their transfer to Toledo, where they were embalmed and granted the first Christian rites. "We were completely terrified at the thought that we could lose their corpses," confessed Cantacuzino.[143]

From Toledo, the Legionary delegation transported the two coffins to the French border along the itinerary Burgos–San Sebastian–Irun. In all these cities, the funeral convoy train stopped for mass political-religious commemorations that celebrated the Romanian-Spanish common heroic fight against Communism. From Irun, the coffins were transported by a funerary truck across the French border to Saint-Jean-de-Luz, where they were embarked onto two rented train cars. The practice of setting up funeral trains and of circulating them along a symbolic itinerary was not new at the time but was in in fact common for national heroes or heads of state (see the funerals of Edward VII in the UK, of Tsar Alexander III and of Vladimir Lenin in Russia, and of Abraham Lincoln in the USA). More directly, the Legion emulated internal and external models that were well-known to its members, namely the reburial of Michael the Brave's head in 1920 and of the unknown soldier in 1923 in Romania, and the burial of the Nazi Swiss leader Wilhelm Gustloff in Germany, assassinated in 1936, all of which involved funeral trains.[144]

Since the two corpses had to cross the European continent from West to East, the train's symbolic itinerary and the political treatment it received became part of the ongoing ideological struggle in Europe between fascist versus democratic forces. Given the hostile attitude of the Léon Blum government, no commemorations were held in France, the train cars being sealed and then opened up again in Berlin, where they arrived on February 6, 1937. In their diaries, the members of the accompanying Legionary delegation deplored the hostile attitude of France. While in Spain they capitalized on the idea of Latin solidarity, in France they downplayed that idea in favor of ideological affinities with Nazi Germany, arguing that "we felt emotionally closer to '*furor teutonica*' rather than to our much celebrated and pitied elder sister of ours, France."[145] In Berlin, the two coffins were taken out of the train by German officers in uniforms and exhibited in the official reception hall, where they were given high state honors. The ceremony was attended by the diplomatic representatives of Francoist Spain and Fascist Italy, by official representatives of the Nazi Ministry of Propaganda, by delegations of the NSDAP and other Nazi political organizations, regular Wehrmacht units, and by squads belonging to the personal guards of Adolf Hitler and Hermann Göring.[146]

After a full night of mourning in the railway reception hall, supervised by a Nazi guard of honor, the coffins were embarked in an imposing train car freely granted by Nazi Germany and continued their journey. After transiting the territory of Poland overnight (via Krakow), the funerary train entered Romania on

February 8[147] through Grigore Ghica Vodă, in Bukovina. At the border, the train was welcomed by a top delegation led by Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, who joined the escorting team.[148] On February 8–11, 1937, the funeral train traveled on a predetermined route, covering all major provinces of Romania, from Bukovina to Moldova, Transylvania, Oltenia, and then Bucharest, in Muntenia. On the route, the train stopped for commemoration ceremonies in no fewer than 60 locations, including Grigore Ghica Vodă, Cernăuți, Dornești, Pașcani, Roman, Bacău, Adjud, Comănești, Petru Rareș, Târgu Mureș, Războeni, Cluj, Teiuș, Alba Iulia, Orăștie, Sebeș, Sibiu, Piatra Olt, Slatina, Pitești, and Bucharest (see Map 4.1). In other, minor localities, the train proceded at reduced speed, being greeted in railway stations by occasional crowds or official delegations. The most impressive ceremonies took place in Cernăuți (3,000 persons), Dornești (2,000), Roman (1,500), Bacău (2,200), Adjud (1,500), Comănești (2,000), Cluj (4,000), Orăștie (3,000), Sebeș (4,000), and culminated with the festivities in Bucharest, attended by a crowd estimated at 15,000 to 20,000 people by authorities and at 100,000 by the Legionary press.[149] The participants originated "from all social strata, and all political nuances," and were thus indicative of the catch-all, integrative nature of the Legionary propaganda. They included mainly pupils and students, teachers, priests, peasants, workers, and military men. In many localities, state bureaucrats and railway workers openly manifested their sympathies for the Legion. The funeral was also one of the few events which temporarily coalesced the far-right "family of authoritarians," as the ceremonies were attended by leaders and rank-and-file members of the National Christian Party (which incorporated the former LANC), and of the Romanian Front, including its leader, Alexandru Vaida-Voevod.[150] The ceremonies invariably involved a religious service officiated by priests, occasional speeches highlighting the importance of self-sacrifice for the Cross, and an oath performed in front of the coffins, taken by Legionaries in uniform and also by the audience: "I swear before God and our holy sacrifice for Christ and the Legion, to break with the earthly joy and to renounce human love for the resurrection (*învierea*) of my people, and to be ready to die." In an official report on the event, General Inspector of the Gendarmerie, Pârâianu, pointed out that: "A dose of mysticism had the effect of impressing deeply the participants, even those who were not members of 'All for the Country', prompting them to consent to taking the oath" of allegiance to the Legion.[151]

In major cities, the coffins were taken out to the main square, as happened in Cluj, or in the main cathedral, as happened in Cernăuți. The most complex ceremony took place in Orăștie. An impressive convoy of 500 Legionaries, lit by torches, carried the two coffins to the house of Priest Ioan Moța, Ion I. Moța's father. After a short religious service, the coffins were then placed in the Orthodox Church for a religious mass performed by 70 priests and attended by over 3,000 people, including numerous officers. Following two speeches "of a political nature, with strong Legionary nuances,"[152] the Legionaries took the oath of allegiance, joined by members of the audience.

The participation of the Orthodox Church to the funeral ceremonies, which reportedly occurred with the express approval of Patriarch Miron Cristea,[153] was outstanding. A detailed report of the gendarmerie mentions on aggregate over 503 priests and ten monks who officiated at religious services at various locations along the route, including 12 in Cernăuți, 16 in Roman, 25 in Adjud, 16 in Petru Rareș, 11 in Luduș, 15 in Cluj, 70 in Orăștie, 32 in Sebeș, 14 in Râmnicu Vâlcea, 18 in Pitești, and no fewer than 180 in București Nord. Among these, there were many high Orthodox clerics, eager to appropriate the sacrifice of the Legionary "martyrs of the Cross" in the Church's benefit. The most important among them were the Metropolitan of Transylvania, Nicolae Bălan; the Bishop of Vad, Feleac and Cluj, Nicolae Colan; the Bishop of Roman, Lucian Triteanu; and the Vicar of the Roman Bishopric, Archimandrite Ilarion Mircea, together with the choir of the Theological Seminar of Roman; and four bishops and the Vicar of the Patriarchy in Bucharest. In Cluj, the Greek-Catholic Church was also represented at the funeral by Father Ion Agârbiceanu. The participation of these high clerics lent legitimacy to the Legion, by reinforcing its propaganda claims. The most significant discourse in this respect was delivered by Metropolitan Bălan on February 13, 1937. Bălan praised "the exemplary sacrifice of Your chosen ones, Ioan and Vasile." The Metropolitan reiterated the redeeming, sanctifying function of martyrdom: "We came here to thank You, Father, that you gifted us with such great and clean souls, so that they wanted to accept *the spirit of faith, the spirit of self-sacrifice unto death, which is the most distinguished ladder toward You given to man*." Bălan also validated the charismatic nationalism professed by the Legion, proclaiming the sacrifice of Moța and Marin as a foundational religious act leading to the salvation of the nation: "You also placed *our promised country*, which You destined to us through Your goodness, on the foundations of the *unprecedented sacrifice of the best sons of our nation*."[154] Bălan was instrumental in conferring religious legitimacy to the Legionary campaign of sanctifying its "martyrs," bestowing on them an aura of sanctity. However, while endorsing the Legionary claims to sanctity, Bălan also tacitly reclaimed these sacrifices for the Church, portraying the Legionaries as agents of God's will and not of a rival fascist faith.

Upon arrival in Bucharest, the coffins of the two martyrs were inserted into larger sarcophagi made of wood and painted in green, the Legionary color. Codreanu was the first to descend from the train, being cheered by the large audience as a potential savior of the country, "our hope for a better future," as a police report pointed out.[155] Approximately 300 Legionaries and a group of priests followed him. A convoy was formed, opened by religious flags, and followed by funeral wreaths, the priests, the coffins, the Legionaries, and the general public. The coffins were placed on a catafalque outside the station; a religious service was performed, attended by a huge audience. Afterwards, the convoy headed to the Legion's center in Bucharest, known as the "Green House." The pick of the ceremony was represented by the burial of the two "martyrs" on February 13, 1937, in a crypt specially built for the occasion at the "Green

House." They also greatly contributed to the solemnity of the events: an official report of the gendarmerie pointed out that:

> The pomp of the ceremony and the act of parading the two victims across the country were characterized by an idealism prompted not by Romanian national needs but only by the vision propagated by a group that has placed itself outside the law. This provided a good opportunity for propaganda, which appealed to the crowd but also to part of the intellectuality, [the Legion thus] harvesting sympathizers both in the capital and across the country.[156]

The "martyrdom" of Moţa and Marin had a powerful impact on the political evolution of the Legion, provoking "a pietist turn."[157] The "voluntary sacrifices" of the two leaders were placed at the center of the Legion's ideology and ritual practice, being presented as a *religion-making event*, with national and universal implications. The cult of the two fallen fighters was closely related to the cult of the war heroes, but went well beyond it, turning fast into a cult of martyrs and then saints of Christianity. According to Codreanu, the death of the two heroes validated the salvational mission of the Legionaries, as God's chosen warriors: "Through their heroic gesture, the Legion proves that she has fully prepared us in the spirit of total sacrifice, on which depends the salvation of the Romanian people."[158]

What were the sources and models for the Legionary cult of the heroes and martyrs? I argue that the cult of the two fallen Legionaries emulated consciously the established ancient practices of venerating early Christian martyrs.[159] In the Legionary propaganda, Moţa and Marin were explicitly called "martyrs of the Cross" (*mucenici*) and "soldiers of Christ."[160] Just like in early Christianity, the deeds of the two Legionaries were seen as inspired by the Holy Spirit, following the behavioral model of *imitatio Christi*. The main focus of the Legionary propaganda was on the meaning of their "saintly sacrifice for Christ."[161] It was claimed that their blood sacrifice was not death, but a form of witnessing their faith, entitling them to *immortality* and *instant saintliness*. To substantiate this claim to immortality, Codreanu decreed that, after the death of Moţa and Marin, each Legionary ceremony was to commence with a roll call of the fallen martyrs followed by the collective answer "Present!" The dead martyrs were venerated as saint relics invested with miraculous powers: "The sanctified souls of Moţa and Marin have a tremendous power, which guards our borders and national patrimony," claimed Alexandru Cantacuzino. The lives and personalities of the two Legionaries were elevated to the status of *exemplum virtutis*: "Through their death, they shook the Romanian people, and even other peoples, as well. *They sacralized the Legionary faith and strengthened it*," claimed Ion Banea. The Legionaries were asked to direct their daily prayers within nests to those "who sacrificed themselves for the Legionary faith and movement," first and foremost "the two *saints* of our movement, Ion Moţa and Vasile Marin, who *willingly sacrificed* themselves for the glory of God and of the Legion."[162]

The "embodied martyrdom" of Moţa and Marin thus reaffirmed the Legion's charismatic core and provided it with a new ritual axis performed at the graves, as a new sacred realm of memory. To honor the two martyrs, the Legionaries protected the two graves with a wooden canopy, under which they placed a large wooden cross. A guard of honor made up of four Legionaries and a votive light were permanently maintained at the site. The tombs of the two martyrs served as places of gathering of the Legionary community and were invested with an oath-taking authority, which could not be undone by any other form of authority. To renew the Legion's charismatic bonds, Codreanu demanded that *all Legionaries* take the "Moţa and Marin" oath by May 1, 1937.[163]

In June 1937, the wooden canopy burned down during a storm, yet the cross remained unharmed. Codreanu interpreted this event as a divine sign that the sacrifice of the martyrs was accepted. The "miracle" re-enforced the importance of Moţa and Marin's grave, as a source of sacrality: He urged the Legionaries to visit the grave anew, "witness the miracle," and worship the wooden cross "as proof of God's power."[164] According to Codreanu's wife's account, Elena Ilinoiu, at the Green House, Corneliu always started his day with a prayer at the grave of the two martyrs.

The cult of the relics was accompanied by a sustained press campaign meant to sanctify the martyrs. Two festive issues of *Cuvântul Studenţesc*, the official magazine of the National Union of the Romanian Christian Students, published in early 1937, provided hagiographies of Ion I. Moţa and Vasile Marin as martyrs of the nation (*mucenici ai neamului*) (see Figure 4.8).[165] The first issue included "saint-hood files" on the two Legionaries: their biographies, political thought, activity, salvational sacrifices, and legacy. The leading articles were signed by members of the Văcăreşteni group (Corneliu Georgescu, Radu Mironovici, and Vasile Christescu), by *AXA* intellectuals (Mihail Polihroniade and Ioan Victor Vojen), and by priests influential in the Legion (Nicolae Georgescu-Edineţ). They focused primarily on the figure of Ion I. Moţa, whose sacrifice was again presented as a *religion-making event*: Moţa was proclaimed "the saint of the Romanian people," who articulated, in his political thought, a new "National Religion." It was claimed that Moţa was "the bearer of the divine word on earth (*purtătorul cuvântului dumnezeesc pe pământ*), with a messianic history."[166] His sacrifice turned the Romanian people into the elect nation: "The nation that gave birth to Ionel Moţa and Vasile Marin will be chosen by God for a noble, imperial mission in the earthly world," claimed Alexandru Cantacuzino.[167] Autobiographical accounts by the members of the military expedition in Spain contributed to the hagiography of the two would-be saints.[168]

The cult of the two martyrs was also placed at the heart of the Legionary propaganda in the new parliamentary elections scheduled in December 1937. Moţa and Marin's writings were republished in numerous copies, turning into cult books.[169] As Codreanu asserted in his introduction to Marin's book, *Crez de Generaţie* (Creed of a Generation), "all youngsters in this country should learn that, by walking on the way of the martyrs' faith, they will prevail and will

FIGURE 4.8 Representations of Moţa and Marin as knights of Christianity

Source: *Cuvântul Studenţesc* XII, no. 1–4 (Jan.–Feb. 1937): 27. The sacrifice of the two "martyrs" is depicted as enabling the rebirth of new fascist Romania as a chosen nation, represented in the image by a child seeking God's blessing. The depiction resembles traditional Catholic religious representations in which a country or a sovereign seeks the protection of God, their bid for divine patronage being mediated by the sacrifice of crusading knights or soldiers.

resurrect together with their people against all exploiters and their conspiracies and strikes."[170] This intense propaganda campaign bore fruit, the graves of the martyrs becoming a sacred sanctuary of the Legion but also a pilgrimage site for Romanian nationalists. Ilie Tudor, one of the children "adopted" by the Legion who lived at the Green House, recalled in his memoirs that:

> Every day bunches of flowers were brought to the graves and always, the next day, they were replaced by fresh ones. Youth groups from all over the country arrived in pilgrimage to the grave of those who sacrificed their lives on Spanish soil in the service of Christ's faith and to the glory of his Church. They stopped a few minutes to light a candle, deposed their flowers, worshiped and went away with watery eyes. This was happening on a daily basis during the time I lived there, from September 1937 to February 1938.[171]

The campaign of heroizing the martyrs continued with intensity for over a year, marked by regular religious or secular celebrations. In January 1938, at the first anniversary commemoration of the death of the "martyrs," Codreanu established the elite "Moţa and Marin" corps, as a distinct section within the "All

of the Country" Party. Its leadership was entrusted to Alexandru Cantacuzino, one of the members of the Legionary team fighting in Spain. Perceived by contemporaries as an equivalent of a "Legionary SS,"[172] the corps was meant to institutionalize "the pedagogy of death and resurrection" centered on the cult of the martyrs through self-sacrifice. Its members were to be carefully selected, through a complex procedure. They were to "love suffering, which fortifies the soul" and to despise a "sheltered life of pleasure and easy profit." Their most important features of character were their loyalty and capacity of sacrifice: "The fighter from the Legionary section 'Moţa-Marin' is happy to face his death." The initiation ceremony was to take place in a historical site, the tomb of a national hero or a Legionary martyr. They had to swear on a sermon extracted from Moţa's writings, which ended with the pledge: "I am ready to die. I swear." That vow had to be displayed by each fighter in his room, under a Christian icon. Moreover, the members of the Moța and Marin Corps had to carry in their pockets a box with earth from the grave, as proof and witness of their oath of allegiance.[173]

Membership in the "Moţa and Marin" elite corpse was limited to 10,000 fighters organized in 13 units—called *bandere*—of 771 men each, dispersed throughout Romania. At his trial in 1938, Codreanu confessed that he set this limit on membership because he did not wish the corps to exceed 10 million members at its peak, in ten to fifteen years(!).[174] The order had a conspiratorial nature: its members shared the same values and worked toward the same goal but were not supposed to meet each other or to know of each other.

The two martyrs provided the foundation of the new Legionary elite: "Let's put on Moţa and Marin the base of the future Romanian elites, which would be called upon to transform this Nation in something which our mind only now is about to conceive." The dual cult was also instrumental in forging the Legionary charismatic community of sacrifice: "you'll swear that you understand that being part of the Legionary elite entails, in our language, not only to fight and prevail in battle, but *permanent self-sacrifice in the service of the nation*, that the idea of elite is linked to sacrifice and to living an ascetic and severe life, and that the Legionary elite ceases to exist where there is no self-sacrifice."[175] The relics of Moţa and Marin were to serve as a solid base for the new fascist nation: "Let us place the heart, the forehead and the body of Moţa and of his comrade Marin as the cornerstone of the Romanian Nation. Foundation over the centuries for the future Romanian glory."[176]

The Legion was thus highly skillful in instrumentalizing the cult of the martyrs to articulate its salvific faith. The dual burial of Moţa and Marin was a complex mass ceremony, arguably the most elaborate funeral in Romania to that date. At a symbolic level, the Legion proved able to articulate an alternative discourse on the Romanian national identity and to appropriate the cult of the heroes. Politically, the burial demonstrated the Legion's capacity to coalesce Romania's "family of authoritarians" around its doctrine of national salvation through violent self-sacrifice, and to associate to it significant segments of the

church and the army. The Legionary campaign of making saints highlights the growing importance played by public discourses on martyrdom and the role of propaganda in the emergence of new totalitarian political faiths in the interwar period. Capitalizing on the example of Mota and Marin, the Legion intensified its campaign of manufacturing fascist heroes and of turning them into martyrs and saints. The Legionary propaganda presented heroes as divinely inspired individuals who, through their action, facilitated God's cyclical work of national regeneration: "God's will is embodied in each people via their heroes. This leads to the regeneration of a people, who wakes up to life again trough his heroes."[177]

The stunning mass response to the Legionary propaganda cannot be understood without exploring the widespread longing for martyrdom and the messianic horizon of expectations in Romanian society. The Legion knew how to exploit collective fears, popular beliefs, and superstitions to its own advantage. In addition, the Legionary campaign of heroization leading to the sanctification of martyrs occurred at a time when there was a general veneration of self-sacrificing heroes in the Romanian political culture and practice, a trend initiated during the 1878 war of independence and further consolidated during and after World War I. This trend was escalated in the 1930s, the polarization of the political life in Europe between the extreme right and the extreme left, and the fear of Bolshevism greatly impacting Romanian politics, too.

In the international realm, the Legionaries' demonstrative fight in Spain, and Moţa and Marin's transnational burial ceremony, was meant to uplift the Legion's international political relevance, by presenting it as part of an emerging European coalition of nationalist-totalitarian movements. The European nationalists' common fight against communism on the Spanish front created a transnational space of fascist exchange and interaction centered on violent sacrifice and the mourning of the fallen heroes. Another key propaganda theme was that of Latin solidarity: the alliance between Italy, the cradle of the Roman Empire, Romania (the ancient Roman Dacia), and nationalist Spain (the birthplace of the legendary Roman Emperor Trajan, the conqueror of Dacia), was portrayed as a symbolic recreation—in fascist key—of the glorious Roman Empire. Pan-Latinism had a long history, being an integral part of pan-nationalist movements attempting to group related nationalisms into larger macro-clusters united by a common language, history, myths, and symbols.[178] Although at its origins, in mid-nineteenth century, pan-Latinism was associated with a Liberal political project, the discourse was re-launched at the turn of the century in a new key by a plethora of far-right European thinkers, such as Charles Maurras in France and Gabriele D'Annunzio in Italy. In the interwar period, Latinism was turned into a foreign policy instrument in Benito Mussolini's Italy, Franco's Spain, and Salazar's Portugal. Romanian fascists participated actively to the re-elaboration of pan-Latinism as a symbolic-ideological discourse but also as a transnational political network of like-minded ultranationalists.

The Legion's apocalyptic discourse on the Spanish Civil War and the messianic connotations attached to the voluntary sacrifice of Moţa and Marin managed

to attain a position of hegemonic dominance in society. This explains why much of the media coverage in Romania and of public opinion was sympathetic to the glorification of Moța and Marin, even if they had different political orientations. The historian-politician Nicolae Iorga, for example, the former apostle of the new nationalism who gradually grew into an adversary of the Legion, commended the sacrifice of Moța and Marin as a fight "for their Christian faith and for the glory of their nation, for what is eternal, dear and pure in the non-Bolshevized Latinity."[179] For the influential journalist Pamfil Seicaru, the Legionary fight in Spain was a crusade against "Marxist Satanism" but reflected also "a certain Romantic inclination, an exaltation of a prolonged adolescence, and a spirit of epic nostalgia."[180]

Only a few sober voices dared to point out that the Legion's small-scale and largely symbolic intervention in the Civil War in Spain did not have any direct relevance for the course of that war or for Romanian politics. As for the Orthodox Church, although it took part in the glorification of the martyrs, its leadership understood that the demand to sanctify the Legionary volunteers killed in Spain was subversive to the Church dogma because it blurred the boundaries between canonically sanctioned and politically manufactured martyrs, thus running the risk of undermining the sanctity of the religious category of "martyr" itself. Therefore, while trying to capitalize on the voluntary sacrifice of the two Legionaries as a paramount example of contemporary Christian martyrdom, the Orthodox leadership resisted the pressure of sanctifying them, fearing it would have a destabilizing impact upon the church and its teachings.[181]

An Aristocratic Hero: The Burial of General Cantacuzino

The burial of Moța and Marin was followed, at the end of 1937, by another stunning Legionary funeral. On October 9, 1937, General Gheorghe Cantacuzino, aged 68, died in his house on Gutenberg 3, Bucharest (which functioned, due to his courtesy, as the seat of the Legion). Cantacuzino's burial provided the Legion with yet another opportunity to affirm its doctrine of national salvation and to stage another impressive public ceremony. However, while Moța and Marin were exclusively "Legionary heroes," the burial of the General was complicated by the fact that, as a hero of the Great War and Knight of the highly prestigious "Michael the Brave" Military Order, Cantacuzino's funeral was an event of national importance that involved official state institutions. Consequently, the Legion could not organize a fully Legionary burial, but had to negotiate the organization of the ceremony with the authorities and with the "Michael the Brave" Knights. This tangled situation presented tangible advantages as well: since the burial combined statist with Legionary elements, it enabled the Legion to renew its attempts to appropriate the cult of the war heroes.

To honor the dead General, Codreanu ordered a week of total mourning, marked by the suspension of all meetings and electoral activities and the organization of religious masses all over the country.[182] In addition, Legionaries were

to wear a mourning badge for a full month.[183] Intense preparations were undertaken for the funeral of the General, which was to be attended by 8,000–10,000 Legionaries from all over the country.[184] All the new recruits enrolled in the "All for the Country" Party were to be part of the "General Cantacuzino Cohort."[185]

The funeral started on Sunday, October 10, 1937, at 11:00 am with a religious mass officiated by Father Grigorie Cristescu at the General's house, in the presence of the Captain and of the General's family. The coffin was then carried away by the Knights of the Annunciation, and deposited in the chapel of the "Michael the Brave Church," built by the Wallachian prince in Bucharest. The funeral cortege to the church was led by three columns of Legionaries, followed by a "living cross," made up of Legionaries in standing formation and by the coffin, flanked on both sides by Legionary commandants. Behind the coffin came the family of the General, the Legion's leadership, including Codreanu, other Legionary units, and only then state representatives and the general public. The cortege was flanked and closed by Legionary human "belts," who supervised the security of the event. In the courtyard of the "Michael the Brave" Church, the coffin was greeted with military honors and the Legionary salute, and was placed on a catafalque by the Legionary commandants. From Sunday to Tuesday afternoon, the church was open to the public. The Legionary press published countless reports about the "pilgrimage" to the General's coffin, numerous personalities, especially army leaders but also by politicians and the general public, coming to pay homage to the defunct General.

On Tuesday, October 12, after a religious mass officiated by a group of Legionary priests led by Grigorie Cristescu, Dominic Ionescu, and Georgescu-Edineț, the coffin was carried to the Belu Cemetery on a symbolic route that crossed the center of Bucharest, via Schitu-Măgureanu, Elisabeth Avenue, and the Victory Avenue. If, as shown above, the first religious mass at home, the road to the church and the wake in the church were organized by the Legion and thus dominated by Legionary symbolism, the burial ceremony itself took an official character. The cortege was opened by a company of gendarmes, followed by the wooden cross, the priests, the military decorations, the gun carriage with the coffin, the family of the General, official state representatives, diplomats, the Knights of the Michael the Brave, military units, and only then, at the end, Legionary representatives, headed by Codreanu, and followed by numerous members of the public. As such, Cantacuzino's funeral was yet another major display of the Legion's increasing political force, human resources, discipline, and organization. The ceremony enhanced the emotional bounds among the Legionaries, while the presence of rural activists in the capital and their accommodation in Legionary centers consolidated membership ties, improving its cohesion.

Overall, the spectacular political actions conducted by the "All for the Country" Party between 1933 and 1937 and its membership growth made it clear that the Legionary movement had escaped from state or police control and was on its way to political prominence. To be sure, the Legion's acts of political violence were

received with mixed feelings by the public. The establishment of terrorist death squads at the Târgu Mureș Congress and the brutal execution of Stelescu in July 1936 horrified many contemporaries and estranged potential allies.[186] At the opposite pole, their actions to venerate the fallen soldiers at Predeal and, mostly importantly, the burial of Moța and Marin in February 1937 and of General Cantacuzino in October 1937 made a strong impression on public opinion. Heavily exploited by Legionary propaganda, these funeral ceremonies gave a final electoral boost to "All for the Country" ahead of the national parliamentary elections.

Notes

1 Brian M. Jenkins, "International Terrorism: A New Kind of Warfare," The Rand Paper Series no. 4, 1974, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, available at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2008/P5261.pdf.
2 Domenico Tosini, "A Sociological Understanding of Suicide Attacks," *Theory Culture Society* 26 (2009), 67.
3 Ronald Wintrobe, *Rational Extremism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 10–12.
4 Tosini, "A Sociological Understanding," 69.
5 Wintrobe, *Rational Extremism*, 117.
6 Moța, *Cranii de Lemn*, 58.
7 "Copie depe scrisoarea lui Corneliu Z. Codreanu," March 18, 1930, Iași, National Archive of the Republic of Moldova [Arhivele Naționale ale Republicii Moldova], Chișinău, Fond 680/1, files 3433, 510.
8 Arhivele Naționale ale Republicii Moldova, Chișinău, Fond 680/1, file 3433, 629.
9 Moța, cited in Sima, *Doctrina Legionară*, 18.
10 Ion I. Moța, "Spasmul și concluziile sale," in *Almanahul Societății "Petru Maior"* (Cluj: Cartea Românească, 1929), 207.
11 *Monitorul Oficial*, no. 55, *Adunarea Deputaților, Ședința de la 4 martie 1933*, 1704.
12 ANIC, DGP, 48/1936, 33.
13 On the cult of the martyrs in modern Italy, see Emilio Gentile, *Il culto del littorio: La sacralizzazione della politica nell'Italia fascista* (Rome: Laterza, 1993); Lucy Riall, "'I martiri nostri son tutti risorti!' Garibaldi, i garibaldini e il culto della morte eroica nel Risorgimento," in *La morte per la patria: La celebrazione dei caduti dal Risorgimento alla Repubblica*, edited by Oliver Janz and Lutz Klinkhammer (Rome: Donzelli, 2008), 23–44; John Foot, *Italy's Divided Memory* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 44–53; and Lisa Bregantin, *Per non morire mai: La percezione della morte in guerra e il culto dei caduti nel primo conflitto mondiale* (Padua: Il Poligrafo, 2010). On Germany, see George Mosse, "National Cemeteries and National Revival: The Cult of the Fallen Soldiers in Germany," *Journal of Contemporary History* 14, no. 1 (1979), 1–20; Sabine Behrenbeck, *Der Kult um die toten Helden: Nationalsozialistische Mythen, Riten und Symbole 1923 bis 1945* (Vierow: SH-Verlag, 1996); Gunnar Brands, "From World War I Cemeteries to the Nazi 'Fortresses of the Dead,'" in *Places of Commemoration*, edited by Joachim Wolschke-Bulmahn (Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks, 2001), 215–256; Monica Black, *Death in Berlin: From Weimar to Divided Germany* (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 69–110; and Paul Betts, Alon Confino, Dirk Schumann, eds., *Between Mass Death and Individual Loss: The Place of the Dead in Twentieth-Century Germany* (Oxford: Berghahn, 2011).
14 Corneliu Georgescu, *Pe drumul cu arhangheli. Însemnări din viața unui legionar* (București: Majadahonda, 1996), 105.
15 For a description of the ceremonies, see Ioan Petrovici, *De-a lungul unei vieți. Amintiri* (Bucharest: Editura pentru Literatură, 1966), 19–20.

16 Maria Bucur, *Heroes and Victims: Remembering War in Twentieth-Century Romania* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010).
17 *România* IX, no. 180 (August 24, 1920), 1.
18 May 4, 1923, in the Julian calendar.
19 For a detailed report of the ceremony, see "Ostaşul Necunoscut," *Foaia Diecezană* XXXVIII, no. 10 (May 7, 1923), 3–6.
20 M.S., "Eroul Nostru Necunoscut," *Vestul României* I, no. 9 (May 18, 1923), 1. For the concept of *lieux de mémoire*, see Pierre Nora, ed. *Realms of Memory. The Construction of French Past,* under the direction of Pierre Nora; ed. And with a foreword by Lawrence D. Kritzman, 3 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996–1998); and Pierre Nora, ed., *Rethinking France: Les lieux de mémoire*, transl. by Mary Trouille (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001).
21 Bucur, *Heroes and victims*, 130.
22 See https://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/M%C4%83r%C4%83%C8%99e%C8%99ti for more information on Mărăşeşti, and its coat of arms.
23 Ion Zelea-Codreanu, "Discursul rostit în şedinţa din 19 iulie 1920," in Scurtu et al., eds, *Totalitarismul de dreapta in Romania*, 221.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid., 222.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 "Actul de constituire al Ligii Apărării Naţionale Creştine (LANC)," Scurtu, et. al, eds., *Totalitarismul de dreapta,* 311–312.
29 A. Vântu, "Ion I. Moţa. Schiţă Biografică," *Cuvântul Studenţesc* XII, no. 1–4 (Jan.–Feb. 1937), 6.
30 ANIC, DGP, 104/1933, 110.
31 Ibid., 120.
32 ACNSAS, P 012879, vol. 2, file "Banea Ion," 14.
33 "Preotul Georgescu-Edineţi." *AXA* II, no. 6 (Feb. 5, 1933), 2.
34 "Agitaţii pe chestiunea dela mormântul soldatului necunoscut. Comunicatul guvernului," *Adevărul* 47, no. 15053 (Jan. 29, 1933), 2.
35 "Crucea pentru mormântul Eroului Necunoscut," *Renaşterea* XI, no. 5 (Feb. 5, 1933), 1–2.
36 "Agitaţii pe chestiunea," 2.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 ACNSAS, Fond Documentar Bucureşti, File Codreanu Zelea Ion, P 010744, vol. 2, 26–27.
40 Ibid., 27.
41 *Lupta de la mormântul fără cruce* 1 (Febr. 1933) (Bucureşti: Institutul de arte grafice Bucovina, I. E. Toroutiu).
42 Codreanu, *Circulări*, 81–82, 85.
43 ACNSAS, Fond Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, vol. 8, 273.
44 Codreanu, *Circulări,* 78.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid., 79.
47 Ibid., 82.
48 Ibid., 81–82.
49 Ibid., 85–86.
50 ACNSAS, Fond Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, P 011784, vol. 8, 175.
51 ANIC, DGP, 284/1936, 16.
52 ACNSAS, Fond Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, P 011784, vol. 8, 237.
53 Vulcănescu, *Mitologia Română*, 16.
54 Ibid., 15–16.
55 Ibid., 18–19.

56 Vulcănescu, "Coarne de consacrare," *Mitologia Română*, 202.
57 Ibid.
58 Zelea-Codreanu, *Circulări*, 95.
59 I paraphrase here a metaphor employed by Ian Kershaw in *Hitler, 1889–1936: Hubris* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1998), 529–531, to explain the impact of the *Führer* principle on the internal dynamics of the Nazi regime.
60 Zelea-Codreanu, *For My Legionaries*, 336.
61 *Adevărul* (July 23, 1930), Ioan Scurtu, (coord.), C. Beldiman, N. Tampa, T. Tănase, C. Troncotă, D. Bordeiu, eds., *Ideologie şi formaţiuni de dreapta în România, 1934–1938*, vol. IV (Bucureşti: INST, 2003), 249–250.
62 Codreanu, *For My Legionaries*, 284.
63 Ibid., 285.
64 ANIC, DGP, 93/1931, 7–11.
65 ACNSAS, Nicolae Petraşcu I 151086, vol. 4, 537.
66 Codreanu, *For My Legionaries*, 362.
67 Constantin Papanace, *Fără căpitan: conducerea în a doua prigoană* (Rome: Armatolii, 1984), 59–60.
68 *Adevărul* (Dec. 31, 1930), in *Ideologie şi formaţiuni de dreapta în România,* vol. II (Bucureşti: INST, 2000), 281–282.
69 *Ideologie şi formaţiuni de dreapta,* vol. II, 294–295.
70 ANIC, MI Diverse, 1/1923, 7.
71 *Monitorul Oficial*, Dec. 9, 1933, no. 286 bis, 7644.
72 For a later summary of this propaganda claim, see Faust Brădesco, *La Garde de Fer et le terrorisme: à l'occasion du semi-centenaire du mouvement légionnaire* (Madrid: Carpaţi, 1979).
73 Zelea-Codreanu, *Circulări*, 11–12.
74 Ibid., 13, 11–12.
75 ANIC, DGP 104/1933, 169.
76 Ibid., 5.
77 ANIC, DGP, 3/1934: 4.
78 The circumstances of Duca's assassination were amply discussed in the press, many analysts blaming Carol II for facilitating the crime, at least indirectly. First, they point out the inexplicable breaches in the Prime Minister's security: he was called to Sinaia during troubled times, the details of his trip were leaked to the press, his protection was minimal, and the security protocol at the railway station was not kept. Second, and most importantly, some historians claim that Carol II had been informed in advance of the threat on Duca's life, but instructed the chief of the *Siguranţa* to ignore the report. Although these allegations are not backed by archival evidence, the rumors are further fueled by the fact that Codreanu was sheltered at the time by Elena Lupescu's relative. Finally, it is also telling that the king treated Duca's corpse with disrespect, depositing it in the servants' room at his palace in Sinaia, rather than in a main hall, and declining participation in the funeral. See Zaharia Boilă, *Amintiri şi consideraţii asupra mişcării legionare* (Cluj: Biblioteca Apostrof, 2002), 42–44. Be that as it may, it is without doubt that Carol II benefited politically from Duca's disappearance. On the one hand, he got rid of a powerful former opponent and a personal enemy. On the other hand, Duca's death weakened the National Liberal Party considerably. Moreover, in defiance of the established practice, Carol II did not entrust leadership of the new government to the new head of the party, Dinu Brătianu, but to the king's loyal collaborator within the NLP, Gheorghe Tătărăscu, thus taking control over Romania's most powerful party.
79 ANIC, DGP, 3/1934.
80 ACNSAS, Fond Zelea-Codreanu, Corneliu, file P 011784, vol. 2, 148, 150.
81 Ibid., 150, 159, 188.
82 Ibid., 144–145.
83 Ibid., 164.

84 Ibid., 179.
85 Ibid., 186.
86 Nichifor Crainic, *Zile Albe – Zile Negre* (Bucharest: Gândirea, 1991), 257–258.
87 "Manifestul guvernului către ţară," *Facla* (1 January 1934), 1.
88 Ibid.
89 Codreanu, *Circulări,* 12.
90 ANIC, DGP 104/1933, 114.
91 ANIC, DGP 102/1933, 15.
92 ANIC, DGP, 104/1933, 155. Although the Legionary press abounded in articles and lists about the Legionary martyrs, an official book of martyrdom was never compiled. For a post-1945 attempt to complete the task, see Constantin Papanace, *Martiri legionari: evocări* (Rome: Armatolii, 1952).
93 ANIC, DGP, 4/1933, 127.
94 The esteem in which the terrorists were kept in the Legion is illustrated by the fact that Horia Zelea-Codreanu, one of Corneliu's brothers, baptized his son, born in September 1935 with the name of Nicador. For Nicador Zelea-Codreanu's (1935–2014) biography, see note *1335*, page *322*.
95 "Cântecul Nicadorilor," in *Cântece legionare* (Bucureşti: Editura L.A.M., 1997).
96 ACNSAS, Fond Gheorghe Cantacuzino, file I 257486, vol. 1, 161.
97 Niki Constantinescu, cited in "Inscriptii," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 49 (Dec. 1, 1940), 2.
98 ACNSAS, Fond Gheorghe Cantacuzino, file I 257486, 161.
99 ANIC, DGP, 104/1933, 8, 9.
100 ANIC, DGP, 102/1933, 16–17, 19, 20.
101 Ibid.
102 ANIC, DGP, 104/1933, 6.
103 ANIC, DGP, 102/1933, 3.
104 Ibid., 5.
105 Zamfirescu, *Legiunea "Arhanghelul Mihail,"* 206.
106 Constantin Papanace, *Despre Căpitan, Nicadori şi Decemviri. Crâmpei de amintiri* (Cetatea Eternă: Armatolii, 1963), 31.
107 Codreanu, *Circulări*, 18–21.
108 Şt. Constant, "Crima în numele creştinismului," *Cruciada Românismului* II, no. 73 (May 23, 1936), 5.
109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
111 Mihai Stelescu, "Corneliu-Zilinsschi-Lorenţ-Condac-Brauner. Gagnsterul naţionalismului românesc. Studiu antropo-socio-lombrozian," *Cruciada Românismului* II, no. 78 (June 27, 1936), 8.
112 Mihai Stelescu, "Afară cu tine, Zelinski," *Cruciada Românismului* II, no. 72 (May 16, 1936), 5.
113 Ion Catoali, "Codreanu Heimatlos," *Cruciada Românismului* II, no. 69 (April 25, 1936), 2.
114 Catoali, "Codreanu Heimatlos," 2.
115 Mihai Stelescu, "Un monument de prostie. A vorbit Zilinski," *Cruciada Românismului* II, no. 77 (June 20, 1936), 7.
116 Stelescu, "Afară cu tine, Zelinski," 5.
117 Armand Călinescu, *Însemnări politice: 1916–1939* (Bucureşti: Humanitas, 1990), 310–312.
118 Stelescu's elimination was meant to discourage other potential defectors. The timing of the execution, two years after Stelescu's defection, was, however, linked with the government's attempts in April 1936 to reopen the Duca trial, based on new pieces of evidence against Codreanu found in a personal letter he sent to Stelescu. Upon Stelescu's elimination as a witness, these plans were abandoned. The self-incriminating letter was nevertheless used in the second trial against Codreanu in 1938, amply publicized at the time by the governmental press.

119 For a Legionary narrative of these events, see Sima, cited in *Ideologie şi formaţiuni de dreapta în România*, vol. IV: 7 *July 1934–30 March 1938* (Bucharest: INST, 2003), 198–199.
120 ANIC, Fond Ministerul Justiţiei, Direcţia Judiciară, 11/1936, in Scurtu, (coord.), et. al., eds., *Ideologie şi formaţiuni de dreapta*, 200.
121 Călinescu, *Însemnări*, 310–312.
122 Mircea Streinul, "Iarăşi o jertfă: Gheorghe Grigor" *Iconar* I, no. 12 (1936), 3.
123 "Sociale. (Rugăminte către I.P.S.S. Mitropolitul Visarion pentru ajutorarea mamei studentului Gheorghe Grigor, omorât de comunişti)." *Iconar* II, no. 2 (1936), 7.
124 See Mircea Streinul, "Înmormântarea camaradului Gheorghe Grigor" *Iconar* I (1936), 6; "La înmormântarea camaradului Gheorghe Grigor (Cuvinte rostite de prof. univ. dr. Traian Brăileanu şi prof. Constantin Zoppa)," *Iconar*, I, no. 12 (1936), 1–2.
125 Barbu Slușanshi, "Conspiraţia jidovilor," *Iconar* I, no. 12 (1936), 4.
126 Mircea Streinul, "Iarăşi o jertfă: Gheorghe Grigor" *Iconar* I, no. 12 (1936), 3.
127 The Legionary view of the Civil War in Spain as an apocalyptic confrontation of ideologies was in line with the contemporary Catholic-nationalist discourse in Spain. On the presentation of the Civil War in Spain as an apocalyptic war against Christ and the Church, see "Carta Colectiva del Episcopado español a los obispos del mundo entero" (Collective Letter of the Spanish bishops to bishops around the world because of the war in Spain), Pamplona, July 1, 1937, available on http://secviccentdocumentosoficiales.blogspot.hu/2006/09/carta-colectiva-de-los-obispos.html. For commentaries, see Hilary Raguer, "La carta colectiva de los obispos (1 julio 1937)," *La pólvora y el incienso. La Iglesia y la Guerra Civil española (1936–1939)* (Barcelona: Península, 2001), 85–100. On the history of the Catholic Church in Spain during this period, see Frances Lannon, *Privilege, persecution, and prophecy: The Catholic Church in Spain, 1875–1975* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).
128 Zelea-Codreanu, *Circulări*, 103.
129 Zelea-Codreanu, "Memoriu adresat M.S. Regelui, oamenilor politici şi ţării," *Circulări*, 101–104.
130 Zelea-Codreanu, *Circulări*, 78–79.
131 Ibid., 79.
132 Alexandru Cantacuzino, *Pentru Christos (amintiri de pe frontul din Spania)* (Bucureşti, 1937); second ed. (Madrid, 1952), 6.
133 "Dramatica moarte a lui Ion I. Moţa," *Buletin Legionar*, no. 1, January 1937, Totul pentru Ţară, Organizaţia judeţeană Buzău, 2.
134 Cantacuzino, *Pentru Christos*, 14.
135 Ibid., 16, 18–19.
136 "Testamenul lui Ion I. Moţa," in Crăcea, *Dezvăluiri legionare,* vol. II, 110.
137 Traian Borobaru, ed., *Legiunea în Imagini: Semicentenarul Mişcării Legionare* (Madrid: Editura Mişcării Legionare, 1977), 52.
138 "Informaţiuni privitoare la aducerea în ţară a corpurilor neînsufleţite ale eroilor Moţa şi Marin," *Buletin Legionar*, no. 2, February 1, 1937, Totul pentru Ţară, Organizaţia judeţeană Buzău, 1.
139 ACNSAS, Fond Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, P 011784, vol. 7, 9.
140 Ibid., 38.
141 Ibid., 21.
142 Ibid., 10.
143 Cantacuzino, *Pentru Cristos*, 23.
144 Mosse, *The Fascist Revolution,* 84.
145 For these commentaries, see Bănică Dobre, *Crucificaţii: zile trăite pe frontul spaniol* (Bucureşti: I.N. Copuzeanu, 1937), 79–80.
146 Dobre, *Crucificaţii*, 80.
147 For earlier works on the burial of Moţa and Marin, see Răzvan Codrescu, "Taina Jertfei: Moţa şi Marin," *In căutarea Legiunii pierdute* (Bucharest: Vremea, 2001),

47–104, also available at http://foaienationala.ro/taina-jertfei-cazul-moa-marin.html; Răzvan Codrescu, *Taina jertfei. Dosar istoric Moța-Marin* (Sibiu: Puncte Cardinale, 2002); and Săndulescu, "Sacralised Politics in Action," 259–269.

148 ANIC, fond MI-Diverse, 4/1937, 1.
149 For a detailed report of the events, see ANIC, fond MI-Diverse, 4/1937, esp. 1–15.
150 Ibid., 8.
151 Ibid., 15.
152 Ibid., 9.
153 See the confession of Father Nicolae Georgescu-Edineț in ACNSAS, Fond Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, vol. 5, 28.
154 *Rugăciune rostită de I.P.S. Mitropolitul Nicolae al Ardealului în Biserica Sf. Ilie Gorgani din Capitală în ziua de Sâmbătă 13 Februarie 1937, la înmormântarea în Bucureștii Noi a eroilor Ion I. Moța și Vasile Marin* (Sibiu: Tiparul Tipografiei Arhidiocezane, 1941).
155 ANIC, fond MI-Diverse, 4/1937, 20.
156 Ibid., 14–15.
157 Veiga, *Istoria Gărzii de Fier, 1919–1941*, 211–44.
158 Codreanu cited in N. Păun, "Circulara nr. 1: Către toti legionarii din Județul Buzău," January 21, 1937, *Buletinul legionar*, no. 1, 1.
159 For classical works on this topic, see Hippolyte Delehaye, *Les origines du culte des martyrs* (Bruxelles: Société des bollandistes, 1933); and Peter Brown, *The Cult of the Saints: Its Rise and Function in Latin Christianity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).
160 Codreanu, *Circulări*, 10; Banea, *Ce este*, 46.
161 Codreanu, *Circulări*, 233.
162 Banea, *Ce este*, 27.
163 ACNSAS, Fond Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, P 011784, vol. 9, 235.
164 Zelea-Codreanu, "Comunicat," June 18, 1937, *Circulări*, 145–146.
165 *Cuvântul Studențesc*, Organ Oficial al Uniunei Naționale a Studenților Creștini Români, Festive Issue XII, no. 1–4 (Jan.–Febr. 1937).
166 Șerban Milcoveanu, "Mormânt de sfânt. Neam Mesianic," *Cuvântul Studențesc* XII, no. 1–4 (Jan.–Feb. 1937), 1.
167 Cantacuzino, *Pentru Christos*, 18–19.
168 Dobre, *Crucificații*; Neculai Totu, *Însemnări de pe front: note din expediția legionară în Spania, noiembrie 1936–ianuarie 1937* (Sibiu: Curierul, 1937); Ion Dumitrescu-Borșa, *Cea mai mare jertfă legionară* (Sibiu: "Totul pentru țară," 1937); and Cantacuzino, *Pentru Christos*.
169 See Vasile Marin, *Crez de Generație* (Bucureşti: Bucovina, 1937). A new edition of Moța, *Cranii de lemn*, was published in 1,000 copies. See ACNSAS, Fond Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, P 011784, vol. 8, 1.
170 Codreanu, in Marin, *Crez de Generație*, 5.
171 Tudor, *Un an lângă căpitan*, 77.
172 Constantin Argetoianu, *Însemnări zilnice*, vol. IV (Bucureşti: Machiavelli, 2002), 92.
173 ANIC, MI-Diverse, 6/1937, 72.
174 ACNSAS, Fond Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, P 011784, vol. 15, 98–99.
175 *Buna Vestire*, 270 (Jan. 23, 1938), 1.
176 Ibid.
177 Ion Vasile, "Naștere și renaștere," *Buna Vestire* I, no. 250 (Dec. 25, 1937), 2.
178 For a comparative study of macronationalisms, which devotes only passing attention to pan-Latinism, see Louis L. Snyder, *Macro-Nationalisms: A History of the Pan-Movements* (Westport, and London: Greenwood Press, 1984).
179 Nicolae Iorga, "Doi băieți viteji," *Neamul Românesc* XXXII, no. 12 (January 19, 1937), 1.
180 Pamfil Șeicaru, "Doi români morți pe frontul spaniol," *Curentul* X, no. 3218 (January 17, 1937), 1.

181 It was only in 1955 that the Romanian Orthodox Church sanctified its first Christian martyrs, a practice that was to be resumed in the post-Communist period.
182 ACNSAS, Fond Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, P 011784, vol. 9, 5.
183 Ibid., 6.
184 Ibid., 8.
185 Ibid., 2.
186 ACNSAS, Fond Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, P 11784, vol. 8, 260.

References

ACNSAS. Fond "Documentar," File Codreanu Zelea Ion, P 010744, vol. 2.
ACNSAS. Fond Gheorghe Cantacuzino, file I 257486, vol. 1.
ACNSAS. File "Banea Ion" P 012879, vol. 2.
ACNSAS. Fond "Informativ," File Nicolae Pătrașcu I 151086, vol. 4.
ACNSAS. Fond "Arhiva Operativă," Zelea-Codreanu, Corneliu, file P 011784, vol. 2, 5, 7, 8, 9, 15.
ANR.M. Fond "680/1," file 3433.
ANIC. Fond "DGP," files: 93/1931; 4/1933; 102/1933; 104/1933; 3/1934; 48/1936.
ANIC. Fond "Ministerul de Interne-Diverse," files: 1/1923; 4/1937; 6/1937.
"Agitații pe chestiunea dela mormântul soldatului necunoscut. Comunicatul guvernului," *Adevărul* 47, no. 15053 (Jan. 29, 1933): 2.
Argetoianu, Constantin. *Însemnări zilnice*, vol. IV. Bucureşti: Machiavelli, 2002.
Behrenbeck, Sabine. *Der Kult um die toten Helden: Nationalsozialistische Mythen, Riten und Symbole 1923 bis 1945*. Vierow: SH-Verlag, 1996.
Betts, Paul, Alon Confino, and Dirk Schumann, eds., *Between Mass Death and Individual Loss: The Place of the Dead in Twentieth-Century Germany*. Oxford: Berghahn, 2011.
Black, Monica. *Death in Berlin: From Weimar to Divided Germany*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Washington, D.C.: German Historical Institute, 2010.
Boilă, Zaharia. *Amintiri şi considerații asupra mişcării legionare*. Cluj: Biblioteca Apostrof, 2002.
Brădesco, Faust. *La Garde de Fer et le terrorisme: à l'occasion du semi-centenaire du mouvement légionnaire*. Madrid: Carpați, 1979.
Brands, Gunnar. "From World War I Cemeteries to the Nazi 'Fortresses of the Dead,'" in *Places of Commemoration*, edited by Joachim Wolschke-Bulmahn. Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks, 2001, 215–256.
Bregantin, Lisa. *Per non morire mai: La percezione della morte in guerra e il culto dei caduti nel primo conflitto mondiale*. Padua: Il Poligrafo, 2010.
Brown, Peter. *The Cult of the Saints: Its Rise and Function in Latin Christianity*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981.
Bucur, Maria. *Heroes and Victims: Remembering War in Twentieth-Century Romania*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.
"Carta Colectiva del Episcopado español a los obispos del mundo entero" (Collective Letter of the Spanish bishops to bishops around the world because of the war in Spain), Pamplona, July 1, 1937, available on http://secviccentdocumentosoficiales.blogspot.hu/2006/09/carta-colectiva-de-los-obispos.html.
"Crucea pentru mormântul Eroului Necunoscut," *Renașterea* XI, no. 5 (Feb. 5, 1933): 1–2.
Călinescu, Armand. *Însemnări politice: 1916–1939*. Bucureşti: Humanitas, 1990.
Cantacuzino, Alexandru. *Pentru Christos (amintiri de pe frontul din Spania)*. Bucureşti, 1937; second ed. Madrid, 1952.

Cântece legionare. Bucureşti: Editura L.A.M., 1997.
Catoali, Ion. "Codreanu Heimatlos," *Cruciada Românismului* II, no. 69 (April 25, 1936): 2.
Codrescu, Răzvan. "Taina Jertfei: Moţa şi Marin." In *căutarea Legiunii pierdute*. Bucharest: Vremea, 2001, 47–104, also available at http://foaienationala.ro/taina-jertfei-cazul-moa-marin.html
Codrescu, Răzvan. *Taina jertfei. Dosar istoric Moţa-Marin*. Sibiu: Puncte Cardinale, 2002.
Constant, Şt. "Crima în numele creştinismului," *Cruciada Românismului* II, no. 73 (May 23, 1936): 5.
Crăcea, Nicu, ed. *Dezvăluiri legionare*, vol. 2. Bucureşti: Buna Vestire, 1997.
Crainic, Nichifor. *Zile Albe – Zile Negre*. Bucureşti: Gândirea, 1991.
Cuvântul Studenţesc, Organ Oficial al Uniunei Naţionale a Studenţilor Creştini Români, Festive Issue XII, no. 1–4 (Jan.–Febr. 1937).
"Dramatica moarte a lui Ion I. Moţa," *Buletin Legionar*, no. 1, January 1937, Totul pentru Ţară, Organizaţia judeţeană Buzău, 2.
Delehaye, Hippolyte. *Les origines du culte des martyrs*. Bruxelles: Société des bollandistes, 1933.
Dobre, Bănică *Crucificaţii: Zile trăite pe frontul spaniol*. Bucureşti: I.N. Copuzeanu, 1937.
Dumitrescu-Borşa, Ioan. *Cea mai mare jertfă legionară*. Sibiu: "Totul pentru ţară," 1937.
Gentile, Emilio. *Il culto del littorio: La sacralizzazione della politica nell'Italia fascista*. Rome: Laterza, 1993.
Georgescu, Corneliu. *Pe drumul cu arhangheli. Însemnări din viaţa unui legionary*. Bucureşti: Majadahonda, 1996.
"Informaţiuni privitoare la aducerea în ţară a corpurilor neînsufleţite ale eroilor Moţa şi Marin," *Buletin Legionar*, no. 2, February 1, 1937, Totul pentru Ţară, Organizaţia judeţeană Buzău, 1.
"Inscriptii," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 49 (Dec. 1, 1940): 2.
Iorga, Nicolae. "Doi băieţi viteji," *Neamul Românesc* XXXII, no. 12 (Jan.19, 1937): 1.
Jenkins, Brian M. "International Terrorism: A New Kind of Warfare," The Rand Paper Series no. 4, 1974, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, available at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2008/P5261.pdf
Foot, John. *Italy's Divided Memory*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
Kershaw, Ian. *Hitler, 1889–1936: Hubris*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1998.
Lannon, Frances. *Privilege, persecution, and prophecy: The Catholic Church in Spain, 1875–1975*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987.
Lupta de la mormântul fără cruce. Bucureşti: Institutul de arte grafice Bucovina, I. E. Toroutiu, Feb. 1933.
M.S., "Eroul Nostru Necunoscut," *Vestul României* I, no. 9 (May 18, 1923): 1.
"Manifestul guvernului către ţară," *Facla* (Jan. 1, 1934): 1.
Marin, Vasile. *Crez de Generaţie*. Bucureşti: Bucovina, 1937.
Milcoveanu, Şerban. "Mormânt de sfânt. Neam Mesianic." *Cuvântul Studenţesc* XII, no. 1–4 (Jan.–Feb. 1937): 1.
Monitorul Oficial, no. 286 bis (Dec. 9, 1933); no. 55 (Mar. 4, 1933).
Mosse, George. "National Cemeteries and National Revival: The Cult of the Fallen Soldiers in Germany," *Journal of Contemporary History* 14, no. 1 (1979): 1–20.
Mosse, George. *The Fascist Revolution. Toward a General Theory of Fascism*. New York: Howard Fertig, 1999.
Moţa, Ion I. *Cranii de Lemn. Articole, 1922-1936*. Sibiu: Totul Pentru Ţară, 1936.
Moţa, Ion I. "Spasmul şi concluziile sale." In *Almanahul Societăţii "Petru Maior."* Cluj: Cartea Românească, 1929: 99–104.
Nora, Pierre, ed. *Realms of Memory. The Construction of French Past*, 3 vols. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996–1998.

Nora, Pierre, ed., *Rethinking France: Les lieux de mémoire*, trans. by Mary Trouille. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.
"Ostaşul Necunoscut," *Foaia Diecezană* XXXVIII, no. 10 (May 7, 1923): 3–6.
"Preotul Georgescu-Edineţi." *AXA* II, no. 6 (Feb. 5, 1933): 2.
Papanace, Constantin. *Despre Căpitan, Nicadori şi Decemviri. Crâmpei de amintiri*. Cetatea Eternă: Armatolii, 1963.
Papanace, Constantin. *Fără căpitan: conducerea în a doua prigoană*. Rome: Armatolii, 1984.
Papanace, Constantin. *Martiri legionari: evocări*. Rome: Armatolii, 1952.
Păun, N. "Circulara nr. 1: Către toti legionarii din Judeţul Buzău," Jan. 21, 1937, *Buletinul legionar*, no. 1, 1.
Petrovici, Ioan *De-a lungul unei vieţi. Amintiri*. Bucharest: Editura pentru Literatură, 1966.
Raguer, Hilary. *La pólvora y el incienso. La Iglesia y la Guerra Civil española (1936–1939)*. Barcelona: Península, 2001.
Riall, Lucy. "'I martiri nostri son tutti risorti!' Garibaldi, i garibaldini e il culto della morte eroica nel Risorgimento." In *La morte per la patria: La celebrazione dei caduti dal Risorgimento alla Repubblica*, edited by Oliver Janz and Lutz Klinkhammer. Rome: Donzelli, 2008, 23–44.
Rugăciune rostită de I.P.S. Mitropolitul Nicolae al Ardealului în Biserica Sf. Ilie Gorgani din Capitală în ziua de Sâmbătă 13 Februarie 1937, la înmormântarea în Bucureştii Noi a eroilor Ion I. Moţa şi Vasile Marin. Sibiu: Tiparul Tipografiei Arhidiocezane, 1941.
"Sociale. (Rugăminte către I.P.S.S. Mitropolitul Visarion pentru ajutorarea mamei studentului Gheorghe Grigor, omorât de comunişti)." *Iconar* II, no. 2 (1936): 7.
Săndulescu, Valentin. "Sacralised Politics in Action: The Feb. 1937 Burial of the Romanian Legionary Leaders Ion Moţa and Vasile Marin." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 8, no. 2 (2007): 259–269.
Scurtu, Ion, et al., eds. *Totalitarismul de dreapta în Romania. Origini, manifestări, evoluţie 1919–1927*. Bucureşti: Institutul Naţional Pentru Studiul Totalitarianismului, 1996.
Scurtu, Ion. *Ideologie şi formaţiuni de dreapta în România*, vol. II. Bucureşti: Institutul Naţional Pentru Studiul Totalitarianismului, 2000.
Scurtu, Ioan (coord.), C. Beldiman, N. Tampa, T. Tănase, C. Troncotă, D. Bordeiu, eds., *Ideologie şi formaţiuni de dreapta în România, 1934–1938*, vol. IV: 7 *July 1934–30 March 1938*. Bucureşti: INST, 2003.
Şeicaru, Pamfil. "Doi români morţi pe frontul spaniol," *Curentul* X, no. 3218 (January 17, 1937): 1.
Sima. Horia. *Doctrina legionară*. Madrid: Editura Mişcării Legionare, 1980.
Slușanshi, Barbu. "Conspiraţia jidovilor," *Iconar* I, no. 12 (1936): 4.
Snyder, Louis L. *Macro-Nationalisms: A History of the Pan-Movements*. Westport, and London: Greenwood Press, 1984.
Stelescu, Mihai. "Afară cu tine, Zelinski," *Cruciada Românismului* II, no. 72 (May 16, 1936): 5.
Stelescu, Mihai. "Corneliu-Zilinsschi-Lorenţ-Condac-Brauner. Gagnsterul naţionalismului românesc. Studiu antropo-socio-lombrozian," *Cruciada Românismului* II, no. 78 (June 27, 1936): 8.
Stelescu, Mihai. "Un monument de prostie. A vorbit Zilinski," *Cruciada Românismului* II, no. 77 (June 20, 1936): 7.
Streinul, Mircea. "Iarăşi o jertfă: Gheorghe Grigor" *Iconar* I, no. 12 (1936): 3.
Streinul, Mircea. "Înmormântarea camaradului Gheorghe Grigor" *Iconar* I (1936): 6.
Streinul, Mircea. "La înmormântarea camaradului Gheorghe Grigor (Cuvinte rostite de prof. univ. dr. Traian Brăileanu şi prof. Constantin Zoppa)," *Iconar*, I, no. 12 (1936): 1–2.

Tosini, Domenico. "A Sociological Understanding of Suicide Attacks." *Theory Culture Society* 26, no. 4 (2009): 67–96.

Totu, Neculai. *Însemnări de pe front: note din expediția legionară în Spania, noiembrie 1936–ianuarie 1937.* Sibiu: Curierul, 1937.

Tudor, Ilie. *Un an lângă căpitan: amintiri sfinte din viața legionară*, 5th ed. Pitești: Editura Fundația Sfinții Închisorilor, 2013.

Vântu, A. "Ion I. Moța. Schiță Biografică." *Cuvântul Studențesc* XII, no. 1–4 (Jan.–Feb. 1937): 2–20.

Vasile, Ion. "Naștere și renaștere." *Buna Vestire* I, no. 250 (Dec. 25, 1937): 2.

Veiga, Francisco. *La Mística del Ultranacionalismo. Historia de la Guardia de Hierron. Rumania, 1919-1941.* Bellaterra: Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, 1989.

Vulcănescu, Romulus. *Mitologie Română*. București: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1987.

Wintrobe, Ronald. *Rational Extremism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Zamfirescu, Dragoș. *Legiunea Arhangelul Mihail. De la mit la realitate*. București: Editura Enciclopedică, 1997.

Zelea-Codreanu, Corneliu. *Circulări și manifeste, 1927-1938*. München: Colecția Europa, 1981.

Zelea-Codreanu, Corneliu. *Pentru legionari*, vol. 1. Sibiu: "Totul pentru țară," 1936. English ed.: *For My Legionaries (The Iron Guard).* Reedy, West Virginia, Liberty Bell Publications, 1990.

5

FASCIST CONSTITUENCIES

Social Identities and Fascist Radicalization

The question of the social appeal of fascism has been hotly debated ever since the emergence of this phenomenon on the political scene. Given the extreme politicization of this field of studies, the dominant models of analyzing the social composition of fascist movements and parties were, from their inception, ideologically driven. Left-wing perspectives were for a long time dominated by the Comintern's approach to fascism as a dictatorship of the grand financial bourgeoisie *against* the working class.[1] This top-down approach, fixated as it was on fascist regimes, obscured the mass character of fascist movements and parties.[2] Later on, neo-Marxist thinkers put forward more sophisticated approaches to the study of fascism that departed from the Stalinist dogma in significant ways.[3] Overall, however, the almost exclusive emphasis on the fascists' material interests at the expense of their worldview made Marxist scholars less receptive to the study of fascism as an ideology and culture that could account for its mass appeal.

Non-Marxist approaches to fascism revisited the issue with fresh eyes, but could not overcome the thesis that fascism reflected the radicalism of the lower middle class, in general, and of the petty bourgeoisie, in particular.[4] This approach is best illustrated by the monumental *Who Were the Fascists*, a volume that constitutes the culmination but also the zenith of the academic effort to study the social history of fascism.[5] The failure of social historians to provide a coherent account of the mass support for fascist movements and regimes inhibited further research on the topic; since 1980, a new wave of scholarship has shifted the focus to fascist ideology.[6] More fruitful was the tradition of historical sociology initiated in 1979 by Juan Linz and continued more recently (after a long hiatus) by Michael Mann, who explored the social heterogeneity of fascist social support.[7]

These international research trends on the social basis of fascism also had a strong if belated impact on the study of fascism in Central and Eastern Europe. The social composition of the Legion has been, in particular, subject

DOI: 10.4324/9780429428043-7

to numerous controversies. In a first insightful social analysis of the Legion, the Marxist intellectual Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu argued that its membership was composed of three main social categories: broken aristocracy; petty bourgeoisie; and *Lumpenproletariat*.[8] Although very diverse, these categories shared the feeling of being uprooted and dispossessed. While acknowledging that the Legion established special workers' sections, Pătrăşcanu argued, in line with the Stalinist dogma on fascism, that "no genuine" workers enrolled in the Legion, beyond a few propagandistic showcases. The massive participation in the Legion of workers from the Malaxa locomotive factory in Bucharest was an exception to the rule, argued Pătrăşcanu: since Malaxa also produced armaments, the employer selected workers with anticommunist convictions for security reasons, an exceptional practice accounting for their right-wing sympathies.[9] Pătrăşcanu concluded that, overall, the Legion's membership was dominated by underclass elements, who—although rebellious—were not capable of conducting a genuine revolution.

In a pioneering article on the connection between fascism and the middle class published in 1966, Eugen Weber used "the lesser-known case of the Legion" to contribute to the sociology of fascism. Drawing on electoral statistics, Weber argued that the Legion recruited predominantly from the impoverished, overwhelmingly rural and geographically isolated regions of Romania such as Northern and Southern Moldova, Southern Bessarabia and Central Transylvania.[10] Weber rejected the Marxist cliché that the Legion was "a bourgeois or petty-bourgeois movement."[11] Although the Legion's leadership was part of what might be defined as the "middle class," it originated in small, "only-just-urbanized intelligentsia: sons or grandsons of peasants, schoolteachers, and priests."[12] In urban areas, it attracted mainly residents of rural extraction such as theological and agronomic students, salaried employees, professionals, and members of "the new middle class," who experienced feelings of social marginality and restlessness due to their lack of full integration in the existing social system.[13] Weber concluded that the Legion was a populist movement developed in areas where there was a political vacuum that could be exploited by new parties.[14] Since in Romania the Communist Party was outlawed and there was no civic resistance to ethnic nationalism, the Legion's radicalism "was able to develop without need to guard itself on its left or compromise too much with the forces of moderation."[15] Ultimately, for Weber, the key to understanding the Legion's social composition and electoral appeal lies less in issues of economy or social class, but in "ideological conditioning," such as the lack of structured parties, and the psychological predisposition of the followers of the Legion to radical actions.

Building on Weber's conclusions, the Romanian-British leftist sociologist Zeev Barbu, argued that the Legion was "a psychological rather than a social group,"[16] whose social composition can therefore be better explained by taking into account socio-psychological factors. Urban Legionaries were united by their marginality or "classlessness": they "were climbing up the ladder of social

hierarchy in the direction of the middle class" without severing their ties with the rural world.[17] The "symptom of marginality" rather than poverty per se accounts, in Barbu's view, for the membership structure of the Legion.

A more comprehensive analysis of the Legion's social profile and electoral support was put forward by Armin Heinen in 1986.[18] Based on a systematic reading of available printed sources, but also incorporating sociological insights from interwar authors, Heinen refuted Weber's thesis on the geographical basis of the Legion in poor and marginal regions. Instead, Heinen pointed out that the Legion was in fact more successful in regions exposed to sudden modernization, "advancing by means of industrialization, trade and communication, as well as more widely spread literacy."[19] The path opened by Heinen has recently been taken by other researchers, who have further documented the variegated social support for the Legion[20] or have tried to systematize and quantify the scant and mosaic-like archival data available by focusing on certain regional samples.[21]

In 2004, Michael Mann proposed the most systematic re-interpretation of the Legion as a mass movement.[22] Mann questioned Livezeanu's thesis that student overproduction was the main cause for the emergence of a rural type of ultranationalism.[23] He accepted only partially Heinen's thesis on the correlation between sudden development and social support for the Legion, characterizing it as "positive but weak."[24] Mann identified three distinct, region-specific forms of fascist support: (1) nationalist activists in multi-ethnic provinces in which the Romanians' domination was co-jointly challenged by at least two other minority groups perceived as "high-status" (e.g., the Jews and the Hungarians or the Germans); (2) proletarian mobilization in industrialized regions of Romania; and (3) "rural fascist-leaning counties," where free but impoverished peasants revolted against "distant" and "alien" capitalist exploitation.[25] On this basis, Mann concluded that in Romania there were "two main fascist core constituencies": (1) the routine "national-statist core" which mobilized parts of the middle class, whose interests were most closely related to the state; and (2) "poor peasants and industrial workers," attracted by a "rather proletarian ideology." With this argument, Mann set the final nail in the coffin of the thesis asserting the petty bourgeois origins of the Legion, instead portraying it as "an odd alliance between disparate groups."[26]

My own approach to the social basis of fascism is based on several premises. First, I argue that fascist movements were not tied to a particular social class but incorporate members from various strata of society. Second, to understand the social support of fascism we should not focus on uncovering a supposedly direct and immutable relationship between class positions and radical political attitudes but explore *processes of radicalization* and the creation of a violent counterculture through new forms of socialization and community-building. Third, I posit that social identities and relations are not static but always in flux and motion, as a function of multiple socio-economic, political, and demographic factors relating to psychological predispositions, positions on the social ladder in a given society and point in time, cultural values, gender identities and roles, and political

contexts, among others. To grasp the multiple entanglements among these complicating factors, I employ a sociocultural approach which reconceptualizes the social and the cultural dimensions of human action as inseparable from each other.[27] The merger between social and cultural history enables historians to re-visit the social history of politics, in general, and of fascism, in particular.[28]

The social trigger of the process of radicalization leading to fascism were feelings of collective relative deprivation. Numerous sociological works pointed out that social movements of protest are not generated by material poverty per se, as Eugen Weber suggested, but by a perceived gap between social reality and expectations.[29] In other words, feelings of deprivation are not an objective indicator of the standard of living of a given actor or social category, but subjective feelings of being disadvantaged *in relation* to a "reference" individual or group. Moreover, works on intergroup competitive relationships point out the interplay among feelings of fraternal deprivation, collective threat, and racial prejudices, leading to resentment-based political mobilization against rival groups.[30] Manichean discourses of collective relative deprivation capitalize on notions of *legitimate* expectations of a virtuous group that are unjustly and illicitly blocked by rival groups. Collective feelings of relative disadvantage stir discontent, frustration, and anger, often generating revivalist movements of change.

The relative deprivation theory illuminates the psycho-social dynamics of the process of student radicalization in Romania. As shown earlier, the post-war upheaval provided structural conditions for the emergence of social movements of protest. The process of "nationalizing the state" generated as a side-effect the confrontation between the hegemonic official culture and a radicalized student counterculture. In this context, a small but fanatical group of radical nationalists managed to channel student discontent into ideological grievances, setting the basis of a violent youth movement, militating for salvation through terrorist revenge. Sociologically, this counterculture can be defined, following a neo-Weberian theoretical perspective, as charisma of resentment or a protest ideology of under-privileged social groups.[31]

I argue that, as a social movement, the Legion was, at its peak, a *catch-all party*,[32] incorporating diverse elements of society, among which the most important were peasants, students, blue and white collar workers, members of the rural and urban intelligentsia, mostly teachers and priests, lower rural and urban bourgeoisie, and members of the aristocracy.[33] While greatly affected by the post-war upheaval, these social strata were united by the feeling of being excluded from the *full* benefits of the ongoing social and political transformation. Their *unfulfilled rising expectations* led to acute feelings of relative deprivation. The Legion's political faith centered on Codreanu's charismatic claims functioning as the unifying cement among these heterogeneous social strata, offering them a compensatory salvific hope. Its populist discourse managed to mobilize socially disenfranchised and economically impoverished groups who perceived themselves as the losers of the parliamentary political regime, but also ambitious urban strata of the population who, while advancing on the social ladder, felt hampered in their

social mobility. Through an inner group dynamic based on radicalization and permanent mobilization, the Legion forged a new political consciousness for this aggregate community, obscuring its internal cleavages and potential social conflicts and directing them toward outsiders. The Legion's nativist discourse capitalized on the "autochthonous rights" of the Moldovans, of all the Romanians, or the Christians, in general (often including also the Greek Catholics and the Catholics), as the referent object against the Jews and their Romanian "accomplices," denounced as invaders of the national space, corrupter of mores, and parasites on societal resources. Thus, while creating consensus within its own community, the Legion generated new conflicts between its fanatical followers and the country's political establishment and ethnic minorities.

In the following, I break down the analysis of the social support for the Legion in two interrelated yet distinct categories: movement members—mostly students, intellectuals, peasants, workers, and aristocrats, on the one hand, and party voters—primarily discussed in view of their regional affiliation, on the other. It should be noted from the outset that the most informed analysis, advanced by Heinen, estimated Legion membership in 1937, at its political peak, at approximately 272,000 enrolled members or approximately 1.5 percent of the total population.[34] In the same year, "All for the Country", the party representing the Legion—received 478,000 votes in national parliamentary elections, or a share of approximately 16 percent of the total electorate. As Heinen pointed out, the mathematical correlation between the number of Legionary members and the votes received in national elections is intriguingly low (less than double). This apparent discrepancy might shed doubts over Heinen's high membership estimate but might conversely also question the accuracy of the 1937 electoral results, fueled by the claim made in 1946 by Eugen Cristescu, the director of the Romanian Intelligence Service, that in reality "Legionaries obtained more than 800,000 votes" but "had 300,000 votes camouflaged [stolen] by the Ministry of the Interior."[35] Cristescu's claim is nevertheless difficult if not impossible to fully verify today and seems exaggerated.

The Followers and Their Needs: Student Radicalization

Upon its establishment, the Legion functioned as an exclusive fraternity of males, in 1929 enrolling from 400 to 1,000 members.[36] Although open to all ages, the Legion was primarily a youth movement: the majority of its early members were students, thus without a fixed, well-established social status and a rigorous social code of behaviors, and also socially deracinated through their transplantation from the familial rural environment to the "hostile" urban environment.

The Legion had its origins in the 1922 nationalist student protests, which gave birth to the National Union of Romanian Christian Students. The main promoter of this anti-establishment protest movement was the nucleus of the *Văcăreşteni*, which had been formed by plans of criminal plots, the common experience of prison, and assassinations. What was the social profile of these

activists? Corneliu Georgescu's autobiographical account entitled *On the Way with Archangels* (*Pe drumul cu arhangheli*) provides valuable insights into the process of student radicalization. Georgescu was born in 1902 in Poiana Sibiului, a village of shepherds (called *mocani*) located in Southern Transylvania, close to the border with Wallachia. The *mocani* were engaged in recurrent seasonal migrations to Wallachia and Dobrudja, and built numerous ties across the border. Politically, many *mocani* gravitated toward Bucharest. Georgescu was socialized, early on, in nationalist values by his father, a local schoolteacher. As a pupil, he resented the Hungarian domination of Transylvania and the national privations suffered by the Romanian population under the dualist system. When the war broke out in 1914, one of his brothers migrated to Romania to avoid being conscripted into the Austrian-Hungarian Army. He enrolled into the Romanian army instead and died in the battle of Turtucaia against the Central Powers, just as the Romanian army entered Poiana Sibiului after the Old Kingdom's entry into the war in August 1916.

After the war, Georgescu left his village, eager to take advantage of the new opportunities for upward social mobility in Greater Romania. After an eventful journey that took him across the mountains to the national capital, Bucharest, and further on through Wallachia and Southern Bessarabia, Georgescu settled in Dobrudja, where he worked as a primary school teacher. Georgescu's hopes of social mobility soon turned into bitter disillusionment, however, as material privations forced him to return to his native village after a single year. Georgescu provided a grim fresco of post-war sociopolitical realities in Greater Romania, dominated in his view by corruption and "foreign invasion." His narrative focused, in particular, on the Hungarian "domineers" and Jewish "exploiters," considered responsible for the Romanians' subordinate social condition: "We were in the third year from the accomplishment of the Union, but we saw, however, day by day, that things did not happen as they should have. The Hungarians acted as they pleased, more defiant than ever, and no authority intervened to stop them, as it should have." This state of affairs prompted Georgescu to join the nationalist movement. He militated for a national type of politics, one that would transcend ideological differences on a common platform against foreign oppression, above party politics. "I felt that in the new and united country we need an urgent purification," confessed Georgescu. In the spirit of the fascist ideology, he defined purification as a dual process of returning to national authenticity, cleansing the body of the nation from the internal "other" but also an inner transformation of the followers leading to the creation of the new man: "Purification between its borders, so that the hostile elements are prevented from undermining the country's foundation, and in the Romanian soul, so as to liberate it from the residues of foreign influence."[37]

In 1921, Georgescu enrolled as a student in the Department of Pharmaceutics at the University of Cluj. Active in the 1922 student movement, Georgescu was expelled from the University of Cluj but managed to obtain a transfer to the Faculty of Law at the University of Iași, where nationalist student activists found

a safe haven under Rector A. C. Cuza's patronage. Georgescu graduated in 1926 and practiced law, opening his own law firm. His experience of student activism proved decisive for his life-trajectory: he built personal ties with Ion I. Moța and Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, joined the anti-Jewish student plot in 1923, and became a founding member of the Legion in 1927, remaining part of the movement's leadership until its end.[38]

In the later 1920s, as the first post-war cohort of nationalist activists graduated, it was not clear, however, what the relationship was to be between the National Union, on the one hand, and the *former* students who moved on to join nationalist parties, mostly notably the National Christian Defense League (*Liga Apărării Național-Creștine*, hereafter LANC), established in 1923, or the newer Legion, formed in 1927, on the other. These matters were discussed at the student congress that took place at Piatra-Neamț between August 1–6, 1927. In his speech, Codreanu pleaded for a close alliance between the student movement, the Legion, and other like-minded nationalist organizations. His speech won acclamations but could not foster full consensus. Some student leaders argued that the national student organization should be apolitical and focus on "purely student-related issues."[39] Others militated for a close collaboration between the organization and the existing nationalist movements, pleading either in favor of the LANC or of the Legion, as alternatives. Some other leaders thought that the student organization should not take sides, but act like a large church or rainbow, incorporating all political orientations.[40] Although the congress failed to fully endorse a nationalist agenda, it nevertheless had a strong impact on the Legion's evolution. On the one hand, Codreanu adopted the suggestion automatically to appoint *ex officio* former student leaders as members of the Legionary Senate. On the other hand, he supported the idea of creating a new "federative" organization that would group all nationalist organizations into a large coalition. This initiative led to the creation of the Iron Guard in 1930, as a would-be umbrella structure of all political or apolitical nationalist youth parties and associations. The Iron Guard was unsuccessful in forging such a grand nationalist coalition. The National Union continued to act, however, in close cooperation with the Legion, its congresses being in many ways part and parcel of the Legion's activity. It is telling in this respect that, under Legionary rule, the National Union was taken over and fully reorganized along Legionary principles by Decree no. 3460 passed on October 15, 1940.[41]

The Legion and the Intellectuals

Another peculiar feature of the Legion was that it managed to enroll prominent intellectuals of the younger generation. These intellectuals bestowed a certain cultural prestige upon the Legion in fascist circles at home and abroad.

As the 1922 student movement portrayed itself as a movement of intellectuals, so was the Legion, by extension. What was the Legion's definition of intellectuality? Contrary to *a priori* assumptions, the Legion was not anti-intellectual; yet,

it promoted its own peculiar vision of the desirable profile and role of the new intellectual class. Active in tense inter-ethnic environments, the Legionaries were aware of the importance of culture in general, and of the power of the printed word, in particular, in forging collective identities. Codreanu and Moța assigned a leading political role to intellectuals, listing them among the most important social categories of the nation, together with the peasantry and the workers. Codreanu referred to intellectuals as figures "supposed to enlighten the people in difficult times—for that is why they were intellectuals."[42] For him, a vigorous nationalist intellectual class was a precondition for a vigorous nation. The success of the nationalist movement depended on the massive enrolment of intellectuals able to articulate and disseminate the Legion's message, and to confer on it their societal prestige. For Codreanu and Moța, the question of the intellectuality was organically linked to the Jewish Question. In Codreanu's *For My Legionaries*, the word "intellectual" appears seven times, linked almost invariably to the "war" against the Jews. The Legion engaged in a battle over the minds and ears of the young generation, arguing that the nation's "war of survival" was fought mainly in the realm of culture, between the rival intellectualities of the two ethnic groups. To Codreanu, Jewish intellectuals were materialist, atheist, and individualist; yet, they were all highly conscious fighters, hostile to the Romanian nation and fully devoted to their own nationalist cause. In contrast, the Romanian intellectuals of the day "were absent from their duty," either "unworthy beings" sold to the Jews or naïve, politically passive, and degenerate.[43] The Captain argued that Romanian youngsters had to emulate the example of Jewish intellectuals, who were thus not just enemies but also models of nationalist fighters:

> The Jews employ these plans [of degeneration] like poison gas in a war, to be used against the enemy, not their own people. They propagate atheism for Romanians but they themselves are not atheistic, as they fanatically hold to respecting their most minute religious precepts. They want to detach Romanians from their love for the land, but they grab land. They rise up against the national idea, but they remain chauvinistically loyal to their own nation.[44]

A devoted intellectual did not necessarily make a good Legionary, however. The "new nationalist intellectual" had to be militant and combative, and to cultivate his leadership spirit, combining intellectual abilities with military training and capacity of physical effort. Codreanu noted with enthusiasm the conversion to the Legion of various groups of militant intellectuals, such as "Acțiunea Românească" led by Prof. Cătuneanu and the smaller group "Fascia Națională." Other elite militants who joined the Legion early on were the Transylvanian intellectual Valer Pop, priest Titus Mălai, lawyer Paul Iliescu, and the intellectual group established around him in Bucharest, General Macridescu from Focșani, the sociology professor Traian

Brăilescu from the University of Cernăuţi, Professor Ion Găvănescu from the University of Iaşi, and Nicolae Paulescu, a professor of physiology with antisemitic convictions.

The adherence of young intellectuals to the Legion intensified in 1932–1933, due to the deepening of the social-economic and political crisis. The dramatic shrinking in state employment opportunities led to the collapse of the long-term youth integration strategies put forward by the National Liberal Party (NLP) in the first post-war decade. If in the last quarter of the nineteenth century graduating students were soon integrated into mainstream cultural institutions, in the 1930s the young generation experienced feelings of prolonged sociopolitical marginalization that would eventually lead to political radicalism. Another factor that contributed to the radicalization of university students and graduates was the political influence exercised by professors with nationalist and antidemocratic convictions. As set out in Chapter 4, the process of conversion to the Legion is best illustrated by three main groupings: *Criterion*, *AXA*, and *Iconar*, all crystalized around magazines with similar names. From a certain perspective, these intellectuals might appear, in retrospect, as naïve "victims" of history: most of them in their early 20s, these youngsters were "drawn into" the new style of politics by their professors and colleagues and experienced the tragedy of the twentieth century to the bitter end, as many of them were executed on Carol II's order in 1939 or died on the Eastern Front fighting the Soviet Union. It is important to note, however, that these intellectuals, some of whom were to survive World War II and achieve world fame and notoriety, were themselves instrumental in forging the new style of politics and in elevating it to a new level of cultural expression.

The Legion and the Peasantry

Besides students and intellectuals, a main social category represented in the Legion was the peasantry. Works on social theory are almost unanimous in pointing out that the peasantry is a conservative social class, due to its territorial fragmentation and its adherence to traditional values and way of life.[45] One would therefore presuppose that fascists had difficulties in enrolling the peasantry to their revolutionary project. The fact that the Balkans (and parts of East Central Europe, for that matter) were predominantly rural areas explains, in Stanley Payne's view, "the missing mobilization for fascism in most of the Balkans prior to 1939."[46] In other words, the key to the political success or failure of fascist movements in the Balkans was their ability to enlist mass support and sustain mobilization in rural areas. Payne argues that the exceptional growth of the Legion in Romania was due to the country's non-egalitarian social system, characterized by huge economic discrepancies in the countryside that generated great potential for political mobilization. By comparison, fascist movements obtained less success in egalitarian peasant economies, such as Bulgaria, Croatia, and Greece.

TABLE 5.1 Distribution of the ownership of agrarian land in Romania, 1905

Categories	*Extent Hectares*	*Percentage of Total*	*Class of Property*
up to 10 ha	3,153,645	40.29%	Small: 40.29%
10–50 ha	695,953	8.89%	Medium:
50–100 ha	166,847	2.13%	11.02%
100–500 ha	816,355	10.43%	Large: 10.43%
500–1,000 ha	803,084	10.26%	Latifundiary:
1,000–3,000 ha	1,236,420	15.80%	38.26%
3,000–5,000 ha	434,367	5.55%	
5,000 ha	520,095	6.65%	
Total	**7,826,766**	**100%**	**100%**

Data source: David Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania: The War and Agrarian Reform, 1917–1921* (New York, 1968): 186.

Payne's judgments on Romania's social system would actually better fit pre-war realities, characterized by an endemic lack of agrarian land for impoverished peasants, as shown in Table 5.1.

These social discrepancies in the countryside and the onerous labor conditions for the dependent peasantry generated the massive 1907 peasant uprising. Yet, in 1921, following its successful participation in World War I, Romania enacted the most radical land reform in post-1918 Europe, transferring 2,776,401 ha from large estates to small peasant properties.

This massive post-war expropriation, as shown in Table 5.2, radically altered the structure of property ownership. Unlike in the Old Kingdom, the system of land ownership in post-war Romania was dominated by smallholders, who possessed 81.43 per cent of the total land. At the same time, large estates (above 100 ha) made up only 7.77 percent of the total arable land of the country. Romania thus became a country of small landowners: although most family lots were very small (up to ten hectares), the peasantry was, by and large, economically self-sufficient, their dependence on large landlords being replaced by a system of precarious yet relatively stable economic subsistence. As a result, large landlords played a lesser economic role in the countryside. Instead, the self-sustainable but largely amorphous peasantry depended on intermediary powerbrokers such as state administrators, elected officials, and local bureaucrats who were tightly controlled by the center, supplemented by the "controlling" actions of the established churches, the school, and the army.

TABLE 5.2 Distribution of the ownership of agrarian land in Romania, 1927

Category	*Changes (ha)*	*Total Surface (ha)*	*Share of Total*
Up to 10 ha	+2,776,401	6,508,195	81.43%
10–100 ha	—	860,953	10.80%
Above 100 ha	−2,776,401	621,450	7.77%

Data source: Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant*, 189.

What was the mobilization potential among the poor yet economically self-sufficient peasantry? Eric R. Wolf's comparative analysis of peasant revolts in the twentieth century provides useful insights into this issue. Wolf pointed out that industrialization and the commercialization of agriculture disrupted not only traditional peasant communities but also "the middle-level ties between center and hinterland, between the urban and the rural sectors." [47] The result was a widening gap between rulers and the ruled in the countryside. Due to the weakening of traditional elites, this vacuum can generally be filled by provincial counter-elites and by intellectuals who know how to access collective symbols that can mobilize and guide the rural population.[48] This seemed to be the case in interwar Romania, too. Despite the glorification of the peasantry as repository of national values, and the rise of the Peasant Party, animated by the doctrine of peasantism, peasant interests remained marginally represented in politics. The gap between universal male franchise and the lack of genuine political participation of the peasantry was filled by alternative counter-elites using a mixture of traditional and modern propaganda tools. Radical messages were especially appealing in the countryside after the 1929–1933 economic crisis—which lead to a dramatic debt crisis among the peasantry and the ruin of subsistence agriculture—and the failure of the National Peasant Party (NPP) to provide a viable alternative for the rural economy. The Legion was arguably the most successful in enrolling and mobilizing the peasantry among the newly emerging parties. The Legionaries employed several effective tactics of mobilization in rural areas: (1) the tradition of social banditry, which was widespread in the countryside since the beginning of the nineteenth century, as a mechanism of correcting social injustice without changing the existing social structure; (2) the exploitation of millenarian expectations about the second coming of the Messiah, a message which had a more explosive, revolutionary character; (3) charitable work for the needy; and (4) recruitment of influential local elites as mediators between the Legion and rural communities. Politician Constantin Argetoianu succinctly described the missionary-like strategies the Legion employed to propagate its salvific faith to the masses:

> All kinds of things were being said about the Guardists' goals, actions and propaganda. They were well received by some, with skepticism by others, or simply ignored by most people. It was thus said that groups of students spread into villages, silently helped peasants in their work, repaired roads and bridges, spaded channels for still waters and sprang wells in dry areas, then left announcing that in the following days "the One who had to come would come to the village." Indeed, "the Captain" came: riding a white horse, accompanied by several lads, he used to stop in the center of the village, get off the horse, kiss the earth, and then go away without a word. People watched with their eyes wide-open, shook their heads and whispered: "Was this the Saint?" Some Legionary agents then spread into the "visited" villages and, hiding their real identity under all kinds of pretexts, completed the action of conquering the souls.[49]

During their electoral tournaments in rural areas, the Legionaries exploited millenarian messages and imagery, usually appearing to peasants on a white horse while wearing a white shirt with a black sign of the cross. Codreanu's short speeches announced a new era for the righteous believers:

> Let us unite, men and women, to fashion for ourselves and our people a different fate. The hour of resurrection and of the Romanian's salvation is at hand. He who has faith, who struggles and suffers, will be recompensed and blessed by this people. New times are knocking at our doors! A world with a dry and sterile soul is dying, another is being born, one that belongs to those whose soul is full of faith. In this new world everyone will have a place, not according to schooling, intelligence, or knowledge, but according, in the first place, to faith and character.[50]

This message appealed to the peasantry, especially in provinces with a tradition of millenarian uprisings. Another strategy of capturing souls in the countryside, closely related to millenarian messages, was that of "apostolic work." "We, the Legionnaires, planed this [type of activity] for a long time, as this was Corneliu Codreanu's idea," confessed the Legionary Nicolae Petrașcu. "In 1935–1936, those Legionaries who went to villages to undertake various jobs as priests, agronomic engineers, human or veterinary doctors, teachers and others, were very highly regarded. Yet these were not expected to conduct politics, but true missionary deeds, so that the village got to love them as their benefactors."[51] Another important strategy employed by the Legion was to attract the rural intelligentsia, represented mostly by priests and teachers, as well as war veterans and retired soldiers. These locally respected social categories assured a successful entry of the Legionaries in local communities, attracting a flow of recruits.

The peasantry was a steady supplier of cadres for the Legion; since Romania was predominantly rural, so was the Legion; its members were either living in rural areas or were newly urbanized descendants of peasants. Proportionally, their representation diminished to a certain extent in the 1930s, as new urban socioprofessional categories enrolled in the organization. The recruits of rural extractions continued, nevertheless, to dominate the Legion numerically. Moreover, at a symbolic level, despite the organization's ideological maturation, the main elements of peasant popular culture, religiosity and morality, remained deeply embedded in the Legionary style of politics, from the peasant national costumes worn at Legionary public events, to language, mores, view of gender relations, rituals in rites of passages (baptisms, weddings, burials), and cuisine in the Legionary restaurants. Acknowledging the peasant origin of the majority of rank-and-file Legionaries, leading ideologues, such as Traian Herseni, devoted special attention to the role of the peasantry into the movement, and harbored plans for the nationalist education of peasants in rural workshops and popular universities.[52]

The Legion and the Working Class

After 1929, taking advantage of the social poverty caused by the Great Depression, the Legion enlarged its territorial basis and incorporated members originating from diverse segments of society. In addition to pupils, students, intellectuals, and peasants, it also recruited industrial workers and aristocrats, among others.[53] The Legion managed to attract these categories using innovative ways of political propaganda, among which their message of salvation through social emancipation figured predominantly.

The most important new social category that joined the Legion in significant numbers was the working class. The enrollment of workers was facilitated by several factors. First, although it openly rejected Marxism and fought against the Communist Party, the Legionary ideology had a strong pre-Marxist Christian-socialist component, transmitted through the tradition of messianic nationalism via Heliade and Bălcescu, among others. The utopian character of Christian-socialism and its fight for social justice through emancipation professed by the Legion appealed to workers. Second, Codreanu himself had experience in working class activism. As a youngster, he joined *Garda Conștiinței Naționale* (Guard of National Conscience), an organization with a pronounced national-socialist orientation led by the worker Constantin Pancu. This experience had a formative impact on the young Codreanu, delineating key traits of his future actions, such as nationalism and antisemitism. The Guard of National Conscience reacted strongly against the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia and its spread in Europe, in general, and in Romania, in particular (mostly via Bessarabia).[54] Pancu and Codreanu denounced Jews as the main carriers of communist ideology, thus endorsing the idea of "Judeo-Bolshevism." In addition, at a time of revolutionary-minded proletarian actions in post-war Romania, marked by recurrent strikes, the Guard targeted mainly workers: their main aim was to "liberate" the working class from Communist domination by mobilizing it to the national cause. To the internationalism of the communists, Pancu and Codreanu opposed nationalism as a mobilizing force. While borrowing from Marxism the idea of workers' social emancipation, the Guard skillfully channeled resentment against the Jews, by portraying capitalist exploitation as being the work of "foreign invaders." The national and the social questions were thus interlinked: solving the Jewish Question would bring Romanian workers their full-fledged emancipation. There was, however, a major difference between the orientation of the Guard and the future orientation of the Legion: as a counter-revolutionary force, the Guard defended the political status quo, asking workers to maintain law and order and cooperate with Romanian authorities against the Communist-led rebellion. The Legion was to acquire, on the contrary, an anti-establishment orientation, becoming a main factor of anarchy.

The chances of nationalist mobilization of the proletariat increased after the Romanian Communist Party was outlawed in 1924, as the ban on the Communist Party created a political vacuum that could be exploited by new grass roots movements, such as the Legion.[55]. The potential for workers' mobilization

became clearer to Codreanu during the Great Depression that affected severely the Romanian economy, triggering workers' violent protest. The strikes that took place in August 1929 at the Lupeni coal mines, and in February 1933 at the Griviţa railway ateliers, in Bucharest, left a strong impression upon the Captain. Political developments in Europe in the early 1930s further strengthened his understanding of the political importance of the workers, as evidenced by his diary comments on the social-democratic actions in Austria and the conservative backlash against them.[56]

Romania's recovery from the economic crisis and its high pace of industrialization after 1934 further increased the numerical and thus also the political importance of the working class. Aware of the revolutionary potential of the working class, as early as 1933, the Legion made special efforts to enroll industrial workers. In two articles published in *AXA* soon after the Griviţa strikes, Mihai Stelescu portrayed the Legion as "the real defender" of workers, criticizing the communists as demagogical and detrimental to workers' interests.[57] The Romanian worker, argued Stelescu, could only reject the atheism and internationalism of the Bolsheviks. Moreover, "the worker is not hostile to a right-wing action," claimed Stelescu, "as long as it is revolutionary, anti-bourgeois, and tends to demolish the current ruling system and to replace it with a dictatorial system in order to destroy the existing ruling capitalist minority."[58] In a second article, Stelescu provided a predictable answer to the question "Who defends the workers?": "We, the ones on the right, we, the ones from the [ranks of the] Iron Guard."[59] From that time on, the "Workers' Problem" or "Question" became a propaganda priority for the Legion, extensively treated in the Legionary press. *AXA* ideologues argued that Romanian workers—a force which organized in 1918 no fewer than 150 trade unions, with 85,000 members—had been let down by their own political representatives, and found themselves isolated and disoriented. The only solution to this crisis of representation, argued R. Pavel in *AXA*, was enrollment in the Legionary movement, to become "the fieriest fighters of the Iron Guard trade unions."[60] Fearing the political radicalization of the workers, the authorities tried to prevent their inflow into the Legion, often by using administrative means. *AXA* reacted promptly against an alleged systematic campaign for 'the persecution of nationalist workers' by the authorities or the employers, as they claimed was the case at the Goldenberg factories in Brăila.[61]

In the mid-1930s, *Însemnări sociologice* further contributed to the theorization of the "workers' question" in Romania. In a leading article, Traian Brăileanu reiterated the thesis according to which the Workers' Question was inherently linked to the Jewish Question.[62] Citing *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* as evidence of the existence of a Jewish plot of world domination, Brăileanu argued that the workers' problem could be solved only through "the elimination of the Jews from the leadership of the workers."[63] The task of the new nationalism was thus not only to spread antisemitism but to also fight for "the destruction of Marxism, of the proletarian creed" and "the conversion of the workers to the true faith (*credinţa adevărată*) encapsulated by the nationalist doctrine!"[64]

Boosted by AXA and *Însemnări sociologice*, the Legion intensified its propaganda among workers. Codreanu defined workers' recruitment as a priority, together with the establishment of Legionary commerce.[65] The growth of workers' membership led to the organization of a distinct Legionary Workers' Corps (*Corpul Muncitoresc Legionar*) in 1936, placed by Codreanu under the leadership of the civil engineer Gheorghe Clime, who had distinguished himself in the organization of the Legion in Bessarabia and Bukovina.[66] During the campaign for the 1937 elections, the Legion targeted workers by means of innovative propaganda: Codreanu instructed the Legionaries to place huge visual placards near industrial units, representing a worker with a hammer in his hand and a cross on his chest, and displaying quotations from Codreanu's writings.[67]

The main propaganda theme in the recruitment of workers was nationalism and not an upfront critique of capitalism. However, the Legionaries were very skillful in denouncing harsh capitalist exploitation as non-national, equating it with the Jewish, or more generally, with the foreign, "invasion" of Romania. In doing so, they portrayed the process of national emancipation as intimately interlocked with that of social emancipation: the cleansing of the national body was thus able concomitantly to solve national as well as social problems. This discourse, and the massive enrollment of workers within the Legion, imprinted on Romanian fascism a strong proletarian component, similar to that of the *Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei* (NSDAP, aka the Nazi Party) in Germany and the Arrow Cross in Hungary.[68]

The Legion's Electorate

In addition to membership in the Legion, the electoral support gathered by the political parties representing the Legion in national elections is also indicative of its social support (see Table 5.3). The Legion participated in four national parliamentary elections, in 1927, 1931, 1932, and 1937. In the following, I approach the Legion's electoral results in a diachronic as well as a synchronic perspective, by comparing its highest electoral results of 1937 against earlier results, but also against those of other political parties of the time. Since the electoral beginnings of the Legion were very modest, a full diachronic comparison among these electoral results would be highly uneven, in view of the great gap between electoral scores: from 0.39 percent in 1927 to 15.56 percent in 1937. Moreover, due to the fact that the Legion was banned just ahead of the 1933 national elections and never participated in local elections, no data is available on the gradual evolution of its electoral support between 1932 and 1937. Since the official electoral statistics do not provide a breakdown of the electorate on age or social categories, the analysis will focus on the regional distribution of votes and its potential correlation with other factors such as ethnicity, religion, or degrees of industrialization. The regional framework of analysis is particularly instructive, in view of the fact that, as a recently unified country, interwar Romania did not yet dispose of well-integrated national parties and a culturally homogenized national electorate but was still shaped by regional political traditions.

TABLE 5.3 Electoral results of the Legion, 1927–1937 (percentages)

County	*1927*	*1931*	*1932*	*1937*	*County*	*1927*	*1931*	*1932*	*1937*
Alba	0.73			21.21	Mehedinţi				9.76
Arad	3.77		3.36	32.73	Mureş		2.33		12.62
Argeş			0.45	12.95	Muscel			1.74	9.47
Bacău				8.57	Năsăud				20.03
Baia			1.31	10.68	Neamţ		4.23	15.39	35.79
Bălţi			4.49	3.50	Odorhei				5.05
Bihor		1.10		14.61	Olt				13.51
Botoşani	5.26		5.82	3.69	Orhei				4.77
Brăila			1.70	25.60	Prahova			0.56	23.22
Braşov				16.91	Putna			9.26	26.75
Buzău				13.30	Râmnicu Sărat			5.81	27.11
Cahul		24.03	18.32	12.00	Roman			1.32	2.63
Caliacra				9.86	Romanaţi				11.66
Câmpulung		19.13	12.04	32.85	Rădăuţi			3.99	32.40
Cernăuţi	1.37			18.81	Sălaj				11.02
Caraş			2.34	20.47	Satu-Mare		1.60		8.85
Cetatea Albă				2.46	Severin				21.68
Ciuc				2.57	Sibiu			5.64	16.93
Cluj		1.26		10.17	Someş				13.87
Constanţa				15.03	Soroca			3.80	8.42
Covurlui		10.61	19.55	35.93	Storojineţ			1.35	14.08
Dâmboviţa				12.14	Suceava	11.81		19.99	23.55
Dolj			1.82	23.46	Târnava Mare		1.11		10.25
Dorohoi			4.95	6.70	Târnava Mică				11.91
Durostor				8.80	Timiş-tor.				19.00
Făgăraş		1.33	2.72	20.78	Tecuci		4.58	9.77	27.96
Fălciu			4.01	3.14	Teleorman				16.72
Gorj			1.24	19.86	Tighina		2.96	12.00	6.07
Hotin				3.99	Trei Scaune				2.20
Hunedoara		2.08	3.50	25.13	Tulcea				21.05
Ialomiţa				19.92	Turda		8.21	13.20	25.27
Iaşi			2.58	4.50	Tutova	0.75	2.97	13.80	12.88
Ilfov			0.78	3.71	Vaslui	1.34		2.96	2.05
Ismail		14.66	8.67	4.65	Vâlcea				11.35
Lăpuşna				3.51	Vlaşca				19.55
Maramureş		4.28	0.77	17.56	Bucureşti				22.44
					Romania	0.39	1.05	2.37	15.58

Source: For 1927, 1931, 1932: Ivan, Marcel. *Evoluţia partidelor noastre politice în cifre şi grafice, 1919–1932*. Sibiu: Krafft & Drotleff, 1933, Table V. For 1937: *Monitorul Oficial* 1 (December 30, 1937): 301.

In a decade of political activity, the Legion was able greatly to enhance its geographical presence: it harvested votes in 7 counties in 1927, 17 in 1931, 36 in 1932, and in all 71 counties in 1937. The original nucleus of the movement originated in Northern Moldova, an area relegated to a peripheral status following the 1859 union between Moldova and Wallachia and steady economic impoverishment allegedly

due to the "Jewish invasion." Significantly, in his early manifestos, Codreanu appealed to the Moldovans as "the poorest and most oppressed of all Romanians," urging them to unite "wherever they live in the Romanian lands."[69] Not surprisingly, in 1927, the bulk of the votes for the Legion were gained in three counties in Moldova (especially Botoşani, in Northern Moldova, with 5.26 percent,), and in two counties in the neighboring province of Bukovina (with a record share of 11.81 percent in Suceava). Outside these areas, the Legion captured votes only in the remote Transylvanian counties of Alba and mostly Arad (3.77 percent). Gradually, the Legion penetrated other historic regions as well. In 1931, the Legion further consolidated its presence in Moldova (especially, this time, in Central and Southern Moldova) and Bukovina, and managed to make strong inroads in Southern Bessarabia (with 24.03 percent of the total votes in Cahul, and 14.66 percent in Ismail) and Transylvania. In the latter region, the Legion gained votes in no fewer than nine counties, even if electoral results were low, with the notable exception of Turda (8.21 percent). One year later, in 1932, the Legion more than doubled its regional presence, making significant inroads in Wallachia as well, an ethnically homogeneous area where votes for the Legion were totally missing in the previous elections. While the share of votes in various counties continued to fluctuate from one election to another, one can detect the emergence of certain electoral strongholds of the Legion in Bukovina, Southern Moldova, and Central Transylvania.

In 1937, "All for the Country" managed to secure votes in *all* 72 counties of Romania, as well as in the capital city, Bucharest.[70] This complete national coverage was a remarkable performance for a new party, created in 1934 and which did not dispose of significant material resources. The performance is even more remarkable if compared to the inferior results of other nationalist parties with superior materials means, such as the National Christian Party.

The Legion's electoral scores in 1937 did not display steady growth in all regions, but were marked by both gains and setbacks. In eight counties electoral support fell under the 1932 level (Botoşani, Tutova, Vaslui, and Fălciu in Moldova, and Bălţi, Cahul, Ismail, and Tighina in Bessarabia); at the same time, support grew substantially in over 35 counties. Surely, these fluctuations are due to a great number of factors, such as the performance of Legionary representatives at the local level, the strong competition from other parties, the hostile attitude of the authorities, who worked hard to prevent the regional consolidations of Legionaries, and the discontinuities in the Legion's political action, forced as it was to always compete under different names.

Table 5.4 shows the electoral results of "All for the Country" in all historical regions of Romania. A first conclusion that can be derived is that the Legion overcame its initial regional concentration on Bukovina, Northern Moldova, and Southern Bessarabia, and managed to penetrate all regions. Second, and equally significant, "All for the Country" obtained significant electoral results in *all but one* of Romania's historical provinces. If we except Bessarabia, where the party received only 5 percent of the total electorate (thus, less than one-third of its national average), the difference between the lowest and the highest regional

TABLE 5.4 Votes for the Legion in 1937 out of the total number of voters by historical region

Region	*"All for the Country"*		*National Christian Party*		*Electoral participation per region*	
	% of votes out of the votes cast per region	*No. votes*	*% of total votes*	*No. votes*	*No. of votes cast*	*% of cast votes out of the total electorate*
Bukovina	22.8	38 562	9.3	15 757	169 136	70.5
Crişana-Maramureş	20.5	50 393	4.3	10 657	246 246	63.9
The Banat	20.0	41 538	5.5	11 370	207 532	75.0
Muntenia	18.0	121 205	6.3	44 760	674 360	70.4
Oltenia	16.1	70 028	7.0	20 676	296 459	79.9
Transylvania	14.8	84 345	3.8	21 411	568 975	61.6
Dobrudja	14.1	17 270	5.5	6 781	122 741	64.5
Moldova	14.0	58 467	17.1	71 559	418 609	70.5
Bessarabia	5.0	18 541	21.3	78 196	367 727	51.6
Romania	15.58	478 368	9.15	281 167	3 071 695	66.1

Source: Calculated from C. Enescu, "Semnificaţia alegerilor din decemvrie 1937," 512–26.

score was a share of 8.8 percent of the regional vote. "All for the Country" scored its highest results in the newly annexed provinces of Bukovina, the Banat, and Crişana-Maramureş, all situated along the border and inhabited by a multi-ethnic population. Mid-range results were scored in the Wallachian provinces of Muntenia and Oltenia, mostly due, as I will show below, to high scores in industrial regions. Finally, remarkably similar and close to average results were obtained in Transylvania, Moldova, and Dobrudja.

Third, in terms of sheer numbers, most voters of the Legion were located in Muntenia, followed by Transylvania, Oltenia, Moldova, Crişana-Maramureş, the Banat, Bessarabia, and Dobrudja (see Graph 5.1). This hierarchy is, by and large, in line with the respective size of these provinces' population (again, with the exception of Bessarabia, which was under-represented, and of Bukovina, which was proportionally over-represented). This territorial distribution of votes confirms, once again, that the Legion was no longer a regional phenomenon, its supporters being distributed in all historical provinces of Romania.

Fourth, considering the previous regional strongholds of the Legion, it is important to stress that there were significant changes in its electoral landscape, its center moving from East to West, with a strong concentration on a border belt stretching from the Banat, Crisana-Maramureş, and Bukovina. To be sure, the Legion remained particularly strong in Bukovina, "All for the Country" becoming the strongest political party in Rădăuţi county and scoring well above its national average in Câmpulung, Suceava, and Cernăuţi, with only Storojineţ slightly below the national average. At the same time, the Legion lost considerable ground in Moldova, where there were only two "green counties" out of 12,



GRAPH 5.1 Share of votes by historical region, out of the total number of votes gained by the Legion, 1937

Neamț and Covurlui (with percentages of over 35 percent of the electorate in both counties). Strong results were also obtained in Putna and Tecuci. Two other counties, Baia and Tutova, were close to the national average, while six counties in Moldova were well below the party's national average, including the Legion's original cradle, the Iași county.

Despite its early inroads into Bessarabia, the Legion scored poorly in that province. The reasons for this result could be the strong grasp of the state administration over the electoral process in rural areas, in general (the "government's dowry"), which explains, to a certain extent, the victory of the ruling NLP in the province. Another stumbling block was also the high results of the National Christian Party in Bessarabia, a direct competitor of "All for the Country," which capitalized on LANC's traditional electorate. The Legionaries were well aware that their organization in Bessarabia was "very weak,"[71] a situation which they attributed to the rival actions of the LANC rather than to poor Legionary activity on the ground. Prior to elections, Codreanu pledged to send in Bessarabia "the most accomplished Legionary propagandists and orators," to help remedy the situation, but these actions met limited success.[72]

Surprisingly, "All for the Country" showed itself strong in Wallachia, a province which was first penetrated in the 1931 elections. Moreover, the votes gained in this province exhibited fewer local discrepancies than in Moldova. Out of 17 Wallachian counties, "All for the Country" scored a share of approximately 20 percent of the votes in seven counties, while in nine counties its results were close to the national average. Only one county, Ilfov, scored below the national average 3.71 percent, but this low percentage was in a way compensated by the high rate obtained in the national capital, Bucharest (22 percent), which was

within the borders of Ilfov. In addition to the capital, "All for the Country" was particularly strong in Râmnicu Sărat and the province of Southern Oltenia.

Moving westwards, the electoral results of the "All for the Country" show a strong concentration in Transylvania and Crișana, in counties such as Hunedoara, Arad, Turda, Alba, and Făgăraș in Central Transylvania. In this province there were five counties with results over 20 percent, ten counties with results around the national average, and only four counties with results well under the national average, mostly in regions predominantly inhabited by Hungarians. Another major electoral stronghold of "All for the Country" was the Banat, in all its three counties the party scoring around 20 percent of the total number of votes cast, well above its national average. A similar yet less impressive outcome was registered in Dobrudja. The Legion made good progress in Northern Dobrudja, in the counties of Tulcea and Constanța, but was considerably weaker in the newly annexed provinces of Durostor and Caliacra, inhabited by a multi-ethnic population (mostly Bulgarian and Turkish) and with only a relative Romanian majority.

Although voting patterns in historical regions are helpful to understand general tendencies, this large unit of analysis might also obscure local patterns. Map 5.1 shows that votes for "All for the Country" were rather unevenly distributed at local level, with great discrepancies between neighboring counties. The key to understand this distribution of votes is to concentrate on certain regional clusters, which transcend the borders of rigidly defined historical regions. On this basis, one can identify several "tiers" or "belts" that delineate strongholds, countries of stable support, and countries with weak support.



MAP 5.1 Electoral results of "All for the Country," by counties, 1937

Source: Copyright Constantin Iordachi.

Map 5.1 shows that the Legion gained its highest electoral scores in three main regional clusters: (1) Bukovina and Central Moldova; (2) the Banat, Crișana, and the western part of Transylvania; and (3) the area made up of Southern Moldova, Northwestern Wallachia, and Northern Dobrudja. Each cluster had an electoral "locomotive," where "All for the Country" managed to win the largest number of votes: Arad in Crișana-Maramureș, Rădăuți in Bukovina, Neamț in Central Moldova, and Covorului in Southern Moldova.

It should be noted that these clusters were very different from each other: the first two were multi-ethnic, while the third one was ethnically homogenous; some had a large Jewish population, while others had no Jewish population at all (Southern Oltenia). As Mann pointed out, the Legion seemed to be stronger in multi-ethnic regions that had, nevertheless an absolute Romanian ethnic majority, such as Bukovina, the Banat, and Central Transylvania. These provinces were generally characterized by traditions of inter-ethnic coexistence but experienced acute ethnoreligious confrontations in the post-war period. Most importantly, in addition to a large Romanian majority, these provinces were also inhabited by Jews and Hungarians, two minority groups regarded by Romaian nationalists as being of "high status." These conditions existed neither in Bessarabia, where only the Jews were a numerically significant minority, nor in Southern Dobrudja, where the Romanian majority was relative rather than absolute. Yet the electoral success of the Legion was not exclusively dependent on inter-ethnic tensions, since "All for the Country" managed to penetrate ethnoreligiously homogeneous regions as well, such as Southern Oltenia. Other electoral strongholds of the party were to be found in the country's most important industrial centers, where "All for the Country" attracted workers' votes: Hunedoara (25.13 percent as compared to 3.5 percent in 1932), Ploiești, in Prahova County (23.22 percent, as compared to only 0.56 percent in 1932), Bucharest (22.44 percent), and Brașov (16.91 percent).

The significant electoral results obtained by the Legion in Southern Oltenia (mostly Dolj), in an area that was ethnically homogeneous, had an overwhelmingly agrarian economy, and lacked a Jewish population, necessitates a detailed explanation. What types of peasants responded to the Legionary call? Weber pointed out that the Legion obtained its best electoral results in rural areas that were heavily forested. Building on this insight, Mann argued that the Legion tended to be successful in areas where peasants were free of state or large landlord interference, but were specializing in complementary activities to agriculture which were exposed to capitalist exploitation and erosion (such as fishing in Tulcea, or wood-cutting in Maramureș, etc.). One can better understand Mann's suggestion if we supplement it with Wolf's views on peasant stratification and political mobilization.[73] Wolf pointed out that, in general, rich peasants have no direct economic interest in acts of political rebellion, while poor peasants or landless laborers are unable to rebel on their own, since they lack the resources to do so, without the help of an external political force. Middle peasantry, however, has a greater potential for political action and even sustained rebellion, mostly in cases they dispose of not only economic autonomy but also some room of maneuver given 1) their lack of

dependency on the state or the landlord (the "free peasantry" in Mann's account); 2) the existence of self-administering communes; and/or 3) their location in peripheral areas, largely disconnected from the political centered. These structural conditions were present in Tulcea, Maramureș, and Southern Oltenia, and generated increased support for the radical, anti-establishment message of the Legion.

The last issue to take into account when judging the electoral results of "All for the Country" is the results of other parties (see Map 5.2). Since electoral factors are highly correlational, an analysis of the Legion's electoral score in isolation is likely to produce erroneous conclusions. The most important parties in this respect were the oppositional NPP and the National Christian Party (NCP).

First, there is an important correlation between the important electoral loses of the NPP and the gains of "All for the Country." Up to 1932, as long as the NPP channeled the oppositional votes against the NLP, the Legion had a narrow space for growth. After its largely unsuccessful rule and the defection of the factions led by Alexandru Vaida-Voevod and G. G. Mironescu, the NPP had difficulties in re-emerging as an uncontested alternative to power. In addition, Iuliu Maniu, the leader of the NPP, identified the authoritarian tendencies of Carol II and not Legionarism as the main danger to democracy in Romania. The electoral campaign of the NPP thus targeted the king rather than the ruling Liberals or the antisystemic Legion. The non-aggression electoral pact Maniu signed with "All for the Country" on an anti-Carlist platform confused the NPP electorate. It also granted the Legion



MAP 5.2 Results of general parliamentary elections in Romania, 1937

Source: Andrein, March 2010, https://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alegeri_generale_%C3%AEn_Rom%C3%A2nia,_1937#/media/File:Alegeri_parlamentare_1937.png (CC-BY-SA 3.0).

an aura of respectability, as a political partner of a major bourgeois-democratic party. Maniu's strategy backfired, the NPP scoring only 20 percent of the votes. Its losses correspond, by and large, with the gains made by "All for the Country."

Finally, as Enescu and Heinen have already noted, there is a direct negative correlation between the regional distribution of the votes for the National Christian Party and "All for the Country": as Table 5.4 and Maps 5.1 and 5.2 make evident, the territorial strongholds of the NCP in Northern Moldova and Bessarabia appear to be precisely the weakest electoral regions of "All for the Country." The reason for this negative correlation is the similar nationalist profiles of the two parties, who were competing for the same electorate. Yet, the NCP underscored antisemitism and thus scored higher in rural regions with a stronger Jewish presence, such as Bessarabia, while "All for the Country" underscored issues of social and national emancipation and thus scored higher in multi-ethnic or industrialized regions.

Judging by the Legion's social composition and electoral results, it became apparent that its radical ideology of national salvation, characterized by xenophobia, antisemitism, paramilitarism, and the drive to permanent mobilization triggered a noteworthy, momentous societal response. At the same time, the mass appeal of fascism had significant limitations, remaining confined to certain social and regional constituencies.

Notes

1 Cf. Georgi Dimitrov, "The Fascist Offensive," report presented at the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International, August 2, 1935, available online at: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/dimitrov/works/1935/08_02.htm.
2 For a synthetic work, see Rajani Palme Dutt, *Fascism and Social Revolution* (New York: International Press, 1934).
3 See mainly Timothy M. Mason, "Labour in the Third Reich, 1933–39," *Past and Present* 33 (April 1966), 112–41; idem., "National Socialism and the German Working Class, 1925–May 1933," *New German Critique* 11 (1977), 49–93; idem., *Social Policy in the Third Reich: The Working Class and the National Community* (Providence, RI: Berg, 1993); and Jane Caplan, ed. *Nazism, Fascism and the Working Class. Essays by Tim Mason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). On workers in Fascist Italy, see Tobias Abse, "Italian Workers and Italian Fascism," in *Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Comparisons and Contrasts*, ed. by Richard Bessel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 40–60.
4 For an early formulation of this thesis, see Joseph Barnes, "The Social Basis of Fascism," *Pacific Affairs* 9, no. 1 (March 1936), 24–32.
5 Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet, and Jan Petter Myklebust, eds., *Who Were the Fascists? Social Roots of European Fascists* (Bergen, Oslo and Tromso: Universitetsforlaget, 1980).
6 For notable exceptions on Nazi Germany, see Thomas Childers, "The Social Bases of the National Socialist Vote," in *International Fascism. New Thoughts and New Approaches*, ed. by George L. Mosse (London and Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979), 161–188; and Detlef Mühlberger, *The Social Bases of Nazism, 1919–1933* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). See also Geoff Eley, *Nazism as Fascism: Violence, Ideology, and the Ground of Consent in Germany 1930-1945* (Oxon: Routledge, 2013) on the way the Nazis created consensus and ruled society, and Götz Aly's work on the material incentives by which the Nazis secured the support of the ordinary Germans, especially his *Hitler's Beneficiaries: Plunder, Racial War, and the Nazi Welfare*

State (London: Verso, 2016). For a European-wide view, see Detlef Mühlberger, ed., *The Social Basis of European Fascist Movements* (London: Croom Helm, 1987).

7 Juan J. Linz, "Some Notes toward a Comparative Study of Fascism in Sociological Historical Perspective," in *Fascism: A Reader's Guide: Analyses, Interpretations, Bibliography*, ed. by Walter Laqueur (Berkeley–Los Angeles–London: University of California Press, 1976), 2–103; Juan J. Linz, "Political space and fascism as a late-comer" in *Who Were the Fascists?*, 153–189; and Mann, *Fascists*, esp. 27–28.

8 Pătrăşcanu, *Sub trei dictaturi*, 42, 44.

9 Pătrăşcanu's Marxist analysis served as a source of inspiration for other—more recent—works on fascism. Cf. Ioanid, *The Sword of the Archangel*.

10 Weber, "The Men of the Archangel," 110–113.

11 Ibid., 105.

12 Ibid., 107.

13 Ibid., 109.

14 Ibid., 118.

15 Ibid., 105.

16 Barbu, "Rumania," 163.

17 Ibid.

18 Heinen, *Legiunea "Arhanghelului Mihail*, 470.

19 Ibid.

20 See Sandu, *Un Fascisme Roumain*, 288-322; and Clark, "Mobilizing Support," in *Holy Legionary Youth*, 63–94.

21 Oliver Jens Schmitt: "Approaching the Social History of Romanian Fascism. The Legionaries of Vâlcea County in the Interwar Period," *Fascism. Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies* 3 (2014), 117–151; and "Wer waren die rumänischen Legionäre? Eine Fallstudie zu faschistischen Kadern im Umland von Bukarest 1927 bis 1941," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 64, no. 3 (2016), 419–448.

22 Mann, *Fascists*, 261–295.

23 Ibid., 274.

24 Ibid., 282–285.

25 Ibid., 287–288.

26 Ibid., 293.

27 Constantin Iordachi, "Reconceptualizing the Social: East Central Europe and the New Sociocultural History," *East Central Europe* 34/35, no. 1–2 (2008), 1–35.

28 For an example, see Georg G. Iggers, *The Social History of Politics: Critical Perspectives in West German Historical Writing since 1945* (Dover, N.H.: Berg, 1985). For new, innovative approaches to the Legion at the level of everyday life and activism, see Clark, *Holy Legionary Youth*, esp. 6–7.

29 On this point, see pioneering works on the relative deprivation theory, see Samuel Andrew Stouffer, *The American Soldier* (Princeton University Press, 1949); W. G. Runciman, *Relative deprivation and social justice* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966); and Robert King Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (New York: Free Press, 1968); and Denton E. Morrison, "Some Notes toward Theory on Relative Deprivation, Social Movements, and Social Change," *The American Behavioral Scientist* 14, no. 5 (1971), 675–690.

30 Marylee C. Taylor, "Fraternal Deprivation, Collective Threat, and Racial Resentment. Perspective on White Racism," in *Relative Deprivation: Specification, Development and Integration, edited by* Iain Walker and H. J. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 13–43.

31 See Bryan Turner, "Max Weber and the spirit of resentment: The Nietzsche legacy," *Journal of Classical Sociology* 11 (2011), 75–92. Exploring the legacy of Nietzsche's writings on Weber, Turner attempts to construct a Weberian sociology of resentment as a necessary addition to "the theory of social status competition in modern societies" (p. 76).

32 I first advanced this claim in Iordachi, *Charisma, Violence and Politics*. My definition adapts Otto Kirchheimer's concept of the *catch-all party*: I do not mean to imply that the Legion was a "tent party" which accommodated people of various ideological persuasions. On the contrary, I argue that the Legion was an ideologically cohesive

Weltanschauungs mass party that consciously attempted to channel the protest vote of wide and heterogeneous strata of society into a radical, anti-systemic direction. See Otto Kirchheimer, "The Catch-All Party," in *The West European Political Party System*, edited by Peter Mair (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 51–60. On the contemporary relevance of Kirchheimer's view on catch-all parties, see André Krouwel, "Otto Kirchheimer and the catch-all party," *West European Politics* 26, no. 2 (2003), 23–40; and Richard S Katz and William J Crotty, "Electoralist Catch-All Party," in *Handbook of Party Politics* (London: Sage, 2006), 256–58.

33 This feature is fully evidenced, early on, by the composition of the leadership forums of the Legion/the Iron Guard. On February 25, 1931, among the twelve members of the Legionary Senate, there were five great landowners, two priests, two professors, one merchant, one writer, and a war invalid. In terms of their regional distribution, most members were from Moldova (five from Focşani, one from Huşi, one from Iaşi, and one from Galaţi), two from Bucharest and only one from Bukovina (Cernăuţi) and Transylvania (Turda). The Supreme Council of the Legion was more heterogeneous in terms of age, residence and profession. Among its 27 members, there were ten students (among which four in theology), seven lawyers, three merchants, two priests, one professor, one engineer, one war invalid, one graduate of philological studies and one graduate of pharmacy. Concerning their residence, 12 originated from Moldova, eight from Transylvania, two from Bukovina, six from Wallachia (among which five from Bucharest), and one from Bessarabia (Chişinău). ANRM, Fond 680/1, file 3433, 610.
34 Heinen, *Legiunea "Arhanghelul Mihail,"* 357.
35 Eugen Cristescu, in Cristian Troncotă, *Eugen Cristescu. Asul Serviciilor Secrete Româneşti* (Bucureşti: Roza Vânturilor, 1994), 371.
36 Heinen, *Legiunea "Arhanghelul Mihail,"* 139.
37 Georgescu, *Pe drumul cu arhangheli*, 151.
38 Ion Fleşeriu, "Corneliu Georgescu. Note biografice," *Pe drumul cu arhangheli*, 33. Georgescu died in 1945 in political exile in Mittersill, Austria, most probably assassinated.
39 Usatiuc in ANIC, Fond Ministerul de Interne, Diverse, 8/1927, 41.
40 Ibid., 59.
41 See Bordeiu, *Mişcarea legionară în Dobrogea anilor 1940–1944 în documente*, 51.
42 Zelea-Codreanu, *For My Legionaries*, 10.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid., 107.
45 Eric R. Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969); Eric R. Wolf, "On Peasant Rebellions," in *Peasants and Peasant Societies*, edited by Teodor Shanin (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971), 264–65.
46 Payne, "The NDH State in Comparative Perspective," 414–415.
47 Wolf, "On Peasant Rebellions," 267–268.
48 Idem, 267–268.
49 Argetoianu, *Memorii*, vol. 9, part VIII (1930–1931), 428.
50 Zelea-Codreanu, *Pentru legionari*, 341–342.
51 ACNSAS, Fond Informativ, File Nicolae Petraşcu I 151086, vol. 1, 133–134.
52 Traian Herseni, *Mişcarea legionară şi ţărănimea* (Bucureşti: Bucovina, 1937).
53 For an ample, comprehensive treatment of aristocrats within the Legion, see Constantin Iordachi, "Aristocracy, Fascism and the Social Origins of Mass Politics in Inter-war Romania," in *Noble Fascists? European Aristocracies and the Radical Right, edited by* Karina Urbach (Oxford, 2007), 201–232.
54 See leading articles in the Guard's newspaper *Conştiinţa* (Conscience), such as: "Apel către meseriaşi, muncitori, soldaţi şi ţărani români," August 30, 1919; "Scopul Nostru," August 30, 1919; and "Socialismul national-creştin şi antisemitismul nostru," January 5, 1920. On Codreanu's views, see "Un cuvânt către muncitorii români care au trecut sub steagul cel roş al duşmanului," February 9, 1920, and "Tendinţa criminală a duşmanului de demobilizare a armatei," June 8, 1920, all reproduced in Scurtu, et. al., eds, *Totalitarismul de dreapta*, 186–200.

55 Cf. Weber, "The Men of the Archangel."
56 *Jurnalul Căpitanului din prigoana anilor 1933–1934*, P 011784, vol. 13, 117.
57 Mihai Stelescu, "Cine apără pe muncitori," *Axa* II, no. 8 (March 5, 1933), 1–2.
58 Ibid., 2.
59 Ibid., 1.
60 R. Pavel, "Spre o nouă orientare a muncitorimei," *Axa* II, no. 11 (April 30, 1933), 3.
61 "Muncitorești," *Axa* II, no. 5 (January 22, 1933), i.
62 Traian Brăileanu, "Problema muncitorească în lumina doctrinei naționaliste (Schițarea problemei)," *Însemnări sociologice* I, no. 3 (1935), 23–25.
63 Ibid., 25.
64 Ibid.
65 ACNSAS, Fond Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, vol. 8, 174.
66 Ibid., 181.
67 ACNSAS, Fond Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, vol. 9, 86.
68 On this point, see also Mann, *Fascists*, 15, 20, 26.
69 Codreanu, *Scrisori studențești din închisoare*, 7, 8.
70 The Legion's 1937 electoral support had been already treated by several pioneering studies. For a first, most perceptive analysis, see C. Enescu, "Semnificația alegerilor din decemvrie 1937 în evoluția politică a neamului românesc," *Însemnări sociologice* III, no. 11–12 (1937), 512–26. His pertinent conclusions were ignored by Eugen Weber in "The Men of the Archangel," but revisited with important results by Heinen in *Legiunea "Arhanghelul Mihail,"* 355–370; and Mann in *Fascists*, esp. 282–288.
71 ACNSAS, Fond Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, vol. 9, 81.
72 Ibid.
73 Wolf, "On Peasant Rebellions," 267–268.

References

ACNSAS. Fond "Arhiva Operativă," file Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, vols. 8, 9.

ACNSAS. Fond "Informativ," file Nicolae Petrașcu I 151086, vol. 1.

ACNSAS. *Jurnalul Căpitanului din prigoana anilor 1933–1934*, file Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, P 011784, vol. 13.

ANIC. Fond "Ministerul de Interne-Diverse," file 8/1927.

ANRM. Fond 680/1, file 3433.

Abse, Tobias. "Italian Workers and Italian Fascism." In *Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Comparisons and Contrasts*, edited by Richard Bessel. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, 40–60.

Aly, Götz *Hitler's Beneficiaries: Plunder, Racial War, and the Nazi Welfare State*. London: Verso, 2016.

Argetoianu, Constantin. *Memorii*. vol. 9, part VIII (1930–1931). Bucureşti: Machiavelli, 1996.

Barbu, Zeev. "Rumania." In *European Fascism*, edited by S. J. Woolf. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968, 146–166.

Barnes, Joseph "The Social Basis of Fascism," *Pacific Affairs* 9, no. 1 (1936): 24–32.

Bordeiu, Puiu D. *Mişcarea legionară în Dobrogea anilor 1940–1944 în documente*. Bucureşti: Editura Enciclopedică, 2014.

Brăileanu, Traian. "Problema muncitorească în lumina doctrinei naționaliste (Schițarea problemei)," *Însemnări sociologice* I, no. 3 (1935): 23–25.

Caplan, Jane, ed. *Nazism, Fascism and the Working Class. Essays by Tim Mason*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Childers, Thomas. "The Social Bases of the National Socialist Vote." In *International Fascism. New Thoughts and New Approaches*, edited by George L. Mosse. London and Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979, 161–188.

Clark, Roland, *Holy Legionary Youth: Fascist Activism in Interwar Romania*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015.

Dimitrov, Georgi. "The Fascist Offensive," report presented at the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International, August 2, 1935, available online at: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/dimitrov/works/1935/08_02.htm.

Dutt, Rajani Palme. *Fascism and Social Revolution*. New York: International Press, 1934.

Eley, Geoff. *Nazism as Fascism: Violence, Ideology, and the Ground of Consent in Germany 1930-1945*. Oxon: Routledge, 2013.

Enescu, C. "Semnificația alegerilor din decemvrie 1937 în evoluția politică a neamului românesc," *Însemnări sociologice* III, no. 11–12 (1937): 512–26.

Fleşeriu, Ion. "Corneliu Georgescu. Note biografice." In Corneliu Georgescu. *Pe drumul cu arhangheli. Însemnări din viața unui legionar*, vol. 1, 2nd ed. Bucureşti: Majadohonda, 1996, 33.

Georgescu, Corneliu. *Pe drumul cu arhangheli. Însemnări din viața unui legionar*, vol. 1, 2nd ed. Bucureşti: Majadohonda, 1996.

Heinen, Armin. *Legiunea "Arhanghelul Mihail." Mişcare socială şi organizație politică. O contribuție la problema fascismului internațional*. Bucureşti: Humanitas, 1998.

Herseni, Traian. *Mişcarea legionară şi țărănimea*. Bucureşti: Bucovina, 1937.

Iggers, *Georg G. The Social History of Politics: Critical Perspectives in West German Historical Writing since 1945*. Berg: Dover, N.H, 1985.

Ioanid, Radu. *The Sword of the Archangel: Fascist Ideology in Romania*. Boulder: East European Monographs, 1990.

Iordachi, Constantin. *Charisma, Politics and Violence: The Legion of the "Archangel Michael" in Interwar Romania*. Trondheim: PEECS, 2004.

Iordachi, Constantin. "Aristocracy, Fascism and the Social Origins of Mass Politics in Inter-war Romania," In *Noble Fascists? European Aristocracies and the Radical Right*, edited by Karina Urbach. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007, 201–32.

Iordachi, Constantin. "Reconceptualizing the Social: East Central Europe and the New Sociocultural History," *East Central Europe* 34/35, no. 1–2 (2008): 1–35.

Ivan, Marcel. *Evoluția partidelor noastre politice in cifre şi grafice, 1919-1932: studiu comparativ al rezultatelor oficiale ale alegerilor pentru Camera Deputaților din anii 1919-1932*. Sibiu: Krafft & Drotleff, 1933.

Katz, Richard S, and William J Crotty. "Electoralist Catch-All Party." In *Handbook of Party Politics*. London: Sage, 2006, 256–58.

Kirchheimer, Otto. "The Catch-All Party." In *The West European Political Party System*, edited by Peter Mair, 51–60. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.

Krouwel, André. "Otto Kirchheimer and the Catch-All Party," *West European Politics* 26, no. 2 (2003): 23–40.

Larsen, Stein Ugelvik, Bernt Hagtvet, and Jan Petter Myklebust, eds. *Who Were the Fascists? Social Roots of European Fascists*. Bergen: Oslo and Tromso: Universitetsforlaget, 1980.

Linz, Juan J. "Political Space and Fascism as a Late-comer" In *Who Were the Fascists? Social Roots of European Fascism*, edited by Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet, and Jan Petter Myklebust. Bergen–Oslo–Tromso: Universitetsforlaget, 1980, 153–189.

Linz, Juan J. "Some Notes Toward a Comparative Study of Fascism in Sociological Historical Perspective." In *Fascism: A Reader's Guide: Analyses, Interpretations, Bibliography*, edited by Walter Laqueur. Berkeley–Los Angeles–London: University of California Press, 1976, 2–103.

"Muncitorești," *Axa* II, no. 5 (January 22, 1933): 1.

Mann, Michael. *Fascists*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Mason, Timothy M. "Labour in the Third Reich, 1933–39," *Past and Present* 33 (April 1966): 112–41.

Mason, Timothy M. "National Socialism and the German Working Class, 1925–May 1933." *New German Critique* 11 (1977): 49–93.

Mason, Timothy M. *Social Policy in the Third Reich: The Working Class and the National Community*. Providence, RI: Berg, 1993.

Merton, Robert King. *Social Theory and Social Structure*. New York: Free Press, 1968.

Morrison, Denton E. "Some Notes toward Theory on Relative Deprivation, Social Movements, and Social Change," *The American Behavioral Scientist* 14, no. 5 (1971): 675–690.

Mühlberger, *Detlef. The Social Bases of Nazism, 1919–1933*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

Mühlberger, Detlef, ed. *The Social Basis of European Fascist Movements*. London: Croom Helm, 1987.

Pătrăşcanu, Lucreţiu. *Sub trei dictaturi*. Bucureşti: Forum, 1944.

Pavel, R. "Spre o nouă orientare a muncitorimei," *Axa* II, no. 11 (April 30, 1933): 3.

Payne, Stanley. "The NDH State in Comparative Perspective," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 7, no. 4 (2006): 409–15.

Runciman, W. G. *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966.

Sandu, Traian. *Un Fascisme Roumain: Histoire de la Garde De Fer*. Paris: Perrin, 2014.

Schmitt, Oliver Jens. "Approaching the Social History of Romanian Fascism. The Legionaries of Vâlcea County in the Interwar Period." *Fascism. Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies* 3 (2014): 117–151.

Schmitt, Oliver Jens. "Wer waren die rumänischen Legionäre? Eine Fallstudie zu faschistischen Kadern im Umland von Bukarest 1927 bis 1941," *Vierteljahrshefte Für Zeitgeschichte* 64, no. 3 (2016): 419–448.

Scurtu, Ion, et al., eds. *Totalitarismul de dreapta în Romania. Origini, manifestări, evoluţie 1919–1927*. Bucureşti: Institutul Naţional Pentru Studiul Totalitarianismului, 1996.

Stelescu, Mihai. "Cine apără pe muncitori." *Axa* II, no. 8 (March 5, 1933): 1–2.

Stouffer, Samuel Andrew. *The American Soldier*. Princeton University Press, 1949.

Taylor, Marylee C. "Fraternal Deprivation, Collective Threat, and Racial Resentment. Perspective on White Racism." In *Relative Deprivation: Specification, Development and Integration*, edited by Iain Walker, and H. J. Smith. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, 13–43.

Troncotă, Cristian. *Eugen Cristescu. Asul Serviciilor Secrete Româneşti*. Bucureşti: Roza Vânturilor, 1994.

Turner, Bryan. "Max Weber and the Spirit of Resentment: The Nietzsche Legacy." *Journal of Classical Sociology* 11 (2011): 75–92.

Weber, Eugen. "The Man of the Archangel," *Journal of Contemporary History* 1, no. 1 (1966): 101–126.

Wolf, Eric R. *Peasants and Peasant Societies*, edited by Teodor Shanin. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971.

Wolf, Eric R. *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century*. New York: Harper & Row, 1969.

Zelea-Codreanu, Corneliu. *Scrisori studenţeşti din închisoare. Văcăreşti, 9 octombrie 1923–30 martie 1924*. Iaşi: Biblioteca Generaţia Junǎ, 1925.

Zelea-Codreanu, Corneliu. *Pentru legionari*, vol. 1. Sibiu: "Totul pentru ţară," 1936. English ed.: *For My Legionaries (The Iron Guard)*. Reedy, West Virginia: Liberty Bell Publications, 1990.

Taylor & Francis
Taylor & Francis Group
http://taylorandfrancis.com

PART II

A Continuum of Dictatorships: Hybrid Totalitarian Experiments, 1937–1944

In December 1937, the national general elections in Romania produced an inconclusive result. For the first time during the interwar period, no political party managed to reach a vote share of 40 percent. Reaching this threshold would have allowed a party to benefit from an electoral bonus that would award the party with the majority of seats in Parliament according to the 1926 electoral law. Instead, the result confirmed two general trends already evident in the 1933 elections: the gradual erosion of popular support for the great bourgeois democratic parties—the National Liberal Party (NLP) and the National Peasant Party (NPP)—and the correlated rise of new nationalist parties in their wake, among which the most important were the fascist Legion "Archangel Michael" and the conservative-right National Christian Party (NCP). Party politics in Romania had been clearly re-cast as a confrontation between bourgeois-democratic and radical parties. Yet, the electoral balance still tipped overwhelmingly in favor of the former. The NLP obtained 35.92 percent of the vote in 1937; the NPP, 20.40 percent. At the same time, the radical nationalist pole had a particularly strong showing—with a record 15.58 percent of the votes for the "All for the Country" Party and 9.15 percent for the NCP—which allowed them to go on the offensive.[1]

The power balance between the two political poles was reversed by Carol II: eager to undermine the parliamentary regime, in December 1937 the king took advantage of the NLP's failure to produce an absolute majority and brought to power the minor National Christian Party as a prelude to his own personal regime. In retrospect, the 1937 elections marked a major turning point in Romania's history, the first in a series of departures from the pluralistic, multiparty parliamentary political regime established after World War I. Over the next six years, Romania experienced a succession of hybrid dictatorial regimes: the royal dictatorship (February 10, 1938–September 6, 1940); the National

DOI: 10.4324/9780429428043-8

Legionary State (September 6, 1940–January 21, 1941); and the military dictatorship of General (later Marshal) Ion Antonescu (September 6, 1940–August 23, 1944), which was subsequently followed by, after a short interregnum in the post-war period, the Communist takeover on March 6, 1945. The 1937 election would be Romania's last free election until 1990, a period of more than 50 years.

Against this background, Part II explores this series of cumulative departures from democracy in Romania (1937–1944), leading to multiple totalitarian experiments. While the history of these totalitarian regimes has been routinely studied in isolation from each other, I approach this period of upheaval as a continuum, being mostly interested in the political legacy of these experiments and the way they built on each other as part of a wider transnational process of political radicalization. To identify the complex patterns of continuity and rupture between these regimes—each of which belonged to the larger "family of authoritarians"—I employ a dual comparative perspective: diachronic, underscoring processes of political transition from one regime to another; and synchronic, to account for the wider transnational influences and transfers between these political experiments in Romania and similar regimes in contemporary Europe. My aim is not to arrive at a static typological classification of the successive political regimes established in Romania, made up of royal, fascist, and conservative-military dictatorships, but to understand the complex interaction between social-political actors, the interplay between local and foreign political models, and the hybridization of ideological options, political styles, and institutional forms. I do not see the Legion's rule as simply marking the transition between the royal dictatorship and the Antonescu regime. Instead of disregarding it as a puppet government, or exclusively highlighting the internal and external constraints upon the Legion's rule, I argue that the National Legionary State provides a pivotal experiment of fascist totalitarianism in action. To substantiate this point, Part II explores the Legion's performance in power and evaluates its successes and failures in building a totalitarian state.

Note

1 For the 1937 election results, see *Monitorul Oficial* 1, no. 301 (Dec. 30, 1937), 9717.

6

CAROL II'S DICTATORSHIP

From Antifascism to Fascistization (1938–1940)

The Legion's 1937 electoral success marked, paradoxically, the beginning of its decline, as King Carol II perceived the political accession of this radical organization as an imminent threat to his rule. The failure of Carol II's repeated attempts to control the Legion—by channeling it into a patron-client relationship—led to an open and violent confrontation between the two sides. Encouraged by the political crisis caused by the 1937 election results, Carol II decided to block the Legion's bid to power by pursuing his own, long-harbored plans to institute a regime of personal authority, the royal dictatorship (*dictatura regală*).

Royal dictatorships were common in the Balkans during the interwar years (e.g., Alexander I in Yugoslavia, 1929–1931, and Boris III in Bulgaria, 1938–1943). Their establishment was usually an ad hoc response by the monarchy and loyal factions of traditional elites to structural political crises. The main declared aim of royal dictatorships was to restore political stability by curtailing pluralism and antagonistic party politics, and by blocking the radical right's access to power. To gain political legitimacy and effectively neutralize fascism, in addition to activating traditional elements of royal authority, these regimes also employed fascist trappings, such as the cult of the leader, the indoctrination of the youth and its enrollment into a single mass organization, an emphasis on the propaganda themes of salvation and redemption of the nation, etc. Such trappings were also intended to make these regimes appear modern and dynamic, in tune with the new style of mass politics emerging in interwar Europe.

In the same vein, Romania's King Carol II presented his dictatorships as a temporary suspension of political pluralism meant to restore stability. Yet, although initially Carol II conceived of his authoritarian rule as a barrier to the Legion's bid for power and did not hesitate to crush it by lawless means, his regime borrowed numerous techniques of mass mobilization from the Legion and from other contemporary fascist movements and regimes, such as the cult of

DOI: 10.4324/9780429428043-9

the predestined, charismatic leader, the single party, corporatism, and the socialization of the youth in new national institutions. In addition. toward the end of the regime, the king endorsed the doctrine of integral nationalism and even antisemitism, which eventually led to a peculiar para-fascist regime as a hybrid combination between fascism and the conservative right. As a result, Carol II's personal regime thus transited from a soft dictatorship with limited political pluralism to an increasingly repressive authoritarian regime with pronounced fascist trappings.

The establishment and consolidation of Carol II's personal regime took place in several stages, each constituting a major political departure from the multiparty democratic political regime. First, to bring about the collapse of the parliamentary system, on December 28, 1937, Carol II brought the National Christian Party (NCP) led by A. C. Cuza and Octavian Goga to power despite only having won less than ten percent of the votes. Formed in 1935, the NCP represented the interests of a narrow radical right section of the regional elites in Moldova and Transylvania. Their program focused obsessively on the Jewish Question as a way of solving Romania's pressing social problems, while in foreign policy they called for close political cooperation with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. To control Octavian Goga's new government, Carol appointed his close collaborator Armand Călinescu as Minister of the Interior, and Ion Antonescu as Minister of Defense (the careers of these two politicians will be explored in more detail below). Unsurprisingly, the NCP was unable to stabilize the tense political situation. Instead, it introduced a decree meant to revoke the state citizenship of Romanian Jews. With the help of their paramilitary *lăncieri* and police, the NCP also engaged in a political vendetta against its enemies, leading to violent confrontations with the Legionaries. While the country plunged into political and economic chaos and lost credit in foreign policy, the ruling party was busy preparing new general elections to win a parliamentary majority.

The uncertain outcome of the upcoming elections worried Carol II, however, as he feared that the nationalist right led by the Legion would be able to claim a sweeping victory and coalesce on an anti-Carlist platform. To prevent such an outcome, the king decided on a preemptive strike. After only 44 days of NCP rule (December 28, 1937–February 9, 1938), imputing the ruling party its inability to manage the ongoing political crisis, on February 10, 1938, Carol II staged a *coup d'état*, instituted a state of emergency, imposed censorship, and assumed authoritarian powers.

Carol II's dictatorship was meant, first and foremost, to block the Legion's road to power. The widths and breaths of the anti-Legionary campaign evinces that Carol II grasped the religious nature of the Legion. He understood that the fascist political faith could not be defeated only through police repression but needed to be delegitimized by a counter-religious discourse that condemned fratricidal violence and emphasized Christian virtues such as peace, solidarity, and respect for authority and tradition instead. To counter the spread of Legionarism, Carol II revived the prewar patterns of sacralizing politics uniting the throne, the army,

and the church, but in a new authoritarian fashion. Thus, the discourse on the role of the constitutional monarchy was replaced with Carol's cult of personality as a providential savior; political pluralism was substituted by single-party rule; and the youth was indoctrinated with a new official ideology of national messianism based on "faith, work, and the national idea," and centered on the figure of the providential monarch.

Although the new royal dictatorship was anti-Legionary in its orientation, in order to subvert the Legion's political message, it appropriated its political style and rhetoric. Thus, in a proclamation that borrowed the apocalyptic language of Legion manifestos, Carol II justified his personal regime by the imperious need to put an end to political chaos and sterile rivalry: "Romania has to be salvaged and am I determined to work toward this end, motivated by my sole and eternal aim: the permanent interests of the country and its continuous strengthening."[1] The king asked for public support in the "great work of national awakening, of the country's recovery and salvation."[2] He appointed a new, non-party government, led by the Patriarch Miron Cristea, and conceived it as a broad anti-Legion coalition. To prevent the emergence of any significant political opposition and to induce the idea of a national union, the new government included all former prime ministers and other leading politicians, most of them as ministers without portfolio, grouped in a newly created Committee of Patronage.

The appointment of the patriarch as prime minister was meant to appease political rivalries, to highlight the Orthodox Church's support for the king's agenda, and to mobilize the clerics and the masses of believers in support of the new regime. The political coalition between the king and the patriarch emulated the Byzantine political tradition functioning in the principalities until the early-modern period, based on the autocratic power of the prince and the intertwined relationship between church and state. In exchange for an extension of the Church's corporate privileges, the patriarch assisted the king in the "domestication" of his subjects. In a virulent pamphlet against political parties, the patriarch enthusiastically endorsed the royal dictatorship, asserting that it was "clear from where salvation comes: from the heroic determination of Your Majesty."[3]

On February 12, the king announced his political program, which combined authoritarian rule with ethnic nationalism. Under the slogan "Peace and Union," Carol II promised constitutional reforms promoting "national ideas and the interests of the Romanian element"; the revision of citizenship for Jews "in order to allow economic life for the Romanian element"; the depoliticization of the administration; and the maintenance of Romania's traditional foreign policy course based on the defense of the Versailles treaty system.[4]

The legal basis of the new regime was the constitution passed on February 20, 1938, under the slogan "Rescuing Contemporary Romania."[5] A few days later, the constitution was approved by a plebiscite orchestrated to produce unanimity. Secrecy was eliminated from the ballot procedure and severe punishment was introduced for absenteeism, so that out of 4,303,064 registered voters a mere 5,483 (0.13 percent of the electorate) had the courage to vote against it.[6]

The new constitution provided the foundation of the royal dictatorship throughout its 30-month existence. Although it preserved the decorative façade of a parliamentary system and a formal separation of powers, the constitution nevertheless consolidated all effective powers into the king's hands and proclaimed the pre-eminence of the executive over legislative power. The king had the right to name the government, to veto the promulgation of the laws voted upon by parliament, and to issue decrees when parliament was not sitting.

Parts of the constitution were specifically directed against the Legion. To eliminate its young electorate from electoral participation, political rights were granted only to literate men but—in a major innovation—also to women over the age of 30. State dignitaries had to originate from families holding Romanian citizenship for at least three generations, a stipulation possibly targeting the Codreanu family, which came from the Austrian province of Galicia and was only naturalized in 1903.[7] Finally, the constitution introduced capital punishment for assassination attempts against members of the royal family or state dignitaries.

The basis of the new regime was the cult of the king, celebrated as a predestined leader able to bring salvation to the national community. The regime's propaganda portrayed Carol II in a multitude of capacities: as a modernizing monarch, a protector of national culture, a legislator, a military commander, a charismatic leader, a guarantor of law and order, etc. This propaganda culminated with the celebration, in 1940, of a decade of rule, marked by extensive public festivities. A congratulatory publication synthesized all these propaganda claims, presenting the king, in a triumphant manner, as a symbol of national unity, a developer of national economy, a pedagogue and educator of the youth, and a keeper of tradition, as well as an explorer of new horizons.[8]

The cult of the monarch was a necessary but not sufficient tool for forging popular consensus. In the era of mass politics, Carol II also felt the need for a new political party and youth organizations as tools of formal mobilization "from above." On April 15, 1938, a royal decree prohibited all existing or future political parties, groupings, and associations.[9] On December 15, 1938, the king established Romania's first *single* mass party, *Frontul Renașterii Naționale* (Front of National Rebirth, FNR). The Front's declared aim was "to mobilize national consciousness for undertaking a unitary Romanian work of national solidarity for the defense and development of the nation and the consolidation of the state."[10] The FNR was to be "the only political organization in the state" that could operate and campaign in national elections, any other political activity "being considered clandestine and its authors punished." The leadership of the new party was entrusted to Carol II's closest collaborators, mostly former and current ministers.

The FNR was thoroughly re-organized in January 1940, under the slogan "The King, the Nation, Work, and Faith" (*Regele, Națiunea, Munca și Credința*), its evolution reflecting the process of radicalization the royal dictatorship had undergone.[11] Thus, if initially Carol conceived of the FNR as a national and implicitly pluralistic union of all political forces in the country, by January 1940 it developed in the direction of a hierarchical-territorial organization, with

its own ideology, leadership, party structure, uniforms, and symbols. Its 1940 decree stipulated that the FNR was meant "to propagate its own ideology,"[12] declaratively based on the national idea, the cult of the monarchy, corporatism, Christian and conservative family values, work and social justice, and "to form the public spirit in this direction."[13]

The main innovations introduced by the new party charter were a strong emphasis on the establishment of grass roots organizations in rural areas, corporatist organization and representation of main professional categories, and stimuli for the mobilization of its members.[14] First, the FNR's new structure included the establishment of cells in all territorial-administrative units of the country, with a particular emphasis on rural areas. Second, party sections were organized along corporatist lines, promoting proportional representation at all levels of three professional corporations expressly mentioned by the 1938 Constitution: agriculture and manual work; industry and trade; and intellectual work.[15] Since the FNR was the only political party allowed to present parliamentary candidates, this party structure provided the regime and its parliament with a corporatist structure of political representation. Third, in order to ensure its members' unconditional loyalty and devotion, and to increase their discipline, the FNR obliged new members to swear an oath of loyalty to the king, the fatherland, and the party (Article 7). To encourage new recruits to get active in the service of the party, the FNR's statutes differentiated between "adherent" and "active" members, the former needing one year of active involvement before achieving full membership (Article 10).[16] The FNR's members were obliged to promote the party's ideology and program, to observe a strict code of behavior, to write regular activity reports, and to participate in various study groups.[17] They were also expected to recruit new members (Article 7). Minority ethnic groups were allowed to create their own distinct organizational sections. The decree also established the National Guard (*Garda Națională*) as the party's paramilitary security organization.[18]

The FNR was led by its president, Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, vice president Gheorghe Tătărescu, and general secretary Constantin C. Giurescu—each appointed for one year by the king.[19] The party had three collective leadership bodies, two deliberative and one executive: the National Superior Council, which approved FNR policy, its candidates for parliament, and brought political recommendations to the government's attention; the Directorate, which assisted the Superior Council and approved the FNR's budget; and the Superior Commission, which was entrusted with control over the FNR's internal appointments and cadre policy. The National Superior Council was made up of 180 members, 60 from each of the three main professional corporations established by the 1938 constitution, with half appointed by the king and the other half elected by corporations. The Directorate had 30 members, proportionally representing the three corporations, all appointed by royal decree from among the members of the National Superior Council.[20] The Superior Commission was made up of the president, one vice president, the general secretary, the three regional first secretaries, and the

Commander of the National Guard. In a demagogic fashion, the FNR was defined as an interface between the citizens and the professional associations on the one hand, and the government and the administration on the other (Article 4).[21]

Overall, the organization of the FNR was based on an even combination between the "election" and "selection" principles of political representation. The party's organizational grid was made up of four parallel pillars, organized territorially and hierarchically, from the most basic (commune), through county, land, and upper national levels, as follows: the National Guard, the corporation of the intellectuals, the corporation of industry and commerce, and the corporation of agriculture and manual workers, all formally subordinated to the Superior Commission. The main leadership axis of the party consisted of the network of presidents and three secretaries at each territorial level. Finally, the last hierarchical pillar of power was represented by the party's collective bodies organized at territorial levels—the advisory councils and the general assemblies, which reported to the Superior Council. All these pillars of power were directly subordinate to the party's president and three vice-presidents, while the general-secretary acted as a link between them.

The creation of the FNR was part of a larger strategy of mass mobilization that involved the establishment of a network of youth, professional, and leisure organizations, with an overt pedagogical role of social control and political indoctrination. Among them, the most important was "Work and Leisure" (*Munca și Voe Bună*); established in the summer of 1938 and aimed at the working class, the organization was modeled along the lines of the Nazi *Kraft durch Freude* and the Italian Fascist *Opera nazionale dopolavoro*.

To increase the popular base of his personal rule, Carol II made particular efforts to secure the support of the youth. These efforts dated back to 1934–1935, when the king established the first experimental centers for the paramilitary education of youth, with the hidden aim of countering the Legion's proselytism. To coordinate these efforts, in 1936, the government established the Office for the Education of the Romanian Youth, in charge of elaborating and implementing a coherent national program of education. As shown above (p. 85), in 1934, a new youth organization was created, called *Straja Țării* (The Sentinel of the Motherland).[22] In December 1938, during the royal dictatorship, *Straja* was thoroughly re-organized by the FNR as a state institution entrusted with the "moral, national-patriotic, social and physical education of the youth of both sexes."[23] Its motto was "Faith and Labor for the Fatherland and the King" (Article 6), in a direct attempt to channel allegiances to the Legionary faith into a monarchist direction. All citizens aged 7–21 were automatically enrolled as members and received military training. The king was its supreme commander (Article 16), and he was assisted by a general commander he appointed and by a supreme guiding council consisting of senior dignitaries, the patriarch, and various ministers with portfolios that touched upon youth policies (Article 17).

Straja's anti-Legion function was evident. First, the participation of "the entire youth" in its activities was mandatory (Article 3). This rule explains the

staggering expansion of its membership, from almost half a million members in 1936 to over three million in 1939.[24] Second, *Straja* held a monopoly over youth education: no other similar organizations were permitted on Romanian territory (Article 3). It alone was allowed to organize initiation courses, training, and recreational camps for boys and girls. Third, its members had to swear an oath of loyalty (*crez*) (Article 6), similar to the Legionary vow in its glorification of ancestors, religion, and sacrifice, but with the difference that *Straja*'s oath of political loyalty was directed toward the king as *Marele Străjer* (the Great Sentinel). Fourth, *Straja*'s main educational activities, consisting of the organization of youth camps and colonies, strongly resembled the innovative Legionary practice of organizing work camps. Fifth, *Straja* had a paramilitary structure, being organized in hierarchical territorial units made up of phalanxes, lands, Legions, cohorts, flocks (flights), and centuries, with sub-units made up of groups, nests, and little nests. This structure combined ancient Roman with local traditions of military organization, yet it also defined the nests as *Straja*'s most basic unit of organization, just like the Legion. The commandants of *Straja*'s territorial unites were recruited from among teachers, professors, officers, and priests—the professional categories targeted by the Legion.

The primary promoter of the new doctrine was the Orthodox Church, portrayed as "the greatest educator of the people," since it was "founded on God."[25] The Church was called on to provide a new education to the youth, focusing on their development "within the national collective life of the Nation."[26] The basis of this program was religious education, based on the teachings of the Gospels: "Prayers sang in choirs, Evangelical texts succinctly explained and adapted to moral and civic live, visits to historical sites of our religious past, confessions and Eucharist for the members of the Sentinels at Christmas and Easter."[27] Each classroom or labor camp was to be adorned with a shrine displaying the national flag and other symbols of national history, but also the cross and the Bible.[28] To facilitate the dissemination of the Biblical model of *imitatio Christi*, and also to associate the king's name with it, the state sponsored a new edition of the Bible, called the "King Carol II Bible," distributed by the tens of thousands to *Straja* members.[29]

These changes gave *Straja* a major boost. Overall, however, the king's concerted efforts to enlist and indoctrinate the youth were unsuccessful. On paper, *Straja*'s achievements were impressive in terms of membership and the list of activities. However, despite the authorities' steady efforts to mobilize the youth in support of the monarchy, *Straja* did not manage to induce in young people a feeling of loyalty to the king, its top-down approach to youth mobilization contrasting sharply with the Legion's efficient grass roots proselytic methods.

Bonapartism vs. Charisma: Bloody Repression

The establishment of Carol II's personal regime greatly alarmed Codreanu, as he understood, early on, that the king's offensive was meant to eliminate the Legion as a social-political movement and to uproot its influence over the youth. Aware

of the danger and confident that his time was yet to come, on February 21, 1938, Codreanu tactically disbanded "All for the Country," forcing its members into political passivity. He explicitly rejected the option of violence leading to civil war as foreign to the spirit of the Legion,[30] pledging that "[n]ever will the Legionary movement organize a plot or *coup d'état* in order to prevail."[31] Instead, he ordered the closure of its headquarters and recommended the Legionaries to take up mystical communitarian isolation through the strict observance of fasting, praying, and the total abandonment of earthly activities:

> Read several times a day "The Oratory of Virgin Mary," pgs. 62–82, the 1899 edition of the Holy Synod, Pavel Suru Library, Victory Avenue, Bucharest.
> Do not read newspapers or books; all forms of entertainment that can distract the soul of the Legionaries from prayer are forbidden.
> Do not smoke, do not eat, do not pay visits on Friday, devote yourself totally to prayer.
> Do not play cards, draws, do not attend shows.
>
> The focus will be on:
>
> > [...] the victory against time and matter
> > The liberation of the soul from the yoke of the matter
> > Focus on prayer, in order to get closer to the dead, the saints, to the redeemer Jesus Christ, and to God.
> > Invoke our dead to pray together with you, call on Moța.[32]

Codreanu's passive attitude was subject to much speculation. Constantin Papanace recalls the Captain's dilemmas in judging the implications of the king's *coup d'état*. Codreanu and Papanace were in accord that, unlike the previous waves of repression (1931, 1932, 1933), keeping a low profile would not be enough to save the Legion this time, given the king's determination to decapitate it. Papanace was of the opinion that the Captain should seek temporary shelter in Rome to escape repression. Preparations were made for a flight to Italy and passports for Codreanu and his family obtained.[33] Soon, however, police withdrew the passports,[34] forcing Codreanu to cancel his trip, aware that police surveillance would prevent an illegal escape. Reportedly, the Captain was also disappointed with the lack of assistance on the part of Italian diplomacy, which did not initiate any political action to facilitate Codreanu's visit. A police report dated March 19, 1938 claimed that, dissatisfied with the passive attitude of Italy, Codreanu decided to redirect his diplomatic efforts toward Nazi Germany, a country that was much more involved in backing ultranationalist movements in Eastern Europe.[35] Another motivation for Codreanu's passive attitude was his conviction that, however harmful, in the long run his sacrifice served the Legion well: "Through his arrestment, Codreanu wants to fortify the will of the Legionaries, stimulating them to suffer on their turn, as does their Captain."[36]

Codreanu's policy of passive resistance was opposed by numerous leaders.[37] There were two other major opinions within the Legion, arguing for either collaboration or resistance with the king. On the one hand, a few leaders, such as Mihail Polihroniade and Alexandru Constant, argued that the movement should turn around its policy and cooperate with the king, since at its core, the Legion was monarchist and loyalist.[38] On the other hand, a stronger dissent opinion was that of violence resistance. In a confidential letter sent to the Legionaries on February 25, Codreanu acknowledged that many commandants demanded openly "to fight, with their lives, if necessary, the establishment of a Liberal government within the framework of the new Constitution."[39] Codreanu opposed this view, but allowed the clandestine activity of the movement, its leadership being instructed to keep regular communication.[40] Disbanding "All for the Country" was only a formal gesture, he claimed, since "the party is dissolved but the Legion remains."[41] Codreanu attempted to boost the Legionaries' morale by arguing that the Legion's "time" was soon to come, since Germany's political actions for dismantling the Versailles treaty system in Central and Eastern Europe had already yielded its first results, as shown by the annexation of Austria on March 12, 1938.

Although Codreanu presented his passive strategy as an ethical response to tyranny, his "Christlike" attitude to the establishment of the royal dictatorship reflected, in fact, the Legion's lack of options. Although between 1932 and 1937, the Legion grew into a mass movement, the organization lacked the capacity to stage a *coup d'état* or to resist state-orchestrated repression. Its leaders were trained to work within fragmented local cells fit to conduct small-scale electoral campaigns or terrorist actions but lacked both the experience and the means of effective mass mobilization on a national scale. It is revealing in this respect that the thorough police searches conducted at Legionary centers or the residences of leading members did not produce more than 100 illegal arms, many of them old and dysfunctional.[42] Despite the Legion's lack of significant military capabilities, Legionaries had a hard time accepting the passive response to the establishment of the royal dictatorship, with numerous rank-and-file members disregarding Codreanu's orders. Fearing that unrest at the grass roots level might intensify the repression, on March 25 Codreanu set up several disciplinary units made up of nest chiefs who patrolled the streets in order to discipline Legionaries who conducted public activities, be they entertainment or protest.[43]

Codreanu's prudent attitude could not prevent a clash with the king. Once he managed to consolidate his personal regime, Carol II unleashed his anti-Legionary strategy with full force. On March 30, 1938, the king appointed a second government led by Patriarch Cristea. The key figure in the new government's full-fledged anti-Legion campaign was Carol II's right-hand man, Armand Călinescu, nicknamed "the Black Monocle." Călinescu made his political debut within the Peasant Party in the Old Kingdom. After its 1926 fusion with the National Party of Transylvania, he emerged within the newly formed National Peasant Party (NPP) as a prominent leader of the new wave of young and

energetic politicians. In 1932–1933, Călinescu was under-secretary of state in the Ministry of the Interior in successive NPP governments led by Alexandru Vaida-Voevod. He gained notoriety for his severe and uncompromising attitude against grass roots agitation by the Legion and the communists. In 1937, dissatisfied with the ossified cadre policies of the NPP—which favored older politicians—and aware that the fortune of traditional parties was in decline, Călinescu defected from the NPP and entered Carol's service as a member of the Centrist political faction. He first served as Minister of the Interior in Octavian Goga's right-wing government (December 1937–February 1938). After the establishment of Carol's dictatorship, Călinescu became one of the king's most trusted collaborators.

Călinescu favored a swift and vigorous campaign of repression against the Legion. The first step in this direction was the decree for the defense of state order, adopted on April 15, 1938.[44] The decree forbade political organizations of any kind and aimed at curtailing all forms of clandestine, paramilitary, or terrorist activities. To this end, it prohibited all activities that would advocate for a change of the existing political regime or would propagate the principle of class struggle or the abolition of private property (Article 2). While some of these stipulations targeted communist activism, most of them were meant to counter the Legionary threat: the decree banned the creation of new political or clandestine organizations of any type (Article 15), oath-taking ceremonies (Article 6), the wearing of uniforms in public, paramilitary activities of any kind (Articles 7, 9), political propaganda in print or by way of group singing in public (Articles 7, 10), etc. To discontinue the Legion's recruitment base, the decree expressly prohibited pupils, students, and priests from being involved in any type of political engagement (Article 25), while political propaganda was strictly forbidden in schools and churches (Article 15). Violation of these stipulations were punishable with hefty fines, house arrest, or imprisonment from one to two years, and the loss of civil rights for a period of up to five years. These offenses were to be prosecuted and adjudicated through accelerated trials.

The new decree served as the basis of repressive action. On April 16/17, 1938, Codreanu and other leading Legionaries and sympathizers were arrested and interned in camps established at Tismana, Dragomirna, and Miercurea Ciuc. Soon, a military tribunal charged Codreanu with the defamation of a public official. The legal pretext invoked for Codreanu's indictment was an injurious letter he sent to Nicolae Iorga, who was at the time a royal counselor. In reaction to Iorga's press campaign against the Legionary restaurants, which led to their closure, Codreanu accused the historian-politician of opportunism, dishonesty, and betrayal of the national ideals he had once preached to his students. After a short trial, Codreanu was sentenced to six months of forced labor. Fully aware that the sentence was only the beginning of a period of harsh repression, in a secret circular letter sent from prison, Codreanu recommended that the Legionaries "hide themselves in woods, mountains or where they could." Any open violence against the authorities "is an act of madness which will be paid by us, those kept hostage."[45] To keep up the Legionary spirit, the Captain presented the repression

as a test of ascetism, recommending Legionaries to turn "as abstinent and religious as they can" and prepare for the final battle for power.[46]

Codreanu's prediction was accurate. In May 1938, after intense preparations, Codreanu was brought to another, more elaborate *political trial*.[47] The political nature of the trial was made evident by the direct interference of politicians in the activity of the court, by the thrust of the charges, and by the "didactic" public function of the trial. The prosecutor's accusations insisted on Codreanu's rebellion against the state, high treason, alleged collaboration with foreign agents against state interests—although no conclusive evidence was produced in this regard—and the subversion of the existing social order.[48] These accusations were not intended simply to neutralize Codreanu politically but to defame the Legion and to demotivate and thus demobilize its members. To this end, the official press launched a sustained campaign of denigration against the Zelea-Codreanu family, accusing them of being non-Romanian, while the Legion was condemned as violent and terroristic. At the same time, the official press portrayed the royal dictatorship as the only possible path to national salvation. On May 26/27, Codreanu was sentenced to ten years of hard labor, despite the fact that the prosecution could not produce a legally sound trial.

Nearly a year later, and upon the death of Patriarch Cristea on March 7, 1939, Călinescu became prime minister and expanded his policy of surveillance and repression. Outlawed and with its leadership interned, the Legion was effectively neutralized. Yet, Carol II feared that Nazi Germany's growing political influence in Central Europe would lead to the Legion's resurrection, and therefore made plans for Codreanu's elimination. On the night of November 29/30, 1938, returning from an unsuccessful diplomatic tour that included an official visit to the United Kingdom and unofficial visits to France, Belgium, and Germany (including a meeting with Hitler at the Berghof), Carol II ordered Codreanu's assassination, along with that of 13 other Legionaries, the *Nicadori* and *Decemviri*. The following day, a media report announced the deaths of the Legionary inmates claiming that they had been killed while trying to escape with external help.

The version accredited by the press communiqué was later contradicted by the deposition of one of Codreanu's executioners in 1940, taken by the Romanian High Court of Cassation. According to him, no escape attempt took place, the prisoners being in fact strangled in a forest near Bucharest (see Figure 6.1), according to a prearranged plan. Their bodies were buried in the courtyard of the Jilava prison and burned with vitriol.[49] Later, the common grave was covered with a thick layer of cement in an attempt to prevent the recovery of the corpses and their political exploitation. After the elimination of Codreanu, the authorities started a campaign to de-radicalize the Legionary members. Convinced that the physical disappearance of their charismatic leader struck a decisive blow to the Legion's cohesion and *raison d'être*, the authorities pressured all arrested Legionaries to sign official declarations abjuring their appurtenance to the Legion. Those who signed such letters were released from camps and gradually reintegrated in the public life but their behavior was continuously monitored.

FIGURE 6.1 The place of Codreanu's execution, near the forest of Tâncăbeşti, currently a pilgrimage site for Legionary sympathizers

Source: Photo by Constantin Iordachi.

The official campaign to dismantle the Legion achieved limited success. The most prominent Legionary leaders refused to abjure their political faith. Moreover, there was a great suspicion that even those who renounced their creed did so only formally, while continuing to hold Legionary convictions. In fact, despite the king's attempt to eradicate Codreanu's cult, the spirit of the "Captain" obsessed his followers more than ever. In 1940, the Legionary leader Şerban Milcoveanu provided a witness account of the immediate emotional reaction of the main Legionary leaders detained at Râmnicu Sărat upon learning of Codreanu's execution:

> Each of us reacted in a distinct way. But then, all of us, without prior agreement, headed quietly toward the Eastern platform of the penitentiary, in our prisoner outfits, one after the other, stooping and bowing our head. We kneeled, each in our own place. Engineer Clime recited *Our Father*. His words flowed sparsely, while a weeping shook one or the other of the attendants. We felt how, in the sky, our Captain and comrades received our prayer. Then we stood up. We embraced each other closely. We amalgamated our tears and pain.[50]

Milcoveanu also provided a typology of individual emotional responses to the death of the charismatic leader. In the short run, Codreanu's death shook

the conviction of many Legionaries, the lack of divine protection questioning his charismatic aura of infallibility. Some Legionaries, however, simply refused to accept that Codreanu was dead; to feed their disbelief, a rumor spread among the members that the Captain and the martyrs had escaped to Bulgaria with the help of the escorting officer.[51] Even after these rumors were refuted, many Legionaries, such as George Furdui, remained in perpetual denial, repeating incessantly: "This is not possible. This is not possible. The Captain cannot be assassinated. I go as far as to state my belief that, even if they would find an assassin to shoot, the bullet will not leave the gun. I believe in God … I believe in God's justice."[52] Obviously, Furdui invoked here the legend on the failed execution of Michael the Brave, as narrated by Bălcescu; the parallel between Codreanu and the other paradigmatic charismatic hero of the Romanians is illustrative of the Legionaries' Romantic historical imaginary and horizon of expectations. Yet other Legionaries, such as Eugen Ionică, accepted the evidence but fell into despair, as the death of the leader seemed to destroy all their certainties and inner convictions.

Soon, however, despair and disbelief were channeled into calls for revenge, the Legion being thus effectively reconstituted as an emotional charismatic "community of resentment." In less than two months, vindictive feelings seemed to have become widespread within the Legion. In December 1938, Victor Dragomirescu edited and clandestinely circulated Codreanu's diary (1934–1935) among the Legionaries. It is telling that, at the end of diary, Dragomirescu added the mobilizing slogans: "I believe in Codreanu's revenge! I believe in the Legionary Victory!"[53] The death of the charismatic leader was thus instrumentalized to strengthen rather than weaken the emotional bonds among the Legionaries. The transformation of Codreanu's diary into a subversive object of political adoration shows that the Captain's charismatic cult was not only a self-projection but answered to, and was also shaped by, a grass roots demand for a behavior role model.

In this climate, revenge followed quickly. After a series of failed attacks, on September 21, 1939, a death squad made up of eight Legionaries led by the lawyer Dumitru (Miti) Dumitrescu (1913–1939) managed to assassinate Prime Minister Călinescu in a Bucharest public square, holding him directly responsible for Codreanu's assassination. Dumitrescu was a new convert to the Legion. He first participated as a sympathizer in the 1937 electoral campaign. His "transfiguration" took place in 1938 in the Brașov prison. Dumitrescu became obsessed with the idea of avenging the Captain, claiming that "the province of Moldova, alienated and invaded as it was, created the greatest man this people could have."[54] Heavily armed with guns and grenades, the attackers ambushed the prime minister's car and, after shooting police agent Radu Androne, fired over 20 bullets in Călinescu's head, lungs, and chest, killing him instantly. After fulfilling their revenge mission, the commandos stormed the national radio station and aired the announcement that "the Captain has been avenged,"[55] after which they surrendered to the radio station guards.[56]

The "political will" left behind by the death squad and published posthumously illustrates the members' fanatical adherence to the Legionary faith, and their belief in Codreanu as a divinely inspired leader. Their public letter was addressed to "all those in which the *holy Legionary faith* burns like a fire."[57] The squad indicated the desire for revenge as the main driving force behind their adoption of political violence: "We have decided to punish!" confessed the squad, invoking as justification Codreanu's urge to punish those who "tortured you [the Legionaries] for your faith in the Romanian people," published at the end of the Captain's *For My Legionaries*. The squad acknowledged that violence was not a solution to the country's problems, but claimed that it could nevertheless contribute to the "transformation of the Romanian soul," which was the Legion's main aim: "Violence in itself does not change anything, but it is a painful necessity. We want only that much: through our violence to awake the Romanian people."[58] In the end, the squad members restated their conviction that the Romanian people were destined to fulfill a messianic mission, "implanted in him by God," and hoped that "God and the nation" would accept their sacrifice.[59]

To the Legionary violence, the authorities answered with an unprecedented wave of lawless repression. The captured assassins were carried back to the public square and executed without trial on the spot of their crime; their corpses were displayed in the open for three days to public opprobrium under the banner: "This is the fate of all traitors of the nation."[60] The same night, the police destroyed another Legionary terrorist cell in Bucharest: following an exchange of fire with the police, two accomplices of the assassins committed suicide while a third one was captured after a failed escape attempt.[61]

In the next days, in retaliation for Călinescu's assassination, the selective violence of the state—accompanied by attempts at cooptation and de-radicalization—was replaced with ruthless mass repression. The new Prime Minister, General Gheorghe Argeşanu, authorized military repression. On the night of September 21/22, over 252 Legionaries were executed without trial.[62] The list included the main leaders held in camps: 44 in Miercurea Ciuc, 31 in Vaslui, 13 in Râmnicu Sărat, 10 in Bucharest, and 7 in Braşov. Among them were Gheorghe Clime, leader of "All for the Country"; Alexandru Cantacuzino, leader of the Moţa-Marin Corps; Gheorghe Istrate, leader of the Cross Brotherhoods; Ion Banea, leader of the Transylvanian regional section; and the *AXA* intellectuals Cristian Tell and Mihail Polihroniade. A further 147 Legionaries were selected at random all over the country by prefects (two or three for each county) and executed.[63]

In addition to this violent retaliation meant to eliminate physically the Legionary leadership, the authorities initiated a new propaganda campaign in order irremediably to discredit the Legion as an antinational terrorist organization. Attended by the king, all high state officials, and the leadership of the army, the burial of Călinescu with national honors was an opportunity to display the unity of state institutions in facing the Legionary challenge, based on the alliance between the church, the army, and the monarchy. The Orthodox Church was at

the forefront of this campaign, its representatives condemning the terrorist attack as an anti-Christian "act of madness," committed by "mindless murderers." In contrast, Călinescu was portrayed as a martyr of the cross who died in the service of his country: "We lost a providential man, who will remain in history as a hero who sacrificed himself for the Nation and the Country," claimed the official journal of the Orthodox Church.[64] These claims were countered by clandestine Legionary propaganda, which demonized Călinescu and instead proclaimed Dumitrescu "an example of faith and total sacrifice."[65]

From Bonapartism to Para-Fascism: The Fasticization of the Royal Dictatorship

The last phase of the royal dictatorship was dominated by foreign policy concerns. The partition of Czechoslovakia, the annexation of Austria, and the occupation of Poland placed Nazi Germany in a position of hegemony in Central Europe. Although Romania had previously acted as one of the pillars of the Versailles system, the collapse of the collective security system and the capitulation of France forced Carol II to search for a *modus vivendi* with Germany. The first outcome of this new political direction was the German-Romanian Treaty for the Development of Economic Relations between the Two Countries, signed on March 23, 1939, which subordinated Romanian economy to German interests.

To facilitate this *rapprochement*, the king took steps toward the establishment of a fascist-like regime, which—he thought—was in line with the Nazi political expectations of Romania. On June 22, 1940, the FNR was renamed *Partidul Națiunii* (the Party of the Nation) by royal decree. The regime's transition from authoritarianism to *totalitarianism* was explicit.[66] Article 1 of the decree stated that: "The Front of National Rebirth becomes a unique and totalitarian party, under the name of the Party of the Nation." Its main aim was to coordinate "the moral and material life of the Romanian state and the Romanian nation."[67] In an unprecedented move, the king assumed direct leadership of the new party: "The party will function under the supreme leadership of his majesty the king." On the same day a new decree reinforced the repressive side of the regime by introducing penalties of up to five years in jail for any individual who challenged the political monopoly or authority of the Party of the Nation. Far from being a simple cosmetic change, this political re-shuffle marked a radical transformation of the nature of Carol II's dictatorship. On June 25, 1940, Constantin Argetoianu noted in his diary that, after a few days of confusion, "people begin to grasp the radical and revolutionary regime change that occurred with the transformation by the Front of the National Rebirth into the Party of the Nation."[68]

This far-reaching political change was also evident in Carol II's most controversial act: the amnesty and renewed attempts at cooperation with the Legion, which the king thought was a Nazi precondition for establishing a political alliance. The cooperation was nevertheless difficult given the resentment caused

by the terror unleashed by Carol II in 1938–1939 that decapitated the Legion's leadership. After backstage negotiations, on July 4, 1940, the king managed to co-opt a number of renowned Legionaries into the new government led by Ion Gigurtu, including the movement's new leader, Horia Sima, as Minister of Religious Cults and Arts.

The last stage in the process of "fascistization" was the promotion of antisemitic measures to the level of official state policy. In January 1938, prior to the establishment of the royal dictatorship, on the basis of a law for the "verification" of citizenship adopted by the Goga government, around 250,000 Romanian Jews (30 percent of the total Jewish population) were deprived of citizenship. In his journal, Carol II noted with cynicism that the law was "at that moment, a necessary throwing away of a corpse."[69] The denaturalization of Jews was followed by their removal from property and exclusion from citizenship rights: on August 8, 1940, decrees 2650 and 2651 annulled the post-1918 emancipation of Jews in Romania and reactivated late nineteenth-century antisemitic regulations. The first decree defined "the Jew" as a legal category in a very broad manner, to include all those of Mosaic religion; all those born of one or two parents of Mosaic religion; as well as the "Jews by blood," even if they were atheists.[70] It also differentiated among three categories of Jews: (1) those who emigrated into Romania after December 30, 1918; (2) Jews who had been emancipated by the parliament prior to December 30, 1918—either individually or collectively, for serving in the Romanian army; and (3) all other Jews who did not fit the first two categories. The decree stripped the entire Jewish population of substantive political and civic rights, such as the right to settle in the countryside and purchase rural property, access to employment in the army, as well as the right to bear Romanian names. The Jews in categories 1 and 3 were placed under additional legal disabilities, being excluded from access to all liberal professions and state positions. Their military obligations were converted into fiscal or labor compulsions. In addition, decree 2651 forbade Jews to marry "Romanians of blood,"[71] thus adding to the process of legal segregation and discrimination against the Jewish community.

The new orientation of the regime could not mend relations between Carol II and the Legion. In fact, facing criticism from inside the Legion for arriving at a *modus vivendi* with the person responsible for murdering Codreanu and the Legion's leadership, Sima resigned from the government after just a few days, on July 8. Carol's meeting with a Legionary delegation led by Sima on August 7 exacerbated rather than calmed the tensions between the two factions. The Legionaries approved of the totalitarian orientation of the new regime but rejected the collaboration with "old cadres" and the "old mentality" within the Party of the Nation as leading to "something hybrid."[72] They demanded the rehabilitation of the Legionary dead and a "fully Legionary party and a Legionary king."[73] These radical and, for his part, unacceptable pretenses convinced Carol II that he could not count on the Legionaries. Moreover, the political re-activation of the Legion and the failure of the prospective collaboration with the king led to a

growing grass roots mobilization of the Legion against the royal dictatorship in late August.[74] Alerted by these developments, on September 2, the king removed the heads of the secret police, Moruzov and Nicki Ştefănescu, blamed for supporting the Legion.[75] After 30 months of rule and many surprising shifts and turns, the collapse of the royal dictatorship seemed inevitable, however.

Notes

1 Carol II, *Cuvântările regelui Carol II, 1930–1940*, 2 vols., (Bucureşti: Fundaţia pentru literatură şi artă Regele Carol II, 1940), vol. 2, 307.
2 Ibid., 305.
3 *Monitorul Oficial*, March 1, 1938.
4 *Universul*, February 12, 1938, cited in M. Muşat and I. Ardeleanu, *România după Marea Unire*, vol. 2, *November 1933–September 1940* (Bucureşti: Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1988), 805.
5 *Noua Constituţie a României. Textul, pe Articole, al Nouei Constituţii* (Brasov: Unirea, 1938).
6 Muşat and Ardeleanu, *România după Marea Unire*, 805.
7 Nicholas M. Nagy-Talavera, *The Green Shirts and the Others: A History of Fascism in Hungary and Rumania* (Berkeley–Los Angeles–London: University of California Press, 1967), 297.
8 See Teofil Ch. Sidorovici, *Carol II. Din culmea unui deceniu de glorioasă domnie* (Bucureşti: Atelierele Luceafărului, 1940).
9 "Decret lege pentru apărarea ordinii în stat," April 15, 1938, Constantin Hamangiu, ed., *Codul General al României. Coduri, Decrete-Legi şi Regulamente*, vol. XXVI, Part 1 (Bucureşti: Imprimeria Centrală, 1938), 498–506. For additional information on this decree, see below pp. 278, 392.
10 "Legea nr. 4.321 din 15 decembrie 1938 pentru înfiinţarea organizaţiei politice a 'Frontului Renaşterii Naţionale,'" *Monitorul Oficial* no. 293, December 16, 1938.
11 *Monitorul Oficial al României*. Part 1, 108 (20 January 1940) no. 017, 214–219.
12 *Monitorul Oficial al României*. Part 1, 108 (24 January 1940) no. 020, 214.
13 Ibid.
14 To prepare the ground for the establishment of a corporatist political regime, as refigured in the constitution, a massive propaganda work was published on the corporatist state in Italy, supervised by the king's collaborator, Constantin Argetoianu. See Ion Angelescu and Constantin Argetoianu, eds., *Aşezământul corporativ: principii, organizare, realizări, legislaţie* (Bucureşti: Atelierele Luceafărul, 1939).
15 Art. 61, *Constitutionea Regelui Carol*, 20–21..
16 *Monitorul Oficial al României*. Part 1, 108, no. 020, January 24, 1940, 214.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid., 217.
19 Ibid., 282.
20 Ibid., 217.
21 Ibid., 221.
22 I. Manolescu, C. Nedelcu, Teofil Sidorovici, "Straja Ţării," *Enciclopedia României*, vol. 1, 486.
23 See "Lege pentru Organizarea şi Funcţionarea Străji Ţării," *Monitorul Oficial* no. 292, December 15, 1938, 5942.
24 *Anuarul Statistic al României, 1939 şi 1940*, 300.
25 "Tineretul, Biserica şi Straja Ţării," *Biserica Ortodoxă Română* LVIII, no. 11–12 (Nov.–Dec. 1939), 605.
26 Ibid., 603.
27 "Tineretul, Biserica şi Straja Ţării," 604.
28 Ibid., 605.

29 Ibid., 604.
30 ACNSAS, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, P 011784, vol. 15, 83–84.
31 This idea had already been expressed by Codreanu in 1937, when he argued that "the Legionary movement can prevail only through the accomplishment of an internal process, of [raising the] consciousness, of the Romanian nation. When this process will encompass the majority of the Romanians and will be accomplished, victory will follow automatically, without plots and *coups d'état*." See Circular Letter no. 58, February 28, 1937, ANIC, MI-Diverse, 6/1937, vol. I, 13.
32 Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, "În toiul rugăciunii," ACNSAS, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, P 011784, vol. 13, 2.
33 ACNSAS, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, P 011784, vol. 15, 92.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., vol. 13, 7.
36 Ibid., 28.
37 Papanace, *Despre Căpitan,* 15.
38 Ibid., 27.
39 ACNSAS, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, P 011784, vol. 13, 4.
40 Ibid., 4v.
41 ANIC, DGP, 2/1938, 23.
42 ACNSAS, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, P 011784, vol. 15, 95–97.
43 ACNSAS, Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, P 011784, vol. 13, 19.
44 "Decret lege pentru apărarea ordinii în stat," April 15, 1938, 498–506.
45 ACNSAS, Fond Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, P 011784, vol. 5, 7.
46 Ibid., 14–15.
47 On political trials, see Otto Kirchheimer, *Political Justice: The Use of Legal Procedure for Political Ends* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); and Barbara J. Falk, *Making Sense of Political Trials: Causes and Categories* (Toronto: Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, 2008).
48 For a Legionary brochure trying to rebuff the official version of the trial, see Mişcarea Legionară, *Adevărul despre procesului lui Corneliu Z. Codreanu. Maiu 1938* (n.p.: n.p., 1938). For a pro-Legionary analysis of the trial, see K. W. Treptow and G Buzatu, eds, *"Procesul' lui Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu (Mai, 1938)* (Iaşi: S.C. Dosoftei, 1994).
49 Quoted in Muşat, Ardeleanu, *România după Marea Unire*, vol. 2, 877–878. For a Legionary account, see the memoirs of Michael Sturdza, Minister of Foreign Affairs during Legionary rule, in *The Suicide of Europe: Memoirs of Prince Michael Sturdza, Former Foreign Minister of Rumania* (Boston, MA, and Los Angeles, CA: Western Islands, 1986), 119–120.
50 Şerban Milcoveanu, "Crăciunul în prigoană 1938–1939, 1939–1940 în penitenciarul special de la Râmnicu Sărat," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 73 (Dec. 25, 1940), 3.
51 ANIC, DGP, 159/1928, 12–13 (this note of *Siguranța* dates from December 1938 but was inserted into a 1928 folder).
52 Milcoveanu, "Crăciunul în prigoană," 3.
53 *Jurnalul Căpitanului*, 172.
54 Mihail Tase, *Miti Dumitrescu, legionarul care n-a purtat nici o clipă cămaşa verde* (Ploieşti: Tip. "Presa Noastră," 1940), 14.
55 *Universul* 56, no. 261 (Sept. 23, 1939), 1, 3; Tase, *Miti Dumitrescu*, 29.
56 The self-sacrificial nature of the commandos' mission generated debates among the Legionaries. Some were of the opinion that "the rascal [Călinescu] does not deserve any sacrifice." Others argued that "we do not surrender for the rascal, but for the nation." Tase, *Miti Dumitrescu*, 29.
57 "Scrisoarea echipei care a pedepsit pe Armand Călinescu, adresată legionarilor," *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 13 (Sept. 22, 1940), 2.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid.

60 *Universul* 56, no. 262 (Sept. 24, 1939), 3.
61 Ibid.
62 Veiga, *Istoria Gărzii de Fier, 1919–1941*, 261; Heinen, *Legiunea 'Arhanghelul Mihail'*, 376.
63 The selection was the arbitrary decision of prefects and—according to the oral witness account of historian Florin Constantiniu—involved bargaining and bribes. In an interview delivered in April 2012, Constantiniu stated that his grandfather paid a large sum of money to the county prefect to save one of his sons from execution. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xB7pijCfts8, accessed November 12, 2019.
64 Emilian Târgovişteanu, "Un martir al Datoriei, Armand Călinescu (1893–1939)," *Biserica Ortodoxă Română* 57, no. 9–10 (Sept.–Oct. 1939), 594–595.
65 Tase, *Miti Dumitrescu*, 29.
66 Gheorghe Dumitraş-Biţoaica, ed., *Statutul Juridic al Evreilor şi Legislaţia Românizării* (n.a.: Editura Prometeu, 1942), 42.
67 "Decret-lege pentru transformarea Frontului Renaşterii Naţionale în Partidul Naţiunii," *Monitorul oficial*, June 22, 1940. Constantin Argetoianu claimed that the source of inspiration for the new charter of the Party of the Nation was the statute of the German National Socialist Party, a copy of which was requested from the German Legation in Bucharest by the king's advisors. See his *Însemnări zilnice*, vol. 8, 1 ian.–21 iulie; 25 oct.–31 dec. 1940, ed. Stelian Neagoe (Bucureşti, Machiavelli, 2007), 377.
68 Argetoianu, *Însemnări zilnice*, vol. 8, 382.
69 Carol II, Regele României, *Însemnări zilnice*, 1837–1951, vol. I: *(1904–1937)* (Bucureşti: Curtea Veche, 2003), 234.
70 Dumitraş-Biţoaica, ed. *Statutul juridic al evreilor*, 34–35.
71 Ibid., 52–54.
72 Carol II, Regele României, *Însemnări zilnice*, 1837–1951, vol. III: 15 decembrie–7 septembrie 1940 (Bucureşti: Scripta, 1998), 269.
73 Ibid., 270.
74 Ibid., 286.
75 Ibid., 296.

References

ACNSAS. Fond "Arhiva Operativă," Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, file P 011784, vols. 5, 13, 15.

ANIC. Fond "Ministerul de Interne-Diverse," 6/1937, vol. I.

ANIC. Fond "DGP," files: 159/1928; 2/1938.

Angelescu, Ion, and Constantin Argetoianu, eds. *Aşezământul corporativ: principii, organizare, realizări, legislaţie*. Bucureşti: Atelierele Luceafărul, 1939.

Argetoianu, Constantin. *Însemnări zilnice*, vol. 8, 1 ian.–21 iulie; 25 oct.–31 dec. 1940, ed. Stelian Neagoe. Bucureşti, Machiavelli, 2007.

Carol II, Regele României. *Însemnări zilnice*, 1837–1951, vol. I: *(1904–1937)*. Vol. III: 15 decembrie–7 septembrie 1940. Bucureşti: Scripta, 1998. New ed. Bucureşti: Curtea Veche, 2003.

Carol II. *Cuvântările regelui Carol II, 1930–1940*, 2 vols. Bucureşti: Fundaţia pentru literatură şi artă Regele Carol II, 1940.

Constantiniu, Florin. Interview, available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xB7pijCfts8, accessed November 12, 2019.

Dumitraş-Biţoaica, Gheorghe, ed. *Statutul Juridic al Evreilor şi Legislaţia Românizării*. n.a.: Editura Prometeu, 1942.

Falk, Barbara J. *Making Sense of Political Trials: Causes and Categories*. Toronto: Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, 2008.

Hamangiu, Constantin, ed. *Codul General al României. Coduri, Decrete-Legi şi Regulamente*, vol. XXVI, Part 1. Bucureşti: Imprimeria Centrală, 1938.

Heinen, Armin. *Legiunea "Arhanghelul Mihail." Mişcare socială şi organizaţie politică. O contribuţie la problema fascismului internaţional*. Bucureşti: Humanitas, 1998.

Kirchheimer, Otto. *Political Justice: The Use of Legal Procedure for Political Ends*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961.

Manolescu, I., C. Nedelcu, and Teofil Sidorovici. "Straja Ţării." *Enciclopedia României*, vol. 1: 482–489.

Milcoveanu, Şerban. "Crăciunul în prigoană 1938–1939, 1939–1940 în penitenciarul special de la Râmnicu Sărat," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 73 (Dec. 25, 1940): 3.

Mişcarea, Legionară. *Adevărul despre procesului lui Corneliu Z. Codreanu. Maiu 1938*. n.p.: n.p., 1938.

Monitorul Oficial, Part 1, no. 301 (Dec. 30, 1937); Part 1, 108 (20 January 1940) no. 017; (24 January 1940) no. 020.

Muşat, Mircea, and Ion Ardeleanu. *România după Marea Unire*, vol. 2, *November 1933–September 1940*. Bucureşti: Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1988.

Nagy-Talavera, Nicholas M. *The Green Shirts and the Others: A History of Fascism in Hungary and Rumania*. Berkeley–Los Angeles–London: University of California Press, 1967.

Noua Constituţie a României. Textul, pe Articole, al Nouei Constituţii. Brasov: Unirea, 1938.

Papanace, Constantin I. *Despre Căpitan, Nicadori şi Decemviri. Crâmpei de amintiri*. Cetatea Eternă: Armatolii, 1963.

"Scrisoarea echipei care a pedepsit pe Armand Călinescu, adresată legionarilor," *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 13 (Sept. 22, 1940): 2.

Sidorovici, Teofil Ch. *Carol II. Din culmea unui deceniu de glorioasă domnie*. Bucureşti: Atelierele Luceafărului, 1940.

Sturdza, Michael. *The Suicide of Europe: Memoirs of Prince Michael Sturdza, Former Foreign Minister of Rumania*. Boston, MA, and Los Angeles, CA: Western Islands, 1986.

Tase, Mihail. *Miti Dumitrescu, legionarul care n-a purtat nici o clipă cămaşa verde*. Ploieşti: Tip. "Presa Noastră," 1940.

Târgovişteanu, Emilian. "Un martir al Datoriei, Armand Călinescu (1893–1939)." *Biserica Ortodoxă Română* 57, no. 9–10 (Sept.–Oct. 1939): 594–595.

"Tineretul, Biserica şi Straja Ţării," *Biserica Ortodoxă Română* LVIII, no. 11–12 (1939): 605.

Treptow, K. W., and G Buzatu, eds. *"Procesul' lui Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu (Mai, 1938)*. Iaşi: S.C. Dosoftei, 1994.

Veiga, Francisco. *La Mística del Ultranacionalismo. Historia de la Guardia de Hierron. Rumania, 1919-1941*. Bellaterra: Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, 1989.

7

TEACHING THE NEW FAITH

The Legion's Rule (1940–1941)

In the summer of 1940, Romania suffered massive territorial losses, ceding Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union (June 28), Northern Transylvania to Hungary (August 30), and Southern Dobrudja to Bulgaria in early September. Since the official propaganda of the royal dictatorship had portrayed the monarch as a guarantor of Romania's territorial integrity, these losses confronted Carol's regime with a deep crisis of legitimization, leading to mass demonstrations and open unrest. In a desperate attempt to rescue his rule, Carol II brought General Ion Antonescu to power on September 4. Adept in authoritarianism and integral nationalism, Antonescu emerged in the 1930s as a staunch critic of the multiparty parliamentary regime. In December 1937, Antonescu joined, at the king's insistence, the Goga government as Minister of Defense. However, Antonescu resigned at the end of March 1938 and subsequently refused to serve again as minister during the royal dictatorship. In response to his critical attitude toward the king's entourage and policies, Antonescu was confined to forced domicile, first outside the capital and later at the Bistrița Monastery. Despite this confinement, the king never lost hope of co-opting Antonescu. In September 1940, Carol II thought that, in view of Antonescu's authoritarian personality and the prestige he had accumulated in nationalist circles, the General would be able to stabilize the political situation and thus implicitly save his monarchic rule. Antonescu accepted Carol's offer to take power; however, after brief political consultations, the general demanded full powers and forced the king's abdication in favor of his son, Michael. Thus, General Antonescu dissolved both the royal dictatorship and Carol's rule. In several public proclamations, Antonescu asserted that his advent to power did not simply mean the establishment of "a new government, but of a new regime,"[1] with the declared goal of "saving the State and the Nation." To achieve this aim, Antonescu pledged to govern on a new basis, following principles that "will emerge entirely from the

DOI: 10.4324/9780429428043-10

creed of integral nationalism."[2] Adopting an authoritarian-paternalist rhetoric, he called on Romanians to display "order, work, discipline and obeisance."[3]

In need of a mass political movement to legitimize his authoritarian rule, the general co-opted the Legion to power. A communiqué of the Council of Ministers informed the public that the general had "addressed the country and the Legion with a call for union and action," which was accepted with "joy and enthusiasm."[4] The Legion thus became the ruling party and supplied cadres for the administration and the government. It nevertheless had to share executive power with the army. Thus, in addition to serving as prime minister and minister of defense, General Antonescu imposed the control of the army over the ministries of justice, economy, and finance. After arduous negotiations, the Legion managed to obtain the post of vice prime minister, held by Horia Sima. In addition, the Legion controlled the Ministries of the Interior and Foreign Affairs, as well as all the ministries in charge of social policies (i.e., the Ministry of National Education, Cults and Arts; the Ministry of Work; the Ministry of Health and Social Protection; and the Ministry of Press and Propaganda), five sub-secretary posts, general directorships, and directorships within ministries. While the position of the Legion was apparently strong, it nevertheless lacked control over the army, the justice system, and the economy. Moreover, in addition to controlling the key Ministries of Defense, Economy, and Finance, General Antonescu had the upper hand in the decision-making process as head of the government.[5]

Based on this agreement, General Antonescu proclaimed the National Legionary State on September 14, 1940. The new state was founded on three main principles: it was "national, Christian and totalitarian."[6] First, the National Legionary State was totalitarian in structure: a series of decrees sanctioned by the new King Michael I concentrated power into the hands of General Antonescu. Royal Decree 3052—promulgated on September 5, 1940—suspended the 1938 Constitution and dissolved the Party of the Nation and the Romanian Parliament for an indefinite period. In doing so, the decree dismantled the last remnants of the party system that survived under Carol's dictatorship, replacing it with a totalitarian structure. Royal Decree 3053, passed the same day, created the new position of Head of State (*Conducătorul Statului*), invested with "full powers to lead the Romanian state" (Article 1) to whom public functionaries had to swear an oath of "loyalty and faith." Ten days later, Royal Decree 3151 defined the Legion as "the only political movement recognized in the new state" (Article 2), while General Antonescu was "the leader of the Legionary state and chief of the Legionary regime" (Article 3). As the only legal political party, the Legion alone could provide cadres to fill positions in the political and bureaucratic apparatus, together with politically non-engaged army officers. This monopoly on political life was accompanied by the politicization of the administration, which was populated by Legionaries appointed by Antonescu as prefects and mayors at the local level, with the recommendation of Horia Sima. The main aim of the new regime was to build a unified totalitarian party-state structure. However, while in politically monolithic totalitarian structures there is usually a symbiosis between the

state and the party, in the National Legionary State the two branches were to be kept separate: once they joined the government, the Legionaries were expected to follow the policy line established by the Council of Ministers strictly. "With Mr. Sima we have an agreement that the entire political side is conducted by the Movement. The party does not mingle in the governing acts, however," claimed Antonescu.[7] Political issues were to be negotiated at the highest level, between Antonescu and Sima.

Following the abolition of the Parliament, the Council of Ministers—led by General Antonescu as head of state and prime minister—was invested with full legislative powers, being in charge of the elaboration, approval, and execution of laws. In order to concentrate power further, Antonescu created a narrow Cabinet Council made up of himself as head of state, the vice prime minister, and a handful of leading ministers (i.e., those of the interior, foreign affairs, defense, and national economy). The Cabinet Council met weekly, drafted laws, and took all major decisions, which were then formally put on the agenda of the larger Council of Ministers, which met every two weeks on average. "This Cabinet Council is the real Government," confessed Antonescu, "since it is responsible for state policy and for the coordination of all governmental activities."[8]

Although technically Romania remained a monarchy, King Michael I's role became largely ceremonial. Since both the Parliament and the constitution were suspended, the young king took a (modified) oath of allegiance in an ad hoc ceremony organized on September 6, 1940, attended by General Antonescu. It should be noted that Michael I was not invested by the Parliament, as was routinely the case, but was crowned and anointed by the Orthodox Patriarch Nicodim himself. The unprecedented nature of this ritual added to the new king's legitimacy. In reaction, General Antonescu disputed, later on, the charismatic legitimacy of Michael: "We cannot accept the mentality of Antiquity and the Middle Ages anymore, that He is a providential being on earth, the representative of God, who inspires him."[9] Apparently, Antonescu's objections were a direct reaction to Carol II's extravagant charismatic claims and state-sponsored cult of personality; yet, this criticism was also meant to make room for the General's own, rival charismatic pretense of being a providential leader meant to salvage Romania.

Politically, the position of the king in the new regime was considerably weakened. In theory, Michael retained certain nominal powers, such as the right to appoint the prime minister; in practice, however, decisional powers were fully in the hands of Antonescu as Head of State, head of the government, and commander of the army. Overall, the new political reforms conferred full legislative powers and complete control over the administrative apparatus to Antonescu. Representative institutions were abolished, and absolute power was concentrated at the top. There was, however, a certain ambiguity in the exercise of power between the Legion and the army (for this dual leadership, see Figure 7.1): the former was represented in the government with only a few ministers but was more heavily represented in the lower branches of the administration.

FIGURE 7.1 Romanian leader Ion Antonescu (left) and Legionary Commander Horia Sima at the Victory Parade, Bucharest, October 6, 1940, under the portrait of the deceased leader Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu

Source: Photo by Tempel Marek, Associated Press-Photo, Berlin, Reference code: 2-16310, Collection "Krakow-Warsaw Press Publishing House," National Digital Archives, Poland (https://www.szukajwarchiwach.gov.pl/en/jednostka/-/jednostka/5900103/obiekty/348451#opis_obiekt).

The second pillar in the organization of the totalitarian state was its "national" character, based on the doctrine of integral nationalism. The implementation of this doctrine under the National Legionary State had two main components: (1) the denaturalization and removal of the Jews, and (2) the redistribution of their property in order to consolidate the Romanian upper and middle classes. As mentioned above, following on the anti-Jewish legislation introduced by the Goga government in January 1938, in August 1940 two antisemitic decrees stripped the entire Jewish population of substantive political and civic rights. The system of segregation and discrimination against the Jews was continued and intensified during the National Legionary State, which turned antisemitic legislation into comprehensive state policy. New anti-Jewish decrees were passed on September 5, 6, 7, and 19; these stripped Jews of additional civil and political rights and effectively sealed off Jewish communities from Romanian society. Additional decrees banned Jews from working in liberal professions. Decree Law 3437 of October 17, 1940 limited Jewish lawyers—except those who had fought in the Romanian army and were decorated or who were war invalids—to working

only for Jewish clients. The places vacated by Jewish lawyers were taken up by Christians (Article 3). Fraud or failure to comply with the law was severely punished with exorbitant fines or even prison sentences ranging from one to three months.[10] According to Mihai Antonescu, the decree was "inspired by nationalist principles"; its aim was to assure the dominance of Romanians and to create places for Romanian lawyers coming in from occupied territories.[11] Following a decree concerning the military status of Jews adopted on December 5, 1940, another decree dated January 21, 1941 imposed military "protection" taxes on Jews, in addition to labor obligations, including upon those who were not fit for military activity. Only Jews who had mobilized into the army and those who had served in the army as officers or non-commissioned officers were exempt from these taxes. Jews who could not afford to pay the tax had to carry out additional forced labor. Those who tried to hide or declare a reduced income were punished with fines that were twice or even three times their tax obligation.[12]

Another main component of the doctrine of integral nationalism was the campaign to Romanianize the economy. The antisemitic policies of the Antonescu regime did not only consist of legal discrimination, marginalization, and later deportation of the Jews, but also of the confiscation and redistribution of their wealth. In Nazi Germany, the process of property confiscation was euphemistically called "Aryanization"; in Romania, it was defined as "Romanianization."[13] This terminological difference reflected a major adjustment in the scope of these policies: a main concern of the Romanian government during the implementation of the campaign of Romanianization was to minimize the takeover of the expropriated Jewish property by non-Romanians (including members of ethnic minorities of "Aryan" origin), and instead to transfer these properties completely to the ownership of ethnic Romanians. As Mihai Antonescu pointed out, the "work leading to the national purification of property" did not only mean the "removal of foreigners, but [also] their substitution with the Romanian element."[14]

The process of forceful property transfer was very arduous, for several reasons. First, it was a complex and laborious campaign, made up of a myriad of transactions in multiple fields. Second, the success of this campaign depended on the existence of a bureaucratic apparatus that could register, classify, take over, and redistribute property to local Romanians or colonists. A third obstacle in the process of the Romanization of the economy was the fact that the Jews were essential to the successful running of Romanian industry. In practice, the process of replacement therefore needed to be gradual, since many valuable Jewish managers had to be retained temporarily until they could be replaced by newly trained cadres of Romanian ethnic origin. Soon, two strategies crystallized within the National Legionary State: one gradual, supported by General Antonescu, based on a centralized, top-down process of property redistribution, which demagogically called for "law and order" in the process of Romanianization; and another one, promoted by the Legion, which conceived of Romanianization as a violent process of property dispossession conducted by uncoordinated Legionary cells at the local level. Despite the political imperatives dictated by the adoption of antisemitism as a central element of the official ideology of the state, and the

numerous abuses of Legionaries at grass root level, the gradual approach prevailed. In September 1940, General Antonescu spelled out this strategy, stating that: "I will solve the Jewish Question in the course of the process of organizing the state, *slowly* substituting the Jews with the Romanians, first and foremost with Legionaries, who will be preparing in the meantime."[15]

The legal framework of the process of Romanization was laid out in late 1940 and early 1941. Decree Law 3347 of October 5, 1940 stripped Jews of all agricultural property.[16] The properties seized from Jews became state property and were handed over to the sub-secretariat of state for colonization and the evacuated population to assist with the resettlement of ethnic Romanian refugees from Bessarabia and Bukovina, which had been occupied by the Soviet Union (Article 9). Another decree adopted on November 17, 1940, extended the scope of the confiscation to forests and rural industries of all kind, including mills, factories and distilleries owned by Jewish individuals or associations. In his report to General Antonescu, the Minister of Justice Mihai A. Antonescu justified this new wave of confiscations with "an old Romanian conception according to which rural properties—the main source of the country's wealth—should belong to Romanians." Since under the National Legionary State this term was understood in an ethnic and not a formal legal sense, it followed that all rural properties owned by members of minority (non-Romanian) ethnic groups had to be transferred to ethnic Romanians.[17] The decree defined Jews as "all those having both or only one Jewish parent, regardless of whether they or their parents are currently baptized in a religion other than the Mosaic one, are Romanian citizens, or live in Romania."[18]

The third ideological pillar of the new totalitarian regime was the doctrine of the Christian state. In numerous proclamations, both the general and the Legion reconfirmed Orthodoxy as the state's dominant religion. Yet, the two parties had divergent attitudes toward the Orthodox Church: the general was willing to work together with Patriarch Nicodim to consolidate the church, while the Legion criticized church leaders and demanded a thorough institutional re-organization of the church meant to subordinate it to the Legion's political faith. The campaign for reforming the church was, however, rather hesitant and did not lead to significant results, ending in a kind of political *modus vivendi* with the church leadership (for details, see Chapter 9).

Integral Nationalism Versus Fascism: the Legion's Fall from Power

The Legion's rise to power opened a new phase in its evolution. Rather unexpectedly, an organization that started as an anti-systemic movement of change on the fringes of the political system managed to seize state power. The Legion thus acquired the means legally to rehabilitate itself; to indoctrinate the masses; to implement its agenda of radical political transformation; to provide its followers with rewards; to punish its enemies; and to contribute to building a new fascist political order in Europe. The Legion prided itself on the fact that it was chronologically "the

fourth national revolution" in Europe after the fascist regime in Italy, the National Socialist regime in Germany, and Franco's nationalist regime in Spain. Romanian fascists attempted to derive legitimacy from their alliance with these regimes by underscoring their active participation in building a new, "heroic" Europe.

Despite the favorable international context, the Legion's rule was marred by internal weaknesses and external political constraints. First, the two years of bloody repression during the royal dictatorship (1938–1940) resulted in disorganization and lack of leadership. In evaluating the impact of state repression, Armin Heinen went as far as to argue that in 1939–1940 the Legion was effectively destroyed as a political *movement*: "Under the shock of rigorous state repression, the Legionary Movement dismembered, what remained from it representing only a small terrorist organization of cadres."[19] Its main organizational problem was therefore the lack of politically experienced cadres to populate the state administration. Second, due to the rapid unfolding of events, the Legion was forced to transition, in a very short period, from an underground movement to a ruling party. Yet, after two years of harsh repression, the Legion was unprepared to rule. While well-adapted for small-scale terrorist insurgencies, the Legion's decentralized cell structure made coordination on the national level particularly difficult. Since the Legion was accustomed to work in a clandestine mode, its members found it easier to continue employing conspiratorial methods even when they were in power. Third, the emergence of Sima as a national leader changed the nature of the Legion. The movement was, at its origin, a family enterprise, being effectively led by Codreanu the son, Codreanu the father, and Moța, their brother- and son-in-law, respectively, joined then by personal friends and family. Sima did not have ties to the Codreanu family and was regarded as an intruder and a potential factor of disturbance by the Captain's father, Ion Zelea Codreanu, and his collaborators. In addition, there were suspicions that Sima was linked to, and thus susceptible to blackmail by, the secret services.[20]

For these reasons, the Legion's rule evolved from entropy to anarchy. Its demise from power in January 1941 was accelerated by its internal weaknesses, its rather vulnerable political position in the new regime, and its troubled relationship with General Antonescu. The Legion and the general represented two related yet distinct streams of nationalism. Attempts at cooperation between the two parties had taken place during the late 1930s as well, as part of previous attempts to form a grand anti-Carol coalition of the radical right, but the outcome of those negotiations was rather discouraging. Antonescu was, both then and later, in favor of a large nationalist coalition based on the principles of integral nationalism and focused on a guided, top-down process of sociopolitical transformation. However, the Legion rejected any cooperation with the National Christian Defense League (*Liga Apărării Național-Creștine*, LANC) or its successor, the National Christian Party, and called instead for a revolutionary, grass roots transformation of society led exclusively by the Legionaries. Another major disagreement between General Antonescu and the Legion regarded the political methods employed to implement the agenda of integral nationalism.



FIGURE 7.2 Portrait of Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu. Such propaganda materials were taken at face value and internalized by Codreanu's family and followers. The report of a Securitate informant during the communist period stated that Decebal Codreanu, Corneliu's brother, was convinced that "Codreanu was a God. As proof, he lent me the newspaper *Buna vestire de duminică*, December 1940, as a document illustrating what kind of man Codreanu really was." See ACNSAS, Fond "Arhiva Operativă," File Moța Iridenta R 396591, 121.

Source: Cover of the inaugural issue of *Buna vestire de duminică* I, no. 1 (December 1, 1940).

The Legion's traditional clandestine organization and terrorist mode of action shaped its approach to violence: during its rule, the Legionaries continued to promote underground methods, based on the unruly violence of small units. This orientation put the Legion in conflict with General Antonescu. While sharing its aims of Romanianizing the economy and of removing the Jews from the public and the economic sectors, Antonescu opted for a top-down process of

FIGURE 7.3 Portrait of Horia Sima as head of the Iron Guard (*comandantul*), in Legionary green paramilitary uniform

Source: Cover of *Buna vestire de duminică* II, no. 8 (January 19, 1941).

dispossession. From his perspective, the ad hoc violent actions of the Legionary squads were not only lawless but also disruptive of the complex, long-term process of nationalizing the economy.

Given these political differences, the collaboration between General Antonescu and the Legion was marred by suspicion, and soon degenerated in private and public confrontations. The two parties provided different accounts of the circumstances in which the collapse of the dictatorship and the establishment of the new regime took place.[21] Emulating the "paradigmatic" example of Italian Fascists' March on Rome in 1922, the Legion's propaganda argued that in the first days of September there occurred a large-scale Legionary armed revolt, a genuine "revolution" that brought about the collapse of Carol's tyrannical regime and their ascension to power. Because of those events, the general had no choice but to collaborate with the Legion as the most energetic, most articulate political movement of the day. In turn, General Antonescu argued that it was his actions and courage that put an end to the royal dictatorship, and that he voluntarily and graciously offered the Legion the opportunity to share in the exercise of power.[22]

Second, the Legion's propaganda contended that Antonescu was never sincere in his cooperation, and that all he wanted was to compromise the Legion in order to disband it. In contrast, General Antonescu asserted that the Legion planned from the very beginning to seize full power. He also argued that its lawless and chaotic actions compromised the National Legionary State, forcing him to act decisively.

Third, and most importantly, the primary source of this mistrust was the different political visions of the two parts, evident in their divergent discourses and actions. General Antonescu shared the main principles of integral nationalism, but wanted to implement the nationalization of the state through a gradual process, coordinated from above in an "orderly" fashion. He also pleaded for a broad coalition of all valuable nationalist forces, rejecting sectarianism and internal struggles within the nationalist camp. His main ideological emphasis was not on the palingenetic rebirth of the *nation*, but on the salvation of the *state*, and through it, of the nation. To this end, he planned to rely on the state administration and mainstream national institutions, such as the church, schools, and the army. Ultimately, his actions were not designed to bring about a social revolution from below, but to shelter and consolidate the interests of the Romanian bourgeoisie to the detriment of ethnoreligious minorities. It is in this context that one can understand his pleas for law, order, lack of violence, and respect for property. These principles were meant to contain the lawless actions of the Legion, but they were not to be applied to ethnoreligious minorities, who were placed outside the protection of the Romanian laws by way of discriminatory policies.

The Legion, in turn, called for a revolutionary transformation of society through the complete elimination of the old political class and its replacement with a new elite; the nationalization of the economy and trade through the elimination of ethnoreligious minorities and the transfer of their property to Romanians; and the indoctrination of the masses in the Legion's ideology.[23] Although highly ambitious in its goals, the Legion did not have a comprehensive

program of socio-economic transformation and lacked both the cohesion and discipline necessary to implement such a long-term agenda. Its ad hoc activities were meant to provide immediate material and political satisfaction to its supporters, who were eager to seize economic and political power. Soon, however, the Legionaries' violent and uncoordinated actions brought chaos and disorganization to the state administration.

The structural crisis in the relationship between the Legion and General Antonescu was to paralyze the new regime soon, generating numerous top-level exchanges and confrontations. In a first exchange of letters between the two leaders in mid-October 1940, Sima reproached the General for his tolerance of the old order and its politicians and demanded a political purge as well as more room of political maneuvering for the Legion. Antonescu replied that there could not be two heads of state, and urged the Legion to choose cooperation or divorce. At the end of October, Sima answered in an apparently conciliatory tone, reiterating the Legion's willingness to work together with Antonescu. At the same time, however, Sima unambiguously noted that "the Legionary regime demands rule in the Legionary spirit: totalitarian rule. Totalitarian rule means the political monopoly of one movement, the one that has prevailed, or exclusivity, if you wish: so it is in Italy, so it is in Germany. In Romania there is no place for any other party or for any other grouping."[24] In his answer, Antonescu reassured Sima of the communion of goals and interests between himself and the Legion, despite their different approaches:

> I want what you want as well, but by other means and at a pace dictated by wisdom. We cannot demolish everything in a single day. We need a system, we need to persevere with our efforts. We need to demolish and rebuild bit by bit. As all these are linked together in a living organism, we have to carefully study each problem before taking action.[25]

Given these superficially compatible but fundamentally irreconcilable positions, the final confrontation was a matter of "when" rather than "if." Irritated by the violent and unruly abuses of the Legionaries at the grass roots level, which culminated in the assassination of 65 former state dignitaries in November 1940,[26] Antonescu gradually limited the Legion's administrative authority, political autonomy, and ability to act, while secretly seeking Berlin's support for removing the Legion from power. Aware that the final confrontation was inevitable, the Legion intensified its clandestine activities and prepared for an armed insurrection while making a concerted effort to undermine Nazi Germany's trust in Antonescu.

The military confrontation between the Legion and the Army took place through January 21–23, 1941, by a series of anti-Legionary measures taken by General Antonescu. First, on January 19, 1940, Antonescu published a governmental decree disbanding the (Legionary) body of commissars of Romanianization, who were notorious for their abuses.[27] The governmental report accompanying the decree demanded "the organization of a unitary system of action and control,"

which would eliminate "the danger of economic chaos in the national production and trade, caused to the disorderly transfer of industrial and commercial units."[28] To bring order in this process, the decree established a special commission within the Ministry of National Economy in charge of supervising all future acts and transactions concerning industrial enterprises. Second, following the assassination of the German Army Major Helmuth Döring, a member of the German Military Mission in Romania by a Greek citizen in Bucharest on January 19, General Antonescu dismissed a series of high Legionary officials, including the Minister of Internal Affairs, General C. Petrovicescu; the General-Director of the General Police Division, Alexandru Ghica; the Director of General Division of State Safety, Constantin Maimuca; and the Prefect of Bucharest Police, Radu Mironovici, each considered directly responsible for this security breach. Resenting these decisions as deliberate attacks on the Legion's position and interests, armed Legionary units barricaded themselves in their local centers or occupied key state institutions, ammunition deposits, and gas stations in Bucharest and other locations around the country. After heavy fights but also intense negotiations, the Army managed to isolate and surround the Legionary centers of resistance. Following the Legionaries' refusal to surrender their guns by a given deadline, the Army proceeded to eliminate the rebels by force, in order to "cleanse" Bucharest and other cities.[29] Facing defeat, Sima issued a communiqué on January 23, demanding all Legionaries to cease resistance and give up their arms.[30] The massive military confrontations inflicted significant casualties among the army and the civilian populations, but also among the Legionaries. According to official figures published in the press, 21 officers, sub-officers, and soldiers died throughout the country, and 53 were wounded. In addition, 236 civilians were killed by the rebels in Bucharest alone (among which were 118 Jews), and 254 were injured. Outside Bucharest, there were 117 dead civilians and 73 wounded, amounting to a total of 374 dead and 380 wounded civilians throughout the country.[31] No official figures were provided on the Legionary losses.

The two sides provided radically different accounts of the events. On the one hand, the Legionary statements issued during the events blamed British secret services and their "allies" in Romania, the "Liberal" or "Jewish" "Masonic hydra," for sparking the conflict as part of a "Satanic" conspiracy to take over Romania.[32] A manifesto entitled "Our Position [*Pozitia noastră*]" published by Horia Stamatu in *Buna Vestire* on January 22, 1941 was quick to proclaim the victory of "totalitarian nationalism" and promised the elimination of all traitors that "poison in the body of the nation." To the General's calls for legality, Stamatu opposed the Legion's charismatic-revolutionary form of authority, claiming "laws outside the law on the existence of the nation do not exist."[33] Invoking the spirit of the Captain, other leading Legionaries demanded a "Legionary Government" and the implementation of a "Total Legionary Revolution."[34] They accused General Antonescu of national betrayal, arguing that his anti-Legionary actions were illegal—a genuine *coup d'état*—and that the Legion did nothing else but defended its position in the state.[35]

On the other hand, in addition to harsh repression, General Antonescu orchestrated a substantial propaganda campaign in order irrevocably to compromise the Legion's actions in the eyes of the Romanian public.[36] The official propaganda machine obscured the anti-Legionary measures taken by the General prior to the conflict and instead accused the Legion of staging an unprovked "rebellion" against the state. Reportedly, the term was inspired directly by Adolf Hitler, who, on January 23, authorized Antonescu to treat the Legionaries as "rebels" and to refuse any negotiations.[37] The official press emphasized the extreme violence employed by the "rebels," revealing that numerous Legionary victims showed signs of mutilation.[38] Building on previous anti-Legionary official discourses, it also condemned the use of terrorism to reach political aims, claiming that "the Romanian people cannot be conquered with terrorism, it can be won over with kindliness, persuasion, and gentleness."[39]

Although Antonescu condemned the rebellion in categorical words, the regime propaganda refrained from accusing the Legion in its entirety, since at that point the general still preserved hopes of collaborating with a more moderate wing of the movement: "Romanians, together with the Legionaries whose hearts are still beating for the Fatherland … we will build the Legionary regime of virtuous people."[40] Tactfully, therefore, Antonescu blamed the "rebellion" on "a gang of 600 wrongdoers … of the lowest kind." He accredited the idea that the "rebels" were not true Legionaries, but rather a band of communists who "hid themselves in the Legionary movement to serve alien aims."[41] The official press further endorsed this allegation, positing that the rebellion was conducted by "foreigners, enemies manipulated and aid from abroad," who "joined our communists."[42] "The Legionary Movement? But who could make the impiety to suggest a link between the idealism of Corneliu Codreanu's martyrdom and the gangs of wrongdoers who ravaged the country in the infamous night of 21 to 22 January? … No. The madness of those days of dark terror, which resembles closely the excesses and the tactics employed by the red anarchy, was strictly a communist work."[43]

Despite Antonescu's pledge to revive the Legion, it soon became clear that, following the military confrontation, the organization was de facto eliminated from the political scene.[44] The Legionaries who took part in the rebellion were arrested, given public trials, and swiftly sentenced to death or forced labor. The main leaders of the Legion, led by Sima, managed, however, to find shelter abroad, mostly in Germany, being used by the Nazi authorities as an instrument of pressure and a potential political alternative to Antonescu. Although some Legionaries sided with the General and publicly repudiated the rebellion—such as, most notably, Ion Zelea Codreanu, the Captain's father—Antonescu soon understood that his initial plans of reviving the Legion were illusory. Therefore, even though in late January 1941 the General renewed his pledge to consolidate further the National Legionary State in collaboration with those "virtuous" Legionaries who remained loyal to the regime,[45] on February 14, 1941 he abolished the National Legionary State after only five months of existence and prohibited

all forms of political activity and propaganda. A new wave of anti-Legion repression was unleashed, meant fully to neutralize the movement. By February 25, 1941, the authorities had arrested 4,638 Legionaries in Bucharest and another 4,714 in the countryside.[46] They were either sentenced to prison or allowed to fight in special military units against the USSR on the Eastern front.[47] Later on, Antonescu allowed certain Legionaries to reintegrate themselves in society if they did not participate in rebellion. On October 12, 1942, he argued that "there were proper Legionaries as well. Those who behave properly should be granted the possibility to live honestly, and can also be used [by the regime]."[48] The most eager to cooperate with Antonescu was the so-called "moderate group" led by Ion Dumitrescu-Borșa, Gheorghe Ciorogariu, and Ioan Vojen. Dumitrescu-Borșa, general inspector in the Central Office of Romanianization, attempted to unite the "moderates" with the faction led by Sima and thus recreate the movement, but without the undesirable Sima. Nevertheless, by the end of 1942, Dumitrescu-Borșa disbanded the moderate faction, acknowledging that neither the government nor the Legionaries understood his initiative.[49]

The elimination of the Legion from power led to important structural changes in the organization of the Antonescu regime. A military government was formed, and Mihai A. Antonescu was invested with extended powers as the main ideologue of the regime and General Antonescu's main collaborator.[50] Although occasionally still invoking the Legion's "ideological spirit" and the Captain's legacy, Antonescu pledged a new state organization, aimed at eliminating internal strife by reconciling social classes and generations.[51] The new regime continued to be structured along the principles of integral nationalism and to rest on the three main pillars: the army, the church, and the family. The concerted propaganda of the regime condemned party politics as evil and sectarian, and promoted instead the ideas of national unity and unconditional devotion to the national cause. A new official newspaper called *Union: Newspaper of National Combat* (*Unirea: Ziar de luptă națională*) was launched in February 1941, with the aim of propagating ideas of unity and social harmony. The newspaper advocated an authoritarian and patriarchal organization of society, under the leadership of the General and with the express support of the Orthodox Patriarch: "To the call of General Antonescu, the Savior of the Romanian State, responds, unanimously and demonstratively, the freed nation."[52] In addition, the official press revived elements of the doctrine of social militarism, praising the role of the army in the work of national salvation and territorial reunification, and spreading military values in society. In an article published on January 26, 1941, just after the Legionary Rebellion, and writing in the commemoration of the 1859 union of Moldova and Wallachia on January 24, 1859, the magazine *Vremea* underscored the new emphasis on militarism and discipline leading to national salvation under the leadership of General Antonescu: "We are all military men, we are all loyal soldiers of the Country and of the King. … Tomorrow, in war, we take on us the military outfit, walking ahead under the leadership of God and of the General, for replacing our state borders in the place where our ancestors had settled it."[53]

Without a mass party to provide popular legitimization to his rule, Ion Antonescu developed his own cult of personality. The regime's propaganda portrayed the General as a predestined hero and the true savior of the country, "a name with mythical dimension,"[54] who "embeds the Romanian destiny."[55] To secure a semblance of legitimacy, the General organized plebiscites on his policies in March and November 1941. In his appeal to the voters, Antonescu declared himself an implacable adversary of "parasite capitalism," and—in the spirit of "true nationalism"—pledged to promote "nationalist reforms for reinstating the Romanian people to its saintly rights."[56] Approximately three million people voted in the first referendum, while three and a half million voted in the second. In each case, 99.99 percent of the participants voted in favor of the regime.[57] The results of the first referendum of March 6, 1941, were proclaimed "a formidable moral victory of the General,"[58] who proved he is "not a Dictator, but is invested with a Mandate by the Romanian people."[59] The absolute unanimity obtained—99 percent, "a percentage which only Adolf Hitler had been able to achieve" to that date—proved that six months after the emergence of the "national revolution" of September 6, 1940, "the Romanian consciousness regained its unity" under the leadership of General Antonescu but also inspired by the "German miracle."[60]

The ideal of national unity did not include, however, the country's ethnoreligious minorities: numerous antisemitic articles called for the removal of the Jews from Romanian society and the confiscation of their properties. General Antonescu expressed this principle unambiguously, stating that: "This new state will be founded on the principle of Romanian predominance in all fields and it will rest on our agrarian and peasant structure. Its foundation stones will be the National and the Social."[61] For Antonescu, the national and the social questions were organically linked: the elimination of Jews from the national body was conceived not only as an ethnic cleansing operation but also as a state-sponsored campaign of large-scale social engineering.

The project of eliminating Jews from the Romanian society, which started under the National Legionary State, thus continued with vigor under the new Antonescu regime. After ousting the Legion from power, General Antonescu took additional steps toward the creation of appropriate institutions and legislation necessary to solve the Jewish Question in Romania in an "organized" manner, in line with the Nazi model.[62] The process of property confiscation was further broadened by the decree for the transfer of all Jewish urban properties to the state patrimony adopted on March 27,1941, which, argued Mihai A. Antonescu, was meant "to restore the historical rights of the Romanian nation."[63] To coordinate the process of property re-allocation, on May 3, 1941 the *Subsecretariatul pentru Problemele Românizării, Colonizării şi Inventarului* [Under-Secretariat for Romanianization, Colonization, and Inventory] was established within the Ministry of National Economy, led by General Eugen Zwiedeneck until December 6, 1941. The official aim of the new organ was to turn the expropriation of Jewish property into a great constructive and educational reform, empowering Romanian owners.

Following Romania's entry into the war against the Soviet Union in June 1941, Antonescu decided to deport the Jews from Bukovina and Bessarabia, just freed from Soviet occupation, and even agreed to collaborate with Germany in implementing the "Final Solution" in organizing the deportation of Romanian Jews to Nazi extermination camps. After 1942, however, with the military situation on the Eastern Front worsening, the Romanian authorities eventually gave up on their plans of deporting the Jews from the Banat and Southern Transylvania, and ultimately refused to send them to the Nazi camps. Overall, Antonescu's Jewish policy exhibits a contradictory outcome: in Bessarabia, Bukovina, and on the Eastern Front, Romania conducted an antisemitic campaign of "cleansing" that resulted in the death of between 280,000 to 380,000 Jews.[64] At the same time, despite considerable German pressure, Romania's Jews from the Old Kingdom and Southern Transylvania were not deported to Nazi death camps but were placed under a harsh system of state-organized exploitation and discrimination. As a result, about 350,000 Romanian Jews survived the war, the largest compact Jewish population to do so in Central Europe. It should be noted that the Legion, together with LANC and the NCP, was instrumental in forging a climate of rabid antisemitism in Romania and in pioneering forms of anti-Jewish violence that paved the way to the adoption of genocidal state policies of discrimination and deportation; yet, due to its early elimination from power, the Legion was not directly involved in the full implementation of these policies, which were further pursued and amplified by other conservative-nationalist or radical right sections of the Romanian political elites.

Notes

1 Ion Antonescu, "Proclamație către țară," September 6, 1940, in *Generalul Antonescu către țară, 6 septemvrie 1940–22 iunie 1941* (Bucuresti: Imprimeria națională, 1941), 11.
2 Ibid.
3 "Proclamația generalului Ion Antonescu către țară" September 6, 1940, and "Chemarea Generalului către țară, la 7 Septembrie 1940," *Pe Marginea Prăpastiei. Ion Antonescu și Mișcarea Legionară, 21–23 ianuarie 1941* (București: Scripta, 2014), 64, 71–72.
4 "Apelul la ordine și muncă al Conducătorului statului, din 11 Septembrie 1940," and "Apelul către țară al generalului din 11 Septembrie 1940," *Pe Marginea Prăpastiei*, 76–78.
5 For a Legionary perspective on these negotiations, and a critical, retrospective evaluation of the Legion's position in the new regime, see Sima, *Era libertății*, vol. 1, 19–20.
6 For the legal foundation of the Legionary regime, see Generalul Ion Antonescu, *Temelia statului național-legionar: 6 septembrie 1940–6 octombrie 1940* (București: Monitorul Oficial și Imprimeriile Statului. Imprimeria Centrală, 1940). The book presents the most important decrees adopted by the new regime during its first month of rule.
7 Marcel-Dumitru Ciucă, Aurelian Teodorescu, and Bogdan Florin Popovici, eds., *Stenogramele ședințelor Consiliului de Miniștri: guvernarea Ion Antonescu* (București: Arhivele Naționale ale României, 1997), vol. 1 (Sept.–Dec. 1940), 71.
8 Ibid.
9 Gen. Ion Antonescu, Sept. 7, 1940, *Stenogramele ședințelor*, vol. 1, 12.
10 "Decree Law 3437, October 17, 1940, concerning the rights of Jewish lawyers," *Noua legislațiune cu privire la evrei* (Buchaest, Curierul Judicial, 1940), 14.
11 M. A. Antonescu, "Raportul d-lui Ministru al Justiției către Conducătorul Statului și Președintele Consiliului de Miniștri, 10 October 1940," *Noua legislațiune cu privire la evrei*, 15.

12 "Decree Law 132, January 21, 1941, concerning the military taxes due by Jews," *Noua legislaţiune cu privire la evrei*, 16–23.
13 See "Decretul-lege no. 1216, pentru înfiinţarea Centrului Naţional de Românizare, Mai 3, 1941," [modified by Decree no. 2816, October 10, 1941, and Decree no. 692 on March 6, 1942] in *Codul de Românizare*, edited by Nicolae D. Ghimpa et al. (Bucureşti: Editura Ziarului Universul, 1942), 30–43, 64–82, 102.
14 Mihai Antonescu, May 2, 1941, *Codul de Românizare*, 136.
15 I. Antonescu, statement for the Italian newspaper *La stampa*, September 26, 1940, in *Antonescu către ţară*, 43. My emphasis.
16 "Decree Law 3347, October 5, 1940, concerning the transfer of Jewish rural properties to the state," *Noua legislaţiune cu privire la evrei*, 3.
17 M. A. Antonescu, "Raportul d-lui Ministru al Justiţiei," 12.
18 *Noua legislaţiune cu privire la evrei*, 3.
19 Heinen, *Legiunea Arhangelului Mihail*, 29.
20 The resentment of Codreanu's family toward Horia Sima is confirmed by the confessions of Iridenta Moţa extracted during the communist period by Securitate informers. The first encounter between the two took place in October 1940, when Sima paid a visit to Iridenta in the hope of winning her over to his side, given her high status and influence in the Legion as the widow of Moţa and sister of Codreanu. Iridenta painted a highly negative picture of Sima, portraying him as arrogant, atheist, and ignorant of the Legionary spirit. Moreover, Iridenta stated her conviction that Sima was a traitor, being in fact manipulated by the secret service led by Moruzov. Reportedly, she felt the need to lecture Sima on the fact that "the Legion started from the icon of the saint Archangel Michael; while the Archangel fought against the evil in the sky, the Legionaries fight against the evil on earth." Iridenta also claimed that she managed to convince important Legionary leaders such as Constant and Iaşinschi of Sima's treacherous nature, but she also stated, in a defeatist manner, that "nothing could be done, because Sima controlled the youth, while Codreanu's men were fewer and fewer." See ACNSAS, Arhiva Operativă, Moţa Iridenta R 396591, 10.
21 V. V. Blănaru-Flamură, *Generalul Antonescu în Cămaşa Verde Legionară: Detronarea Regelui Carol al II-lea şi 'Rebeliunea' Văzute din Stradă, de la Radiodifuziunea Română şi din 'Buncărul' Antoneştilor* (Bucureşti: Sepco, 1995). For Antonescu's view, see *Pe Marginea Prăpastiei*, a propaganda book originally published in 1941.
22 See Antonescu's statement "I am the one who decided on September 7 to organize the National Legionary State," February 1, 1941, in *Antonescu către ţară*, 233.
23 Horia Sima, "Appeal to the Legionnaires," September 15, 1940, *Pe Marginea Prăpastiei*, 83.
24 Horia Sima's letter to Ion Antonescu, in *Pe Marginea Prăpastiei*, 116.
25 Ion Antonescu's letter to Horia Sima, ibid., 118.
26 For the Antonescu regime's official investigation into these assassinations and its conclusions, see Arhivele Naţionale Istorice Centrale, Ministry of Interior, Diverse, file 27/1940.
27 See "Desfiinţarea comisarilor de românizare," *Porunca Vremii* X, no. 1850 (Jan. 21, 1941), 1–2.
28 Ibid., 2.
29 "Pentru judecata opiniei publice. Cum s-a desfăşurat rebeliunea în zilele de 21–23 ianuarie 1941," *Unirea* I, no. 2 (Febr. 12, 1941), 5.
30 Horia Sima, "Ordin către toţi legionarii," *Cuvântul*, Special edition, January 23, 1941, 1.
31 "Pentru judecata opiniei publice," 5.
32 "Apelul lui Dumitru Groza," January 23, 1941, in Ion Scurtu, (coord.) et al., eds., *Ideologie şi formaţiuni de dreapta in Romania*, vol. VII: ianuarie 1941–februarie 1943 (Bucureşti: INST, 2009), 75.
33 Horia Stamatu, "Poziţia noastră" in *Buna Vestire*, Jan. 22, 1941, in Scurtu, et al., *Ideologie*, vol. VII, 71.
34 Dr. Serban Milcoveanu, "Ai încredere în noi, vom merge până la capăt, Căpitane," *Cuvântul*, January 24, 1941, in Scurtu, et al., *Ideologie*, vol. VII, 87.

35 P. P. Panaitescu, "Pentru ce," *Cuvântul*, January 24, 1941, in Scurtu, et al., *Ideologie*, vol. VII, 85–86.
36 See *Pe marginea prăpastiei, 21–23 ianuarie 1941*. For a first scholarly treatment of the Legionary rebellion, see Matatias Carp, *Cartea Neagră: Suferinţele evreilor din Romania.în timpul Dictaturei Fasciste, 1940–1944*, 3 vols. (Bucureşti: Atelierele grafice Socec, 1946–1948).
37 See Puiu Dumitru Bordeiu, "Studiu Introductiv," in *Mişcarea legionară în Dobrogea anilor 1940–1944 în documente*, 19–20, fn 23.
38 "Pentru judecata opiniei publice," 5.
39 Dr. Ilie Rădulescu, "Trăiască Armata!," *Porunca Vremii* X, no. 1853 (Jan. 26, 1941), 1.
40 Ion Antonescu, "Apel către naţiune," January 22, 1941, in Scurtu, et al., eds., *Ideologie*, 75.
41 *Antonescu către ţară*, 225.
42 Rădulescu, "Trăiască Armata," 1.
43 Ibid., 4.
44 For documents on the Legionary rebellion, see Gheorghe Buzatu, et al., eds., *Evenimentele din ianuarie 1941 în Arhivele germane şi române*, 2 vols. (Bucureşti: Majadahonda, 1998–1999); and Ottmar Traşcă and Ana-Maria Stan, eds., *Rebeliunea Legionară în Arhive Străine: Germane, Maghiare, Franceze* (Bucureşti, Albatros, 2002).
45 *Antonescu către ţară*, 66–67.
46 *Universul* no. 52, Febr. 25, 1941, cited in C. Troncotă, *Eugen Cristescu: Asul Serviciilor Secrete Româneşti* (Bucureşti: Roza Vânturilor, 1994), 71.
47 Dorin Dobrincu, "Legionarii şi Guvernarea Ion Antonescu (1941–1944)," in K. W. Treptow, ed., *Romania: A Crossroads of Europe* (Iaşi, Oxford, Palm Beach, FL, and Portland, OR: The Center for Romanian Studies, 2002), 199–230.
48 Fond Operativ, Dumitrescu-Ion zis Borşa, I 264315, 17, 25.
49 Ibid., 10–11.
50 Mihai A. Antonescu gave up his position as Minister of Justice (September 1940–January 1941) but became vice president of the Council of Ministers (January 1941–August 1944), Minister of National Propaganda (June 1941–August 1944), and Minister of Foreign Affairs (1942–August 1944). In addition, through a decree passed on June 21, 1941, General Ion Antonescu designated Mihai Antonescu, who was at the time vice president of the council of ministers, as his successor.
51 *Antonescu către ţară*, 233.
52 "Un adevărat plebiscit moral," *Unirea* I, no. 1 (Febr. 11, 1941), 1.
53 "Un singur steag: al Ţării," *Vremea* XIII, no. 587 (Jan. 26, 1941), 1.
54 Al. Gregorian, "6 martie: România urcă pe şantierul istoriei," *Sfarmă-piatră* VIII, no. 92 (March 7, 1941), 1.
55 Mihai A. Antonescu, *In serviciul justitiei românesti; patru luni de activitate la Ministerul Justiţiei. Reforma justiţiei româneşti* (Bucureşti: Monitorul Oficial şi Imprimeriile Statului, Imprimeria Centrală, 1941), iv.
56 I. Antonescu, "Apelul prin care se chiamă ţara să-şi spună cuvântul la plebiscitul din 2 martie 1941," in *Antonescu către ţară*, 96–97.
57 In both plebiscites, the vote was open and public rather than secret. Failure to vote was interpreted as approval, which accounts for the small number of votes against the regime.
58 Gregorian, "6 martie: România urcă pe şantierul istoriei," 1.
59 Al. Gregorian, "Generalul faţă în faţă cu ţara," *Sfarmă-piatră* VIII, no. 86 (March 1, 1941), 4.
60 Gregorian, "6 martie: România urcă pe şantierul istoriei," 1.
61 *Antonescu către ţară*, 233.
62 Further on the impact of the Nazi legal-institutional model on the evolution of the Jewish Question in Romania, see Constantin Iordachi, Ottmar Traşcă, "Ideological Transfers and Bureaucratic Entanglements: Nazi 'Experts' on the 'Jewish Question' and Romanian-German Relations, 1940–1944," *Fascism: Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies* 4 (2015), 48–100.
63 Anonescu, *In serviciul justitiei româneşti*, 107.
64 Given the impossibility of providing complete statistics, these figures are subject to debate. Yehuda Bauer estimated that up to 380,000 Romanian Jews died during

World War II, out of which 260,000 were killed as a result of the actions of the Romanian authorities in Bessarabia, Bukovina, and Transnistria, while 120,000 were killed by the Hungarian authorities in Northern Transylvania. See Yehuda Bauer, *A History of the Holocaust*, rev. ed. (New York: Franklin Watts, 2001), 338. Dinu C. Giurescu calculated that there were 214,005 Jewish victims, of which 15,000 were from the Old Kingdom and 108,710 from Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina, and the Herţa Region, while 90,295 victims originated from Northern Transylvania, then under Hungarian occupation. See Dinu C. Giurescu, *Romania in the Second World War: 1939–1945* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 2000). Dennis Deletant argued: "Under Antonescu, Transnistria was the graveyard of between 200,000 and 250,000 Jews, and for up to 20,000 Gypsies." See Dennis Deletant, "The Holocaust in Transnistria: An Overview in the Light of Recent Research," in *Moldova, Bessarabia, Transnistria*, ed. Rebecca Haynes, (London: University College London, 2003), 143. Radu Ioanid maintained that "at least 250,000 Jews under Romanian jurisdiction died, either on the explicit orders of Romanian officials or as a result of their criminal barbarity." See Radu Ioanid, *The Holocaust in Romania*, 289. This book employs the figures provided by the International Commission of the Study of Holocaust in Romania, Friling, Ioanid, Ionescu, eds. *Raport Final*, 387–388.

References

ACNSAS. Fond "Arhiva Operativă," File Moţa Iridenta, R 396591.

ACNSAS. Fond "Arhiva Operativă," file Dumitrescu-Ion zis Borşa, file I 264315.

Arhivele Naţionale Istorice Centrale. Fond "Ministerul de Interne-Diverse," file: 27/1940.

Antonescu, Mihai A. *In serviciul justitiei românesti; patru luni de activitate la Ministerul Justiţiei. Reforma justiţiei româneşti*. Bucureşti: Monitorul Oficial şi Imprimeriile Statului, Imprimeria Centrală, 1941.

Antonescu, Ion. *Generalul Antonescu către ţară, 6 septemvrie 1940–22 iunie 1941*. Bucuresti: Imprimeria naţională, 1941.

Antonescu, Ion. *Temelia statului naţional-legionar: 6 septembrie 1940–6 octombrie 1940*. Bucureşti: Monitorul Oficial şi Imprimeriile Statului. Imprimeria Centrală, 1940.

Bauer, Yehuda. *A History of the Holocaust*. New York: Franklin Watts, 2001.

Blănaru-Flamură, V. V. *Generalul Antonescu în Cămaşa Verde Legionară: Detronarea Regelui Carol al II-lea şi 'Rebeliunea' Văzute din Stradă, de la Radiodifuziunea Română şi din 'Buncărul' Antoneştilor*. Bucureşti: Sepco, 1995.

Bordeiu, Puiu Dumitru. *Mişcarea legionară în Dobrogea anilor 1940–1944 în documente*. Bucureşti: Editura Enciclopedică, 2014.

Buzatu, Gheorghe et al., eds. *Evenimentele din ianuarie 1941 în Arhivele germane şi române*, 2 vols. Bucureşti: Majadahonda, 1998–1999.

Carp, Matatias. *Cartea Neagră: Suferinţele evreilor din Romania.în timpul Dictaturei Fasciste, 1940–1944*, 3 vols. Bucureşti: Atelierele grafice Socec, 1946–1948.

"Desfiinţarea comisarilor de românizare," *Porunca Vremii* X, no. 1850 (Jan. 21, 1941): 1–2.

Deletant, Dennis. "The Holocaust in Transnistria: An Overview in the Light of Recent Research." In *Moldova, Bessarabia, Transnistria*, edited by Rebecca Haynes. London: University College London, 2003.

Dobrincu, Dorin. "Legionarii şi Guvernarea Ion Antonescu (1941–1944)," in *Romania: A Crossroads of Europe*, edited by K. W. Treptow, 199–230. Iaşi, Oxford, Palm Beach, FL, and Portland, OR: The Center for Romanian Studies, 2002.

Friling, Tuvia, Radu Ioanid, and Mihai E. Ionescu, eds. *Raport Final. Comisia Internaţională pentru Studierea Holocaustului în România*. Iaşi: Polirom, 2005.

Ghimpa, Nicolae D. et al. eds. *Codul de Românizare*. Bucureşti: Editura Ziarului Universul, 1942.

Giurescu, Dinu C. *Romania in the Second World War: 1939–1945*. Boulder: East European Monographs, 2000.

Gregorian, Al. "6 martie: România urcă pe şantierul istoriei," *Sfarmă-piatră* VIII, no. 92 (1941): 1.

Gregorian, Al. "Generalul faţă în faţă cu ţara," *Sfarmă-piatră* VIII, no. 86 (1941): 4.

Heinen, Armin. *Legiunea "Arhanghelul Mihail." Mişcare socială şi organizaţie politică. O contribuţie la problema fascismului internaţional*. Bucureşti: Humanitas, 1998.

Ioanid, Radu. *The Holocaust in Romania: The Destruction of Jews and Gypsies under the Antonescu Regime, 1940–1944*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000.

Iordachi, Constantin, and Ottmar Traşcă. "Ideological Transfers and Bureaucratic Entanglements: Nazi 'Experts' on the 'Jewish Question' and Romanian-German Relations, 1940–1944," *Fascism: Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies* 4 (2015): 48–100.

Marcel-Dumitru, Ciucă, Aurelian Teodorescu, and Bogdan Florin Popovici, eds. *Stenogramele şedinţelor Consiliului de Miniştri: guvernarea Ion Antonescu*. Bucureşti: Arhivele Naţionale ale României, 1997, vol. 1 (Sept.–Dec. 1940).

Milcoveanu, Serban. "Ai încredere în noi, vom merge până la capăt, Căpitane." *Cuvântul*, January 24, 1941, in Scurtu, et al., *Ideologie şi formaţiuni de dreapta in Romania*, vol. VII: ianuarie 1941–februarie 1943. Bucureşti: INST, 2009, 87.

Noua legislaţiune cu privire la evrei. Bucureşti: Curierul Judicial, 1940.

Pe Marginea Prăpastiei, 21–23 ianuarie 1941. Ion Antonescu şi Mişcarea Legionară, vol. 1, *Part 1: Lovitura de stat din septembrie 1940*. Part 2: *Guvernarea naţional–legionară*; Vol. 2, Part 3: *Pregătirea rebeliunii*; Part 4: *Rebeliunea*. Bucureşti: Scripta, 2014 [1941].

"Pentru judecata opiniei publice. Cum s-a desfăşurat rebeliunea în zilele de 21–23 ianuarie 1941." *Unirea* I, no. 2 (Febr. 12, 1941): 5.

Rădulescu, Ilie. "Trăiască Armata!," *Porunca Vremii* X, no. 1853 (Jan. 26, 1941): 1.

Scurtu, Ion (coord.) et al., eds. *Ideologie şi formaţiuni de dreapta in Romania*, vol. VII: ianuarie 1941–februarie 1943. Bucureşti: INST, 2009.

Sima, Horia. "Ordin către toţi legionarii," *Cuvântul*, Special edition, (January 23, 1941): 1.

———. *Era libertăţii. Statul Naţional–Legionar*. Vol. 1. Madrid: Editura Mişcării Legionare, 1982–86.

Stamatu, Horia. "Poziţia noastră" in *Buna Vestire*, Jan. 22, 1941, in Scurtu, et al., *Ideologie*, vol. VII, 71.

Traşcă, Ottmar, and Ana-Maria Stan, eds. *Rebeliunea Legionară în Arhive Străine: Germane, Maghiare, Franceze*. Bucureşti, Albatros, 2002.

Troncotă, Constantin. *Eugen Cristescu: Asul Serviciilor Secrete Româneşti*. Bucureşti: Roza Vânturilor, 1994.

"Un adevărat plebiscit moral," *Unirea* I, no. 1 (Febr. 11, 1941): 1.

"Un singur steag: al Ţării," *Vremea* XIII, no. 587(Jan. 26, 1941): 1.

8

A FASCIST FESTIVAL OF THE DEAD

Codreanu's Reburial and the Politics of National Resurrection

The Legion's short rule did not follow a comprehensive program of legal-political transformation. Its main stated goal was the conversion of the nation to the new faith: "Only when the entire Romanian nation is Legionized (*legionarizată*) can we speak of the complete victory of the Movement," argued Horia Sima.[1] To reach this aim, Legionaries preferred symbolic ritual action and violent revenge at the grass roots level over orderly reforms from above. At the national level, political emphasis was placed on grandiose fascist ceremonies, rites, and rituals meant to enroll the masses into the new totalitarian party-state and to instill in them the values of the Legionary faith. Since that faith was built on the idea of salvational sacrifice and the cult of the martyrs, the funeral became the most important and representative public Legionary ceremony. Soon after its advent to power in September 1940, the Legion placed pompous and carefully staged (re)burials at the very center of its style of political representation. The Legion's short, 130-day period of rule, was a *morbid festival of the dead*, marked by an extraordinary frenzy of exhumations and reburials of the Legionaries assassinated on the orders of Carol II in 1938–1939. A plethora of disinterment sites and graveyards were opened all over the country; mortuary trains and public burial cortèges crossed the country along symbolic rural and urban itineraries in order to relocate corpses to Legionary cemeteries and mausoleums. Innumerable Legionary funerary altars and monuments mushroomed all around the country, in a symbolic attempt to re-sacralize, and thus also appropriate, the national territory. These ceremonies were meant to bestow legitimacy over would-be fascist elites and the political body.

In theoretical terms, the chapter highlights the centrality of death and burials for the articulation and dissemination of the Legionary faith. As is well known, the mystery of death and the treatment of the dead are central concerns to all religions.[2] No wonder, therefore, that funerary customs have constituted the

DOI: 10.4324/9780429428043-11

very core of religious rites and rituals throughout time. As highly complex, multivocal, and multifaceted ceremonies, burials encapsulate and codify multiple layers of religious, but also social, cultural, and political meanings. They do not simply involve the dead, the clergy, and the family of the deceased, but entire human collectivities. As such, they serve as forums of confirmation, reproduction, or confrontation of established societal values pertaining to cosmologic views, temporal and spatial structures, kinship and social relations, forms of political representation and legitimization, and visions of individual and collective identities.[3]

The importance of funeral ceremonies has been further emphasized in the modern period and invested with new connotations. As leading anthropologists have pointed out, the importance of death as a fundamental rite of passage increases at times of social and political upheaval.[4] This is particularly relevant for the modern period, due to a variety of factors. First, processes of rapid social transformation and radical institutional re-organization have repeatedly set into question established religious and political values. Second, the advent of mass politics heightened the societal importance of burials as public ceremonies, and political rites of passage. Third, the "media revolution" and the development of new communication technology enabled the dissemination of local ceremonies and their projection as formative regional, national, or even global events.[5]

In this context, new political ideologies have built on the treatment of the dead and on funeral ceremonies to articulate, express, and disseminate integrative, quasi-religious views on society and politics. As Katherine Verdery has pointed out, dead bodies are among the most powerful and efficient political symbols. On the one hand, corpses have a concrete, material nature; on the other hand, they do not have an agency of their own, and can thus easily be instrumentalized by investing them with a complex set of—often ambivalent and even contradictory—meanings.[6] In addition, the morbid nature of dead body politics has always had a strong impact on public opinion, instilling fear as well as veneration. Interwar fascism serves as the most relevant example in this respect: an extensive literature has documented fascists' fixation—indeed, a morbid obsession—with the dead and funeral ceremonies, leading certain scholars to speak of fascist necrophilia. As George L. Mosse pointed out, the practice of organizing state funerals had its roots in the French revolution and "marked the beginning of a democratization of politics that climaxed in twentieth-century fascism."[7] Building on Mosse's insights, Mark Neocleous argued that the fascist fascination with the dead is not a simple prolongation of the cult of the heroes or the fallen soldiers but a central feature of the generic fascist ideology and an expression of its inner ideological core.[8]

The Legion's rule provides a most striking example of the centrality of the cult of the dead for fascist ideology and ritual practice. In the prepower stage, the funerals of the Legionaries who passed away or were killed in confrontations with authorities were central political events for the movement, serving as prime sites for the making and re-making of the Legionary community (see the stunning

burial of Moța and Marin in February 1937, and of General Cantacuzino in October the same year in Chapter 4). Under Carol II's royal dictatorship, burials, political ceremonies, and the erection of public monuments became central events for the political-ideological confrontation between the king and the Legion, as yet another manifestation of their rivalry. First, to avoid the political exploitation of the cult of the fallen soldiers by the Legionaries, Carol II installed a state monopoly over practices of burying, mourning, and commemorating war heroes.[9] Under the new "burial regime," commemoration practices organized by relatives of the deceased, by local communities, or by third parties were regarded not only as "secondary" in importance to the official ceremonies, but even as "clandestine" to the extent that they deviated from official guidance.[10] Second, the state instituted a firm monopoly over the erection of public monuments, including some which were the preferred medium of Legionary propaganda: busts, statues, crosses, crucifixes (*troițe*), monuments for heroes, fountains, colonnades, and commemorative stones and plaques, etc.[11] Third, in order to counter the great propaganda impact of the Legionary burials of Cantacuzino, Moța, and Marin, the royal dictatorship organized impressive national funerals for the Legion's enemies or victims; the most notable were the burials of Patriarch Miron Cristea in March 1939 and of Prime Minister Armand Călinescu, assassinated by the Legion in September 1939. In particular, the funeral of Cristea stood out as the most pompous burial ceremony in modern Romania. Cristea died in Cannes, France, on March 6, 1939, and was carried back to Romania by a mortuary train via Milan. The train entered Romania at Jimbolia, in the Banat, early on Saturday, March 11. Emulating the burial of Moța and Marin, the mortuary train stopped for numerous religious commemorations in the major cities of Romania, along the route Timișoara–Caransebeș–Lugoș–Turnu Severin–Filiași–Craiova–Piatra Olt–Slatina–Pitești–Bucharest. Cristea was given full state and church honors as patriarch and prime minister.[12] The train arrived in Bucharest late in the evening of March 11 and the coffin was placed in the royal salon of the Bucharest-Nord station, which had been turned into an ad hoc chapel. The metropolitans of Iași and Sibiu performed a religious ceremony, attended by high church hierarchs and state officials. The following day—Sunday, March 12—the coffin was transferred to the Cathedral of the Patriarchy on a symbolic route that crossed the center of Romania's capital. The impressive cortège included representatives of all church institutions in the country, as well as all major state institutions and social strata, emphasizing the unity between the church and the people. The march of large numbers of male and female delegations of *Straja*, the regimented youth of the country, was meant to emphasize the role played by the patriarch and the church in mentoring and in guiding the new generation. At the royal palace, the patriarch and the impressive mortuary convoy was greeted from the balcony by King Carol II and his son, Michael. At the patriarchy, Cristea's massive coffin, made of oak, was carried into the cathedral by eight priests and eight soldiers, under the supervision of Metropolitan Nicodim, the new head of the Holy Synod and successor to the office of the patriarch. Cristea's remains were displayed for public

commemoration for two days, under sealed glass. Cristea was buried in the crypt of the patriarchy on Tuesday, March 14, in an impressive, if not lavish, ceremony attended by the king, the government, all high state dignitaries, all bishops and metropolitans of the Romanian Orthodox Church, and over 2,000 priests.[13]

Once in power, the Legion was able to access state resources to organize its own state-sponsored, large-scale funerary ceremonies, directly rivaling the ones organized under Carol's personal regime. The impressive list of reburial ceremonies and commemoration of the dead conducted during the short Legionary rule is indicative of the centrality of funerals for the Legion's ideology and ritual practice, accounting for the regime's change of name in the public memory from the "National Legionary State" into the "National Funeral State."[14] September 7, the first day after King Carol II's abdication, was declared a day of prayer and remembrance for all Legionary heroes across the country. On September 7 and 8, Legionaries who died on September 3 in uprisings against Carol's dictatorship were buried, in Constanța[15] and Brașov, in ceremonies covered in detail by the press. On September 11, 46 Legionaries killed in Miercurea Ciuc were reburied at the Predeal Monastery. On September 13, a majestic ceremony was organized in Bucharest honoring the Captain's name day, officially proclaimed "The Day of Legionary Victory" (*Ziua Biruinței Legionare*).[16] September 22—the day of the mass executions of Legionaries in 1939—was officially declared "The Day of the Legionary Heroes and Martyrs" and celebrated in impressive public ceremonies in Bucharest, Predeal, Râmnicu Sărat, Vaslui, and Râșnov.[17] On October 24, the corpses of 46 Legionaries killed in the Vaslui camp were excavated and reburied with national honors at the Predeal monastery. The ashes of 22 prominent Legionary martyrs killed and cremated by police in Bucharest in November 1938 were also brought there, in an attempt to create a Legionary cemetery of the martyrs. On November 8, 1940, the new regime organized a major public celebration, on St. Michael's Day, meant to capture the support of the Romanian public. Festivities took place in Iaşi, the first center of the Legionary Movement, proclaimed "a saint Legionary city" and the symbolic capital of Romania—a role comparable to that played by Nuremberg in the Nazi propaganda.[18] On November 20, Ioan Moța, the father of Ion I. Moța, was buried. The fascist festival of the dead culminated with the exhumation, on November 27, 1940, of Codreanu's corpse and of the 13 Legionaries charged with political assassinations—the *Decemviri* and the *Nicadori*—killed at Carol II's order in November 1938, and ended on December 1 with the 22nd celebration of the union of Transylvania with Romania.

Overall, these ceremonies involved the high-profile reburial of over 115 corpses, to which one has to add other Legionary (re)burials that took place at the local level. Thus, if in the early 1930s the Legion and the authorities were engaged in a battle over the holy bones of the fallen soldiers, in the late 1930s they engaged in a battle over corpses. Aware that dead bodies can serve as efficient political weapons, Carol II closed down the mausoleum of Moța and Marin, made desperate attempts to hide and destroy the corpses of Codreanu, the

Nicadori, and the *Decemviri*, and had the bodies of the later Legionaries' victims cremated, as a form of ultimate annihilation. Once in power, the Legion used dead bodies in order to forge its fascist body politics. To this end, it recovered corpses and ashes and paraded them throughout the country, giving them a political afterlife (see Map 8.1). As Moța anticipated in his writings, Legionaries' own ashes became their most powerful weapons, more efficient than guns and rifles.

I argue that these funerals were conceived—together with the act of cleansing the nation—as *the last and most important stage in the full articulation and mass dissemination of the Legionary faith*, and were therefore invested with a complex set of political as well as cosmic meanings. First, occurring soon after the establishment of the National Legionary State, reburials fulfilled a central political function, as part of a larger campaign aimed at delegitimizing the previous order of the royal dictatorship and at legitimizing the Legionary doctrine of national salvation. The funerals thus served as rites of passage marking not only the deceased's transition from "this world" to the "next," but also from one political regime to another. Second, reburials provided an ideological and ritual basis for the new political regime by articulating discourses of divine election, victimhood, and martyrdom leading to national salvation. The main function of these ceremonies was to rehabilitate "truth" and to re-interpret history by condemning the



MAP 8.1 Itineraries of Legionary funeral trains, Sept.–Nov. 1940

Source: Copyright Constantin Iordachi.

royal dictatorship (and implicitly, the post-1918 liberal regime) as illegitimate. Instead, they proclaimed a new regime of sacrality, which endowed life with a new political meaning. By severing ties with the past, they were meant to signal the entrance into a new historical era, and to re-order time and space by re-sacralizing the nation and by reassessing its immortality. They were also meant to redeem the honor of the Legionaries and, by extension, of the Romanian nation, and to thus "reconcile" it with the divinity, history, and nature.

Third, reburial ceremonies were conceived as central components of the Legionary "psychological revolution" aiming at the creation of the new man, leading to the inner spiritual transformation of the nation. They redefined the meaning of heroism, patriotism, and self-sacrifice, and glorified the fascist practice of suicidal terrorism as acts of purification, allegedly similar to the martyrdom of primitive Christianity, leading to the salvation of the nation.

Fourth, reburial ceremonies were means by which the Legionaries attempted to forge the new fascist nation. They promoted an alternative version of national identity, based on fascist moral and ethical values. Last but not least, reburial ceremonies were elaborate expressions of the fascist *aestheticization of politics*, serving as effective ways of mass mobilization in support of fascism. They involved sound (military bands, religious choirs, and traditional bugles); visual symbols (flags, uniforms, green billboards, slogans, giant portraits of Codreanu, and other Legionary martyrs), modern means of transportation, such as mortuary trains, as well as a complex set of national, religious, and military rites and rituals. Yet, these events were not simply propaganda campaigns or a mere exercise in the fascist aestheticization of politics. Retrospectively regarded by Sima as the most important task in justifying the Legion's accession to power, reburial ceremonies provided the *political liturgy* for converting the nation to the fascist faith, *Legionarism*. As the Legion was at the time the fourth fascist party to access political power in Europe and Romania became an integral member of the Axis alliance, these ceremonies acquired an international political importance, being used as sites for re-affirming the transnational value of sacrifice for the fascist cause, and for displaying fascist unity and solidarity across Europe.

In addition to organizing funeral ceremonies, the Legion also employed a wide array of techniques to manufacture martyrs and to spread the new religion among people, such as various forms of collective remembrance in public commemorations and the re-narration of the past through musealization. Such initiatives came from above as well as from below. Thus, in a letter to General Antonescu, the families of the Legionary martyrs, led by the widow Elena Codreanu and by Alexandrina Cantacuzino, the mother of Alexandru Cantacuzino, demanded—on behalf of "people sentenced, imprisoned, humiliated, tortured and then assassinated for their faith"[19]—that the Râmnicu Sărat Prison be officially declared an historical monument and turned into a Legionary museum. They also asked that a documentary film be produced about the fatal night of executions, September 21/22, 1940, restoring historical truth. Finally, they asked that the pictures of the martyrs not be commercialized for profit under

the new regime. Antonescu approved all requests and instructed the Ministry of Arts and Cults to work toward their implementation.[20] At the same time that it glorified its martyrs, Legionary propaganda demonized the king and his entourage. Carol II's partner, Elena Lupescu, who was of Jewish origin, was a special target of practices of *Damnatio memoriae*: her "luxurious" Bucharest villa on Alea Vulpache was turned into a "museum of shame," meant to display to public opprobrium the nefarious scene of Carol's immoral relationship.[21]

Forging the Legionary Pantheon: The New "Church of the Nation"

Soon after the collapse of royal dictatorship, the Legion commenced its assiduous campaign to recover its martyrs and complete its pantheon of heroes through an unprecedented series of reburials and pilgrimages to mausoleums and cemeteries. This campaign was accompanied by a bureaucratic process of legal rehabilitation of the victims of Carol's repression. On December 24, 1940, at the end of lengthy procedures, Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu was rehabilitated by a decision of the High Court of Cassation and Justice, which reversed the previous court decision and declared null and void all former official charges against the Captain.[22]

The main emphasis was, however, not on the legal side of the rehabilitation but on religious values and funeral practices. The public ceremonies were centered on the corpses of the "martyrs," proclaimed by the Legionary press as saint relics possessing miraculous powers. Official propaganda focused on the early departure of the deceased, their unnatural death, and the criminal behavior and homicide committed by the authorities. According to popular beliefs, improper burial is a violation of the divine order: it can cause harmful effects not only for the soul of the victim, who is wondering around until s/he can rest in peace, but also of the community, since the deceased can become a ghost or even a vampire and take revenge on his victimizers or relatives.[23] Capitalizing on these beliefs and superstitions, the movement's main ideologues claimed that the Legion's rule was tormented by the disembodied spirit of the Legionary "martyrs," whose phantoms haunted the living in search for justice, rehabilitation, and proper burial. The Legionaries claimed that this apocalyptic scenario was anticipated by Moța,[24] the mastermind of the Legion's suicidal terrorism, who warned in his cult book, *Wooden Skulls*: "The people of today's century should stop for a moment their lives of ease and indifference and listen to the strange noises that rack mysterious depths and yell like the night winds. And this is to be heard and known: The terrible rule of the ghosts is approaching."[25]

The bones of Legionary martyrs were to be gathered in two symbolic places: the Mausoleum of the Martyrs at the Green House, the Legion's seat in Bucharest, and a Legionary cemetery at the Predeal Monastery. The Legionary ideologues claimed that these locations had been selected by the Captain before his death, in a moment of divine inspiration. The two spots were strategically located in the heart of the national capital and in the Carpathian Mountains, thus

symbolically dominating the national territory. They reflected the Legionaries' attempts to conquer and re-sacralize the fatherland. Predeal was also a main site for the commemoration of the unknown soldiers who died in World War I. The Legionary martyrs were to rest there together with "the brave soldiers fallen asleep twenty-four years ago over the bosom of the afflicted country."[26] The bones of the Legionary martyrs were deliberately amalgamated with the victims of World War I. In this way, the Legion tried to appropriate the Romanians' fight for self-determination, and to insert itself into the panoply of national heroes.

The first commemorative project was the establishment of a new cemetery at Predeal, the site being proclaimed "the Symbol of Legionary Heroism,"[27] the "Pantheon of the Legion and of the Nation"[28] and "the Holy Shrine of our Memories and the Mecca of our Hope in Eternity."[29] Reportedly, Codreanu chose the location of the cemetery in 1937, claiming that "during Legionary rule, a monastery of the nation will be built here to shelter all the bones of the Movement's heroes and martyrs."[30] The idea was reiterated by the Legionary press, which pointed out that:

> The meeting of the tragic [Legionary] destinies [will take place] in the Legionary Predeal, in the place the Captain selected to become *the moral capital of the new Romania*. Capital at the foundation of which will eternally lay the ashes and dust of the best sons of the nation, killed in the most painful moment of its history, to awaken from the deathly sleep and the expiation of its historical sins, committed with and without will.[31]

The Legionary Cemetery was designed as "the cornerstone of the Cathedral in which would rest, over the centuries, the sad remnants of those who died for the Legionary victory."[32] The Legionary press emphasized the fact that it was the charismatic leader's prophetic command "given to the dead of the Movement, to transfer their frozen bones, from wherever they lay, cut by the scythe of the Legionary destiny—to Predeal."[33] Codreanu's charismatic spirit was to oversee the process from the top of his preferred place, Mount Rarău, from where he would "always watch over them, as from the top of an iconostasis." The location of the Predeal cemetery was part of a larger Legionary vision on the Romanians' ethnonature, centered in the Carpathian Mountains as a symbolic *axis mundis*, and on Mount Rarău as a natural shrine of the nation. In the spirit of their faith, the Legionaries appropriated the Carpathians, turning them into a sacred realm of Legionary martyrs:

> The Captain had turned the camp on Mount Rarău into an immense sanctuary in which every corner found its true greatness. To the North, the Lady's Stone (*Pietrele Doamnei*) raise their forehead. This entire mountain is dubbed by the comrades "the Captain's mountain." To the West, the forested peak was baptized by the Captain the "Ion Caranica Height." To the East, the high mountain range was named "Nicolae Constantinescu

> Height," and the neighboring cliff is the "Doru Belimace Height." In the back, to the South, The Stony Mountain (*Pietrosul*) which looms in the horizon was baptized the "Sterie Ciumetti Height" by the Captain.[34]

To populate the Predeal cemetery, the Legion organized major public reburial ceremonies each month. In September, the exhumation of the Legionaries from Miercurea Ciuc took place; in October, the exhumation and reburial of the martyrs buried in Vaslui and Bucharest. These ceremonies were patterned on the burial of Moța and Marin, but with new specific elements. They all followed similar stages: the disinterment of the corpses; the identification of the victims; the preparation of the bodies; the religious service meant to "re-Christianize" them; the *vigilae* in the church to chase away the evil spirits; and the funeral made up of religious services and of the Legionary rites and rituals culminating with the oath of allegiance at the grave of the martyrs.

The first ceremony was organized on September 11–12, few days after the collapse of the royal dictatorship, when 46 Legionaries were reburied at the Predeal Monastery.[35] These Legionaries had been killed in Miercurea Ciuc on September 21–22, 1939; after their executions, their corpses were thrown into a common grave and disfigured by lime, making their posthumous identification difficult. This exhumation ceremony was planned before the Legion's formal advent to power and was therefore less elaborate than those following. A Legionary unit from Brașov traveled to Miercurea Ciuc (at the time in Horthy's Hungary) and disinterred the corpses of the martyrs; after identification, the dead Legionaries were placed into coffins, and a religious service was officiated by the priest Lecca. The ceremony, headed by the Legionary Commandant Vasile Iasinschi and the Legionary Senator Aristotle Gheorghiu, extended into the night, by the light of projectors. The families of the victims were not present at the scene but were represented by the Legionaries Aurel Borzea and Caranica.

On Tuesday morning, September 12, the coffins were loaded into five wagons and the mortuary train left Miercurea Ciuc. Along the way, the population was given the opportunity to render homage to the Legionary martyrs. In the Gheorgieni railway station, a military unit presented honors. At Predeal, the martyrs were displayed to the public on a secondary railway, flanked by a guard of honor. The reburial ceremony started at 15:00, with a religious service officiated by Archimandrite Serafim Georgescu, the abbot of the Sinaia Monastery, and Father Atanasie Popescu, the Abbot of the Ghighiu Monastery, assisted by priests Nicandru Prodan, Nicolae Pantea, Ioan Popa, M. Marinescu-Filipesti, and Ioan Leuca. After the service, the funeral cortège left for the Predeal Monastery. The ceremony was led by the Commanders of the Annunciation Corneliu Georgescu and Ilie Gărneață, and by Constantin Stoicănescu. The cortège was opened by the officiating priests and the Legionary choir, followed by Legionaries carrying the 46 green crosses of the martyrs, and by an impressive display of funeral wreaths. Next in line came the funeral cars covered by

fir tree branches and flowers, surrounded by the families of the deceased. The huge convoy ended with the military parade of 300 Legionaries from Brasov, the Company of Honor of the Hunters' Regiment No. 17 from Transylvania, and by Legionary detachments from Bucharest and Prahova Valley, all in green shirts. The 46 martyrs were buried on a mountain slope near the monastery, covered with fir trees, symbolizing redemption and regeneration. The religious service was followed by Legionary rites and rituals: the fascist salute and the intonation of the Legionary anthems "Moța and Marin" and "Hoist the Flag and Close Your Ranks [*Drapelul sus şi rândurile strânse*]." Late at night, Corneliu Georgescu performed the fascist roll call; the pick of the ceremony was the oath of allegiance to the Legion performed by all participants at the graves of the martyrs (*trupurile mucenicilor*), invoked as witnesses.

Ten days later, in a symbolic continuation of the reburial ceremony, September 22—the day of the martyrs' execution—was officially declared the *Remembrance Day of the Legionary Heroes and Martyrs*. For these occasions, Legionaries conducted impressive, mass pilgrimages to *lieux des memoires* all over the country—in Bucharest, Predeal, Râmnicu Sărat, Vaslui, and Râșnov—to worship the graves of those "who sacrificed themselves in their unshakable faith in the virtues of the people." The Remembrance Day was meant to redefine the meaning of heroism and patriotism, by appropriating the cult of the war heroes and by redrawing the map of sacred places of the nation.

The main commemoration of Remembrance Day took place at the Legionary cemetery in the Predeal Monastery. Legionary units from Bucharest, Brașov, Bârșa, Sinaia, Câmpina, Ploiești, and Prahova Valley traveled to Predeal by trains or buses to attend the ceremony. The ceremony marked the first active participation of General Ion Antonescu to the Legionary commemorations. He was accompanied by Wilhelm Fabricius, the Ministry of Nazi Germany to Bucharest; Pellegrino Ghici, the Ministry of Italy to Bucharest; Minister Vasile Iasinschi; Mile Lefter, Commander of the Annunciation; and Ion Dobre, the prefect of Tecuci county. The commemoration started with a religious service, followed by a military ceremony. At the end of the program, Iasinschi performed the fascist roll call.

The next major stage in the completion of the Legionary cemetery occurred on October 24, when 32 Legionaries killed in 1939 at the Vaslui camp were exhumed and reburied with national honors at the Predeal Monastery.[36] The families of the deceased were transported by a special train to Vaslui to attend the exhumation ceremonies.[37] They were welcomed in Vaslui by a local guard of Legionaries. The excavation, executed by a team of 20 Legionaries in parade uniforms, started at 07:00 and continued uninterrupted until evening. The first bones were discovered at 11:30. In a highly charged emotional atmosphere, a Legionary choir sang "The Hymn of the Legionary Martyrs," while numerous candles surrounded the common grave. The families of the deceased proceeded with the identification of the corpses. Legionary press reports emphasized the fact that many corpses showed signs of "terrible mutilation."[38]

At 19:00, the coffins were loaded on traditional carts pulled by oxen, adorned with fir tree branches. The funerary convoy crossed the town of Vaslui on its way to the railway station, accompanied by a large audience; along the road, candles and flags were hoisted on balconies and on top of official or private buildings: "A spirit of humility, silence and religiosity dominated the whole town. All eyes are soaked in tears," wrote *Buna Vestire*.[39] The next day, a mortuary train carrying the coffins and the relatives of the deceased left for Predeal.

On October 26–27, another exhumation ceremony occurred in Bucharest, at the *Cenușa* [Ashes] Crematorium.[40] After investigations and depositions of the crematorium's personnel, a team of the Legionary Police led by Bartolomeu Livezeanu discovered the ashes of 22 Legionaries killed between January 1939 and October 1939, during the royal dictatorship. Among these were the terrorist squad who assassinated Prime Minister Călinescu in September 1939, led by Miți Dumitrescu and composed of eight other members; seven members of the team led by Enache Nadoleanu, cremated on February 18, 1939; the ashes of the female Legionary commandant Nicoleta Nicolescu, reportedly cremated alive on July 10, 1939; an unidentified Legionary, cremated on September 24, 1939; and the ashes of Victor Dragomirescu and another, unidentified Legionary, cremated respectively on October 10 and 14, 1939.

On Sunday to Monday night, October 27–28, at 02:00, several Legionary units met at the crematorium to recover the ashes of the martyrs and transport them to Predeal. The ceremony was imbued with mystical practices.[41] The Legionaries took over the evil "masonic cave," "illuminated [it] with Christian candles" and "re-sacralized" it through the display of innumerable Christian crosses and icons, "under the protection of the Legionary Green Shirts."[42]

The ashes of the martyrs, deposited in urns, were aligned together with their portraits. After mourning the dead, the Legionaries gathered quietly in the crematorium courtyard, surrounded by wreaths and candles. At 02:30–03:00, a religious ceremony "for the departure of the dead" was officiated by 20 monks from Cernica Monastery, led by Dionisie Udișteanu. The Legionary press emphasized the mystical-religious atmosphere of the ceremony: "Thousands of resin torches are lit. … The spirits of the dead comrades float above. The huge yard is a single prayer," wrote *Buna Vestire*.[43]

At 03:15, the Legionary units were rounded up and started their procession toward the Bucharest Northern Railway Station. The convoy was led by the families of the deceased, followed by a Legionary unit who carried, in a jug on a huge sheaf, the ashes of Nicoleta Nicolescu; by the Legionary Choir; by Christian Orthodox priests; the jugs with the ashes of the martyrs; the cart with the wreath; the Brothers of the Cross; the Legionary students; the *Răzleți* [Scattered] Legionary unit; the guard of the Legionary workers; and a general audience. Lit by thousands of torches, the convoy proceeded to the railway station along a symbolic itinerary in the Bucharest city center, via the Calea Șerban Vodă, Splaiul Dâmboviței, Schitu Măgureanu, Cobălcescu, and Dinicu Golescu avenues.

From 05:00 to 06:15, the Legionaries boarded on trains and left Bucharest for Predeal. The huge train convoy also transported the families of the deceased in five pre-booked train cars. The Legionary units numbered over 2,000 members occupying 35 cars, as follows: 200 female Legionary members (*Cetățui*); 200 members of the Legionary student centers; 200 members of the Brotherhood of the Cross; 600 members of the *Răzleți* unit; and 800 members of the Legionary Workers' Corps Guard.[44] Other Legionary units joined the mortuary trains along the way, at Ploiești. The trains arrived at Predeal at approximately 13:00; at 15:00, they commenced the burial ceremony.

At Predeal, thousands of Legionaries paid homage to the martyrs displayed in the mortuary trains. The corpses or ashes were not brought to the church; the *vigilae* was organized in the wagons, officiated by priests and relatives. At 11:00, a delegation of Aromanian Legionaries arrived; at 11:15, a motorized convoy of the Legionary Workers' Corps, made up of approximately 1,000 people. After the mourning of the dead, the 32 coffins of the Legionaries killed in Vaslui were brought down from the train cars and merged into a single convoy with the jugs carried from Bucharest, and with the coffin of two other martyrs (Elena Bagdad, a female Legionary executed on September 22, 1939 near the Bârnova sanatorium, and of Vasile Naciu, hanged on September 24, 1939, in Tecuci, as retaliation for the assassination of Prime Minister Călinescu). The ceremony was attended by the Commander of the Legion, Horia Sima, by the Commanders of the Annunciation Ilie Gârneață, Mile Lefter, and Vasile Iasinschi, and by high state-dignitaries, such as Minister of Interior General Constantin Petrovicescu, Minister of National Education Traian Brăileanu, the Rector of the University of Bucharest and the Director of *Cuvântul* Petre P. Panaitescu, and by the families of the deceased.

At 14:30, the coffins were loaded into individual mortuary carts pulled by oxen and headed toward the Legionary Cemetery. Each cart was adorned with a cross and the portrait of the deceased, and was followed by his family and by other comrades. The jugs with ashes were placed on a distinct truck following behind the carts. The convoy ended with the Legionary leaders headed by Horia Sima and "endless columns" of rank-and-file Legionaries.[45] The bells were ringing while the mortuary convoy passed, flanked by a forest of arms raised in the Legionary salute. The Hunting Regiment no. 17 presented military honors.

At the cemetery, the convoy was joined by General Antonescu accompanied by his wife and his deputy, Mihai Antonescu. The coffins and the urns were carried on the shoulders of the Legionaries and placed at the front of the chapel for the religious service performed by a group of monks led by archimandrite Valeriu Nicoloiu and the abbot Serafim Georgescu of the Sinaia Monastery, and the arch-priest Ion Mihăilescu from Pitești.

After the last religious ceremony, the commandant performed the roll call of the dead. The Legionary community answered "Present" and sang "The Hymn of the Fallen Legionaries." The coffins were carried to the tombs and buried in a

more intimate religious ceremony attended by the families of the deceased. The urns were deposited in the church. The ceremony ended at 18:00, with General Antonescu and Sima paying homage to the dead Legionaries.

From Soldier-Priest to the "Patriarch of the Nation": The Burial of Ioan Moța

The last cycle of official commemorations started with the pompous official funeral of Father Ioan Moța, who died of natural causes on November 20, 1940 in Bucharest. Ioan Moța was commemorated by the Legionary press not only as the "father of the Martyr" and "hero of Majadahonda" Ion I. Moța, but also, in his own right, as "the priest of the Romanian people," the "Apostle," the "Father," or the "Patriarch of the Nation." The Legionary propaganda stressed the fact that the young Moța "continued the line of fighting and sacrifice of his father, joining the Captain in his grandiose plan of inner transformation of our people."[46]

Ioan Moța was buried with national honors. His body was laid in state at the Legionary Church St. Ilie Gorgani—"the church of the Captain and of the entire Legionary movement"—and then transported to Orăștie by train, in a procession reminiscent of that of his son.[47] Moța's corpse was exposed to the public from Wednesday, November 20, to Friday, November 22, at noon. There were continuous religious ceremonies officiated by "the most prominent priests in Bucharest" and attended by a permanent Legionary guard of honor.

The Legionary propaganda integrated Moța's funeral into a scenario of divine redemption. It claimed that, in order to reconcile itself with the forces of heaven, the nation had to go through the school of sacrifice and humility. In the first phase, the Legionary apocalyptic view of politics seemed to be fulfilled, as evidenced by the country's massive territorial loses, the abdication of the king, the collapse of the royal dictatorship, and the devastating earthquake which ravaged Moldova and Bucharest on November 10, 1940.[48] On November 22, Patriarch Nicodim organized a prayer for healing the harm caused by the earthquake. The procession stopped along the way at the St. Ilie Gorgani Church to pay respect to Father Moța and ended at the seat of the patriarchy. The Legionary propaganda capitalized on this visit. In order to prove the world was "re-enchanted" again, the Legionary press presented the death of Moța as a sign of divine intervention in the life of the nation. The deceased nationalist fighter was destined to serve as a mediator between heaven and earth, and was to complete the heavenly pantheon of the Legion, preparing the accession of the Legionary martyrs to the throne of God: "We have to listen to Father Ioan Moța's voice, who is praying for us. Because, if it is true that priests mediate between God and the people, then Father Moța is *the first genuine Patriarch of the Romanian people and of the Romanian Church*."[49] This was a clear attack on the memory of Patriarch Miron Cristea, to which Father Moța was symbolically counterposed.

On Friday, November 22, the funeral convoy headed toward the Northern Railway Station (*Gara de Nord*), attended by the family, diplomats representing the allied countries of Italy, Germany, Spain, and Japan, Horia Sima, Legionary commandants, the army, and military units. His coffin was carried by priests, wrapped in the national flag. On the way to the station, the funerary convoy stopped in front of the royal palace for another religious service. At the railway station, a military fanfare performed the national anthem, followed by a paramilitary parade of Legionaries in uniforms. Along the way to Father Ioan Moța's home town in Orăștie, the funerary train stopped for short religious ceremonies in Ploiești, Sinaia, Brașov, and Alba Iulia. In Orăștie, Moța's coffin was placed for a short time at the new Orthodox Cathedral. The construction of this church started in 1936 at his initiative and was dedicated—in line with Legionary ideology—to the Archangels Michael and Gavril.[50]

The "Christ of the Romanians": The Reburial of Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu

After the completion of the Predeal Cemetery and the burial of Ioan Moța, the most important project of Legionary rule was the exhumation and reburial of Codreanu and the 13 Legionaries killed on King Carol's order on November 30, 1938. These reburials were planned to take place in Bucharest on November 30, 1940, at the two-year commemoration of their death. Incidentally, the event was opportunely placed two months after the establishment of the Legionary regime. The Legionaries were thus able carefully to stage the commemoration ceremonies as the apotheosis of their scenario of redemption and salvation centered on the cult of *imitatio Christi*. The reburials of the 14 martyrs thus stood out as the most dramatic, emotionally filled and politically charged of all Legionary ceremonies. Given their importance, the "leading martyrs" of the Legion were buried at the seat of the movement in Bucharest, the national capital, and not away in the countryside, in the Carpathian Mountains.

The reburial of the Legionary "sacrificial elite" consisted of a highly complex set of ceremonies, a morbid political festival of the dead lasting for more than a week, from Monday, November 25, to Saturday, November 30. The program was carefully prepared by the Legion's leadership, discussed with all the Legionary heads of regions and counties on Sunday, November 24 at the Legionary student house, and then comprehensively disseminated on the radio and in the press. The week beginning on Monday, November 25 was to be "entirely dedicated to the memory, heroism and eternal sacrifice of the founder of the Legionary Movement." On November 27, the "holy bones" of the Captain, of the *Decemviri*, and of the *Nicadori* were to be placed for three nights at the St. Ilie Gorgani Church, for a religious wake. The reburial was scheduled for November 30, at the Green House, the Legion's seat in Bucharest.

In the Christian Orthodox religious tradition, funerals are complex and highly ritualized ceremonies. They are composed of several stages, which

take place at the house of the deceased; on the way to the church; at the church; on the way from the church to the graveyard; and at the site of the grave. These religious rituals provided the structure of the Legionary reburial ceremonies, yet with apparently minor but in fact highly significant modifications necessitated by the incorporation of Legionary rites and rituals. This particular reburial ceremony can be broken down into three major stages, corresponding by and large to the three major components of a traditional burial ceremony: the disinterment of the corpses of the Legionary martyrs at the Jilava fort, which took place on the night of Tuesday to Wednesday, November 26–27; the *vigilae* of the corpses at the St. Ilie Gorgani Church, from Wednesday evening to Saturday morning, November 30; and the reburial in the Mausoleum of the Legionary Martyrs at the Green House, on Saturday afternoon. While part of a unified scenario, the three stages fulfilled different functions, characterized by different sets of emotions: (1) the disinterment was dominated by grief, compassion, and feelings of anger and victimization, and culminated in a terrifying orgy of violent revenge against the assassins; (2) the *vigilae* was dominated by religious rites and rituals meant to re-assess Codreanu's charismatic qualifications and to sanctify the Legion, and, through it, the Romanian nation; and (3) the burial ceremony, conceived not as a farewell but as a triumphal re-affirmation of the nation's redemption and regeneration, in fascist mode.

These distinct ceremonies took place at Legionary symbolic sites and places of memory. The first was the Jilava Prison, declared by the Legionary propaganda "the Golgotha of the Legionary martyrs," the place where the "saint corpses" were buried under a heavy gravestone, "just as Christ the Redeemer was covered [with a stone] by the assassin Jews."[51] The second stage took place at the Sf. Ilie Gorgani Church, the place "where the Captain used to pray, and from where the heroes Moța and Marin and, more recently, Father Ioan Moța, departed to eternity." The third stage took place not in a cemetery but at the mausoleum of the Legionary "Green House" in Bucharest. Between these "sacred" sites, impressive convoys and public processions were organized, along a symbolic itinerary meant to appropriate Bucharest's public urban spaces.

These events were followed, on December 1, by the 22nd anniversary of the Great National Assembly of Alba Iulia in 1918, which proclaimed the union of Transylvania with Romania. The proximity of the two celebrations provided the regime with an opportunity to tie history, religion, and politics into a unified charismatic scenario of divine election and salvation of the Romanian nation. The particular historical context in which the anniversary took place—immediately after the Vienna Diktat on August 30, 1940, which awarded Northwestern Transylvania to Hungary—gave the Legion the opportunity to arrogate a new historical mission for its rule: the task of national re-unification, leading to the re-constitution of Greater Romania. Codreanu's reburial and the Alba Iulia national celebrations thus became interrelated components of the Legionary campaign of spiritual regeneration of the

Romanian nation leading to the creation of a new man, a new Christian-totalitarian state, and a unified nation.

The Exhumation of the Corpses of the Martyrs

Codreanu and the 13 Legionaries condemned to life imprisonment for assassination, the *Nicadori*, and the *Decemviri* were secretly and lawlessly executed in the night of November 29–30, 1938, following direct orders from Carol II. Their corpses were buried in a valley covered with acacias in the Southwestern part of the Jilava prison,[52] at a distance of approximately 200 meters from the railway station. The corpses were thrown, with their faces down, into a common grave 13 meters long, 3 meters wide, and approximately 1.50 meters deep. Although the corpses were buried in a militarized prison, these security measures were not considered sufficient by Carol II, who was concerned with the powerful political symbolism potentially carried by corpses and the possibility of them being recovered as "saint relics" of the Legion in the future. Therefore, several weeks later, the gendarmes returned to the gravesite and spilled 15 gallons of sulfuric acid over the corpses, in a desperate attempt to destroy the corpses and eradicate the potential basis for the Legionary martyrdom cult.[53] The grave was covered with a layer of bricks over which was cast a thick plaque of cement weighing approximately 30 tons. The plaque was hidden under a large mound of earth in the form of a trapeze, about 1.50 meters high. A modest wooden cross with the names of the 14 victims was placed on the top.

The excavation of the common grave started on Tuesday, November 26, 1940. The Legionary dispatched at Jilava Prison a large delegation made up of all Legionary commandants and deputy commandants from Bucharest, led by the Commanders of the Annunciation Ilie Gârneață, Corneliu Georgescu, Radu Mironovici, and Mile Lefter. They were assisted by three Legionary teams from Țara Moților, from the Polytechnic School in Bucharest, and the "Black Hill" (*Dealul Negru*) unit, and by a group of engineers headed by Ștefan Drăgănescu. The exhumation works were supervised by a special commission of inquiry over the death of the 14 victims, headed by Councilor Eugen Bănescu, the forensic expert Valentin Sava, and the commander of the Jilava Prison, Colonel Opriș. The families of the victims were also present at the scene, including Codreanu's wife, Elena Zelea-Codreanu, and his father, Ion Zelea-Codreanu.[54]

Working in four-hour shifts, the three Legionary teams removed the mound of earth from the grave and reached the massive cement plaque. Initially, urged by Councilor Bănescu, the technicians intended to perforate the plaque into pieces and remove it from the tomb. The Legionary commandants objected that the plaque had a historical value (they compared it to "Christ's tombstone") and, as such, should be kept intact. They also argued that the noisy destruction of the plaque would violate their sense of piety, since traditionally any sounds other than quiet whispering or mourning at a burial site is considered disrespectful of

the deceased.[55] After great efforts, at 02:00 the plaque was lifted by a crane and placed near the grave, serving as a platform for corpses and coffins.

Once the plaque was removed, on Wednesday, November 27, at 06:00, honorary Legionary teams made up of the "Commanders of the Annunciation," the Legionary commandants, and deputy commandants started to exhume the corpses. This operation was a symbolic substitute for the preparation of the dead, which in the Orthodox popular religious practice involve the washing of the dead, the dressing of the corpses, and placing them in coffins. By 10:00, the grave was finally excavated and the first bones recovered. At that moment, Priest Vasile Boldeanu performed the first religious service, while numerous candles were lit around the grave. After the service, the relics were gradually collected and placed on the platform. Because of the huge amounts of sulfuric acid that had been poured into the grave, the corpses were blackened yet relatively well preserved, protected as they had been from the elements by the cement plaque. First were removed the *Decemviri*, followed by Codreanu and the *Nicadori*. Codreanu's corpse was identified by the three crosses he wore at his neck, his necklace, his ring, a personal icon he wore, his suitcase, and a book of prayers.[56]

The exhumation and identification of the remains extended well into the night, by the light of projectors. After careful identification, the bodies were wrapped in white cloth, a symbol of purification and innocence and, covered with flowers, awaited their placement into preprepared coffins. Codreanu's coffin, made of white bronze and thus distinguished from the others, was placed in the middle of the plaque, framed by the two distinct groups of martyrs on each side.

The ceremony of body identification was largely non-verbal, dominated by the physical effort of the working team, prayers, and piety. When the Captain's corpse came in turn to be placed in its coffin, a Legionary guard led by Commandant Sandu Valeriu presented the arms, honoring Codreanu as a chief of state and military commander. After a moment of silence, the Legionary Priest Dionisie Udrișteanu officiated a religious mass (see Figure 8.1). During the Gospel reading, all participants knelt in deep reverence; at the end of the ceremony, a Legionary choir sang *The Anthem of the Fallen Legionaries*.

After the religious service, the coffins were closed, draped in the national tricolor flag and in the Legion's green flags, and carried to cars by the Commanders of the Annunciation. The funerary convoy, headed by the car carrying the Captain's coffin and followed by the *Nicadori* and the *Decemviri*, departed at 21:00, heading for the St. Ilie Gorgani Church. In line with the Orthodox tradition, religious services were performed at every crossroad, until exiting the fort. On the way to the church, the convoy stopped at several locations intimately linked to the lives of the deceased, such as the " *Progresul*" (Progress) Church, Doru Belimace's house, and the Legion's seat on Gutenberg Street no. 3.

In sum, the disinterment of the corpses was a complex event which fulfilled many functions: the body identification was part of a police investigation involving forensic expertise; the religious rituals at the grave were part of the ceremony

FIGURE 8.1 The exhumation of the corpses of Codreanu, the *Decemviri*, and the *Nicadori*, November 27, 1940

Source: Photo by Tempel Marek, Associated Press-Photo, Berlin, Reference code: 3/2/0/-/16314, Collection "Krakow-Warsaw Press Publishing House" (Wydawnictwo Prasowe Kraków-Warszawa), National Digital Archives (Narodowe Archiwum Cyfrowe), Poland (https://www.szukajwarchiwach.gov.pl/en/jednostka/-/jednostka/5956934).

of granting proper Christian burial to the deceased; while the mourning was a family drama. First and foremost, the ceremony was meant to give the martyrs a proper Christian burial. As shown above, the bodies had been buried in a common grave, being thrown in with their faces downwards, without coffins and without being administered the last Christian rights. This pagan practice violated the traditional Christian Orthodox conviction that every Christian is entitled to a proper burial. Legionary ideologues blamed the illicit nature of the execution, presenting Carol's rule as pagan and even anti-Christian. Second, the martyrs' exhumation and reburial were not only meant to perform a proper religious ritual. The reparatory act was also meant to stigmatize Carol's dictatorship as lawless and antinational, and to legitimize the Legionary "revolution," portraying it as a return to the national tradition and Christian order. The reports of the exhumation emphasized the brutality of the executions; they also pointed to the Christian symbols found almost intact in the grave, such as Codreanu's crucifix and his pocket Bible. Last but not least, the funeral was used as an opportunity to "actualize" the events of the assassinations: the lawless executions of the Legionaries in 1938–1939 took place at night, hidden from the public eye. The truth about the executions was never communicated to the families of the

deceased or to the public opinion. The burial ceremony was meant to reveal the truth, to rehabilitate the victims, and symbolically to reintegrate them into their families and communities as heroes and role models.

From Legal Rehabilitation to Criminal Revenge

Reburial was coupled with a campaign for retroactive justice. Thus, while the exhumation of the corpses was well under way, another drama was unfolding at the Jilava fort, several hundred meters from the gravesite: during the night of November 26–27, a squad of the Legionary Workers' Corps executed without trial 65 former dignitaries considered guilty of persecuting the Legion and of killing the 14 Legionaries.[57] These dignitaries had been arrested in several waves and awaited legal punishment in Jilava prison, in close proximity to Codreanu's grave.

Violent revenge was a main principle of the Legion's ideology and practice. That principle provided the motivation for the most infamous acts of the Legion, from the student plot in 1923, to the assassinations of Manciu in 1924, Duca in 1933, Stelescu in 1935, and of Călinescu in 1939. If the first acts of revenge were ad hoc reactions to perceived "injustice," after 1930 the Legionary ideologues put forward various ethical or political justifications for their actions and devised comprehensive plans of systematic punishment in the eventuality of their advent to power. In *The Nest Leader's Manual*, Codreanu stated:

> The first day after the Legion's victory, an Exceptional Tribunal will be established to summon and set to trial for betrayal of the fatherland:
> a) all plunderers of public property;
> b) all those who have accepted bribes to facilitate businesses;
> c) all those who, violating the fundamental laws of the country, have persecuted, imprisoned or damaged Legionaries or their families. Whatever position they hold, from *gendarme* to Minister, no one will escape this judgment. … The Romanian nation, aware of its own rights, will start the new life by legal punishment. We are patiently waiting for this moment. Without this moment of chastise, no reconstruction is possible in this country. (Point 84)

In anticipation of that moment of revenge, in 1937 Codreanu sent confidential letters to the Legionaries containing names of officials who had committed "grave acts" against the movement, asking them to punish and "stigmatize" these elements and their parents for national treason, "toward the betterment and purification of the nation."[58] He also instructed the Legionaries to submit to the center detailed monthly reports of all "abuses" committed by authorities against the Legion.[59] This policy intensified the persecution complex within the movement; while anger mounted, the moment of revenge was tactically postponed again and again, making numerous Legionaries fear that the promise of revenge

was only a tactical, platonic encouragement by the top leadership. Nevertheless, soon after the Legion's advent to power, these plans begin to be translated into practice. Although Codreanu demanded legal punishment, a widespread rumor circulating among Legionaries stated that the Captain would allow, in his "political will," 24 hours of revenge actions.[60] To prepare the ground for such actions, the Legionary press made the apology of purifying "Sorelian" violence, arguing that justice and rehabilitation could only be achieved through violent revenge. Constantin Noica, at the time the editor-in-chief of *Buna Vestire*, claimed that "violence does not always mean blindness, but can also mean thirst for purity." In his view, punishing terrorist acts committed by Codreanu and Moța and emulated by the other Legionary terrorist squads "had a purifying sense for the souls of this nation."[61] Noica acknowledged that these actions were contrary to the teachings of the Christian Church, but argued that they were justified by the need for divine justice, in the spirit of the Archangel's punishing mission. Departing from Christian ethics, Noica invoked practices of purification through sacrifice conducted in ancient Greece (as in the myth of Elektra and Orestes) and in Dacia.[62] Others justified revenge in view of the traditional Romanian mores, even if those contradicted the "foreign" or "superimposed" Liberal Civil Code: "Everything that was legal then is guilty today under another law: The Law of the Nation."[63]

The first lists of culprits to be punished were compiled on September 27, 1940. To supervise the process, the authorities established a Commission of Criminal Investigation led by Eugen Bănescu, a councilor at the High Court of Cassation and Justice.[64] The Commission was to work closely with the Prefecture of Bucharest Police in arresting the culprits and bringing them to justice. Yet, it soon became obvious that the Commission and the police had different visions as to how the process was to be conducted. The police force, led by the Legionary Prefect (and colonel in reserve) Ștefan Zăvoianu and his close collaborators, sub-secretary of state Constantin Orășanu, and Quaestor of Police Romulus Opriș had been heavily infiltrated by the Legionaries, every post of career policeman being doubled with a Legionary collaborator. As a result, the police became a Legionary stronghold of planning the violent revenge. Thus, in addition to the 27 former dignitaries arrested by the Commission, the police arrested an additional 38 persons, without observing legal procedures.[65]

The 65 prisoners awaited legal punishment at Jilava Prison; although the prison was under military control, the internal security of Fort no. 13, where the prisoners were interned, was fully controlled by the Legion. The guard consisted of 30 Legionaries supplied by the Legionary Workers' Corps; organized in shifts, they drove to the prison every evening at 21:00 from the seat of the Legionary Police in Bucharest. Although Bănescu insisted that the prisoners be moved to a regular penitentiary, the request was resisted by the Legionary Prefect of Police Zăvoianu, using various pretexts or simply refusing to execute orders. On November 25, 1940, visits of relatives—routinely allowed upon permission from the sub-secretary of state Alexandru Rioșanu (Rioșianu)—were

suspended. Under the guise of responding to the protests filed by the relatives, Prefect Zăvoianu and sub-secretary Orăşeanu traveled to Jilava to mediate the conflict; in fact, they remained there until 19:00, reportedly in order to prepare the assassination plan for the next day.[66]

The coordination of the assassinations with the exhumation of the Legionary "martyrs" involved careful planning. The exhumation was expected to start on Wednesday morning, but the work stagnated, apparently without reason, the whole day. Although, at Bănescu's insistence, the lifting of the cement plaque did start in the morning, the activity was suspended soon after his departure so that at 16:00, when the commission returned, the work was still in an incipient stage. According to a later Commission of Investigation of the Legionary Crimes established by General Antonescu in February 1941, the delay was consciously planned by Zăvoianu in order to synchronize the exhumation of the corpses with the execution of the prisoners, planned for the night of November 26–27. Indeed, at 20:00, a new shift of the Legionary Guard, in fact an execution squad, departed from Bucharest to Jilava, accompanied by Questor Opriş, Intendant Constantin Savu and the chief of the Workers' Corps, Dumitru Groza, all accomplices to the plan. According to Legionary Police Commissar Gheorghe Creţu, in charge of supervising the shift that night, the guard was composed of Legionaries unknown to him, which was unusual. At 23:45, Groza delivered a short speech urging the Legionary guard to revenge their Captain before his reburial. He distributed each guardian to distinct cells where they were to carry out the executions, according to a predetermined scheme. The synchronic execution took place on Thursday, November 27, at 00:30, after the external military guard executed the last security check outside the fort. The Legionaries intended to take advantage of the fact that, at that moment, a huge crane was lifting the cement plaque making an infernal noise which could cover the sound of the rifle shots. At a revolver signal, the Legionary guard stormed the cells and shot the prisoners, killing 64 of them and leaving behind only one survivor. Sergeant Sîrbu, Codreanu's hangman, was executed in cell no. 10, together with the entire *gendarmerie* unit who participated at the execution of the 14 Legionaries. The orgy of Legionary vendetta was terrifying: according to the medical report released by the Commission of Investigation, each body was penetrated by up to 38 bullets. Some of the prisoners' heads were further chopped with axes. This abominable treatment might have been a deliberate attempt to make investigators believe the crimes were committed spontaneously by the excavating team with their digging tools. However, corroborated by the undignified treatment of the bodies of other victims (such as Nicolae Iorga, see below), these practices also show evidence of unleashed rage and ritual slaughter. After the execution, the Legionaries regrouped and marched to Codreanu's graveside, singing the Legionary hymn. After a collective prayer at the grave, they dispersed at approximately 01:30. In the morning of November 27, other dignitaries were arrested and executed in Bucharest and

in other locations. Two Legionary death squads assassinated historian Nicolae Iorga and economist Virgil Madgearu.

Reported by the press, these abominable crimes were a source of great embarrassment for General Antonescu, since they exposed his pretense of instituting the rule of law, order, and legal retribution as empty words or a mere propagandistic facade. In reaction, the next day a stormy meeting of the Council of Ministers took place, marked by a direct confrontation between General Antonescu and the Legion. The minutes of the Council were not taken, as was routinely the practice. That fact was indicative of the high political tensions existent between the two parties: General Antonescu expressly forbade access to the minute-taker, since he was determined to convey grave messages to the Legion, and did not want those to circulate outside the room.[67] Three brief summaries of the meeting have nevertheless survived, provided by an official governmental source and by two members of the cabinet, Generals Gheorghe Dobre and Nicolae Mareș.[68] During the meeting, General Antonescu blamed the Legion for crossing the boundary of legitimate revenge into criminal behavior, and refused to have his career and prestige "compromised by the activity of a gang of terrorists,"[69] made up of madmen. He was categorical in condemning the crimes, pledged to punish the culprits, and asked the Legion to issue a communiqué distancing itself from the massacres and enforcing discipline, and threatening his resignation if that did not occur. The Legionary leadership, most importantly Horia Sima and Corneliu Georgescu, stated they had no prior knowledge of the criminal plans and played no part in the planning process. They tried, nevertheless, to exculpate the perpetrators of full responsibility, claiming that the emotional burden of the disinterment ceremony unleashed legitimate feelings of grief and anger among the Legionary guards and the working team present at the scene, leading to violent revenge. They also blamed the justice system for the slow pace of solving the issue, arguing that an unchecked rumor—according to which the arrested dignitaries would eventually avoid punishment—intensified the emotional impact, generating a "psychosis" that led to the tragic outcome. The Legionary discourses were not convincing: "The general impression of the non-Legionary ministers, mine included, was that all Legionary ministers, together with General Petrovicescu, were well informed of these plans and were the moral authors of the massacre," concluded General Mareș in his summary report.[70] During the meeting, several non-Legionary ministers demanded the Legion's resignation from power. Although the government eventually survived the crisis, the rupture between the army and the Legion was almost total, the final divorce between the two parties being only a question of time.

After several additional hours of futile negotiations on wording, a laconic communiqué of the Council of Ministers formally repudiated the lawless "act" of revenge.[71] Although the communiqué was drafted on behalf of the Legion, the rift between General Antonescu and the Legion was quite evident from the structure of the communiqué and its accusatory tone. Thus, the document started by

reiterating the fact that, "from the very beginning," General Antonescu "based the new regime on legality and justice." Consequent to this principle, the government promised to implement severe sanctions against the perpetrators. At the end, the Legion renewed its pledge to implement "the strict and rigorous integration of all its members in the existing state order and the exemplary punishment of all those who will violate the regime of legality." To underscore this principle, a second communiqué signed by Horia Sima as Commander of the Legion appealed to the Legionaries to walk "the line of the Captain" and strictly to observe the regime of "order and discipline," threatening malefactors with severe punishment.[72] To salvage public order, on the same day General Antonescu passed a decree introducing heavy penalties (including death sentences) against those who violated the liberty and safety of private persons or harmed private or public properties.[73]

It is important to note that, while openly blaming the Legion for its illegal actions, the governmental communiqué endorsed the Legionary claim that the massacre was a spontaneous reaction of anger. Although comprehensively elaborated upon in the Legionary press and in subjective witness accounts,[74] the thesis of an ad hoc reaction of the rank-and-file Legionaries was refuted by empirical evidence: the report of the Commission of Investigation into the Legionary crimes demonstrated unambiguously the premeditated character of the executions.[75] After the Legionary "rebellion" of January 1941 (see below), General Antonescu used the Commission's report openly to repudiate the horrible crimes and to bring the perpetrators to justice.[76] The planned nature of the executions proves, yet again, that violent revenge was in fact one of the Legion's most intimate aims.[77]

At the Church: The Vigilae and the Routinization of Charisma

The second stage of the burial ceremony took place at the St. Ilie Gorgani Church (see Figure 8.2; for the Legionaries' cult of Archangel Michael inside the church, see Figure 8.3). In the Orthodox religious ritual, this stage, which is called the wake or *vigilae*, takes place according to an established scenario traditionally made up of the Mass of the Dead (a cycle of prayers from the Office of the Dead), the funeral mass, and absolution. Candles are lit around the coffin throughout the ceremony.

The funerary cortège arrived at the church on Wednesday, November 27, at 22:45. The coffins were carried into the church and placed in front of the altar. The Captain's coffin was set on a catafalque in the center, while the *Nicadori* and the *Decemviri* were displayed on its two sides. A religious service was performed, led by priest Udrișteanu. A solemn honorary guard took positions at the Captain's coffin, composed of the Legionary commandants and deputy commandants who distinguished themselves in service. The first guard was made up of the three surviving members of the *Văcărești* group, Ilie Gârneață, Radu Moronovici, and Corneliu Georgescu, joined by the Commander of the Annunciation Mille Lefter. They were followed, in the second shift, by other Commanders of the Annunciation: Vasile Iasinschi,

FIGURE 8.2 The Legionary church, St. Ilie Gorgani

Source: Photograph by Constantin Iordachi.

FIGURE 8.3 The representation of Archangel Michael in the church

Source: Photograph by Constantin Iordachi.

Andrei Ionescu, Ion Blănaru, and Nicolae Petrașcu.[78] As a charismatic "staff" or "cleros," the Commanders of the Annunciation were assigned to play the role of the apostles in this behavioral scenario patterned on *imitatio Christi*.[79] As models of communal life, they were at the forefront of the burial ceremony, carrying Codreanu's coffin and granting both legitimacy and continuity to the Legion as an organization.

The religious service, the organization of the *vigilae* and the burial ceremony were supervised by the Legionary Priest Ilie Imbrescu and his deputy Ion Lungianu. They convened all priests who volunteered to participate in the ceremony at the Legionary seat on Gutenberg Street, in the vicinity of the church, and distributed them with specific roles in the procession. All over the country, Legionary priests were asked to perform religious services for the martyrs every day; on the day of the burial, they had to perform the special service at 11:00. On Thursday, Friday, and especially on Saturday, the day of the burial, church bells rang throughout the country three times a day.

The church was adorned in green by a team of the Legionary Workers' Corps, while the female members covered the coffins with flowers.

Watching over the dead (*vigiliae*) was an established practice in the Orthodox Church; its purpose was to protect the body from evil spirits and harmful influences until burial. Traditionally, the wake consists of the continuous reading of the Psalter, regularly interrupted by brief memorial services. The reading is performed aloud by members of the family and friends throughout the night until the body is taken to the church. At Codreanu's burial, it was exceptional that the *vigiliae* lasted for three days and three nights. During this time, the watch was permanent, the corpse never being left without prayer: the Legionary priests organized religious services without interruption, assisted by choirs. The prayers were not performed by lay relatives or friends but by Orthodox priests, a privilege which is usually reserved only for deceased priests.[80] Moreover, in addition to the watch performed by family and friends, as in ordinary ceremonies, the martyrs were watched by a Legionary guard made up of prominent Legionaries (see Figures 8.4 and 8.5).

On Thursday morning, November 28, the church was open to the public and became a site of pilgrimage for Legionaries, sympathizers, and the population at large, either from Bucharest or from the provinces. Legionary newspapers throughout the country published comprehensive reports of the "impressive pilgrimage" at the "St. Ilie Gorgani" Church (see Figure 8.6). *Curentul* claimed that "thousands and thousands of citizens marched in front of the 14 martyrs of the Legion."[81] In the same propagandistic manner, *Buna Vestire* emphasized the large popular participation to the *vigilae* of people of all ages and social extractions. According to the Legionary press, on Friday, November 29, the pilgrimage reached its climax. The traffic around the church was completely stopped, while the public was waiting in long lines along the street to pay homage to the "Captain" and the "martyrs" (see Figure 8.6 below).

La Biserica Sf. Ilie-Gorgani
Sicriul cu osemintele Căpitanului, in jurul căruia, in permanență comandanții legionari fac de gardă

FIGURE 8.4 Codreanu's coffin guarded by Legionary commandants in the St. Ilie Gorgani Church

Source: *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 48 (Nov. 30, 1940): 3.

FIGURE 8.5 Kneeling in front of the coffins of the martyrs at the St. Ilie Gorgani Church

Source: Photo by Tempel Marek, Associated Press-Photo, Berlin, Reference code: 2-16315, Collection "Krakow-Warsaw Press Publishing House", National Digital Archives, Poland (https://www.szukajwarchiwach.gov.pl/en/jednostka/-/jednostka/5900104).

FIGURE 8.6 People waiting in line on the streets of Bucharest to pay homage to "The Captain"

Source: *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 50 (Dec. 1, 1940): 8.

Fascitizing the Masses: The Reburial of the Martyrs

The climax of the week-long festival of the dead was the reburial of the martyrs, which took place on Saturday, November 30. That day was proclaimed a national day of mourning, educational activities at all levels and entertainment performances being suspended throughout the country. The burial ceremony had several stages: the religious service performed in the church; the funeral convoy to the Green House; and the burial in the Legionary Mausoleum of the Martyrs.

The first act took place in the church and was reserved for the families of the deceased, for state officials, and for the Legionary leadership. At 08:45, state dignitaries took their place in the church, hierarchically distributed according to their power, status, and prestige. At the front of the church were Colonel Erwin Kraus, King Michael's representative; General Ion Antonescu, the head of the state, and Horia Sima, the Commander of the Legion, the latter both wearing green shirts; and the Commanders of the Annunciation, Ilie Gârneaţă, Corneliu Georgescu, Radu Mironovici, Mile Letter, and Ion Blănaru. In the second row were members of the government; behind the ministers, there were the sub-secretaries of state and other senior officials. In the same group were placed the Legionary commandants, high-profile magistrates, the Knights of the Military Order "Michael the Brave," and various generals.

The display of diplomatic and political representatives of the Axis powers at the ceremony was remarkable (see Figure 8.7). The most powerful fascist leaders,

FIGURE 8.7 General Ion Antonescu, Horia Sima, and representatives of the Axis diplomatic corps, at Codreanu's funeral. Ion Antonescu: first row, first from the left; Horia Sima: first row, second from the left; Gauleiter Ernst Wilhelm Bohle: third from the right, in the second row; and the German ambassador to Romania, Wilhelm Fabricius: first from the left, in the second row.

Source: Tempel Marek, Heinrich Hoffmann Presse Dokumentował, Reference code: 2-16318, Collection "Krakow-Warsaw Press Publishing House," National Digital Archives, Poland (https://www.szukajwarchiwach.gov.pl/en/jednostka/-/jednostka/5948041/obiekty/245931#opis_obiektu).

Hitler, Mussolini, and General Franco sent wreaths, eager as they were to associate their image with the dead fascist martyr and thus share in his charisma. So did the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, Joachim von Ribbentrop and Galeazzo Ciano, respectively. The German, Italian, Japanese, and Spanish ministers took part in the ceremony. The German Reich was represented by a numerous delegation headed by Baldur von Schirach, Governor of Vienna and former leader of the National Socialist Youth Movement, and Ernst Wilhelm Bohle, head of the Nazi Organization for Germans Abroad, as representatives of the government. They were accompanied by Wilhelm Fabricius, the Minister of Germany to Bucharest; Army General Erik Hansen, military attaché to Bucharest and the commander of the German Military Mission (*Deutsches Heeres Mission in Rümanien*), and Luftwaffe Lieutenant General Wilhelm Speidel, commander of the German air force mission (*Deutsches Luftwaffe Mission in Rümanien*); *Generalmajor* Eduard Ritter von Schleich, the Extraordinary Envoy of the Reich's Army; Hermann Neubacher, former mayor of Vienna and the *chargé*

of economic affairs in Romania; and *Obergruppenführer* Werner Lorenz, as representative of *Reichsführer* SS Heinrich Himmler. Italy was represented by Pellegrino Ghigi as representative of the emperor-king, and by Silenzi, Mussolini's personal representative. Spain was represented by the *chargé d'affaires* Merry del Val and Beneyto Luis, the delegate of the Spanish Phalange in Romania.

The religious ceremony commenced at 09:00, when the bells of all the churches in the capital began to ring out. The service was performed by a group of high-profile priests, headed by the former Metropolitan Gurie, assisted by PSS Veniamin Ploeșteanu, the first Vicar of the Patriarchate. Other members of the group of priests included PSS Valeriu Moglan, the Vicar of the Metropolitan of Moldova, the Legionary priests Andrei Mihăilescu-Gorgani and Nicolae Georgescu-Edineț; Atanasie Popescu; Dionisie Udrișteanu, the Director of the Cernica Seminary, Dr. Liviu Stan, General Director in the Ministry of Religious Cults, Ștefan Palaghiță, General Inspector in the Ministry of Religious Cults, Arch-Priest Firmilian Marin,[82] G. Butnaru, Antipa Florescu, and Cristofor Dancu, among others. The answers were given by the Choir of the Patriarchy, led by Deputy Commandant Remus Tincoca. After the religious service, the coffins were taken out of the church and placed on the biers. Codreanu's coffin was carried by Colonel Zăvoianu (who orchestrated his violent revenge at Jilava), and a group of six priests. The coffins of the other martyrs were carried by Legionary commandants (see Figure 8.8).

Fascist symbols and visual propaganda materials filled the square, while the church was framed by huge green billboards with the image of Archangel

FIGURE 8.8 The coffins of the martyrs carried out of the St. Ilie Gorgani Church

Source: *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 51 (Dec. 2, 1940): 4.

FIGURE 8.9 The St. Ilie Gorgani Church adorned for Codreanu's burial

Source: *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 50 (Dec. 1, 1940): 4.

Michael (see Figure 8.9). To substantiate Codreanu's presence, in front of the church a huge green panel with the portrait of the Captain was placed across the street, with the slogan of the fascist roll call inscribed underneath: "Present!"

The Burial Procession

The culmination of the burial ceremony was the funeral cortège which took place on Saturday afternoon, coordinated by Radu Mironovici and Livezeanu Bartholomeu. If the other two events were organized in an intimate space, the burial was conceived as a huge mass rally meant to demonstrate the Legion's force, unity, cohesion, and popularity. The cortège was assembled at 10:30–11:00 at the St. Ilie Gorgani Church and departed slowly toward the Green House, following a long and symbolic route in downtown Bucharest through Elisabeta Avenue, Brătianu Avenue, Victoria Square, Basarab Avenue, and Griviţa Avenue, where the traffic was suspended for the occasion. The composition and the organization of the funeral convoy is highly illustrative of the Legionary worldview. The convoy was made up of three major components: religious symbols and the priestly procession at the front; the coffins followed by the families of the deceased and state officials in the middle; and, finally, the Legionary community, represented by numerous delegations.

The convoy was opened by a suite of 25 peasants from Codrii Câmpulungului in Bukovina and from Ţara Moţilor, in the Apuseni Mountains, on the Arieş

and Crișul Alb rivers. The choice of these regions, hailed as areas of Romanian ethnic purity, was another expression of the nationalist cult of authenticity, their inhabitants being generally regarded as direct descendants of the Dacians. These peasants were playing the *bucium* (bugle; derived from the Latin *bucinum*, from which the name of the players, *buciumeni*), an alphorn in the form of a long-curved horn or tube made from lime tree bark. The choice of the *bucium* was highly symbolic as well, since this ancient instrument holds a special significance in folk mythology. Considered to be of Dacian origin, the horn was traditionally used by mountain dwellers, especially in Bukovina and Northern Moldova, for communication and for guiding sheep and dogs. In the Orthodox religious tradition, the *bucium* was associated with singing the doomsday, as in the mural fresco below from the St. Ilie Gorgani Church.[83]

The suite of *buciumeni* was followed by a living crucifix (*troița*), made up of the members of the Legionary "Brotherhood of the Cross." A few steps behind, the Legionaries Vasile Iovin and Dumitru Banea carried the old cross placed on the common grave at the Jilava Prison, while other Legionaries carried the crosses to be placed on the martyrs' new graves. Next in line was a group of Legionaries carrying the traditional *prapuri*, the religious flags routinely displayed at burials; and *coliva*, a ritual food of boiled wheat, blessed by the priest, which symbolizes death and resurrection. These were followed by an impressive array of funeral

FIGURE 8.10 The funerary convoy of the Legionary martyrs

Source: Photo by Tempel Marek, Weltbild, Berlin Dokumentowałł, Berlin, Reference code: 2-16317, Collection "Krakow-Warsaw Press Publishing House," National Digital Archives, Poland (https://www.szukajwarchiwach.gov.pl/en/jednostka/-/jednostka/5965850).

wreaths sent by the families of the deceased, by state dignitaries, and by diplomatic missions. A huge fir tree wreath from Mount Rarău, Codreanu's preferred meditation site, ended that part of the procession.

After wreaths came the choir of the patriarchy led by Legionary Remus Tincoca; the Legionary student choir led by Mircea Hoinic; and the Cernica Monastic Seminary Choir, led by monk deacon Felix Dubneac. The choirs were followed by an impressive march of approximately 1,000 Orthodox priests, led by priests Gheorghe Dan Popescu and Ion Potecaş (see Figure 8.11). The priests were disposed in a pre-arranged order: first came priests and monks from monasteries, followed by deacons serving in the synod, and then other priests, sorted according to the color of their saint vestments (first those with white epitrachelions and phelonions, and then those in blue).[84] The procession of the Orthodox priests was followed by a group of Greek Catholic priests, who also performed a religious mass for the Legionary martyrs in the St. Ilie Gorgani Church.[85] Although numerically they were in the minority, the presence of Greek Catholic priests was politically important for the Legion. When referring to the church, in general, the Legionary press used the formula "National Church," by which they meant both "sister churches," the Orthodox and the Greek Catholic.

The procession of priests was followed by the Captain's coffins, carried by the Legionary Commanders of the Annunciation and by 24 other Legionary commandants. The 13 coffins of the *Nicadori* and the *Decemviri* followed in line, arranged with two in each row, each held by 13 Legionary casket-bearers and flanked by 24 other Legionaries serving as pallbearer shifts (see Figure 8.10).

FIGURE 8.11 The procession of priests proceeding Codreanu's coffin, backing Codreanu's claims to divine election

Source: *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 51 (Dec. 2, 1940): 6.

Along the entire route, the coffins of the martyrs were carried on the shoulders of 156 Legionary casket-bearers of various grades and functions. Initially, emulating the funerals of Moța and Marin, the Legionaries intended to place the coffins on a cart covered in fir-tree branches, pulled by Legionaries. This plan was ultimately abandoned due to the lack of time to organize it properly. According to Sima, the parade of the coffins on the streets of Bucharest had a shattering effect on the public; yet, the organization of the shifts was poor, the casket-bearers being exhausted by carrying their burden over long distances.

A few steps behind the coffins proceeded the families of the "martyrs": Ion Zelea-Codreanu, Elena Codreanu, Mrs. Iridenta Moța and her children, Gabriela and Mihăiaş, followed by the family of Nicolae Constantinescu, the family of Doru Belimace, Mrs. Maria Ciumetti, and the family of Ion Trandafir. After another guard of honor walked Colonel Erwin Kraus, the king's representative, followed by General Antonescu, and Sima, both wearing Legionary green shirts. Behind them came another guard of honor composed of Legionaries dressed in black leather wrappings. They were followed by members of the government, diplomats, senior officials, generals, and the knights of the "Michael the Brave" Military Order, whose symbolism was closely associated with the cult of the Archangel Michael, in dynastic version.

After these officials, the cortège was joined by a military band, followed by various associations related to the Legion. The huge procession concluded with the march of the Legionary battalions, in the following order: the Women Fortresses led by Lucia Trandafir; the Brothers of the Cross led by Ilie Smulțea; the Legionary students led by Vasile Andrei; the Workers' Corps led by Dumitru Groza; *Corpul Răzleților* led by Ilie Niculescu, and, finally, Legionary provincial units.

The huge funeral convoy departed at the signal of the Bukovinian *buciumeni*. The procession made the first stop at the statue of Brătianu. An immense billboard with the Captain's portrait covered the statue of the Liberal statesman, framed by the wings of the Archangel Michael. The coffins were laid down by the honor guard. A group of priests performed a religious service, attended by a large crowd. The convoy proceeded on the Brătianu and Take Ionescu avenues. The next stop was in Victoria Square, in front of the Council of Ministers. After another religious service, General Antonescu and members of the government and foreign representatives left the procession. Led by Sima, the convoy continued its itinerary with another stop at the Grivița Workshops, on Basarab Avenue. The procession was attended by large crowds, an aspect strongly emphasized (and exaggerated) in the Legionary propaganda.

The Martyrs' Reburial

The huge funeral procession approached the Green House in the afternoon, accompanied by the elegiac music of the *buciumeni*. "The Green House receives its founder", wrote the Legionary press.[86] At that point, General Antonescu,

members of the government and the foreign diplomats and guests rejoined the reburial. In front of the Green House a huge green billboard with the portrait of the Captain dominated the horizon. On two sides of the square, Legionary units hoisted green banners with images of the *Decemviri* and *Nicadori*. The entrance to the Green House was guarded by a team of 12 Legionaries. In the background were displayed green panels, flags, and other Legionary symbols. Above them there was a huge billboard featuring stylized images of the Archangel Michael.

The convoy proceeded into the small courtyard, which was packed with people. In front of the Mausoleum, on the left side, three open graves were prepared for the *Nicadori*, while on the right side ten open graves were dug for the *Decemviri*. The participants were arranged following a strict symbolic hierarchy. To the right side of the crypt were placed the Commanders of the Annunciation, joined by other Legionary commandants; on the left side, there were the families of the deceased, while in front were placed the priests officiating the mass. Behind the priests, also in front of the mausoleum, sat high officials and members of the government, headed by General Antonescu and Sima, along with foreign delegations. After the religious service, the "holy bones" of the Captain were placed in the crypt, between Moța and Marin, followed shortly afterward by the burial of the *Nicadori* and the *Decemviri*. At that point, the ceremony reached its emotional peak. The guards and their assistants took their positions of honor, while the audience sang the "Hymn of the Fallen Legionaries."

To prove Codreanu's charismatic qualifications, the Legionary propaganda claimed that the succession of events in Codreanu's life was revealed by signs of divine revelation: Codreanu's death occurred on St. Andrew's Day, very close in time to the celebration of Romania's national unity; the death of Father Ioan Moța was a predestined preparatory departure, mediating Codreanu's accession to heaven; and 29 November, the day of Codreanu's burial, coincided with the signing of Romania's adherence to the Tripartite Pact. On Codreanu's cross was inscribed a poem written by the Legionary poet Sandu Gavrilescu glorifying his immortality:

> He didn't die! He lives for us!
> Today he is among us, as ever before.
> We all wear his as "living icon"
> In our soul and heart and mind.
>
> You carry our destiny, Captain!
> On the coarse road of heroes;
> We want to get to be like you,
> As you were, so shall we all be.
>
> Descendants of work and honor,
> And of all the martyrs who fell,
> We shall build a country, Captain,
> As you have dreamt of and wanted it to be.[87]

The burial ceremony was visually played out under the shadow of the Archangel's billboard, suggesting the spell of divine intervention. Moreover, the entire order of natural events in that day was propagandistically put in the service of Codreanu's charisma, being invoked as mystical signs of divine communion.

Soon after the burial, the Legionaries planted crosses, crucifixes, and other funerary monuments all over the country, especially in places marked by previous confrontation with the authorities, in an attempt to take over and re-sacralize the national space in the Legionary faith. Thus, on November 30 a Legionary delegation placed an icon of Archangel Michael on Mount Susai,[88] while on December 22, 1940, the Green House Legionary section built a wooden crucifix (*troița)* in the memory of Codreanu, *Nicadori*, and *Decemviri* at the intersection of Avenues Gloria and Cireşoaia, near the seat of the Legion, the Green House.[89]

Re-making the Movement: Renewing the Legionary Community of Sacrifice

Codreanu's burial was a strong re-affirmation of the unity of the Legionary movement as a charismatic-totalitarian community of sacrifice leading to salvation. The Legion acted as an extended family, the Legionaries taking upon themselves the roles and duties which are usually attributed, in traditional burial ceremonies, to the family of the deceased. They were expected to fast and pray "for the Captain's soul" and to mourn their leader in churches all over the country. The Legionary community also actively participated in the wake of the dead and the funerary cortège. The exhumation and burial ceremonies were attended by all Legionary commandants and deputy commandants; by all Legionaries present in the capital; and by fully representative delegations from all over the country.[90] In addition, the flags of all Legionary units were brought to the St. Ilie Gorgani Church to be blessed by the Captain. Their presence was meant to affirm Codreanu's charismatic stature and prestige as a quasi-military commander of an earthly Christian army, and thus to increase the Legion's unity and cohesion.

On the day of the burial, the Legionaries were asked to observe strict fasting and to practice abstinence, silence, and reverence. The climax of the burial ceremony was the collective oath-taking of the Legionaries at the grave of the martyrs. The text of the oath was conceived as a direct dialogue with the Captain: "Long Live the Legion and long live our Captain! On the shattering day of your sacrifice, we pledge to keep until the end of our days Your laws. So we swear! Long Live the Legion and the Captain."[91] By way of this oath, the charismatic bonds of the Legionary community were renewed and the organization symbolically reborn. Once again, Codreanu was venerated as a creator of a religion, a prophet legislating a new set of life-guiding ethical commends. The ceremonies were repeated at local level: prayers and *vigiliae* were organized throughout the country, in major cities such as Arad, Timişoara, Braşov, and Ploieşti, in important Legionary churches and monasteries and *lieux des memoires*, such as Sinaia and Predeal, or in Legionary village nests, all honoring the body of the leader in absentia.[92]

"The Saintly Legionary Faith,"[93] the Charismatic Leader, and the Nation

The exhumation and reburial of Codreanu and of the Legionary martyrs was invested with a distinct ideological-religious significance, and the apotheosis of the Legionary doctrine of national salvation. According to this scenario, the burial of the martyrs was the lowest, most critical point of the nation's decline, yet at the same time it prefigured its imminent redemption:

> In the night of November 30, 1938, the dement ruling power planed its own fatality, working toward the tragic fulfillment of *the new redeeming Gospel*. The Captain, with the *Nicadori* and the *Decemviri*, dictated, with their last suffering, the new law of the Romanian existence.[94]

The collective burial of the martyrs was thus not a simple funeral: it was concomitantly a ceremony of "crowning the martyrs in immortality" and the beginning of a new historical era for the Romanians.

Legionary propaganda focused on Codreanu's reburial, exploited by the official propaganda as a strong re-affirmation of his charismatic qualifications. In a concerted press campaign, the Captain was presented as a role model for every Legionary, and for the Romanian youth, in general. To facilitate the internationalization of Codreanu's persona and life struggles, deeds, his political and autobiographical writings, as well as propaganda photos and posters with the leader were printed in 1940 in huge numbers and distributed to Legionary organizations throughout the country: a report of the Prime Minister's Office filed on March 21, 1941, mentioned 39,289 printed copies of *For My Legionaries* (out of which 30,159 had already been distributed); 19,442 copies of *Circulars and Manifestos* (out of which 3,670 had already been distributed), 22,284 photos of Codreanu, and no less than 166,657 copies of *The Nest Leader's Manual* (out of which 137,609 had already been distributed).[95] In addition, the Captain's personality was eulogized in an impressive array of official newspaper articles, public conferences, radio programs, propaganda posters, calendars, postcards, and stamps depicting "heroic" scenes from his life, supplemented by presentations of the lives of the other leading Legionary martyrs, Moța and Marin. Codreanu's charismatic cult took on gigantic proportions, serving as the foundation of the Legionary faith (see Figure 8.12). Codreanu was celebrated in a multitude of charismatic capacities with religious, mythological, and legendary connotations. He was proclaimed a nationalist awakener, a legendary, fairy-like character, a martyr for the Christian cause, a religious reformer and prophet, a new messiah and the "Christ of the Romanians." The religious imageries employed by the press emphasized the charismatic hero's capacity of bringing about the rebirth of the nation, and underscored the value of purification through violent revenge.

First, Codreanu was presented as a popular hero, in the tradition of the *haiducs* fighting injustice. Numerous poems of folk inspiration presented Codreanu

FIGURE 8.12 Shrine of the Captain set up at the center of the Legionary charity organization *Ajutorul Legionar*. The shrine displays icons of the "holy trinity" of the Legion, Codreanu, Moța, and Marin, all under the divine protection of Archangel Michael. The votive light and the permanent guard at the shrine of the martyrs emulated practices first established at the military lyceum at the Dealu Monastery.

Source: *Cabinetul de stampe, Colecția fotografică, Biblioteca Academiei Române.*

as a legendary folk hero fighting the dragon, following the pattern of the fairy tale character *Făt Frumos* (Prince Charming) glorified in Romanian ballads but also in Romantic poetry of folk inspiration.[96] Second, Codreanu was celebrated as a nationalist leader, a *tribun*[97] or *Apostle of the People*, along the tradition of Romantic awakeners embodied by the 1848 revolutionary awakeners Nicolae Bălcescu and Ion Heliade Rădulescu, and later epitomized by Nicolae Iorga. Historian P. P. Panaitescu compared Codreanu to Bălcescu, but emphasized that Codreanu brought that tradition to its culmination as "the greatest hero and martyr" of the Romanian people.[98] An editorial published in *Libertatea* went further in the direction of historical analogies, calling Codreanu a new Stephen the Great, but also as a martyr who brought about "the greatest sacrifice in the national history."[99]

Third, the Legionary propaganda portrayed Codreanu as a nation-builder, emphasizing the national unity forged around Codreanu and his unanimous acceptance as a national, redemptive hero. Panaitescu presented Codreanu's totalitarian movement as a laboratory for the creation of the new Romanian nation, through the obliteration of regional differences:

> To his pure nationalist doctrine, we owe the definitive cementation of the Romanian soul. Barely two decades have passed since the union, and, among the Legionaries, it is already impossible to distinguish a Transylvanian from a Wallachian or a Moldavian, in terms of their ideas, attitudes, and behavior. Those who live in the midst of the Legionaries and got to know them understand how deep is this transformation of the provincial soul in in a *unitary Romanian soul*.[100]

The most powerful and integrative propaganda theme was that of the new messiah. Codreanu was presented by the Legionary press as the Sky's Messenger (*Trimisul cerului*) to redeem the Romanian nation. According to Fănică Anastasescu, Codreanu was the "savior of the nation," and an "icon of heroism," "a legendary figure predestined to write the bright page in the history of Romania." What distinguished Codreanu from other historical figures was his divine mission and superhuman qualifications: "The Heavenly Grace made The Chosen ONE rise above the nation as a venerated stalk, transfigured by the superhuman mission which animated him."[101]

The leading Legionary ideologue Ion Veverca argued that Codreanu's sacrifice was "a defeat of death," the final act leading to the redemption of the nation and ultimate proof of its divine election. In his view, Codreanu was not only a great prophet, but the creator of a new political faith called *Legionarism*:

> The Captain believed and acted *in the spirit of great prophets and founders of a new faith*. Our life today is based on this legacy of the Captain, as the foundation of tomorrow's deeds and the strengths of today's weaknesses. That fact explains why, for the Legion, the Captain is alive, walking among us. He can never be dead. He lives with us in eternity. *For his sacrifice was the condition of our resurrection*. His sacrifice laid the foundations of the resurrection of the Romanian people. It is the measure of the soul defeating death, for the resurrection we were longing for.[102]

On the eve of and during the reburial ceremony, the key propaganda theme of the Legionary press was that of the resurrection of the charismatic prophet leading to the redemption of the nation, following the pattern of *imitatio Christi*:

> The Captain is alive! … Just like Jesus, breaking the locks and frightening his torturers, prevailing over Death, the Captain has been resurrected for the glory of the Legion and the Redemption of the Nation.[103]

Codreanu was not only the "Founder of the New Romania,"[104] but also its eternal *ruler*. Thus, the Workers' Guard pledged to guard the new Romania "under the invisible leadership of Archangel Michael and the spirit of the Captain."[105] In a radio conference, the young philosopher Emil Cioran provided a powerful plea for Codreanu's post-mortem charismatic cult:

> After his death we all feel lonely. … With the exception of Jesus, no other dead was so present among the living. Has anybody even thought about forgetting him? "From this moment on, our country is being led by a dead man," a friend was telling me on the bank of the Seine. This dead man spread a perfume of eternity over our human drag and brought back the sky over Romania.[106]

The burial of Codreanu was thus presented as the culmination of the Legion's charismatic rule, leading to the awakening of the fascistized nation. On the day of the reburial, *Cuvântul* wrote: "The Captain has resurrected. He passes in defiance, like a prince, in this city which thought it can kill him with bullets and hanging. And He shall pass again! He has resurrected."[107] In the view of some Legionaries, the resurrection of Codreanu meant also the redemption of the Romanian nation: "Our people has expiated, with the death of its innocents, all the sins of the past."[108] For others, however, the certainly of resurrection was accompanied by the uncertainty of national salvation. First, despite their declamatory tone, the Legionaries were in fact doubtful about the extent to which the Romanians would respond to their call. In a propagandistic manner, Sima inflated the public's participation in Codreanu's burial at half a million people; this high figure is not confirmed by independent press reports, which estimated a popular participation of between 100,000 and 150,000 people.[109] To mobilize popular support for the National Legionary Regime, the official press argued that, at a crucial point in their history, the Romanians had a *duty* to follow the Legionary call for salvation in order to avoid the curse of damnation:

> If this people, even after the resurrection of their own Jesus, do not change, do not put an end to their crimes, then we will have the destiny of the kikes. We will lose our homeland. We will wonder around at the closed gates of the other nations, spitted on and bullied, until we will totally disappear or till nobody will ever know our name.[110]
>
> The despairing tone of the text above shows that, behind the highly triumphalist attitude cultivated by the official press, the Legionaries were in fact tormented by uncertainties and fears of failure to mobilize the masses, leading—in their apocalyptic worldview—to the loss of the fatherland and degeneration at the hand of the Jews. These fears were also tactically amplified by the press in order to mobilize the population in support of the Legionary cause, by exposing the allegedly terrifying consequences of the Romanians' national indifference and political apathy.

Second, and in relation to the anxieties expressed above, while some press articles argued that the reburial of Codreanu marked the final and irreversible victory of the Legionary faith, the bulk of the Legionary press warned that the redemption of the nation was not complete but was to be the end result of a long and arduous process of violent cleansing: "No Romanian with a clean consciousness can affirm that the year 1940 brought victory to Romania," wrote a leading editorial in *Cuvântul*. To achieve victory, the editorial asked for the elimination of all those guilty of "breaking the body of the nation and of poisoning its blood (*frângerii trupului și otrăvirii sângelui*)."[111] In a similar vein, Constantin Papanace asked for a thorough act of cleansing the body of the nation from the Phanariots, the Gypsies (Roma), and the Jews, thus listing all the groups that had been "stigmatized" during the time as agents of degeneration in modern Romania.[112] The "reactivation" of the Phanariots as a contemporary political concern for the Legion was not entirely surprising, given Papanace's Aromanian origins and the nationalist conflict that opposed the Aromanians to the Greeks. But the listing of the Roma population as a paramount danger to Romania's blood purity might come as a surprise. Although anti-Roma attitudes were widespread in Romanian society, the Roma were rarely singled out as a national danger by the Legionary propaganda, which was obsessed first and foremost with the "Jewish danger." Papanace's article testifies, however, to the growing influence of social Darwinist theories of racial purity in Romanian politics, in general, and the Legionary ideology, in particular, most evident in the late 1930s.[113]

After the destruction of the old order and the violent revenge against their arch-enemies, the Legion was thus ready to embark on a new stage in the process of fascist nation-building: the racial cleansing of the unwanted others:

> Victory and difficult task ahead for the Legionary Regime, victory and difficult task ahead for the Romanian people! But the order of commend has already been given by Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, by the head of the State, and by the Commander-in-Chief of the Legion! Following the road of the martyrs' sacrifice we will prevail, without being derailed by the parasites on the body, the toxins in the blood and the infected blood cells whose fate has already been sealed by the reaction of the blood! [114]

The Legion could not fully implement this desideratum into practice, as it was ousted from power at the end of January 1941. The program of cleansing was to be implemented, nevertheless, by General Antonescu who, although he parted ways with the Legion, did share their ideal of ethnoreligious homogenization.[115]

Historicism, Redemption, and National Unity: The Alba Iulia Celebrations

The final component of the cycle of ceremonies occasioned by the reburial of the Legionary martyrs was the 22nd anniversary of the Great National Assembly of December 1, 1918, in Alba Iulia, which proclaimed the union of Transylvania and the Banat with Romania. In the first post-war decade, December 1 was not a

paramount official holiday in Greater Romania, the event being celebrated mostly at the regional level by Transylvanian politicians and by non-governmental associations such as *Astra* and *Liga culturală*.[116] It was only in 1928 that the authorities elevated this day to the rank of an official state holiday, on a par with the celebration of the proclamation of the monarchy and the independence of the Old Kingdom on May 10. The symbolic importance of December 1 grew in the late 1930s, mainly as a propagandistic counteraction to the growing danger of Hungarian irredentism. The most impressive celebration of that event took place on December 1, 1939, when King Carol II utilized that state holiday to articulate his claims of being a predestined national leader in order further to consolidate his personal regime.

The Legionary celebration of the 22nd anniversary of the Great National Assembly on December 1, 1940 in Alba Iulia was the second major and arguably most pompous celebration of the event.[117] The ceremony was a culmination of the previous trend of re-evaluating December 1 as a prime national holiday, yet it imbued the event with new connotations. The Alba Iulia celebration added a new dimension to Codreanu's reburial, by linking the cult of the dead leader to the Legionary historicism, based on the idea of salvation and redemption *in* and *through* history. The podium of the union celebration, as shown in Figure 8.13,

FIGURE 8.13 Banner of the Legion, December 1, 1940

Source: "Serbările legionare dela Alba-Iulia," *Cuvântul*, XVII, no. 53 (Dec. 4, 1940): 11.

illustrates the elaborate historicist component of the Legionary faith. The wooden grid of the banner was in fact the Legion's coat of arms, representing prison bars, as symbols of harsh repression. On it, there was a Christian cross made up of five historical portraits. Codreanu was placed in the middle as the central figure of Romanian history and the new messiah. Around him, there were the most prominent fighters for social and national emancipation of Transylvanian Romanians: Ursu Nicola (1731–1785), Ion Oarga (1747–1785), and Marcu Giurgiu (1733–1785), the three leaders of the 1784 peasant revolt in Transylvania, known as Horea, Cloșca, and Crișan, martyred by Habsburg authorities in 1785 in Alba Iulia by cudgeling them to death on the breaking wheel; and Avram Iancu (the top portrait, above Codreanu), the legendary hero of the Romanians' 1848 revolution in Transylvania. An expression of the Legionary historicism, the banner also exemplifies the syncretism between nationalism and religion in the Legionary rituals and political symbolism.

The celebrations were dominated by the historical figure of Michael the Brave, thus re-affirming the ideal of national unity as the main ideological axis of the Legion. But the Alba Iulia celebration gave the Legion the opportunity to complete its historical pantheon with Transylvanian regional figures, in an effort to develop stronger roots in that historical province. To this end, on the eve of the anniversary, the Legionary press initiated a series of articles on Transylvania, hailed as the cradle of the Romanian civilization and a core province of the national territory.

Of particular interest is the cult of the Transylvania hero Avram Iancu. The military leader of the Transylvanian Romanians' 1848 fight for self-determination, Iancu enjoyed a strong cult among the Transylvanian Romanians, living at the time under the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy, even during his lifetime. In 1872, Iancu's burial occasioned a popular procession, supported by both the Orthodox and the Greek Catholic Churches. Iancu became a sacred, cult figure, perpetuated both in the oral peasant tradition and in the written press: his heroic but tragic personality came to symbolize the fight, hopes, and disillusionment of the Romanians from Transylvania. In an attempt to resurrect the national consciousness of the Romanians, *Gazeta Transilvaniei* proclaimed him a "martyr of the nation," elevating him to be on a par with the Moldovan Stephen the Great and Wallachian Michael the Brave.[118] The hero was not much known outside the borders of the province, and was not yet proclaimed a member of the *national* pantheon of heroes.[119] In the interwar period, after the union of Transylvania with Romania, Iancu and the three peasant heroes, Horia, Cloșca, and Crișan, were gradually adopted into the Romanian national pantheon; in 1938, they were depicted in the historical frescos of the Bucharest Atheneum, the most representative cultural edifice of the country, together with leading historical figures of the Romanians. By inserting Codreanu into the Transylvanian pantheon of heroes, the banner intended to consolidate the national dimension to the Legionary ideology, completing its symbolic coverage of the national territory and its own gallery of heroes. The banner also

strengthened Codreanu's charismatic claims of national representation and his identification with tragic heroes.

Overall, however, the official propaganda surrounding the Alba Iulia celebration shifted its emphasis from Sima and the Legion to the figure of General Antonescu and the army. During the celebrations, General Antonescu presented himself as the successor to Codreanu, in an attempt to extract legitimization from the routinization of Codreanu's charisma, and thus to share his charisma, seemingly together with—but in fact rather away from—Sima. While Codreanu's burial was key to the Legion's political legitimization, the Alba Iulia celebration provided symbolic capital to General Antonescu, presented as a military savior, whose historical mission was to reunify the country. The tension among the two poles of power, the Legion and the army, was evident. If Codreanu's burial occasioned a confrontation between claims of kin-charisma within the Codreanu family versus a new charismatic leader, the Alba Iulia celebration revealed a latent conflict between two would-be saviors of the nation, a military commander of integral-nationalist convictions (Antonescu) and a fascist leader (Sima). This conflict further escalated until it took a violent form in January 1941.

Christ of the Romanians and the New Redeeming Gospel

As is well known, fascist movements and regimes were highly personalized, the death of their almighty leaders endangering their very existence. The cult of the dead Codreanu provides, in contrast, a rare example of a successful routinization of the charisma of a fascist leader, similar to the earlier post-mortem cult of the Austrian chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss, assassinated in 1934.[120] As this chapter amply illustrates, the charismatic cult of the dead leader and of the fascist martyrs served as the main ideological and ritual axis of the Legionary rule. Its most important manifestation was Codreanu's reburial, conceived as the central episode in the charismatic scenario of national salvation. His death was presented as a predestined sacrifice, following the pattern of *imitatio Christi*. The crimes committed by the Romanian ruling elites against the Legionary movement were regarded as an integral part of this scenario of salvation, the perpetrators playing the role of Judas and thus working, by way of their deeds, toward their own death sentence.[121] Finally, Codreanu's reburial and "resurrection" was conceived as an undisputable re-validation of his charismatic qualifications and a powerful confirmation of the Legionary ideology of national salvation.

Codreanu's reburial was a grandiose public ceremony, certainly one of the largest and most complex funerals in modern Romania, rivaling in this respect the burial of the Patriarch Miron Cristea in March 1939. This high-profile event was attended by the leadership of the country, including Antonescu and Sima; by all members of the government; by representatives of the monarchy; foreign diplomats; high Orthodox hierarchs; an impressive number of priests from Bucharest and the countryside; by all Legionary commandants; all Legionary members from Bucharest and many representatives from all over the country;

and by all members of the Brotherhood of the Cross from Moldova, Wallachia, and Dobrudja, and large delegations from Transylvania and the Banat, in official uniforms.[122] Other memorial services were organized all over the country, attended by local Legionaries, priests, state dignitaries, and the general public.

The funeral ceremony was highly composite, combining national honors with religious, (para)military, and fascist rites. Codreanu was buried as a head of state; as a military commander; as a high cleric; and as a charismatic fascist leader. He was proclaimed a prophet of the nation, a new messiah, or, in the most daring claim, the "Christ of the Romanians." First, Codreanu was granted a national funeral with the full honors, solemn pomp and ceremony usually granted only to heads of state. These included an established protocol, such as: the proclamation of a national day of mourning on the day of the burial; the attendance of the burial ceremony by the head of state, high officials, members of the government, members of the justice system, army generals, diplomats, and representatives of foreign governments; the decoration of the corpse; and wide press and radio coverage of the events. Codreanu's massive coffin cast in white bronze was meant to convey the leader's social distinction and posthumous earthly authority.

Codreanu was also celebrated as a military commander. Routinely, national funerals included certain military rites, even for lay statesmen. However, in Codreanu's case, military burial rites went far beyond the honor routinely granted to heads of state. They included the presentation of rifles in honor; the draping of the coffin in the national flag, usually reserved for high-ranking military or for soldiers who died in combat; the ceremonial military guard of honor during the wake; the presentation of all the Legionary flags at the coffin; marches of military and paramilitary troops in uniform, music played by a military band; and bugle calls during the funerary procession which, in Codreanu's case, were replaced by the traditional *buciums*. It is important to note, however, that these rites combined military and paramilitary elements. On the one hand, the Romanian army, as an institution, was heavily represented at the ceremony by General Antonescu, by other members of its leadership, and by military units who actively participated in the burial ceremony. On the other hand, the reburial was a paramilitary funeral in the sense that it featured Legionary guards of honor, paramilitary marches, and parades in "official" uniforms. The combination of military and paramilitary elements was also evidenced by the fact that Codreanu's coffin was draped in the national *as well as* in the Legionary flags, emphasizing Codrenau's multiple capacities of being both a *Legionary* as well as a *national hero* and *military* commander.

Second, the reburial mixed Christian Orthodox with fascist political rites, in a peculiar syncretism, prompting international observers to claim Codreanu was reburied "with weird rites."[123] At first sight, the reburial was a strictly religious event, structured by traditional religious rites and rituals. The Orthodox Church distinguishes between four main types of funeral rituals: (1) for children; (2) for lay adults; (3) for priests and deacons; and (4) for monks and bishops. The rites and rituals employed for Codreanu's burial indicate that the fascist leader was given

the funeral of a high priestly figure. *Indeed, Codreanu was buried with the pomp and rites appropriate for a high Orthodox religious hierarch*. His corpse was surrounded at all times with a high degree of religious esteem. Prayers during Codreanu's wake were performed by priests and not by lay relatives; his coffin was carried out of the church by six priests, a privilege reserved strictly for deceased priests, who are routinely carried to the grave by their brethren. High Orthodox prelates performed the religious service for the burial. Moreover, according to Legionary reports, Codreanu's funeral convoy was attended by more than 1,000 priests, an outstanding turnout customarily reserved only for the funeral of high prelates, such as Orthodox metropolitans or the patriarch himself. The massive clerical presence was presented in the Legionary press as the Orthodox Church's validation of Codreanu's messianic qualifications as the Messiah or Christ of the Romanians.

Although Codreanu's funeral was apparently performed following strict observance of Christian Orthodox rites and rituals, all certified by the presence of high-profile Orthodox priests, on a closer look the burial appears to be a peculiar ceremony which blended Christian rites with neo-pagan superstitions, popular religious practices, and fascist rites and rituals, all integrated into a specific Legionary mythological view of the world. Religious rites were combined with Legionary fascist rituals, many of them of pagan inspiration, with roots in pre-Christian, Dacian practices, in a complex and highly unusual syncretism: see, in this respect, the plentiful visual propaganda employed, which showed a concerted effort of aestheticizing politics, a significant innovation in the public funeral practices in Romania; the ceremony of the earth-bag, which adapted but also deviated from standard religious practices; the collective Legionary oath; the entombment of the martyrs at the Legionary Green House, in the Crypt of the Legionary Martyrs, together with Moța and Marin, and not in a consecrated cemetery; the glorification of suicidal terrorism and of violent revenge; and, finally, the blasphemous proclamation of Codreanu as the "Christ of the Romanians," who died and was resurrected in order to redeem the Romanian nation.

This combination of Christian, pagan, and profane elements generated multiple tensions between the church and the Legion, also evident during the ceremony itself. First, it is important to note that the new patriarch of the Orthodox Church, Nicodim, did not attend the ceremony; neither did other influential high Orthodox prelates. The Orthodox prelates who were actively involved in the ceremony fell almost exclusively within the category of "Legionary priests." While prominent in the Legion, they were of a lower rank in the official Orthodox Church's structures of power. As a matter of fact, the most influential Legionary priests had ceased to be active in the Orthodox Church, being either without a parish or suspended for political activity, dissent or embezzlement allegations, as was the case of Gurie, the former Metropolitan of Bessarabia. Third, the burial ceremony did not rely solely on the Orthodox Church, but also included a delegation of the Greek-Catholic Church. The presence of the two

"sister churches" was followed by requests in the Legionary press for the union into a single national Christian church. For these reasons, Codreanu's burial cannot be regarded as a manifestation of a perfect collaboration or—even more—of a symbiosis between the Legion and the Orthodox Church. On the contrary, Christian Orthodox religious rites were, in fact, inserted into a Legionary ideological framework, in a process that can be most accurately defined as the *Legionarization of death*, rather than the Christianization of the Legion.

In sum, Codreanu's burial was conceived as the most formative stage in the creation of a full-fledged Legionary political faith and its mass dissemination, as the most important act in forging the new fascist nation. Apparently, with Codreanu's reburial, the making of the Legionary faith came to an apotheosis, since it transited all the phases of an established religion: the revelation of the inner core; the movement-building by the apostles of the new faith; conquering the masses through proselytism; repression and martyrdom; death and symbolic resurrection; as well as the seizure of power and the building of a totalitarian Christian state based on the "New Church of the Nation." The Legion's rule was short and chaotic, however, due mostly to the utopian nature of its program, its precarious political position and decentralized party organization, and its failure to mobilize the masses.

Notes

1 "Apelul lui Horia Sima către legionari, la 15 septembrie 1940," *Pe Marginea Prăpastiei*, 83.
2 On this topic, see, more recently, Thomas Walter Laqueur, *The Work of the Dead: A Cultural History of Mortal Remains* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2015).
3 See Verdery, *The Political Lives of Dead Bodies*.
4 Verdery, *Political Life of Dead Bodies*; Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).
5 See the funerals of Lenin and Stalin, celebrated across Soviet Russia and, in the latter case, the state socialist bloc, as manifestations of a transnational leader cult. For recent striking examples of a different sort, see the 2010 exhumation of Simon Bolivar in Venezuela—a televised ceremony presided over by President Hugo Chavez himself—as well as the funeral of the popstar Michael Jackson, transformed by CNN into a gigantic televised media event, the "most grandiose funeral ceremony of all time."
6 Verdery, *The Political Lives*, 3, 27.
7 Mosse, *The Fascist Revolution*, 87.
8 Mark Neocleous, "Long live death! Fascism, resurrection, immortality," *Journal of Political Ideologies* 10, no. 1 (Febr. 2005), 31–49.
9 See "Regulamentul pentru monumentele publice," *Monitorul Oficial* CVI, Part I, no. 293 (December 16, 1938), 5974–76.
10 *Bucur, Heroes and Victims*, 145.
11 See "Regulamentul pentru monumentele publice," 5974–76. All such monuments erected without approval were to be demolished (see Articles 25–26).
12 V.M., "Ultimul drum al I.P.S.S. Patriarhului Dr. Miron Cristea," *Renaşterea* XVII, no. 12 (March 19, 1939), 2–4.
13 "Funeraliile Patriarhului nostru," *Biserica şi şcoala* LXIII, no. 13 (March 19, 1939), 98–99.

14 I reconstruct these ceremonies based mainly on the reports published in the Legionary newspapers *Cuvântul*, *Libertatea*, *Curentul*, and *Buna Vestire*. The most important among them was *Cuvântul*, re-launched in a new series on October 14, 1940, as the "official newspaper of the Legionary movement," and which printed 120,000 copies daily. These reports were corroborated with partisan accounts provided by Horia Sima, *Era Libertății*; Ştefan Palaghiță, *Garda de Fier spre reinvierea României. Însoțită de o cronologie privind istoria mișcării legionare* (Bucureşti: Roza Vânturilor, 1993 [1951]), and with archival information.
15 "Înmormântarea legionarilor căzuți în noaptea de 3 septembrie la Constanța," *Buna Vestire* V, no. 5 (Sept. 13, 1940), 3.
16 *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 4 (Sept. 12, 1940), 4.
17 "Comunicatul d-lui Horia Sima," *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 11 (Sept. 20, 1940), 1.
18 Ştefan Gheorghe Ion, ""Iaşii, oraşul mişcării legionare. Iaşii, cetatea sufletului românesc," *Axa* (Dec. 5, 1940), 1.
19 Antonescu, *Temelia statului național-legionar*, 258.
20 Ibid.
21 See the witness account of the correspondend for *Newsweek* to Bucharest, R. G. Waldeck, in *Athene Palace, Bucharest: Hitler's "New Order" comes to Rumania* (London: Constable, 1943), 158–161.
22 On the decision, see "Revizuirea proceselor politice privitor pe Corneliu Z. Codreanu," *Monitorul Oficial al României*, Part 1, no. 303 (December 24, 1940), 7004–7007.
23 Verdery, *Political Lives*, 43, 46. See also Simion Florea Marian, *Înmormântarea la români: Studiu etnografic* (Bucureşti: Lito-tipografia Carol Göbl, 1892); and Gail Kligman, *The Wedding of the Dead: Ritual, Poetics, and Popular Culture in Transylvania* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
24 Constantin Noica, "Cumplita lor călătorie," *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 4 (Sept. 12, 1940), 1.
25 Ion I. Moța, "Autobiografie (în loc de introducere)," in *Cranii de Lemn*, 9–11.
26 D. M. Ranetescu, "Predealul," *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 38 (Oct. 27, 1940) 38, 1.
27 Ranetescu, "Predealul." 1.
28 Alexandru Constant, "Întâlnire pe Culmi," *Buna Vestire*, IV (27 Oct. 1940) 38, 1.
29 Ranetescu, "Predealul." 1.
30 Ibid., 1.
31 Ibid., 1.
32 Ibid., 1.
33 I. Diaconescu, "Icoane din martirajul dela Vaslui," *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 38 (Oct. 27, 1940), 3.
34 George Macrin, "Cum va fi biruința, Capitane?" *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 49 (Dec. 1, 1940), 1.
35 "Reînhumarea la Predeal a celor 46 legionari asasinați pentru credința lor, la Miercurea Ciuc," *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 4 (Sept. 12, 1940), 2.
36 For a description of the ceremonies, see I. Diaconescu, "Zguduitoarea solemnitate a deshumării martirilor legionari uciși la Vaslui," *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 37 (Oct. 26, 1940), 4; and I. Diaconescu, "Icoane din martirajul dela Vaslui," *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 38 (Oct. 27, 1940), 3.
37 For details on the names of the martyrs and the intended train itineraries, see "Reînhumarea Legionarilor Martiri uciși la Vaslui," *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 3 (Oct. 24, 1940), 3.
38 Diaconescu, "Zguduitoarea solemnitate," 4.
39 "Slujbă pentru plecarea morților," *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 41 (Oct. 30, 1940), 3.
40 For the program of the ceremonies, see "Programul transportării la Predeal a urnelor cu cenușa camarazilor uciși la București," *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 38 (Oct. 27, 1940), 3.
41 For a description of the events in the official press, see "Predealul, simbolul eroismului legionar," *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 40 (Oct. 29, 1940), 3.
42 "Pioasa ceremonie a ridicării urnelor cu cenușa camarazilor arși la Crematoriu," *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 40 (Oct. 29, 1940), 3.

43 "Slujba pentru plecarea morților," *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 40 (Oct. 29, 1940), 3.
44 "Programul transportării la Predeal," 3.
45 "Coboară morții," *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 40 (Oct. 29, 1940), 3.
46 "Ce a poruncit Comandantul Legionarilor la moartea Părintelui Moța," in *Libertatea*, no. 8 (Nov. 23, 1940), 2.
47 For a complete description of the funeral, see "Cum a fost dus la locul de veci părintele Moța. Lucruri văzute și scrise de către un trimis anume al redacției," *Liberatea*, 38, no. 9 (Nov. 23, 1940), 2–4.
48 The earthquake had a magnitude of 7.4 degrees on the Richter scale, and produced enormous damage and casualties, estimated at 1,000 dead and 4,000 wounded, mostly in Moldova, but also in Bucharest.
49 Vasile Posteucă, "Patriarhul neamului românesc," *Libertatea*, 38, no. 8 (Dec. 1, 1940), 2.
50 Completed in 1943, the church was sanctified by Metropolitan Bălan in September 1945. See Primăria Municipiului Orăștie, "Catedrala Ortodoxă din Orăștie, 'Sf. Arhangheli Mihail și Gavriil,'" available at http://www.orastie.info.ro/index.php?im=106.
51 "Cum s-a făcut desgroparea sfintelor oseminte ale Căpitanului," *Libertatea* 38, no. 8 (Dec. 1, 1940), 7.
52 A former military fort built in the 1860s for the defense of the capital Bucharest, the site was turned into a military prison in 1907 and served as a detention site for political prisoners under various regimes, including the Legionaries.
53 Muşat, Ardeleanu, *România după Marea Unire*, vol. 2, 877–878; see also Sturdza, *The Suicide of Europe*, 119–120.
54 "Osemintele sfinte ale Căpitanului au fost scoase la lumină," *Cuvântul* (Nov. 27, 1940), 14.
55 On graves as "saintly sites" in the popular tradition that demand veneration and respectful silence, see Florin Rotaru, *"Pro Patria"—In Memoriam* (București: Editora Biblioteca Bucureștilor, 2001), 20.
56 As mentioned, Horia Sima did not attend the exhumation ceremony, due to his ongoing conflict with Ion Zelea-Codreanu. Nevertheless, in order to capitalize propagandistically on this key political event, Sima provided his own, very detailed yet "fictitious," as it were, account of the ceremony in the leading newspaper *Curentul*. On this particular point, Sima argued that the operation was followed by an emotionally moved audience: "All eyes filled with tears. The remains are taken with great care, placed in a sheet and then put on the cement platform." Sima contrasted the Christian rituals of the ceremony to the non-Christian practices of Carol's regime: "The entire audience is stunned by what it sees there. So much barbarity, such a conspicuous lack of fear of God." Horia Sima, "Eri au fost desgropate la Jilava osemintele Căpitanului, Nicadorilor și Decemvirilor," *Curentul* XIII, no. 4599 (Nov. 29, 1940), 10.
57 My account is based on the report of the military commission of inquiry established in February 1941 by Ion Antonescu: see ANIC, Ministerul de Interne, Diverse, 27/1940, "Asasinatele de la Jilava, 26–27 November 1940."
58 Circular Letter no. 92, Sept. 28, 1937, ACNSAS, Fond Zelea-Codreanu, P 011784, vol. 9, 47.
59 Circular Letter no. 93, Oct. 1, 1937, ACNSAS, Fond Zelea-Codreanu, P 011784, vol. 9, 37–39, 43, 44.
60 Ornea, *Anii treizeci*, 313.
61 Constantin Noica, "Sufletul Cetății," *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 14 (Sept. 24, 1940), 1.
62 Ibid.
63 Horia Stamatu, "Iar au fost printre noi. La Predeal s-a pus temelia noii biserici a neamului," *Buna Vestire* IV (Oct. 30, 1940) 41, available at http://www.miscarea.net/1-predealul-legionar.htm.
64 ANIC, Ministerul de Interne, Diverse, 27/1940, 30.
65 See the example of gendarme Tudor Petre, erroneously arrested due to a resemblance of name with a gendarme who took part in Codreanu's execution. Although

the Commission had exposed the confusion, the Legionaries refused to release the innocent Tudor Petre, who was finally executed with the group. Official reports also claim that another prisoner, Virgil Diculescu, was arrested only because he had a conflict with the sub-secretary of the Police Prefecture, Constantin Orăşianu, because he refused to allow the former illegally to reimburse 30 bottles of champagne consumed at Orăşianu's daughter's wedding. See ANIC, Ministerul de Interne, Diverse, 27/1940, 63, 117–118.

66 ANIC, Ministerul de Interne, Diverse, 27/1940, 64.

67 Marcel Dumitru-Ciucă, "Introducere," in *Stenogramele şedinţelor*, vol. 1, vii–viii.

68 Ibid.

69 "După consemnarea din *Pe marginea Prăpastiei*," *Stenogramele şedinţelor*, vol. 1, 527–528.

70 "După însemnările lui Nicolae Mareş," *Stenogramele şedinţelor*, vol. 1, 526.

71 "Comunicatul preşedintelui consiliului de miniştri," *Curentul* XIII, no. 4599 (Nov. 29, 1940), 1.

72 "Comandantul Mişcării Legionare face apel la ordine şi disciplină," *Curentul* XIII, no. 4599 (Nov. 29, 1940), 1.

73 "Pedepsirea infracţiunilor împotriva persoanei, proprietăţii şi bunurilor publice," *Cuvântul* (Nov. 27, 1940), 14.

74 For individual reports on the disinterment ceremony, see Vasile Posteucă, *Desgroparea Capitanului* (Madrid: Editura Mişcării Legionare, 1977), available at http://miscarea.net/posteuca-desgroparea-capitanului.htm

75 The Military Commission of Inquiry concluded that the moral authors of the crimes were Stefan Zăvoianu, Gheorghe Savu, Dimitru Groza, Ilie Stan, and Romulus Opriş, in particular. The executioners were arrested but punished only after the Legionary rebellion; judged by a military tribunal, they were sentenced to death on July 22, 1941 and executed shortly thereafter. ANIC, Ministerul de Interne, Diverse, 27/1940, 70, 163.

76 *Pe Marginea Prăpastiei*, 344–353.

77 The issue caused much debate among rival Legionary factions, especially after their fall from power. To exculpate themselves of the moral responsibility for these crimes, the *Codrenişti* accused Horia Sima of personally ordering the executions, arguing that he deliberately distorted the meaning of Legionary justice. See Ion Dumitrescu-Borşa, *Cal Troian intra Muros. Memorii legionare* (Bucureşti: Lucman, 2002), 349. Another accusation, launched by Ion Zelea-Codreanu, was that Sima wanted to assassinate the state dignitaries because some of them held evidence of his previous collaboration with the secret police. This accusation has not been fully proven, but it is plausible, at least in part. See ANIC, Ministerul de Interne-Diverse, 27/1940, 71. In turn, the Simişti blamed the responsibility of the murders on Antonescu, stating that the General intended to release the detainees soon, thus forcing the Legion to act in haste. See Palaghiţă, *Garda de Fier*, 135.

78 *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 47 (Nov. 29, 1940), 1.

79 Eckart Marchand, "'Monastic 'Imitatio Christi:' Andrea del Castagno's 'Cenacolo di S. Apollonia,'" *Artibus et Historiae* 24, no. 47 (2003), 31–50.

80 The Orthodox Custom is that if the deceased was a priest or bishop the reading is done by the higher clergy; instead of reading from the Psalter, they read from the Gospel.

81 *Curentul* XIII, no. 4600 (Nov. 30, 1940), 1.

82 Under the communist regime, Firmilian Marin was to become Archbishop of Craiova (1947) and the first Metropolitan of Oltenia, an entity established in 1949 (and until his death in 1972).

83 For another example, see the exterior walls of the Voroneţ Monastery in Northern Moldova which shows an angel playing a *bucium* at the onset of the Last Judgment and people rising from the grave. On the symbolism of *bucium* as an instrument of communication with the dead, see Rotaru, *"Pro Patria"*, 44.

84 In the Orthodox tradition, there is no strict color rite as in the Roman Catholic Church. There are, however, practices consecrated by tradition: white garments are preferred for large festivals, especially during Pentecost as a symbol of joy and purity; scarlet is preferred for holidays of the martyrs, while black is a sign of grief, repentance, and sadness, and is thus reserved for Holy Pascha on Fridays and funerals. As for the phelonions itself, white is the symbol of purity, sanctity, and divine glory, while red stands mainly for the color of blood, as a symbol for the Passion of the Savior. See Father Petre Vintilescu, "Originea şi simbolismul veştmintelor liturgice," accessed at http://www.crestinortodox.ro/liturgica/viata-liturgica/originea-simbolismul-vestmintelor-liturgice-70640.html.
85 *Cuvântul* (Nov. 29, 1940), 3.
86 "Casa Verde îşi primeşte Ziditorul," *Cuvântul* (Dec. 2, 1940), 4.
87 Sandu Gavrilescu, "Pe crucea Căpitanului," *Cuvântul* (Dec. 2, 1940), 2.
88 "Trimişii Corpului Legionar participă la recucerirea Susaiului," *Cuvântul* (Dec. 2, 1940), 8.
89 ANIC, Ministerul de Interne, Diverse, 17/1940, 158, 4.
90 Originally, Sima intended to bring to Bucharest *all Legionaries* from Romania, but was forced to renounce this plan following suspicions that the Legion prepared a *coup d'état* against the head of the state, General Ion Antonescu.
91 "Jurăm," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 50, (Dec. 2, 1940), 4.
92 For reports on such ceremonies, see *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 50 (Dec. 2, 1940), 6.
93 "Sfânta credinţă legionară," *Curentul* XIII, no. 4601 (Dec. 1, 1940), 3.
94 "Radio România despre jertfa Căpitanului, Nicadorilor şi Decemvirilor" *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 50 (Dec. 2, 1940), 6.
95 See the address of the General Secretary of Prime Minister's Office, no. 17038, March 21, 1941, CNSAS Archive, Fond Operativ, file I 234980 "Codreanu Corneliu şi alţi," 9–10. Since, at the time, the Legion was out of power and favor, the remaining printed materials were returned to Codreanu's wife, together with royalties for the copies sold.
96 See the poem by Gherginescu Vania, "Moartea lui Făt Frumos," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 49 (Dec. 1, 1940), 1.
97 A *tribun* was a commandant of a legion of fighters engaged in the 1848 uprising of the Romanians in Transylvania. The word comes from the Latin *tribunus*, meaning a Roman magistrate with civil or military authority.
98 P. P. Panaitescu, "Profeţii neamului," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 49 (Dec. 1, 1940), 1.
99 "Sfintele oseminte ale Căpitanului vor fi îngropate Sâmbătă la Casa Verde," *Libertatea* 38, no. 8 (Dec. 1, 1940), 7.
100 P. P. Panaitescu, "Căpitanul şi Unitatea Naţională" *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 50 (Dec. 2, 1940), 1.
101 Fănică Anastasescu, "Căpitanul," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 49 (Dec. 1, 1940), 3; see also Barbu Sluşanschi, "Imn Jertfei," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 49 (Dec. 1, 1940), 1. For commemorative stamps with the portrait of Codreanu, see *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 49 (Dec. 1, 1940), 10.
102 Ion Veverca, "Biruinţa Jertfei," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 50 (Dec. 2, 1940), 1–2.
103 Dumitru Groza, "Să ne gândim la Căpitanul nostru," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 48 (Nov. 30, 1940), 1.
104 "Drumul spre veşnicie al Căpitanului," *Cuvântul*, XVII (Dec. 2, 1940) no. 50, 3.
105 Dumitru Groza "Între nebunia lor şi cumineţenia noastră," *Cuvântul* (Dec. 2, 1940), 8. See also Dumitru Groza "Căpitanul, Mesia Muncitorului Român," *Cuvântul* (Dec. 30, 1940), 7.
106 Emil Cioran "Profilul interior al Căpitanului," *Glasul strămoşesc* VI (Dec. 25, 1940), 10, cited in Ornea, *Anii treizeci*, 197.
107 Vasile Posteucă, "Nevoia ispăşirii," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 50 (Dec. 2, 1940), 1.
108 Gheorghe Racoveanu, "Tâlcul jertfei celei mari," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 47 (Nov. 29, 1940), 1.

109 For the figure of 100,000 attendants, see "Victims of the Iron Guards," *The Times*, issue 48788 (Dec. 2, 1940), 4. For the figure of 150,000, see Ben A. Thirkield, "150,000 Follow Codreanu's Body, Nazis Drop Wreaths," *The Washington Post* (Dec. 1, 1940), 1.
110 Vasile Posteucă, "Nevoia ispășirii," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 50 (Dec. 2, 1940), 1.
111 Genvra, "Biruința legionară, biruința neamului!" *Cuvântul* (Dec. 29, 1940), 5.
112 Constantin Papanace, "Desjudaizare, Desfanariotizare, Desțiganizare," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 76 (Dec. 30, 1940), 1.
113 On Eugenics and biopolitics in Romania, see especially Maria Bucur, *Eugenics and Modernization in Interwar Romania* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010); and Marius Turda, *Biopolitică și eugenism în România, 1920-1944. Biopolitics and eugenics in Romania, 1920-1944* (Bucureşti Editura Muzeului Municipiului Bucureşti, 2019).
114 Genvra, "Biruința legionară, biruința neamului!" 5.
115 See, for example, the partial deportation of Gypsies at the order of General Antonescu in 1942, thus fulfilling Papanace's desiderata, at a time when the Legion was already eliminated from power.
116 On the commemorations of December 1, 1918, see Maria Bucur, "Birth of a Nation: Commemorations of December 1st, 1918 and the Construction of National Identity in Communist Romania," in *Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, 1848 to the Present* (La Fayette, In.: Purdue University Press, 2001), 286–325.
117 For an official description of the event, see *Cuvântul* (Dec. 3, 1940), esp. 1–2.
118 *Gazeta Transilvaniei*, (September 14, 1872).
119 See, selectively, Alexandru Ciura, *Povestire pe scurt a vieții lui Avram Iancu* (Cluj: Ardealul, 1921); Siviu Dragomir. *Avram Iancu* (Bucureşti: Casa Şcoalelor, 1924); and Ioan Lupaş, *Avram Iancu. Comunicare făcută în Şedința Academiei Române la 8 iunie 1924* (Cluj: Ardealul, 1924).
120 On this case study, see Lucile Dreidemy, *Der Dollfuss-Mythos: Eine Biographie Des Posthumen* (Köln, Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 2014).
121 "Radio România despre jertfa Căpitanului, Nicadorilor și Decemvirilor," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 50 (Dec. 2, 1940), 6.
122 "Un comunicat al comandamentului Frăților de Cruce," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 47 (Nov. 29, 1940), 1.
123 Thirkield, "150,000 Follow Codreanu's Body," 1.

References

ACNSAS. Fond "Arhiva Operativă," file I 234980.
ACNSAS. Fond "Arhiva Operativă," file Zelea-Codreanu, P 011784, vol. 9.
ANIC. Fond "Ministerul de Interne-Diverse," files: 17/1940; 27/1940.
Anastasescu, Fănică. "Căpitanul," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 49 (Dec. 1, 1940): 3.
Antonescu. *Temelia statului național-legionar: 6 septembrie 1940–6 octombrie 1940*. Bucureşti: Monitorul Oficial şi Imprimeriile Statului, Imprimeria Centrală Bucureşti, 1940.
Bucur, Maria. "Birth of a Nation: Commemorations of December 1st, 1918 and the Construction of National Identity in Communist Romania." In *Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, 1848 to the Present*. La Fayette, In.: Purdue University Press, 2001, 286–325.
Bucur, Maria. *Eugenics and Modernization in Interwar Romania*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010.
Bucur, Maria. *Heroes and Victims: Remembering War in Twentieth-Century Romania*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.
"Casa Verde își primește Ziditorul," *Cuvântul* (Dec. 2, 1940): 4.

"Coboară morții," *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 40 (Oct. 29, 1940): 3.
"Ce a poruncit Comandantul Legionarilor la moartea Părintelui Moța.," *Libertatea*, no. 8 (Nov. 23, 1940): 2.
"Comandantul Mișcării Legionare face apel la ordine și disciplină," *Curentul* XIII, no. 4599 (Nov. 29, 1940): 1.
"Comunicatul D-lui Horia Sima," *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 11 (Sept. 20, 1940): 1.
"Comunicatul președintelui consiliului de miniștri," *Curentul* XIII, no. 4599 (Nov. 29, 1940): 1.
"Cum a fost dus la locul de veci părintele Moța. Lucruri văzute și scrise de către un trimis anume al redacției," *Liberatea* 38, no. 9 (Nov. 23, 1940): 2–4.
"Cum s-a făcut desgroparea sfintelor oseminte ale Căpitanului," *Libertatea* 38, no. 8 (Dec. 1, 1940): 7.
Ciucă, Marcel-Dumitru, Aurelian Teodorescu, and Bogdan Florin Popovici, eds. *Stenogramele ședințelor Consiliului de Miniștri: guvernarea Ion Antonescu*, vol. 1: Sept.–Dec. 1940. București: Arhivele Naționale ale României, 1997.
Ciura, Alexandru. *Povestire pe scurt a vieții lui Avram Iancu*. Cluj: Ardealul, 1921.
Constant, Alexandru. "Întâlnire pe Culmi," *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 38 (Oct. 27, 1940): 1.
"După însemnările lui Nicolae Mareș," *Stenogramele ședințelor*, vol. 1, 526.
"Drumul spre veșnicie al Căpitanului," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 50 (1940): 3.
"După consemnarea din *Pe marginea Prăpastiei*," *Stenogramele ședințelor*, vol. 1, 527–528.
"Înmormântarea legionarilor căzuți în noaptea de 3 Septembrie la Constanța," *Buna Vestire* V, no. 5 (Sept. 13, 1940): 3.
Diaconescu, I. "Icoane din martirajul dela Vaslui," *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 38 (Oct. 27, 1940): 3.
Diaconescu, I. "Zguduitoarea solemnitate a deshumării martirilor legionari uciși la Vaslui," *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 37 (Oct. 26, 1940): 4.
Dragomir, Siviu. *Avram Iancu*. București: Casa Școalelor, 1924.
Dreidemy, Lucile. *Der Dollfuss-Mythos: Eine Biographie Des Posthumen*. Köln, Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 2014.
Dumitrescu-Borșa, Ion. *Cal Troian intra Muros. Memorii legionare*. Bucureşti: Lucman, 2002.
"Funerariile Patriarhului nostru," *Biserica și Scoala* LXIII, no. 13 (March 19, 1939): 98–99.
Gavrilescu, Sandu. "Pe crucea Căpitanului," *Cuvântul* (Dec. 2, 1940): 2.
Geertz, Clifford. *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*. New York: Basic Books, 1973.
Genvra, "Biruința legionară, biruința neamului!" *Cuvântul* (Dec. 29, 1940): 5.
Groza, Dumitru. "Căpitanul, Mesia Muncitorului Român," *Cuvântul* (Dec. 30, 1940): 7.
Groza, Dumitru. "Între nebunia lor și cuminţenia noastră," *Cuvântul* (Dec. 2, 1940): 8.
Groza, Dumitru. "Să ne gândim la Căpitanul nostru," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 48 (Nov. 30, 1940): 1.
"Jurăm," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 50 (1940): 4.
Kligman, Gail. *The Wedding of the Dead: Ritual, Poetics, and Popular Culture in Transylvania*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.
Laqueur, Thomas Walter. *The Work of the Dead: A Cultural History of Mortal Remains*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2015.
Lupaș, Ioan. *Avram Iancu. Comunicare făcută în Ședința Academiei Române la 8 iunie 1924*. Cluj: Ardealul, 1924.
M. V. "Ultimul drum al I.P.S.S. Patriarhului Dr. Miron Cristea," *Renașterea* XVII, no. 12 (March 19, 1939): 2–4.
Macrin, George "Cum va fi biruința, Căpitane?" *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 49 (Dec. 1, 1940): 1.

Marchand, Eckart. "Monastic 'Imitatio Christi:' Andrea del Castagno's 'Cenacolo di S. Apollonia," *Artibus et Historiae* 24, no. 47 (2003): 31–50.
Marian, Simion. *Florea Înmormântarea la români: Studiu etnografic*. Bucureşti: Lito-tipografia Carol Göbl, 1892.
Monitorul Oficial CVI, Part I, no. 293 (Dec. 16, 1938).
Moţa, Ion I. "Autobiografie (în loc de introducere)." In *Cranii de Lemn*, 9–11.
Neocleous, Mark. "Long live death! Fascism, resurrection, immortality," *Journal of Political Ideologies* 10, no. 1 (Feb. 2005): 31–49.
Noica, Constantin. "Cumplita lor călătorie," *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 4 (Sept. 12, 1940): 1.
Noica, Constantin. "Sufletul Cetăţii," *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 14 (Sept. 24, 1940): 1.
"Osemintele sfinte ale Căpitanului au fost scoase la lumină," *Cuvântul* (Nov. 27, 1940): 14.
Ornea, Zigu. *Anii treizeci: extrema dreaptă românească*. Bucureşti: Editura Fundatiei Culturale Române, 1995. English ed.: *The Romanian Extreme Right: The Nineteen Thirties*. Boulder: East European Monographs, 1999.
"Pedepsirea infracţiunilor împotriva persoanei, proprietăţii şi bunurilor publice," *Cuvântul* (Nov. 27, 1940): 14.
"Pioasa ceremonie a ridicării urnelor cu cenuşa camarazilor arşi la Crematoriu," *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 40 (Oct. 29, 1940): 3.
"Predealul, simbolul eroismului legionar," *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 40 (Oct. 29, 1940): 3.
"Programul transportării la Predeal, a urnelor cu cenuşa camarazilor ucişi la Bucureşti," *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 38 (Oct. 27, 1940): 3.
Palaghiţă, Ştefan. *Garda de Fier spre reinvierea României. Însoţită de o cronologie privind istoria mişcării legionare*. Bucureşti: Roza Vânturilor, 1993 [1951].
Panaitescu, P. P. "Căpitanul şi Unitatea Naţională,"*Cuvântul* XVII, no. 50 (Dec. 2, 1940): 1.
Panaitescu, P. P. "Profeţii neamului," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 49 (Dec. 1, 1940): 1.
Papanace, Constantin. "Desjudaizare, Desfanariotizare, Desţiganizare," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 76 (Dec. 30, 1940): 1.
Pe Marginea Prăpastiei, 21–23 ianuarie 1941. Ion Antonescu şi Mişcarea Legionară. Bucureşti: Scripta, 2014 [1941].
Posteucă, Vasile. "Nevoia ispăşirii," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 50 (Dec. 2, 1940): 1.
Posteucă, Vasile. "Patriarhul neamului românesc," *Libertatea* 38, no. 8 (Dec. 1, 1940): 2.
Posteucă, Vasile. *Desgroparea Căpitanului*. Madrid: Editura Mişcării Legionare, 1977, available at the address: http://miscarea.net/posteuca-desgroparea-capitanului.htm
Primăria Municipiului Orăştie, "Catedrala Ortodoxă din Orăştie, 'Sf. Arhangheli Mihail şi Gavriil,'" available at http://www.orastie.info.ro/index.php?im=106.
"Radio România despre jertfa Căpitanului, Nicadorilor şi Decemvirilor," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 50 (Dec. 2, 1940): 6.
"Reînhumarea Legionarilor Martiri ucişi la Vaslui," *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 3 (Oct. 24, 1940): 3.
"Reînhumarea la Predeal a celor 46 legionari asasinaţi pentru credinţa lor, la Miercurea Ciuc," *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 4 (Sept. 12, 1940): 2.
României "Revizuirea proceselor politice privitor pe Corneliu Z. Codreanu," *Monitorul Oficial Al* 1, no. 303 (Dec. 24, 1940): 7004–7007.
Racoveanu, Gheorghe. "Tâlcul jertfei celei mari," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 47 (Nov. 29, 1940): 1.
Ranetescu, D. M. "Predealul," *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 38 (Oct. 27, 1940): 1.
Rotaru, Florin. *"Pro Patria"—In Memoriam* (Bucureşti: Editora Biblioteca Bucureştilor, 2001): 20.
"Slujba pentru plecarea morţilor," *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 40 (Oct. 29, 1940): 3.

"Sfintele oseminte ale Căpitanului vor fi îngropate Sâmbătă la Casa Verde," *Libertatea* 38, no. 8 (1940): 7.
"Slujbă pentru plecarea morților," *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 41 (Oct. 30, 1940): 3.
"Sfânta credință legionară," *Curentul* XIII, no. 4601 (Dec. 1, 1940): 3.
Sima, Horia. "Eri au fost desgropate la Jilava osemintele Căpitanului, Nicadorilor și Decemvirilor," *Curentul* XIII, no. 4599 (Nov. 39, 1940): 10.
Sima, Horia. *Era libertății. Statul Național–Legionar*, 2 vols. Madrid: Editura Mișcării Legionare, 1982–86.
Sluşanschi, Barbu. "Imn Jertfei," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 49 (Dec. 1, 1940): 1.
Stamatu, Horia. "Iar au fost printre noi. La Predeal s-a pus temelia noii biserici a neamului," *Buna Vestire* IV (Oct. 30, 1940): 41, available at http://www.miscarea.net/1-predealul-legionar.htm.
Ştefan Gheorghe, Ion, ""Iaşii, oraşul mişcării legionare. Iaşii, cetatea sufletului românesc," *Axa* (Dec. 5, 1940): 1.
"Trimișii Corpului Legionar participă la recucerirea Susaiului," *Cuvântul* (Dec. 2, 1940): 8.
Thirkield, Ben A. "150,000 Follow Codreanu's Body, Nazis Drop Wreaths," *The Washington Post* (Dec. 1, 1940): 1.
Turda, Marius. *Biopolitică și eugenism în România, 1920-1944. Biopolitics and eugenics in Romania, 1920-1944*. Bucureşti: Editura Muzeului Municipiului Bucureşti, 2019.
"Un comunicat al comandamentului Frăției de Cruce," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 47 (Nov. 29, 1940): 1.
"Victims of the Iron Guards," *The Times*, issue 48788 (Dec. 2, 1940): 4.
Vania, Gherginescu. "Moartea lui Făt Frumos," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 49 (Dec. 1, 1940): 1.
Verdery, Katherine. *Political Life of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.
Veverca, Ion. "Biruința Jertfei," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 50 (Dec. 2, 1940): 1–2.
Vintilescu, Petre, Father. "Originea și simbolismul veştmintelor liturgice," accessed at http://www.crestinortodox.ro/liturgica/viata-liturgica/originea-simbolismul-vestmintelor-liturgice-70640.html
Waldeck, R. G. *Athene Palace, Bucharest: Hitler's "New Order" comes to Rumania*. London: Constable, 1943.

9

THE LEGIONARY FAITH AND THE ROMANIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

This book has argued that the Legion "Archangel Michael" developed a new political faith called *Legionarism*. As has been extensively shown above, this faith was based on religious or religion-related themes, the most important of which were the belief in God and in salvation, the expiation of sins through violent sacrifice, and the cult of the martyrs.

The religious nature of this collective belief-system challenged the Legionaries to spell out its rapport to Christianity in general, to the "dominant" Orthodox Church and its dogma in particular, but also to the Greek-Catholic Church. During the 1927 student congress, a student leader pointed out that the Legion "revolves around a [religious] myth," and challenged Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu to explicate the Legion's relation to Orthodox Christian dogma, "in order to avoid degeneration in mysticism that would lead to the creation of religious sects of the kind that exist in Russia today." In his answer, Codreanu professed his belief in Orthodox Christianity, confessing that "since 1919 I have concerned myself with deepening [my understanding of] religion." "Do not accuse me of mysticism," protested Codreanu, adding, however, that "I believe in a power superior to us, which embodies beauty, perfection, and the infinite."[1]

Codreanu imprinted his religious orientation onto the Legion, as well. The Legionaries were always adamant in stressing the religious fundaments of their doctrine. For Ion I. Moța, "the truth and guidance received through *revelation* are the only ones that can bring life to purpose here on earth."[2] In the same vein, Gârniceanu argued that the Legion's most original features were the adoption of Christianity as an integral social norm and the application of the idea of salvation in history.[3] He defined the Legion as a salvific faith, and argued that the "roots of its theories were in the Christian theology."[4] In a work published in 1980, Horia Sima—Codreanu's successor—reiterated these claims.[5] He argued that, while other movements were based on Marxism or on rationality, the Legion "anchored

DOI: 10.4324/9780429428043-12

its assumptions in the teachings of the Gospel." The Legion was thus superior to all other political movements of its time because, claimed Sima, the religious idea represented "the primordial truth of life."[6] Furthermore, to attain its aims, the Legion operated with a new model of human being, who was, naturally, a *homo religiosus*.[7] The Legionaries were determined to "live" the Gospel, claimed Sima. Their individual and collective redemption was to lead to the regeneration of the nation, in its entirety: "The Christian principles, on which the education of the new man is based, are called upon to give birth to the regenerated nation."[8]

In addition to professing Christian convictions, Legionary rituals emulated Eastern Christian Orthodox religious practices. Often officiated by Orthodox priests, these practices were fused with fascist rites and rituals, and, in the process, they were also significantly altered. Thus, the most important Legionary ceremonies were centered on religious rites of passage (baptism, brotherhood of the cross, marriage, oath-taking ceremonies, funerals), and employed central religious symbols, most importantly crosses and icons. These symbols were, nevertheless, mixed with pagan fascist paraphernalia—most notably the swastika—and inserted into a paramilitary style of politics.

The palingenetic foundations of the Legionary faith, its theological matrix of political thought, and the peculiar syncretism between fascist and Christian rites and rituals account for the complex, intricate, and multifaceted relationship between the Legion and the two established churches and their dogmas, the Orthodox and the Greek-Catholic churches. In discussing this multidimensional relationship, one should note from the onset that neither these churches nor the Legion were monolithic units, but composite entities made up of a variety of individual and collective actors. The entanglements among these sets of actors were not only complex but also in permanent flux and motion, a fact that refutes attempts at sweeping generalizations. More concretely, in the case of the Legion, one can differentiate at least five main categories of actors with a different position and attitude toward religion, in general, and established churches, in particular: (1) Orthodox believers within the movement; (2) Greek Catholic members, who, although in the minority, were leading Legionary figures, such as Ion Banea; (3) leaders with a strong religious education (either formal or received in the family, such as Ion I. Moța, the son of a priest); (4) lay-oriented intellectuals, such as some of those attached to the *AXA* group, who were primarily interested in attaining political rather than religious goals;[9] and (5) theology students, priests, and church officials who enrolled in the movement, and who thus qualify as examples of "clerical fascism."[10]

The visions of these actors were divergent and, at times, even antithetical: some followed a lay political agenda; others used general Christian religious references and imagery, be they early Christian (thus predating the 1054 East-West church schism) or pan-Christian (mixing Catholic and Orthodox elements); most others, however, favored a strong association between the Legion and the Christian Orthodox dogma. In institutional terms, too, our analysis needs to take into account not only the numerically dominant Orthodox Church but

also the minoritarian Greek Catholic Church, and the Catholic Church, in general. Some Legionary leaders regarded both, the Greek-Catholic and Orthodox churches, as an integral yet subordinated components of the fascist political faith, while others thought the Legion's actions should be no more than a political manifestation of the Orthodox Church, under the banner of *Orthodoxism*. On the other side, within the Orthodox Church, we should differentiate between the attitude to the Legion of the Bucharest-based patriarchy, of top hierarchs in the newly joined multi-ethnic provinces, of lower hierarchs and priests but also of believers at the local level. These actors envisioned their relationship to the Legion quite differently, due, among other factors, to their distinct political orientation, regional affiliation, or personal relations: some Orthodox hierarchs favored a close alliance with the Legion, while others saw it as a blasphemous organization which subverted the unity of the church and its dogma. The attitude of the Greek-Catholic Church toward the Legion was far more critical, but it was not devoid of similar contradictions, ambiguities, and occasional collaboration at various hierarchical levels. As noted in previous chapters, the Legion was imbued with a militant spirit specific to Catholic religious orders; it occasionally employed Catholic concepts and visual symbols (see Codreanu's personal veneration of Saint Anthony of Padua, and Catholic representations of the Archangel Michal); and often appealed to *all* Christians, juxtaposing them against non-Christians, mostly the Jews. Its message attracted many Greek-Catholic but also regular Catholic believers and hierarchs, despite the critical discourse of the Greek-Catholic Church leadership toward the Legion as an extremist, terroristic, and totalitarian organization.[11]

A comprehensive analysis of the Legion's relation to Christianity, in general, and to the Orthodox and Greek-Catholic Churches, in particular, should, therefore, be *multilayered* and account for diverse patterns of interaction among actors at local, regional, and national levels. Second, it should also underscore novel forms of hybrid syncretism between fascism and Orthodoxy created by this tangled relationship: on the one hand, it generated lay intellectual-theologian activists such as Alexandru Cantacuzino and Legionary "theological" journals such as *Predania*; on the other hand, it led to fanatical forms of clerical fascism. Thus, many pupils and students in theology kept arms, emulating the paramilitary style of the popular haiducs.[12] It was not by chance that a squad of theology students assassinated Mihai Stelescu. Likewise, many Legionary priests replaced their Christian medals and decorations with the symbols of the Iron Guard.[13] More strikingly, some "*haiduc* priests," such as father Liviu Stan, a brilliant doctor in Orthodox theology, did not shy away from wearing the green shirt during the Legion's rule and from displaying a pistol on his desk in the Ministry of Religious Cults.

This chapter argues that the intense interaction between the Legion and the Orthodox Church resulted in a complex set of institutional, ideological, and grass root *entanglements*, with profound consequences for all parties involved. At a time when the Orthodox Church was in the process of inner transformation and reorganization, the activity of the Legion had a powerful impact upon the

church as an institution, exacerbating existing cleavages and eventually splitting it into pro- and anti-Legionary factions. By and large, I identify two main axes of differentiation within the church: one split was between the attitudes toward the Legion of the rank-and-file priests versus the top leadership of the church; the other split was regional, between the attitudes of regional metropolitan seats versus those of the central leadership in Bucharest. In general, ordinary priests at the local level, as well as bishops and metropolitans in the newly annexed, multi-ethnic provinces of Greater Romania, proved more receptive to Legionary actions and propaganda than the Bucharest-based establishment of the church (the patriarchy), who traditionally collaborated more closely with the political power of the day.

To substantiate these claims, the chapter approaches the relationship between the Legion and the Orthodox Church at several levels. The first part explores the status of the Orthodox Church, interconfessional strife, and the politicization of traditional religions in interwar Romania. The second part evaluates the complex and ambivalent relationship between the Legion and the Orthodox Church, at high and grass roots levels.

The Status of the Romanian Orthodox Church: New Challenges

The Orthodox Church was deeply affected by the process of nation- and state-building that culminated in the creation of Greater Romania. Traditionally, the principalities of Wallachia and Moldova were part of the Eastern Orthodox Christian Commonwealth, being attached in terms of dogma and church affairs to the ecumenical patriarchy in Constantinople. After the fall of the Byzantine Empire, the principalities contributed to the survival of the Byzantine politico-religious traditions, a role synthesized by Romanian historian Nicolae Iorga in the formula "Byzance après Byzance."[14] A central component of the Byzantine legacy was the strong link between church and state, captured by the Byzantine concept of "Symphonia."[15] Given the charismatic nature of their rule, the prince in each principality was also head of the church, officiating certain religious ceremonies and confirming the election of Orthodox metropolitans and bishops. While accepting the direct political interference of the prince over the election of its high-level leadership, the Orthodox Church benefited from numerous privileges and functioned as a "state-within-the-state," possessing its own judicial system, landed property, dependent peasantry, slaves, and cities.

The establishment of the Romanian nation-state in 1859 through the union of Moldova and Wallachia under the rule of Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza (r. 1859–1866) reconfigured the relationship between church and state. Romanian political elites treated the Orthodox Church as a central institution in the process of nation- and state-building, the unification of the two Wallachian and Moldovan branches, and their reorganization being regarded as an integral part of the more extensive process of state unification. At the same time, as part of its

effort to westernize Romania's legislation, Prince Cuza promoted an agenda of secularization, based on the principles of the separation between state and church and the primacy of the laic over religious authority. Under this new legal regime, the church preserved its prominent political profile but was subordinated to state policies and interests. Thus, as part of its effort to emancipate the church from the influence of the patriarchy in Constantinople, Prince Cuza substantially reduced the political role and property of the Orthodox Church, targeting, in particular, the local monasteries "dedicated" (and thus subordinated) to patron monasteries at Mount Athos. In December 1863, "The Law of Secularization of the Monastic Estates" nationalized the land of Orthodox monasteries that comprised 25.2 percent of the country's territory at the time. The 1865 Civil Code emancipated civil life from the jurisdiction of the church by transferring the control of parochial registers from religious authorities to the local civil administration.[16] In addition, since Romania was a laic state, civil marriage ceremonies became mandatory and were always to precede religious rites, which were optional.

In 1866, the new Constitution of Romania took additional steps toward secularization. On the one hand, it conferred the Orthodox Church a privileged legal status as compared to other religious cults, stating that "Eastern Orthodox Christianity is the dominant religion of the Romanian State." High-level Orthodox hierarchs were granted political representation: metropolitans and bishops were automatically appointed as members of the Senate, the upper house of the Parliament. Most importantly, the existence of an overwhelming Eastern Orthodox majority in Romania coupled with the tradition of ancient treaties (*capitulations)* between Moldova and Wallachia and the Ottoman Empire, which had forbidden the practice of Islam on the territory of the two principalities, favored the legal association between the practice of Christianity and access to Romanian citizenship; Article 7 of the Constitution read that: "Only Christian foreigners can acquire naturalization." The main aim of this stipulation was the exclusion of Jews from state citizenship on religious grounds.

On the other hand, the 1866 Constitution and the subsequent 1872 Law for the Election of Metropolitans and Diocesan Bishops unified the historical metropolitans of Wallachia and Moldova into a single church under the governance of a Holy Synod appointed by a *lay and politically dominated council*. The larger Wallachian metropolitan seat based in Bucharest was given pre-eminence in its relation to the Moldovan one, bearing the new title of primate-metropolitan seat.

Despite vivid protests of high clerics against the lay composition of the Holy Synod, secular control over the church continued to consolidate in the next period. At the same time, after the fall of Cuza, the Orthodox Church participated actively to the process of sacralizing politics, playing an important role—together with the school and the army—in the creation and consolidation of the doctrine of national salvation centered around the new ruling Hohenzollern-Siegmaringen dynasty. The role of the church was heightened during Romania's War of Independence, 1877–1878, when it promoted the idea of sacrifice for the fatherland, following the behavioral pattern of *imitatio Christi*. The Orthodox

Church was also regarded as a symbol of the country's self-determination. In 1878, its jurisdiction was extended over the newly annexed province of Northern Dobrudja, despite resistance from the local churches affiliated to the Bulgarian Exarchate. In 1884, an amendment to the Constitution proclaimed the autocephaly of the Romanian Orthodox Church from the ecumenical patriarchy in Constantinople.

Against this background, Romania's territorial enlargement in 1918 fundamentally changed its religious configuration. The country became a religious mosaic, with 15 major religions practiced, and an additional number of sects. According to the general census of 1930 (see Graph 9.1), the most numerous religious cult was the Orthodox one, with 13,108,227 believers or 72.5 percent of the total population; followed by Greek Catholics, with 1,427,391 believers or 7.9 percent; Roman Catholics, with 1,234,151 believers or 6.8 percent; Judaism, with 756,930 believers or 4.2 percent of the population; Calvinists, with 710,706 believers or 3.9 percent; Lutherans, with 398,759 believers or 2.2 percent; and Islam, with 185,486 believers or 1.0 percent of the population.[17]

This massive change in Romania's religious composition opened up new opportunities but also new challenges for the Orthodox Church. First, as a result of political unification, all Orthodox believers of Romanian ethnic origin lived, for the first time, in the same state. This posed the urgent problem of their administrative integration into a single church. In 1919, by royal decrees, the autocephalous Orthodox Churches of Transylvania and the Banat, and of Bukovina, as well as the Bessarabian Orthodox Church (previously subordinated to the Russian patriarchy in Moscow) joined the Romanian Orthodox Church of the Old Kingdom. In December 1919, the Bishop of Caransebeş,



GRAPH 9.1 Religious composition of Romania, 1930

Miron Cristea (1868–1939), was elected Primate Metropolitan Archbishop of Wallachia, with authority over the entire Romanian Orthodox Church. The principle of church unification was included in the 1923 Constitution, which stipulated that the Romanian Orthodox Church "will have a unitary organization with the participation of all its constituent elements, clerics and laymen." As a result, the Romanian Orthodox Church became the largest Orthodox Church in Southeastern Europe, with over 14 million believers organized in 18 eparchies (as compared to eight in the pre-1918 period) grouped in four metropolitan archbishopries (enlarged to five after the establishment of the Bessarabian Metropolitan Seat in 1923, see below). To consecrate the increased regional dominance of the Romanian Orthodox Church in the larger Orthodox Commonwealth, in 1925 the Wallachian Metropolitan Archbishopry was elevated to the status of patriarchy, under the leadership of Miron Cristea (until his death in 1939). The Holy Synod presented this act as "a proof of the full maturity and national empowerment of the Romanian people," in line with Romania's national sovereignty and right to self-determination.[18]

Church unification thus prefigured the more laborious process of legal-administrative integration of the new provinces at the national level. The terms and mechanisms of ecclesiastical unification did not go uncontested, however. As in the case of Dobrudja before World War I, the incorporation of regional churches within the Romanian Orthodox Church was rather arduous, due mainly to the persistence of local traditions, the resistance of certain local actors and their autonomous tendencies, and foreign interference. The cases of Bessarabia and Transylvania are revealing in this respect, although in different ways. At the institutional level, the Metropolitan Archbishop of Transylvania, Nicolae Bălan (1882–1955), voiced the most concerted objections against an unconditional administrative unification of the Romanian Orthodox Church. The son of a Transylvanian Orthodox priest, Bălan attended the Faculty of Theology at the University of Cernăuți/Czernowitz (B.A., 1900–1904; Ph.D., 1905). Active in the Romanian national movement in Transylvania, Bălan militated during the Great War for the unification of Transylvania with Romania. In February 1920, Bălan was elected Metropolitan of Transylvania. In that capacity, he agreed to the principle of administrative unification that would lead to the establishment of a single Romanian Orthodox Church. At the National Church Congress of Transylvania organized in October 1921, Bălan called for "one Holy, Apostolic, undivided autocephalous national church of the Romanian state," that would "express allegiance to the throne, serve the interests of the State and promote its goals with dedication."[19] At the same time, Bălan argued that the unified Romanian Orthodox Church should be organized on the principles of autonomy, constitutionalism, and a representative electoral system, as spelled out in the Statute of the Transylvanian Orthodox Church enacted by the influential Metropolitan of Transylvania, Andrei Șaguna (1808–1873). Bălan also rejected the principle of administrative centralization, arguing instead for the large regional autonomy of metropolitan archbishoprics.

Other leading representatives of the Metropolitan Archbishopric of Transylvania reiterated these principles. Although they tactically stated that, "in principle, we cannot be against the administrative unification of the church," the Transylvanian hierarchs argued nevertheless that this reform was inopportune in the first post-war years.[20] Dr. Gr. Ciuhandu, for example, denounced in 1921 "the haste and ease" with which some Bucharest-based officials approach the unification of the church.[21] Pointing out that "today," the administrative reorganization of the church "does not enchant us at all," Ciuhandu recommended that the issue "would be still kept on hold for a while," allowing for a period of transition of approximately 10 to 15 years.[22] Ciuhandu also argued that, if coupled with an excessive centralization, the "unification would mean the unconditional destruction of an existing system of religious life, without guaranteeing local churches other, more favorable, conditions for functioning and further development."[23] The Orthodox Church in Transylvania was not ready "to renounce its constitutionalist principle in favor of hierarchical absolutism."[24] The new law on religious organizations had to be democratically negotiated and "avoid centralization, which would bring ballast in our religious life."[25] Instead, the administrative basis of religious life in Greater Romania had to be centered on the metropolitan sees in the historical provinces.[26] The priority of the local Orthodox Church in Transylvania was, therefore, the consolidation of its own ecclesiastical traditions: "Our first thought does not go that much to the issue of unification as to that of revising and improving the Transylvanian Organic Statute."[27] The Transylvanians were partially successful in their endeavor: also promoted by Primate Metropolitan Cristea (himself a Transylvanian), the Şagunian principles did eventually serve as a basis of the post-war organization of the Romanian Orthodox Church,[28] but the principle of regional autonomy was rejected in favor of centralization.

In Bessarabia, resistance against administrative unification was manifest at institutional as well as at the grass roots levels. Upon the occupation of the province by Tsarist Russia in 1812, the Bessarabian Orthodox Church was detached from the Moldovan metropolitan seat of Iaşi and attached to the Russian Orthodox Church. In 1918, following the dissolution of Tsarist Russia and the union of Bessarabia with Romania, the Bessarabian Orthodox Church was reintegrated into the Romanian Orthodox Church. This administrative union was marked by tensions, several local religious leaders preferring to resign rather than accept it. Another, even graver source of tension was the adoption of the new Gregorian calendar by the Romanian Orthodox Church in 1928. A significant part of the more conservative Bessarabian Church refused to adopt the new calendar, denouncing it as a Western imposition that would disrupt the Orthodox tradition. Those who rejected the reform of the calendar were called *stilişti* (from the *stilul vechi*, old style, or rite). The elevation of the Bessarabian bishopric to the rank of a metropolitan seat in 1923 (consecrated by the 1925 Law on the Organization of the Orthodox Church) and the investment of Gurie Grosu as the first metropolitan of the Bessarabian Church in 1928 did little to alleviate

local resistance. The dissidence of *stiliști* remained a source of great concern for the Romanian state—called *problema stilistă*—having their activities closely monitored by *Siguranța*.[29] The process of territorial unification of the Orthodox Church thus duplicated, in a nutshell, the administrative crises of unification experienced at the level of Greater Romania.

Second, the inclusion of a large number of Roman Catholics, Greek Catholics, and Protestants within the new state also led to greater religious diversity, imperiously posing the problem of interconfessional relations. For many contemporaries, the creation of Greater Romania generated a "religions question" not in terms of theological debates over dogmas but concerning the sociopolitical impact of interconfessional debates over property issues and the legal-political status of churches.[30] Given its high degree of religious homogeneity (and the precarious legal status of Romania's Jewish population), the Old Kingdom of Romania did not adopt a special law on the status of religious cults, besides the organic law regulating the activity of the Orthodox Church. Such a law was, however, a priority in Greater Romania, Romanian authorities regarding the "kaleidoscopic variation of legal regimes" governing religious life in the newly annexed provinces as "incompatible with the unitary nature of the State, which has to be led and administrated by unitary laws, similar to all and in all places."[31] Eager to set these relations on common foundations, the Romanian state adopted a series of organic laws which—as part of its post-war reorganization—spelled out the relationship between the state and religious denominations. The 1923 Constitution guaranteed, in Article 23, the liberty and equality of all religious cults insofar as they did not run against public order, morality, and state organization. It also announced the adoption of a new law regulating relations among religious cults. After extensive debates and many political tribulations, the bill on religious cults drafted in 1925 by the ruling Liberal Party was finally adopted in 1928.[32] The law recognized seven religious cults in Romania, in addition to Orthodox Christianity: Roman Catholic (Latin, Greek, and Armenian), Calvinist, Lutheran, Unitarian, Mosaic, Islamic, and Baptist.

Finally, and most importantly for our analysis, Romania's new religious composition challenged the fragile prewar equilibrium between the Orthodox Church and the state. From the point of view of the state, the laws on religious organization were meant symbolically to preserve the dominant status of the Orthodox Church, while also upholding the principles of religious liberty and equality and the international legal treaties and conventions signed by Romania. The Primate Metropolitan (future Patriarch) Cristea provided, in his memoirs, a glimpse into the arduous negotiations over the wording of the Constitution, of the Organic Law of the Orthodox Church, and of the Law on Religious Cults.[33] During the drafting of this legislation, the Orthodox Church aimed at preserving its dominant status, while also forbidding neo-Protestantism.[34] The first proposal of the Ministry of Cults was simply to state that the Orthodox Church was the religion of the majority of the population. Metropolitan Cristea regarded this statement as insufficient, and asked instead that the Orthodox Church be declared

the "National Church" of the Romanians. The Liberal Party objected that this formula would offend the Greek Catholics, and proposed to call both churches "national," on an equal basis. This proposal was rejected by the Orthodox metropolitan on the count that the Catholic Church was supranational, as its head was located outside the country.[35] Ultimately, the 1923 Constitution stated that the Eastern Orthodox Christian Church and the Greek Catholic Church are "Romanian churches." Formally, the Constitution perpetuated the privileged status of the Orthodox Church by stipulating that "the Romanian Orthodox Church, being the religion of the great majority of the Romanians, is *the dominant church* in the Romanian State; the Greek Catholic Church has *pre-eminence* in relation to the other religious denominations." However, the wording of the Constitution was ambiguous, since the dominant character of the Orthodox Church was argued on numerical grounds without de jure justifications. The Constitution further specified that "A special law will fully establish the fundamental principles of the Orthodox Church's organization."

Adopted in May 1925, the new Law on the Organization of the Orthodox Church confirmed the dominant, unitary, and autocephalous character of the Romanian Orthodox Church. The most important issue addressed by the law was the relationship between the church and lay authorities. The primate metropolitan demanded an extensive autonomy for the church, arguing that a lay-controlled church "is an organism without a heart. The heart is at the ministries. … Only the political factor is decisive [in decision-making]."[36] At the express insistence of Metropolitan Cristea, art. 4 of the law confirmed the internal autonomy of the church, yet is also consecrated its subordination to lay control: "The Romanian Orthodox Church regulates, leads and manages its religious, cultural, and administrative matters *through its own organs and under the control of the State*."[37] The state organized its control through the Ministry of Religious Cults. The Orthodox Church was led by the Holy Synod, made up of the church leadership; by the National Church Congress, composed of church representatives from all eparchies; and by the latter's main elected organ, the Central Church Council. The principle of lay control over the church was also evident in the composition of the Central Church Council, the supreme administrative organ of the church and the executive organ of the Holy Synod and of the National Church Congress: one-third of the members of the Council were clerics, while two-thirds were lay members (Article 7).[38] Religious instruction was also placed under the joint control of the church and the Ministry of the Instruction (Articles 33–34). The bulk of the church budget was to be assured by its own means, but it could also be supplemented with state funds, upon request, and pending state financial verifications and evaluations (Article 21). The status of the Orthodox Church could be modified by the National Church Congress with a majority of two-thirds and the express approval of the Council of Ministers (Article 37).

The new legal framework did not satisfy the leadership of the Romanian Orthodox Church, who experienced feelings of insecurity in its relationship to other religious denominations. Although nominally declared "dominant" by the

1923 Constitution, the Orthodox Church felt underprivileged, mostly as compared to the Roman Catholic Church, which allegedly enjoyed superior material power and political influence. The tension between the two churches was higher in Transylvania, where there was a legacy of antagonistic relations. Significant concerns were voiced by Orthodox clerics with regard to the Greek Catholics, as well, who were more numerous in Transylvania than "regular" Catholics. In recognition of the vital role played by Greek Catholics in the emergence of the Romanian national movement, the 1923 Constitution defined the Greek Catholic Church as a "Romanian church," on the same par with the Orthodox Church, the two being routinely referred to as "sister churches." Despite this conciliatory official formulation, the interconfessional relations between the two churches were strained, characterized more by keen competition for material resources and political prominence rather than by cooperation.

The peak of the controversy between the Orthodox and the Catholic Churches was the Concordat signed on May 10, 1927, between Romania and the Vatican. This act was vehemently criticized by the Orthodox Church, on the grounds that it privileged the Catholic Church in Romania. According to the Concordat, Catholic bishops had to swear allegiance to the Pope, as well as the king, but not to the Romanian state. In exchange, all Catholic institutions (such as orphanages, schools, and hospitals) were free from governmental control. This stipulation was in contrast to the tight state control over Orthodox religious schools, fueling Orthodox allegations that the Catholic Church in Romania was a genuine "state within a state."[39] In reaction, an official declaration of the Romanian Orthodox Church, read in the Parliament by the Bishop of Transylvania, Nicolae Bălan, called the Concordat "anticonstitutional," a "generator of privileges, affecting confessional peace, and antipatriotic."[40] A first objection was that the status of Catholicism in Romania was not regulated by an organic law, as stipulated in the Constitution, but through a "bilateral convention between equal partners." Second, the Orthodox Church claimed that the Concordat was in the service of Catholic proselytism, since it granted the Catholic Church complete autonomy—including free communication with the Vatican—outside of state control. In particular, Orthodox hierarchs vehemently objected to the broad autonomy enjoyed by Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic religious schools, while the Orthodox schools were placed under state ministerial control. These Orthodox objections found common ground with a nationalist campaign accusing Catholic schools in Transylvania of being centers of Magyarization. Finally, claimed Bălan, the Concordat consecrated de facto the existence of the Greek Catholic Church as legitimate, and thus implicitly "consecrated the division of the Romanian soul."

Along with the theological dimension of the Orthodox/Catholic rivalry and the quest for spiritual and political influence, another aspect of institutional rivalry was the competition for material resources and state support. Bălan claimed that "minority churches" had a superior number of state-sponsored councilors, proto-priests, and priests. The Romanian Orthodox Church demanded a *strictly proportional* administrative structure of all churches, reflecting the number of their

believers, which would have led to an exponential increase in the number of Orthodox hierarchs and bishoprics. Finally, another source of contention was the status of religious property controlled by the Catholics. Bălan argued that, by admitting the Catholic principle according to which the property of local religious constituencies did not belong to the believers but to the Catholic Church, the Romanian state was guilty of estranging a significant part of the national patrimony. It is "inadmissible," concluded Bălan, that "one of the minority religions in Romania is privileged, being granted a special treatment, against the principles laid down by the Constitution."[41] Appealing to the Romanian state "to make justice, not Concordat," the Romanian Orthodox Church decided to boycott the parliamentary procedures over its adoption. The Orthodox Church also pursued a virulent political campaign outside the Parliament against the ratification of the Concordat.[42] These objections were overruled, the Concordat being ratified by the Chamber of Deputies on May 29, 1929. Despite this setback, the Orthodox Church did not give up its fight against the Concordat: due to its lobbying activity, in 1932 a new bill put forward in the Chamber of Deputies demanded the denunciation of the Concordat on the basis that "it serves as a pretext for a systematic action which gravely undermines the life interests of the Romanian people and state unity and safety."[43] The bill failed to be adopted by the Parliament; yet, the Orthodox Church did not resign from its goals. In 1935, the National Church Congress reiterated its determination to militate for "the abolition of the Concordat," stating that the "Concordat-based Catholicism" was "the most implacable enemy of the Church of the Nation and of our political integrity."[44]

In addition to the Catholic "menace," the Orthodox Church denounced the "offensive" of neo-Protestant movements, represented mostly by Baptists, Adventists, and Pentecostals, who were fast-growing mostly by making proselytes among Orthodox believers. In 1930, there were approximately 76,600 neo-Protestants in Romania, among which 15,000 Adventists, 25,000 Romanian Baptists, 20,000 German Baptists, and 6,000 Hungarian Baptists.[45] The greatest increase was registered, by far, by the Baptists, whose number grew from 22,228 members in 1922 to 93,842 in 1942, just before Antonescu's repressive 1942–1943 laws (see below).[46] The Orthodox Church, as well as the Greek Catholic Church, followed with anxiety the advances of neo-Protestantism, which they both regarded as a direct competitor. To obstruct the neo-Protestants' proselytizing campaign, these churches placed a greater emphasis on training their own cadres in order to prevail in the fierce religious competition. They also increased their hostile written and oral propaganda in rural areas, portraying the neo-Protestants as heretic and antinational and as a danger to the existing state order.[47]

In sum, the status of the Orthodox Church was greatly challenged by the post-war legal and political reorganization, and this provoked a strong reaction from Orthodox hierarchs and theologians. Katherine Verdery explained the extensive participation of theologians in the debates on national identity in Greater Romania through the keen competition of religious cults over material resources and spiritual hegemony.[48] As part of their efforts to defend the interests

of the Orthodox Church, Orthodox theologians attempted to develop a symbolic-ideological control over the nation by defining the Orthodox Church as a spiritual leader and repository of traditional national values, while denouncing their competitors as "non" or even "antinational." It is telling in this respect that, in the Orthodox discourse, the Greek Catholics were blamed for the "dangerous subordination of the national to the confessional (identity)."[49] Orthodox leaders accused the Greek Catholic elites of betraying the Romanian national interest, and called publicly for the return of the Greek Catholic believers to the mother church (*matca ortodoxă*), even against the will of the official Catholic leadership.[50] Orthodox leaders also argued that, since the 1700 union of a part of the Orthodox Church with Rome was a forceful imposition, the Greek Catholic Church "was created artificially and against the nation."[51] Given the fact that, in their history, the Romanians did not experience the phenomenon of religious reformation, they "are *not* a pluri-confessional people," but an Orthodox one. The Orthodox Church was thus not just a religious institution of the Romanians, among many others, but "a threefold symbol: of religion, which we so aptly call 'law,' of nationality, and of our land."[52] Orthodox hierarchs argued that Greater Romania was not only a nation-state but also an Orthodox state; its proper title should have been a National Orthodox State (*Stat național și ortodox*), animated by the doctrine of the Romanian National Orthodoxy.[53] This view was also endorsed by numerous state officials: in 1935, Alexandru Lapedatu, the Minister of Cults and Arts, stated that the Orthodox Church will not cooperate with "the other religious denominations, because the former, due to their international and chauvinistic character, have interests that are contrary to those of the State, while the Orthodox Church, due to its national character, has identical interests" with those of the state.[54]

These institutional and interconfessional conflicts explain why, in the interwar period, theology left the narrow "ivory tower" of purely ecclesiastical debates and became a main terrain of ideological confrontation. The political activation of the Orthodox Church was expressed by the combative attitude of church representatives in the Parliament, the impressive number of new religious publications, and by the prominent political role played by the Orthodox Church during the king's personal regime and Antonescu's dictatorship.

Vertical Splits Within the Church: Grass Root Activism vs. Hostility at the Top

The charismatic nature of the Legion and the political faith it promoted account for its ambivalent relationship with the Romanian Orthodox Church, which oscillated between periods of collaboration and conflict. This uneasy alliance was directly linked to the post-1918 institutional crisis of the church, as highlighted above. In their attempt to defend their institutional privileges, Orthodox clerics intensified their political lobbying to modify the legal framework governing religious cults. To many Orthodox prelates, the nationalist youth movement, in general, and the Legion, in particular, appeared to be potentially useful allies.

In an era marked by a rapid spread of secularization, the Legionaries rejected atheism, and professed their belief in God and their respect for the Monarchy and the Orthodox Church. They were also staunchly anticommunist, denouncing the Bolshevik attack on the Russian Orthodox Church and their destruction of churches as the work of Satan. Finally, the Legionaries were against political pluralism and foreign influences, and argued for a policy that would cultivate national values, such as Orthodoxy.

This view of the Legion was not unanimous inside the church. In fact, one can identify different attitudes toward the Legion between low and high Orthodox hierarchs, namely collaboration at the grass roots level but an ambivalent, if not overtly critical, attitude of the top leadership, especially from the part of the Bucharest-based patriarchy. Although the gap between these two attitudes was certainly not absolute (since at least two Orthodox metropolitans out of five, and many bishops collaborated with the Legion), it was nevertheless evident ever since the first interactions between the church and the Legion. The events surrounding the initiative of the Legionary student association to place a cross on the grave of the Unknown Soldier, in January 1933, is revealing in this respect. As shown above, after confronting the authorities on this issue, the Legionaries turned to the mediation of the Orthodox patriarch, to whom they ultimately deposited their cross. The patriarch welcomed the spirit of the student action, but disapproved of their unconventional methods. His promise to place the cross on the grave did not materialize, although, later, the patriarchy discretely placed the sign of the cross on the fence surrounding the grave. The Legionary press exploited the event heavily for its political purposes, proclaiming a religious crusade against atheism. *AXA* was quick to report that "the confessor of the students [Father Georgescu-Edineț] fell prey to the Masonic forces of state authority." At the same time, Mihai Stelescu proclaimed the beginning of a gigantic fight of Christians against anti-Christians, who are "under the influence of national and international masonry."[55]

The Legion's initiative to place a cross on the grave of the Unknown Soldier marked the emergence of an ad hoc yet enduring alliance between the Legionaries and countryside priests at the grass roots level, but also of the first tensions and rhetorical confrontations with the Orthodox patriarchy and its representatives.[56] Thus, parallel to the mediation of the patriarch, the Legionary action was supported by a delegation of Orthodox priests who, in a public memoir and also during a meeting with Prime Minister G. G. Mironescu, appealed to the government to place a Christian cross on the grave of the Unknown Soldier.[57] This incipient "alliance" was further cemented by the activity of the Legionary labor camps, most of which involved activities of church repair or other forms of voluntary assistance. The alliance seemed to be mutually beneficial: the Legionary activity was at times valuable for local churches and also brought to the attention of the local community the needs of the church. At the same time, the Legionaries' involvement in local church affairs was an effective propaganda technique, giving them access to rural communities and allowing them to present themselves as altruist believers and "protectors" of the church.

The attitude of the Orthodox leadership toward the Legion continued, however, to be ambivalent. On several occasions, Orthodox leaders showed sympathy to the antidemocratic and antisemitic message of the Legion and signaled their intention to forge an alliance. Despite instances of occasional collaborations, top Bucharest-based Orthodox hierarchs distanced themselves from the Legion's most controversial political actions. Much to the disappointment of the Legionary leaders, the high Orthodox hierarchs did not speak publicly in their favor when the Legion was banned in December 1933. On the contrary, the Orthodox Church rebuffed the assassination of Prime Minister Duca as an anti-Christian act. An editorial of the Cluj-based orthodox newspaper *Renașterea* [Rebirth], condemned "the odious crime, which shakes us and horrifies us."[58] The newspaper eulogized the personality of Duca, presenting him as "a touching example of commitment and sacrifice," and denounced "the dementia of extremist political trends."[59]

Orthodox hierarchs were also concerned with the active participation of clerics in Codreanu's movement, understanding its potentially destabilizing impact upon the church. On October 4, 1935, following an address from the Ministry of Religious Cults, the Holy Synod instructed the church leadership to refuse assistance for church repairs from political organizations, regardless of their nature, and to report such requests to the Ministry. The patriarchy warned church hierarchs that, behind the activities of the work camps in rural areas, is "the former Iron Guard," who, under the mask of free work, "aims at nothing else but the captivity of the popular masses to Iron Guard ideas.[60]

Thus, while at the grass roots level Orthodox priests collaborated with the Legion in growing numbers, the leadership of the church continued to tactically distance itself from the Legion, not least in response to state pressure. On March 10, 1937, at the request of the Minister of the Interior Victor Iamandi, the Holy Synod expressly forbade Orthodox priests to become involved in party politics, to bless party insignia or symbols, or to take oaths of allegiance to a political party or a private individual. Instead, the Holy Synod asked Orthodox priests "to identify themselves, in every moment, with the interests and aspiration of the Romanian state."[61] While taking the side of the state in its open conflict with the Legion, the Holy Synod spelled out, in a second communiqué, the conservative-nationalist creed of the Orthodox Church, in that it affirmed the "Romanian character" of the state, spoke against materialism and the growing influence of "foreigners" in Romanian society, and pleaded for a form of national politics, beyond and above party "agitation."[62] The communiqué made it evident that the Orthodox Church was unwilling to abdicate from its active public role in society, arguing that the Orthodox Church was the country's most vital institution for patriotic education. Finally, following a report by Metropolitan Nicolae Bălan, on March 11, 1937, the Holy Synod openly condemned freemasonry "as an occult doctrine, organization, and method of work."[63]

The Legionaries praised the nationalist orientation of the church, but did not shy away from openly criticizing the hesitations of high-level Orthodox clerics

in supporting the Legion. In August 1932, the newspaper *Legiunea* defined religious faith as "the pillar on which is based the entire edifice of our Romanian people," and appealed to priests to follow the "call of the Archangels," and to join the fight "for liberating the Christian faith from the hideous claws deeply implanted into the martyrized body of St. Church."[64] In June 1933, in an article entitled "Teologii şi Garda de Fier (Theologians and the Iron Guard)," published in *AXA*, the Orthodox priest and Legionary activist Ilie Imbrescu claimed the existence of a "natural alliance" between the church and the Legion, as the most loyal and devoted servant of the faith.[65] He portrayed Legionaries as "lunatics for Christ" who "subjugate the political to the spiritual, and transform in a religious faith their fight and sacrifice for a Christian 'Romania for the Romanians.'"[66] Criticizing the ambivalent attitude displayed by the Orthodox leadership, Imbrescu argued that "Legionaries do not falsify the teaching of the Holy Church, but they fully obey the canons. Therefore, they … do not lend themselves to heresy."[67] In the end, Imbrescu placed the Legionary struggle within the "apocalyptic show of the modern world, in which the fight between two opposing principles is hardening."[68]

Another article entitled "*Mântuirea* (Salvation)," published in *AXA* in December 1933, explicitly criticized the Orthodox leadership for not taking the side of the Iron Guard, banned by authorities in December 1933.[69] The article accused the "Official Church" of cowardliness and opportunist collaboration with the state: "The church fails to fulfill one of its imperious duties […], continuing to ignore the Legionary spirit, and despising exactly those who are its best sons and who have exposed themselves, and thus sacrificed themselves, then as now, in the fight with the satanic spirit that dominates the former and current leadership of the state."[70] The passivity of the church was even more anomalous considering that, among the arrested Legionaries, "there are also several priests, and not entirely anonymous ones." This attitude was not only an abdication from its mission, but also detrimental to church interests: "If indeed it wants to conquer the world, the Christian Church cannot do this without the support of a spiritual army such as the Legionary army."[71] The article ended with a strong reiteration of the divine mission of the Legionaries, destined to bring salvation to the Romanian people through sacrifice: "Between the heavenly army of Saint Michael and the innocent souls of the Legionaries sacrificed for the national idea, a new pact has been established in a miraculous way, a new agreement between the sky and the earth which will bring, as in other times, the Salvation. Do believe in this one, as in that one!"[72]

In the same vein, deploring the hostility of Orthodox leadership, the leading Legionary theologian Gheorghe Racoveanu argued for a 'natural' alliance between parochial priests and Legionaries:

> The activity of Codreanu's school … was, at the same time, help given to the Church. The fact that the churches were full of Legionary youth is very telling. The lack of understanding from the higher-level hierarchy of the Orthodox

> Church is surprising. But communal priests knew who their real allies were, and they supported Codreanu's efforts, in spite of unavoidable risks.[73]

On December 2, 1935, General Cantacuzino, the leader of "All for the Country," vehemently condemned the decision of the Holy Synod to refuse Legionary assistance for church repair. Citing previous enthusiastic endorsements of the Legionary activity from the part of Patriarch Cristea, Metropolitan Visarion of Bukovina, Metropolitan Gurie of Bessarabia, and Metropolitan Nicodim of Moldova, Cantacuzino accused the church of opportunism and hypocrisy. He firmly condemned the hostile attitude of the church, and personally of the patriarch, as a betrayal of the national cause, arguing that it led to a rift between the church leadership and the nationalist youth, since "it broke the sacred élan in their hearts."[74]

Codreanu himself criticized the Orthodox leadership on many occasions, differentiating between the institution and its representatives. In his diary covering the period from 1933 until 1934, Codreanu deplored the Holy Synod's "hostile attitude" toward the Legion, stating unequivocally: "This is an unacceptable attitude of the church authorities, which generated in our hearts unmatched indignation."[75] In November 1936, Codreanu stated again: "It seems to me that the church—through its representatives, men—has distanced itself from the line of The Church."[76] He complained that Orthodox hierarchs did not respond to his Legionary appeal to the extent of his expectations. Yet, Codreanu also distinguished between the terrestrial actions of the Legion and the other-worldly actions of the church:

> There is one historical line: the one in which we live. Because we live an earthly, timely existence. The line of the Church is much above us. We aim toward it, but we accomplish little. That is because we are damned by the burden of our own sins, by those of the world, and by those of our ancestors. We acknowledge that we are sinners: this is the Legionary attitude toward the Church.[77]

The distinction Codreanu made between "the line in which we live," and "the line of the Church" was not only tactical but served to justify the substantive differences between the official theology of the church and the Legionary political faith. Legionaries utilized a millenarian message for accomplishing worldly, terrestrial, and secular aims through violent political action. Codreanu believed that this type of action was permitted only to the Legionaries, the laymen, since priests could not use, bless, or encourage the use of arms. In other words, the Legion arrogated for itself the role of serving as the armed "hand" of the church. This discourse was meant to put pressure both on priests and on the central church leadership to cooperate with the Legion. Thus, a police report dated December 29, 1936, informs the superior authorities that the Committee of the National Union of Christian Students decided that all student centers in

the country should organize meetings during which to denounce all priests who refused to leave the National Peasant Party and to enroll in the Iron Guard as "traitors of the nation" and to place them on a "blacklist."[78] The Legion also closely monitored the activity of the Ministry of Cults and vehemently reacted against the persecution of Legionary priests. In October 1937, Codreanu made known in a circular letter the names of the functionaries involved in the suspension of Fathers Gheorghe Popescu and Ştefan Smărăndescu from Romanați County for officiating an oath-taking ceremony at a local Legionary meeting.[79] The Legion thus combined propaganda stressing its affinities with countryside priests and Orthodox dogma with forms of public collective and individual pressure on high church representatives.

Because of the Legion's open polemics with the Orthodox Church, its hybrid political-religious practices, and its embracement of violence, the organization was overtly accused of blaphemic deviation from the Christian Orthodox dogma. To refute accusations that the Legion was "promoting a new faith, placed outside of our Christian Orthodox Church," the Legionary Viorel D. Trifa, a theology graduate and deputy president of the Bucharest Student Circle, initiated a series of public lectures on "Orthodoxy and Nationalism," meant "to highlight the concordance between nationalism and the ancestral [Christian Orthodox] faith and to thus counter such hostile propaganda."[80] The list of speakers included the most prestigious mentors of the young nationalist generations, from Nae Ionescu and Father Grigorie Cristescu to Nichifor Crainic, Mihail Manoilescu, and Simion Mehedinți. In the first conference, held on January 10, 1937, Nae Ionescu argued that, while the universalistic spirit of Catholicism is in contradiction with nationalism, in Orthodox Romania there was "a perfect similitude between nationalism and our [Christian Orthodox] faith, as both include people of the same community of love and ideals."[81] Nevertheless, this attempt to prove dogmatic conformity was, in fact, another controversial practice, as these lay conferences were organized inside the St. Anton Church in Bucharest. Reportedly, in order to ease Ionescu's discomfort of lecturing in front of the church altar, Father Georgescu-Edineț formally endorsed this unorthodox practice by absolving in advance the speaker of that sin.[82]

Toward a Legionary Orthodox 'Theology': Predania, 1937

In the late 1930s, Legionary criticism against the church coalesced into an alternative theological discourse, centered on the journal *Predania: Revistă de critică teologică* (Tradition: Review of Theological Critique). Established in February 1937, the new journal gathered Legionary priests and religiously minded intellectuals, engaging them in a systematic effort to spell out the relationship between *Legionarism*, the Orthodox dogma, and the Orthodox Church. The *Predania* debating circle was grouped around Nae Ionescu, as its spiritual leader and leading editorialist, seconded by the Legionary theologian Gheorghe Racoveanu, who served as director of the journal and main editorialist. Another prominent

collaborator was Father Grigorie Cristescu, a graduate of, and then a professor at, the Bucharest Department of Theology, who used to officiate over major Legionary ceremonies. The team was joined by I. D. Petrescu, Șerban Popescu, D. N. Ionescu, and Nicolae M. Popescu, among others.

Naturally, the intellectual orientation of the journal was imprinted by Ionescu, the new guru of the young generation who emerged in the late 1930s as a leading ideologue of the Legion. Although he was a university professor of philosophy, in late 1920s Ionescu ventured—as noted earlier—in the field of political theology, mostly by way of sharp editorial essays in *Cuvântul*. Arguing for the necessity of a pan-Orthodox debating forum, in 1928 Ionescu initiated a theological journal called *Logos: Revue internationale de synthèse orthodoxe*, with the participation of Romanian, Eastern Orthodox, and scholars from other parts of Europe.[83] As an appreciation for his apologetic campaign in support of Orthodoxy, Ionescu was initially perceived by the Romanian Orthodox Church, and personally by Patriarch Cristea, as a precious lay ally and was therefore involved in church committees on reforming theological education. Soon, however, Ionescu entered into a long-lasting conflict with the church due to his pretense to monitor its actions closely and judge upon their canonicity. The conflict broke out in 1927, occasioned by the participation of Patriarch Cristea to the three-person Regency Council supervising Michael I (1927–1930);[84] Ionescu pointed out that the patriarch's new position was not only non-canonical but also unconstitutional, since he was exercising two sets of incompatible royal as well as ministerial prerogatives at the same time.[85] The conflict stirred a long-term societal debate on the legal status of the church, its canons, and its relation to the state, involving the Minister of Cults, other church hierarchs, and numerous journalists and intellectuals.

Ionescu's conflict with the church exacerbated following the decision of the patriarch to celebrate the Orthodox Easter on March 31, 1929, ahead of the Jewish Easter.[86] Once again, Ionescu vehemently criticized the patriach's decision as non-canonical. In his support, he invoked the "Holy Tradition of the Church,"[87] based on the authoritative canonical texts of the Early Church Fathers, an orientation that made him compatible with an emerging transnational neo-patristics orientation in Orthodox theology.[88] Ionescu's vigorous campaign culminated with an open letter sent to the patriarch himself, contesting his authority arbitrarily to decide on the issue of the religious calendar and asking him to work in harmony with the religious canons: "Who can tell me I am not right? I beg your pardon, but on this issue, the opinion of Your Highness can only be of the same essence as mine or as that of any other ordinary person," asserted Ionescu.[89] Ionescu's critical campaign angered Patriarch Cristea to such an extent that, at his order, he had Ionescu depicted as the incarnation of the devil on the exterior Apocalypse fresco of the patriarchal cathedral in Bucharest!

Building on this sharp critique of the church, Ionescu developed a traditionalist religious program, spelled out in a manifesto published in the first issue of *Predania*. Ionescu argued that the Great War generated a genuine religious

renaissance, leading to a profound transformation of individuals as well as communities. In Romania, this renaissance was even stronger than in the rest of the continent, because it allegedly occurred "within the realm of Orthodoxy, the spirit of the time and the genius of the nation."[90] Unfortunately, lamented Ionescu, the leadership of the Orthodox Church was unable to understand and stimulate this impulse of religious renaissance originating "from below." Consequently, the new vigorous religious orientation was promoted mostly by countryside priests and lay intellectuals and touched only to a limited extent "our departments of theology, the official authorities of scientific religion." The result was, claimed Ionescu, a growing gap between the genuine religious life and experience of the population, on the one hand, and the "dry and empty theological literature" produced in Orthodox departments of theology, on the other. Ionescu reproached the official theologians of the Orthodox Church "the incapacity to think and present theological problems in actual contemporary terms." To remedy this situation, Ionescu pleaded for the right of lay persons to mingle in theological matters, arguing that "any member of the church has the right to provide criticism if he actively participates in the life of the Church."[91] Official theologians could, of course, "supervise" this laic interference, but they could not refuse the dialogue and were not entitled to expel laic commenters from religious debating circles.[92]

The principle of lay interference in church affairs and its religious dogma served strategic purposes. The undeclared aim of *Perdana* was to break the official monopoly of the Orthodox Church and its educational institutes over theological matters and to set up an alternative center of religious reflection over the meaning of religion and the mission of the church that would gravitate around the Legionary movement. To this end, the journal had the ambition to function as a counterpart to the official journal of the Holy Synod, *Biserica Ortodoxă Română*. Not incidentally, the content of *Predania* was similarly structured, starting with a leading polemical op-ed, continuing with research articles on crucial religious topics (such as salvation, redemption, a community of love, sacrifice, and sainthood), and ending with an internal chronicle of events and a book-review section.

In order to delegitimize the top leadership of the Orthodox Church, *Predania* closely monitored the actions of top Orthodox hierarchs, pressuring them to join the nationalist camp unconditionally and to synchronize their actions with those of the Legion. The leading programmatic article of the first issue, called "Clarifications," made evident the anti-establishment orientation of the new journal. *Predania* criticized the church leadership harshly, openly accusing it of "laziness" and "stupidity," and of conscious attempts to "modify the Gospels and alter the essence of truth," thus "ending up in substituting lies for truth." The result was an evident rupture between the leadership of the Orthodox Church, on the one hand, and ordinary priests and believers at the grass root level, on the other. To overcome the dialogue of the deaf between these parties, *Predania* took upon itself the task of renewing the Orthodox Church by going

back to the "holy" Byzantine tradition handed over by the Founding Fathers of the Christian Church;[93] and by collaborating closely with the Legion, the only nationalist organization who could adequately capture the new form of religiosity and channel it into a constructive nationalist direction. To this end, the journal tried to reformulate Orthodoxy from the inside out, by redefining the key concepts of martyrdom, sainthood, love, salvation and redemption, through the lenses of, and with the political means of, *Legionarism*.[94] *Predania* also mingled in critical matters regarding the organization of the Orthodox Church.[95] It took the side of former Bessarabian Metropolitan Gurie in his conflict with the Holy Synod, and argued for the regional reorganization of the Orthodox Church in Moldova into a single metropolitan seat, including Bessarabia and Bukovina.[96]

In addition to criticizing the church leadership, *Predania* tried to also delegitimize competing nationalist-religious discourses. The main target was Nichifor Crainic, the former self-declared mentor of the young generation who gradually fell out of favor, being replaced by the engulfing yet also polarizing figure of Ionescu. In a series of polemical articles, Racoveanu went as far as to contest the theological qualifications of Crainic, denouncing him as a false prophet, a "sinister ignorant," and a political impostor who wanted to manipulate the nationalist youth.[97] Other polemical articles criticized both Catholicism and Protestantism (and thus, implicitly, also the political religion of Nazism), and portrayed *Legionarism* as the only genuine political religion of the time, which was in tune with both the authentic Byzantine tradition of Christianity and with the spirit and political imperatives of the time. *Predania*'s ultimate aims were thus to systematize the Legionary faith into a comprehensive religious doctrine by fusing it with Orthodox dogma but also to take over and subordinate the agenda of the Orthodox Church through the active involvement of lay theologians.

The Legion and Regional Cleavages Within the Church: Bessarabia and Transylvania

The religious components of the Legionary discourse attracted numerous Orthodox priests, especially of lower rank. Spanish historian Francisco Veiga estimated that in 1937, of approximately 10,000 Orthodox priests, 2,000 converted to or sympathized with the Legion. This unfounded claim is difficult to verify and appears exaggerated.[98] Although complete and reliable statistics of this kind are missing, partial data confirm, nevertheless, the strong participation of Orthodox priests in the Legion. Thus, according to police reports, the burial of Moţa and Marin was attended by over 500 priests. Moreover, in the general parliamentary elections of November 1937, 33 of the 103 candidates representing "All for the Country" were priests, roughly one-third of the total number.

The Legionary penetration of the Orthodox Church destabilized the church as an institution, exacerbating internal ideological and regional conflicts. While the patriarchy in Bucharest had an ambivalent attitude toward the Legionary action and kept a certain distance, the Orthodox metropolitans in the newly joined

territories were more open to collaborating with the Legion. The most relevant examples in this respect are the alliances between the Legion and Metropolitan Gurie Grosu of Bessarabia, and Metropolitan Nicolae Bălan of Transylvania.

The most significant challenge to the unity of the Orthodox Church was provided by regionalist tendencies of the Bessarabian Church. As shown above, in 1918, upon the union of Bessarabia of Romania, Romanian authorities initiated a campaign of religious union, which resulted in the reintegration of the Orthodox Church of Bessarabia into the Romanian Orthodox Church, followed by the former's elevation to the rank of a metropolitan seat. This administrative union was, however, marked by numerous tensions revolving around issues concerning property, centralization, allocation of resources, the homogenization of the religious ritual, and the introduction of the new Gregorian Calendar. First, Archbishop Anastasie, the head of the Bessarabian Orthodox Church, refused to accept the union with the Romanian Orthodox Church and left for Moscow, being replaced by Nicodim of Huși. Second, the land reform implemented by the Romanian state in Bessarabia in 1920 was a source of grave tension with the Bessarabian clerics. The law expropriated all lands belonging to churches and monasteries exceeding 50 hectares, preserving only small individual plots for the use of the priests. In reaction, the Bessarabian clergy established the Union of the Orthodox Clerics of Bessarabia (*Uniunea Clericilor ortodocși din Basarabia*), and asked for the transfer of all church property to this association, a claim contested by authorities as illegal.

Third, another source of grave tensions was the adoption of the Gregorian Calendar by the Holy Synod of the Romanian Orthodox Church on October 14, 1924. Implemented without preparation, the reform of the calendar met significant regional resistance. An important part of the Bessarabian Church, instigated by the leader of the Union of the Orthodox Clerics of Bessarabia, Iustin St. Frățescu, refused to adopt the new calendar, on the count it was a foreign imposition and a departure from their proper faith[99]; these dissidents were subsequently called *stiliști* (from the *stilul vechi*, i.e., "old style" in rite). The dissent turned into a significant socioreligious movement: in addition to upholding the old calendar, the *stiliști* went as far as to break their ties to the official church, established separate religious hierarchies, and cemeteries, built fortified churches and even created armed guards for self-defense. Following a violent clash with the authorities in July 1934 in Toropești, Vaslui County, the movement radicalized, turning into acts of armed rebellion against state authorities. Territorially, the movement expanded exponentially: it started in Bălți County, Bessarabia, but soon extended in Northern Moldova (in Baia, Neamț, Iași, Vaslui, and Putna), then in the entire Moldova, Bessarabia, and even in the neighboring Dobrudja and Southern Wallachia. *Problema stilistă* became a source of great security concern for the state. A report of Siguranta dated October 29, 1936, argued that the *stiliști* were recruited mostly from the Russian or minority populations, and was agitated by foreign monks financed by the Soviets, who attempted to use religious riots to foster irredentist aims. But the issue was instrumentalized by Romanian

politicians, as well. National Christian Defense League (*Liga Apărării Național-Creștine*, hereafter LANC), in particular, was very active in attracting the *stiliști* within its ranks, by promising a return to the old calendar.[100] In late 1936, following an armed intervention of the authorities resulting in the mass arrestment of the stilist leaders, the movement was largely curtailed. The movement shook the local trust in the Romanian Orthodox Church, however, so that many Bessarabian peasants joined neo-protestant religious sects.[101] The leadership of the Romanian Orthodox Church deplored the escalation of the stilist dissidence and its loss of authority and influence in Bessarabia; inclined to compromise on the issue, the church accused the Romanian state for urging it to implement in haste a law on administrative unification.

In addition to *problema stilistă*, the Romanian Orthodox Church also faced internal resistance for autonomy within the church, from the part of its Bessarabian hierarchs. The symbol of the local resistance against church centralization was Gurie Grosu (1877–1943), a prelate who, after imposing himself as a symbol of Romanian national activism in Moldova in the prewar period, became a symbol of the regional autonomy of the Bessarabian Church in the interwar period. Originating from Bessarabia and educated in Chișinău and Kiev, Gurie took an active part in the Romanian national movement in the Russian-occupied Bessarabia. He militated for the introduction of the Romanian language in the local church, and authored the first books in the Latin script (*abecedar*), to help spread literacy and knowledge of that language. Active in the Romanian National Party, Gurie participated in the first Regional Council (*Sfatul Țării*), also serving as Deputy Minister of Justice in the provisional government of Moldova.[102] In 1919, Gurie—at the time Dean-Bishop (*arhireu-vicar*) of the Metropolitan of Moldova and Suceava serving in Iași, was invested by the Holy Synod as Dean-Bishop of the Archbishopric of Chișinău. In February 1920, Gurie was elected Deputy Archbishop of Chișinău and Hotin by the eparchial congress of Bessarabia. It is important to note that Gurie was not elected by the Great Electoral College of the Old Kingdom; yet he was confirmed by Royal Decree as Titular Archbishop of Chișinău on December 25, 1920. He was invested by King Ferdinand on March 29, and installed by the Primate Metropolitan Miron Cristea on March 16, 1921. The regionalist tendencies of Gurie generated, early on, frictions with the central church leadership and the Romanian authorities. The latent conflict opened in 1923 when, during the investment ceremony of the Bessarabian Bishop of Bălți, Archbishop Gurie insisted that he would read the investment act and not the Iași-based Metropolitan of Moldova, who had that right under the existing administrative organization of the church. "The situation of the Bessarabian Church," noted the newspaper *Unirea*, "has become very upsetting, and it will surely generate additional troubles to the government in the future."[103]

In 1928, after the elevation of the Bessarabian bishopric to the rank of a metropolitan seat, the Orthodox Church organized elections for the new position. The event occasioned a fierce debate between the Bucharest-based patriarchy and the Bessarabian Church. The local priests imposed Gurie Grosu as their

successful candidate, against the will of the Center. The controversy surrounding Gurie's autonomist tendencies erupted right at the ceremony of his installment in the office of metropolitan, since it contained ritual elements influenced by the Russian tradition. Furthermore, in 1930, Gurie openly defied King Carol II—during the latter's visit to Chişinău—on the matter of his incestuous family life, a gesture which further alienated the hierarch from the king and the Bucharest political elite. At the same time, Gurie grew closer to the Legion, also as a way of pressuring the patriarchy to give in to the Bessarabian demands for greater local autonomy. It was telling in this respect that, in September 1936, Gurie officiated the religious service for the fallen soldiers organized by the Legion on the Susai Mountain, near Predeal. Soon afterward, in October 1936, Gurie was accused by the Holy Synod of fraud[104] and asked to resign by the Minister of Cults, Victor Iamandi, a move which most contemporaries saw as a retaliation for his regionalist tendency, his defiance of the king, and his support for the Legion. Gurie denied all official charges and refused to resign, calling the legal action opened by the government against him a "great injustice" and a non-canonical, politically motivated "sociopolitical trial."[105] In his defense, Gurie published a volume of commentaries in which he portrays himself as an innocent victim of centralism at the top, on the one hand, and communist tendencies of Bessarabian clerics at the bottom. Gurie pointed out that, as an institution of the old regime, the Bessarabian church "was particularly hit by the trends of democratization, expropriation, and secularization of the property of public institutions" that took place in Greater Romania. Gurie questioned the fact that the most "profound and radical expropriation and secularization" was implemented in Bessarabia, a reform which alienated many local priests. His critique of the state of affairs in the Romanian Orthodox Church much resembled the Legionary discourse on *politicianism* in Romanian society.[106]

The Legionaries were quick to convey their support for the deposed Gurie: In a letter dated November 12, 1936, Codreanu let Gurie know that "me and the entire Legionary youth are with you" in denouncing the Masonic plot to whom the metropolitan presumably fell victim. In the same vein, General Cantacuzino assured Gurie that Codreanu, who rebelled "for the Cross" and "justice," will work for "straightening" the course of church affairs upon the pending Legionary victory.[107] The Legionaries continued to keep Gurie in high esteem, not only due to the leading position he had held in the church but also because he became a symbol of resistance against the centralizing and pro-Carol policy of Patriarch Cristea. During the Legionary rule, the (suspended) metropolitan officiated the most important Legionary ceremonies, such as the burial of Codreanu and of the Legionary martyrs, in November 1940. Gurie Grosu died in 1943, before his trial was completed.[108]

Another Legionary stronghold in the Orthodox Church emerged within the metropolitan archbishopric of Transylvania. Without displaying the same regionalist tendencies as in Bessarabia, Metropolitan Nicolae Bălan (1882–1955), was also a militant for autonomy and a supporter of the Legion. This attitude was, at times, at odds with the policy of the Bucharest-based Orthodox leadership. As

shown above, in the first post-war decade, Bălan emerged as a staunch defender of the Orthodox Church's internal autonomy and specific interests, his combative attitude being most evident during the parliamentary debates over the Concordat with the Vatican. At the same time, Bălan opposed the full administrative unification of the Romanian Orthodox Church, defending the regional autonomy of the metropolitan archbishopric of Transylvania against the Bucharest-based centralization. Acting in a historical region where the Orthodox Church faced fierce competition for souls from Catholics and Greek-Catholics, but also from neo-protestants, Bălan was in search of political allies to defend Orthodox interests. According to secret service informant reports, although Bălan was personally closer to the National Liberal Party, he used to systematically implant his collaborators in all major political parties of the country, in order to shape their religious politics and to shelter the interests of the church, as well as his own position, in case of political changes.[109]

Bălan's pro-Legionary sympathies were influenced by his friendship with priest Ioan Moța, the father of Ion I. Moța.[110] In 1930, Bălan entrusted the editorship of the newspaper *Lumina Satelor* to Ioan Moța, who was at the time also in charge of *Libertatea*. Moța intended to turn *Lumina Satelor* into a pro-Legionary newspaper. This experiment was short-lived; due to a massive drop in subscriptions, Bălan decided to reinstate the former editor Iosif Trifa, who reportedly had fallen out of favor because of his critical attitude against the Legionary violence.[111]

Throughout the 1930s, Bălan continued to support the Legion's actions. Recognizing its growth potential, Bălan decided to implant a series of young and promising priests in the movement, in an attempt to control the Legion from within but to also shape its attitude toward the church.[112] Bălan supervised the education and career of these youngsters attentively, sponsoring their doctoral studies, their research trips in foreign universities, and then securing them teaching position at the "Andreiana" Orthodox Theological Academy in Sibiu. Soon, Bălan became the backstage patron and sponsor of a dynamic Legionary priestly circle in Sibiu, made up of a sum of bright and particularly well-trained individuals: Dr. Spiridon Cândea (1902–1990), who became the Legionary leader of the Sibiu County; Dr. Nicolae Colan (1893–1967), the Rector of the Theological Academy (1928–1936) who was to become bishop of Vad, Feleac, and Cluj (1936–1957), and later Metropolitan of Transylvania (1957–1967); Prof. Dr. Nicolae Terchilă (1898–1983); Dr. Dumitru Stăniloae (1903–1993), Rector of the Academy (1936–1946); Dr. Nicolae Popovici (1903–1960), bishop of Oradea (1936–1941); Dr. Grigorie Marcu (1911–1987); Dr. Liviu Stan (1910–1973); Teodor Bodogae (1911–1994); Corneliu Sârbu (1913–1979); Dr. Nicolae Mladin (1914–1986), Metropolitan of Transylvania (1967–1981); Gheorghe Șoima (1911–1985); and Dr. Dumitru Călugăr (1907–1988).

The core of the group was made up of four youngsters implanted by Bălan in the Legion: Stan, Cândea, Terchila, and Popovici. At his instigation, all four entered the Legion and were to play an important role in shaping its religious policy. To consolidate the status and prestige of this priestly circle within the

Legion, Bălan offered them two rooms in Hotel Bulevard, in the center of Sibiu, to serve as their seat. He also helped them acquire the Octavian L. Veştemean printing house, led by A Bidinaru, which was to publish important Legionary works in the second half of the 1930s.[113]

Through these intermediaries, Bălan kept a direct channel of communication with the Legion, but could also exercise an indirect influence over it. Also, through Nicolae Terchila—who was married to a German woman—Bălan extended his connection to Nazi Germany, as well, in an attempt to forge direct political ties with Hitler and the Nazi Party, above the head of the Legionaries.[114]

In addition to facilitating the creation of this vivid Legionary network at the Orthodox Theological Academy in Sibiu, Bălan was also instrumental in conferring religious legitimacy to the Legionary campaign of canonizing its "martyrs," bestowing on them an aura of sanctity. Bălan's speech delivered at the burial of Moța and Marin on February 13, 1937, in particular, and the massive *official* participation of clerics to the event, in general, gave a boost to the cooperation between priests and the Legion at the local level. A police report from Dolj communicated that, at a meeting of the Cultural Circle of Orthodox Priests in the commune of Terpezița-Dolj, a religious service was performed for the commemoration of Moța and Marin, who, according to the local priest Domintru Popescu, "died in the service of the Church."[115] The service was attended by approximately 30 Legionaries, who then marched, singing Legionary songs.[116]

During the royal dictatorship, Metropolitan Bălan continued to support the Legion in critical moments of its history, even if he did so more discreetly due to the repressive political climate of the time. According to witness accounts, in 1939, Bălan intervened for the release of the Legionary priests detained at Sadaclia.[117] Under the Legionary rule, Bălan officiated key Legionary ceremonies, such as the birthday celebration of Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu on September 13, the burial of priest Ioan Moța on November 22, 1940, and the commemoration of Moța and Marin in January 1941.

Legionarism and Social Christianism: Bishop Bartolomeu of Râmnicu Noul Severin

Another high-profile ally of the Legion was Bishop Bartolomeu (also spelled Vartolomeiu) Stănescu of Râmnicu Noul Severin, in Southern Romania. His collaboration with the Legionaries was not prompted by interethnic or confessional strife in his ethnically homogeneous bishopric, but by ideological affinities. Bartolomeu studied theology at the University of Bucharest (1897–1901), and law, humanities, and sociology at the Sorbonne under the supervision of Émile Durkheim (1905–1909).[118] During his student years, Bartolomeu distinguished himself as a leading activist, becoming the president of the Society of Theologian Students and vice president of the National Student Organization.[119] During the Great War, he militated for the national unity of the Romanians and promoted the cult of Michael the Brave as a symbol of national unification.

In the course of his studies in Paris, Bartolomeu embraced the doctrine of social Christianism, which—in line with the encyclical *Rerum novarum* ("Rights and Duties of Capital and Labor") issued by Pope Leo XIII in 1890—aimed at applying the principles of Christian ethics to social problems to enhance social justice and reduce oppression and economic inequality. Influenced primarily by French Catholic social reformers such as Léon Harmel, Adrien Albert Marie, Comte de Mun, and François-René de La Tour du Pin Chambly, but also by Durkheim's social theory, Bartolomeu rejected the liberal social contract theory based on individualism in favor of a conservative Christian social theology founded on the principle of solidarity in family, parish, and professional corporations. For Bartolomeu, social Christianism meant the implementation of the social program of the American and French revolutions by clerics, via Christian activism in the realm of civil society.[120] To this end, he endorsed a program of "social regeneration" through emancipation and the emulation of the principle of *imitatio Christi* at individual but also collective levels, leading to the re-Christianization of social and political institutions.[121]

In the post-war period, Bartolomeu engaged in a teaching career as a professor of the New Testament at the University of Bucharest. He also had a fast ascension in the church, holding the offices of Titular Bishop of Argeş (1919–1920) and Titular Bishop (1920–1921) and then full Bishop of Râmnicu Noul Severin (1921–1938). In the 1920s, together with the Orthodox theologians Şerban Ionescu and Vasile Gh. Ispir, Bartolomeu founded the Center for Social-Christian studies (*Centrul de Studii Social-Creştine*), publishing the magazine *Solidarity* (*Solidaritatea*, 1920–1929), to transplant the—mostly Catholic and Protestant—agenda of social Christianism to the social-political context of Orthodox Romania. The circle failed to stir societal interest in their projects or to develop a social movement and became dormant in the late 1920s.[122] However, in the 1930s, Bartolomeu militated for the implementation of the doctrine of social Christianity in his bishopric, where he built "a clerical fortress."[123] He advanced an ambitious agenda of *national* regeneration based on the principles of social Christianity, the autonomy of the church in relation to both the state and political parties, and a new active role of the church in society. To mobilize the clerics in his bishopric in support of his agenda, Bartolomeu organized the "Renaissance" Priestly Association. The Bishop's political orientation was nationalist and anticapitalist, but also anti-syndicalist and antisocialist. He promoted the principle of social solidarity and peasant emancipation through the establishment of rural cooperatives and popular banks.[124] His Christian nationalism became increasingly dominated by xenophobia and nativism: the high cleric openly militated for "the purification of the nation from the foreign element and its complete Christianization."[125] Due to this orientation, Bartolomeu distanced the local Orthodox Church from democratic political parties, instead moving closer to the Legion. This rapprochement became first evident in the early 1930s, when Bartolomeu presided over two Legionary student congresses in Craiova (1932 and 1934).[126] In addition, in 1935 Bartolomeu supported the activity of the Legionary camps in his bishopric and

encouraged local priests to take part in the Legion's activities. Such camps were established at Arnota, where a team of approximately 242 Legionaries cut a road through the mountain from Bistrița Monastery to the Arnota Monastery, from June 8 to September 15; at Drăgășani, where 100 Legionaries manufactured approximately 100,000 bricks for the completion of the local cathedral, from June 3 to August 14; and at the Mamu Monastery, where Legionaries built six levees to prevent the waters of Olt from overflowing, from September 16 to October 4. According to Father Dumitrescu-Borșa, the Secretary of the "All for the Country," Arnota was "the most difficult but most famous" work camp,[127] its prestige being enhanced by the participation of high-profile intellectuals such as Nae Ionescu and Radu Gyr. Dumitrescu-Borșa also highlighted the supportive role played by Bartolomeu in the activity of the Arnota Camp:

> The camp here was in the subsistence of the Diocese of Vâlcea. Bishop Vartolomeiu sent food daily and often came to Bistrița Monastery, and watched the work done by the Legionnaires. We stopped at Vâlcea to pay a visit to the Bishop who sent us to Arnota by a car driven by Father Cristescu, an Episcopal Counselor who was my former colleague at the Seminar and at [the Faculty of] Theology.[128]

Bartolomeu drew closer to the Legion in ideological terms, as well. In the early 1930s, he supported the nationalist publications *Calendarul* and *Cuvântul* financially. Between 1935 and 1938, he published leading articles in pro-Legionary journals such as *Porunca Vremii*. In early 1937, he officiated at the burial of Moța and Marin and delivered a public lecture on "Science and Faith" in the high-profile series of speeches organized by Trifa at the St. Anton Church in Bucharest. It should be noted, however, that, although Bartolomeu's authoritarian, antidemocratic, and nationalist agenda of social Christianism had many things in common with the Legionary doctrine, the two were not fully compatible with each other. It is telling in this respect that, while supporting the Legionary activities, Bartolomeu was not a "regular" Legionary member. Instead of unconditionally supporting the Legion, he rather attempted to channel the Legionary activity toward his church-based agenda of social Christianism: "I do not want to know who has organized you, who is your Captain and what plans you have. Elevate yourselves and your Captain and tie yourselves to the Church of Christ, no matter what your name is: Guard, Legion, etc."[129] On their turn, leading Legionary ideologues, such as Marin, reproached Bartolomeu and the other major church allies of the Legion that they fell short of full attachment to the movement: "everywhere, Orthodox shepherds such as Vartolomeu or Visarion, Gurie or Nicodim found no words of praise for the work and creative virtues of these young people [the Legionnaires who worked in the camps]."[130] These shadows in bilateral collaboration explain why, although the Legionaries kept Bartolomeu in high esteem, they did not organize a campaign of support when the Bishop was forced to retire from his seat in 1938 and did not insist on his reinstatement in October 1940.

The Church and Anti-Legionary Repression, 1938–1940

The cumulative departures from democracy that started in 1937 greatly affected the Orthodox Church, elevating its status and active role in politics. This change was already evident after the advent to power of the National Christian Party, in December 1937. In his first programmatic speech, Prime Minister Octavian Goga affirmed his belief in "the spiritual rebirth of Romanianism by way of the mysteries and lights of the Christian Church."[131] In the same vein, Ion Lupaş, the new Sub-secretary of State in the Ministry of Cults, issued a proclamation announcing a new era of close cooperation between church and state.[132] He revealed the government's intention "to set the foundation of the Romanian state on the spiritual principle of Christianity," to organize "a combative priestly body, as an essential factor in the organization of the State," and to invest the church with the role of a supreme moral authority in society, in accordance to its "permanent, creative and purifying mission."[133] Patriarch Cristea responded favorably to this program, viewing it as "a new and totally distinct step [in the relation between church and state], in a pronouncedly Christian spirit."[134] He expressed his hopes that Romania will revert to its medieval traditions, "when the ethnic Romanianism of our people [.] was interwoven with the faith of the ancestral Church."[135] To highlight the ideological affinities between the orientation of the patriarch and the Goga-Cuza government, a publication of the Orthodox Church republished the former's earlier statements on the Jewish question, which asserted Romania's right "to get rid of this threat, as of all parasites."[136]

The program of the National Christian Party was not put into practice due to the fast demise of the new government. Yet, the Orthodox Church's involvement in politics was to reach its peak during Carol's dictatorship, with the church acting as a pillar of the new regime. The king placed the church at the forefront of his campaign to de-legitimize and neutralize the Legion, employing a combination of coercive and symbolic-ideological measures. First, Carol II adopted firm measures to "depoliticize" the church, which meant to de-fascitize it. To this end, the new Constitution forbade "priests of every religious rite and denomination to put their spiritual authority in the service of political propaganda, both in churches and in official buildings, or outside them."[137] The constitution also forbade "political propaganda in churches or at religious manifestations." Second, to prevent the further formation of charismatic bonds, the Constitution interdicted any form of authority outside of the legal framework of the state to take or demand an oath of allegiance. [138]

Third, aware that the Legionaries continued to be bound by Codreanu's oath-taking authority even after the Legion was formally disbanded, the authorities urged additional measures to break up the charismatic Legionary community. To speed up the practical implementation of the new constitutional stipulations on religious life, on February 22, 1938, the patriarch convoked an early session of the Holy Synod, pointing out to the need to depoliticize the church, in view of the fact that "the political parties, which were over twenty in number, lured

the priests, transforming them from servants of the shrine in agents of political clubs."[139] In his opening address to the Synod, the Minister of Cults, V. Iamandi reiterated the vital role the church had to play in "the action to depoliticize the country and strengthen the state."[140] Iamandi identified as the most urgent task of the church the act of undoing charismatic oaths of allegiance, arguing that "the abuses of oath-taking practices lead to a malformation of the collective soul."[141]

The Holy Synod was quick to accommodate these demands, officially asking all priests and church singers to resign from political parties, to refrain from political involvement, and to refuse to officiate oath-taking ceremonies of political parties or movements.[142] In the hope of undermining the charismatic basis of the Legionaries' long-lasting loyalty to Codreanu, the Synod tried to undo the political oaths taken by the Legion, as well. The first initiative in this respect had already been taken on April 15, 1937. Under the strong impression produced by the collective oath taken by the Legionaries on the grave of Moța and Marin in March that year, the Ministry of Interior expressly asked Patriarch Cristea to assist the state in the implementation of the new "Carol II" Penal Code (adopted in 1936 and valid from January 1, 1937, onward), which forbade "private" oath-taking ceremonies "in the service of certain political faiths."[143] An initial response delivered by I. Mihălcescu, the Vicar of the Orthodox Patriarchy, assured the Minister that the church had the willingness but also the right to revoke all non-official political oaths, as they were both illegal and non-canonical.[144] An official response of the Holy Synod signed by the Patriarch Cristea dated May 14, 1937, modified this position, however.[145] The Synod confirmed that the church could indeed assist individuals in their endeavor to remove previous oaths taken in the presence of a priest, but only with the consent and at the express request of the respective individuals. A unilateral, collective revocation of an oath would resemble the Papal absolutions of the Middle Ages, which had no precedent in the Orthodox Church. The Synod also pointed out that "the Church has neither a specific ritual nor other stipulations for *general* ceremonies of oaths undoing." The root of the problem was the high demand for oath-taking ceremonies by political organizations, so that "poor priests are no more than simple instruments" of these harmful practices. The church also openly condemned paramilitarism: "We cannot understand what scope can serve so many quasi-armies of larger parties. A single army is legal: of the country and the King, where the youth grows in a unitary patriotic spirit."[146] Under the royal dictatorship, the church reconsidered its position on the issue: the Holy Synod finally decided to organize a religious service on the Day of the Orthodoxy (March 13, 1938), during which the patriarch proclaimed, in a pastoral letter read throughout the country, the revocation of all oaths of allegiance taken for various political faiths, outside of the established laws of the church and the country.[147] In doing so, the patriarch employed his earthly, state authority as prime minister to force the Legionaries to attend the religious service, but also his religious-charismatic authority to undo non-canonical oaths. As earlier evidenced by the Holy Synod, the practice was not fully canonical, however, since it was done

collectively rather than individually and against the will of the sworn persons. According to archival reports, many Legionaries were forced, throughout the country, to attend the religious service, but some left the church before the oath-undoing ceremony was performed since they regarded themselves as still bound to Codreanu's charismatic authority. So did the Legionaries in Câmpina, for example, at the instigation of Codreanu's personal secretary, who reminded them of the oath they took on Moța and Marin's burial.[148]

The constitutional provisions and actions of the Holy Synod were further expanded by the new law for the defense of the existing state order, passed in April 1938.[149] This law reiterated the interdiction on political propaganda in churches or educational institutions; violation of these rules were punished with huge fines or prison from six months to one year. To eradicate the Legionary faith, the authorities disbanded all associations who were even remotely politically or ideologically related to the Legion, even if they were non-political. The law thus forbade all alternative (and non-official) political and religious organizations and doctrines (Art. 3), as well as all forms of public mobilization on an ethnoreligious basis (Art. 15).[150] In addition, Art. 39 of the law allowed the Ministry of the Interior to place under forced domicile all persons proven dangerous for the state order and safety, for a period between six months to one year.[151] That stipulation was used by the government to intern Legionaries in camps without a trial (including many priests), following a simplified legal procedure. After a temporary stay in various detention points, Legionary priests were transferred in a special camp at the hermitage of Sadaclia, in Tighina Country, Bessarabia, built by the former Metropolitan of Bessarabia, Gurie Grosu. The choice of the hermitage was undoubtedly not a coincidence, but was meant to de-sacralise Gurie's foundation and to underscore the fact that the priests who sided with the Legion placed themselves outside the church. The purge of the Legionary priests was followed by disciplinary measures taken against higher prelates who sided with the Legion. The most important of them was Bishop Bartolomeu Stănescu of Râmnicu Noul Severin. In 1937, Bartolomeu was convened to Bucharest by the Minister of the Interior to account for his collaboration with the Legion. In addition, his bishopric was subject to thorough church and ministerial inspections, while his conflicts with local prelates degenerated in several lengthy trials. Official pressure against the Bishop intensified during the royal dictatorship. Bartolomeu could escape punishment only by repenting publicly, in a pastoral letter, for his collaboration with the Legion.[152] In the same letter, he warned the believers in his bishopric to stay away from the Monasteries of Tismana and Cozia, where the Legionaries were interned, otherwise risking "the harshest punishment the Public Power can apply."[153] His open support for Carol II's personal regime could not dissuade the mounting contestations from the Holy Synod and rival prelates. To appease these tensions, on November 1, 1938, Bartolomeu requested a two-year leave of absence for medical reasons, followed by his official retirement from the bishop seat at the end of that period, in November 1940.

After Patriarch Cristea passed away in 1939, his successor Nicodim continued Cristea's policy of close collaboration with the king on an anti-Legionary platform. Nicodim's attitude might come as a surprise, considering that the new patriarch originated from the Neamț County, which was traditionally a stronghold of Legionary support. Moreover, before World War I, Nicodim collaborated closely with Ion Zelea-Codreanu to stir national mobilization in Bukovina and Bessarabia by sending books on Romanian history to these provinces.[154] However, Nicodim's political orientation drew him closer to LANC and the National Christian Party rather than the Legion, the relation with the latter being therefore quite tense. The rift was further enlarged in September 1939, when Nicodim condemned the assassination of Prime Minister Călinescu by the Legionaries vehemently, denouncing it as "a crime against the State, against the Fatherland, and the nation."[155] Although the assassins were executed in the public square without trial, the patriarch approved their punishment, pointing out that as an anti-Christian act, the assassination of the prime minister was a "heavy sin," which could be forgiven neither by humans nor by God. In apologetic words, Nicodim praised Călinescu as a patriot, a servant of the throne, and a "martyr of duty" to the state. In contrast, he stigmatized the assassins as sub-humans: "He who commits such a crime is lower than the most embittered beast."[156] The patriarch's categorical condemnation of the Legionary terrorism openly contradicted the Legion's claims of Christian martyrdom and sanctification of its "vengeful warriors."

Although apparently efficient in neutralizing the Legion, the actions of the church widened instead of healing the gap between itself and the radicalized priests. The case of priest Ilie Imbrescu is revealing in this respect. Imbrescu studied theology in Cernăuți/Czernowitz (BA) and Bucharest (Ph.D. candidate). In 1934, he was ordained a priest in the historical province of Dobrudja, where he made an assiduous Legionary propaganda. On April 17, 1938, during the royal dictatorship, Imbrescu was first placed under arrested at his domicile in Balcic and then interned at a camp in Miercurea Ciuc. On August 10, 1938, Imbrescu sent a virulent letter of protest to the Holy Synod, asking it to be judged under the canonical laws of the church. He also accused Patriarch Cristea of betraying the church and the religious cannons by assuming the function of prime minister and by allowing repression against the Legionary priests.

Soon, Imbrescu was transferred to Sadaclia, where he was interned together with another 33 Legionary priests. On December 2, 1938, following Codreanu's death, Imbrescu, together with the other priests, addressed a collective memoir to the Ministry of the Interior asking for amnesty, stating that they were now determined "to give Caesar what belongs to Caesar," and to place themselves under the authority of Carol II. Soon, the priests were conditionally freed, following an intervention in their favor by Bălan, the metropolitan of Transylvania. On December 7, the priests were asked to sign a declaration stating, on their "word of honor as priests and human beings," that they "dissociated" themselves from "Codreanu, the Legion and the members of the All for the Country," and considered null and void their oath toward the movement and its leader.[157] The

priests also pledged to obey the laws of the country, fulfill all their duties, and enroll in the party created by Carol II, the Front of National Rebirth.

Both the official gesture and the priests' request were made under the impact of Codreanu's death in November 1938. The authorities believed that the death of the charismatic leader created a window of opportunity for the final dismemberment of the charismatic community. That was, however, not the case, as Imbrescu abjured his convictions only formally, animated by tactical considerations. His book called *Biserica şi Mişcarea Legionară* (The Church and the Legionary Movement)—written in 1939 but, due to censorship, published only in November 1940, under the National Legionary Regime—illustrates, in a highly personalized manner, the syncretism between Orthodoxy and the Legionary faith, promoted by Legionary priests. Imbrescu advanced an all-encompassing theological interpretation of the charismatic Legionary nationalism, based on the principles of love and divine revelation. In his view, the Legionary totalitarian state was to be a new form of organization, harmoniously combining nationalism with Orthodoxy and thus attaining a state of "national ecumenicity," "revealed to the Captain by the Holy Spirit."[158] The Legionary state of the Romanian Christianity was "the political expression of Orthodoxy;" its goal was the resurrection of the nation. The Romanians' divine mission was that of implementing the ideal of *Orthodox nationalism*, first in Romania, and then in the entire world. Through the Captain's action, the Romanian people was to become a precursor of a new historical era, a Theologian people, in the service of the cross. As Saint John the Baptist was the precursor of Jesus Christ, so the Romanian people "is the nation that fulfills the role of the precursor of the new era of the unity of people."[159] This religious vision of national messianism was coupled with a vitriolic critique of the leadership of the Romanian Orthodox Church and of its Patriarch, Miron Cristea, portrayed as Judas and agents of Lucifer, rather than divine agents of regeneration.

Imbrescu's creed animated his subsequent political action. Although during the royal dictatorship, Imbrescu formally renounced his Legionary affiliation, during the Legion's short rule he resumed his political activity, promoting an institutional reform of the Orthodox Church within the Ministry of Education, Religious Cults, and Arts.

The Church under the National Legionary State: September 1940–January 1941

The proclamation of the National Legionary State on September 14, 1940, set the relationship between the Legion and the Romanian Orthodox Church on a new basis. Once in power, the Legion could employ state instruments to officially co-opt the church in the dissemination of its political faith, with the aim of converting the masses through fascist rites and rituals enacted in grandiose ceremonies. The Legion was in a position to use its direct control over the Ministry of Religious Cults to try to reform the Orthodox Church, in order to force it to fully assume the political role assigned to it in the new regime.

In view of the multiple ideological affinities between the church and the Legion and the massive participation of clerics to its previous activities, one might have expected an apotheosis of the collaboration between the two parties. On the one hand, in its first public proclamations, the National Legionary State defined itself as a Christian state, and emphasized the important symbolic-ideological role the church was to play in the organization of the new regime. On the other hand, numerous priests and theologians hailed the Legion's rule as "the victory of Christ" in politics. The professor of theology Ioan Gheorghe Savin, for example, a cleric who had been for a long time a close collaborator of Octavian Goga and of the National Christian Party, criticized the former democratic regime for its sectarian party politics and praised "the totalitarian politics of the Christian state," as the most suitable organization of society, facilitating national redemption."[160]

> The right and heroic solution has been the purification, through re-Christianization, of the political struggle. That was done through the full victory of Christian nationalism in the Legionnaire Romania of today. Among the four European countries where totalitarian nationalism prevailed, that of Romania is the most profoundly Christian. This feature is possibly the most characteristic, authentic, and Romanian-specific one. Our ancestral Church can be reassured today: Christ is again in control of our destinies, in this and the other world. Restored to its true vocation, the political battle has become once again sacrifice for the people and sacrifice for faith. To this policy, our Church and her servants cannot refuse its adhesion and trust.[161]

Despite these apparently favorable auspices, the policy of the Legion in the religious field was marred by lack of coherence and internal factional confrontations, institutional tensions with the Orthodox Church, and numerous political, administrative, and budgetary constraints. First, Romania's territorial losses in the summer of 1940 provoked administrative disorganization, and a significant refugee crisis that affected the church personnel, as well. Second, due to budgetary problems, the Ministry of Religious Cults and Arts was merged with the Ministry of Education and Public Instructions into a heterogeneous Ministry of National Education, Cults, and Arts. This ad hoc fusion affected the coherence of the Legion's religious policy, the downscaled Department of Religious Cults lacking administrative means to embark on major reforms.

Third, after the death of Nae Ionescu, the influence of the *Predania* group diminished, leading to factional competition within the Legion. The new Ministry of National Education, Cults and Arts was led by Prof. Traian Brăileanu from Cernăuți, seconded by the Transylvanian sociologist Traian Herseni. A former assistant professor at the University of Bucharest, in the mid-1930s Herseni developed overtly fascist and racist views. For this reason, he parted ways with the Institute of Romanian Sociology led by Dimitrie Gusti and drew closer to the Bukovinian sociological circle led by Brăileanu. In addition to this Bukovinian nucleus, the religious policy of the new regime was mainly shaped by Sima's close

collaborators, the Secretary-General of the Legion, Nicolae Petrașcu, and his deputy, priest Vasile Boldeanu, joined later by members of the Sibiu Legionary theologian circle assembled by Bălan.

The links between these individuals was forged in time by personal ties and various forms of collaboration. Horia Sima and Nicolae Petrașcu both originated from Făgăraș, and studied together at the local Negru Vodă Secondary School, which at that time served as an important source of activists for the Legion. Petrașcu entered the Legion in 1928, after graduating the Faculty of Law at the University of Cluj. In 1935, he was appointed Legionary chief of the Sibiu County and, in that capacity, worked closely with the local circle of Legionary priests patronised by Bălan. Born on November 24, 1902, in Risipiți, Focșani County, Vasile Boldeanu graduated from the St. Apostle Andrei Theology Seminar in Galați and the Faculty of Theology in Bucharest. After completing his studies, Boldeanu returned to his native region and served as a priest in Focșani. Boldeanu entered the Legion in 1927 and conducted laborious publishing and proselytizing activities. His dedicated activism assured the priest a remarkable accession in the organization, being advanced to Legionary commandant in 1933, chief of the Putna Legionary Region, and later chief of the Muntenia Region. Through an active proselytizing campaign, Boldeanu worked toward entangling the Legion with the Orthodox Church: in 1936, Boldeanu established an Orthodox religious association in Focșani, which served as "a camouflage of the 'All for the Country' Party," and "made exclusive propaganda to the Legion."[162] In 1938, soon after the establishment of the royal dictatorship, Boldeanu was detained at Miercurea Ciuc, where he built friendship ties with Horia Sima and his entourage. Due to these ties, during the Legionary rule, Boldeanu was appointed commandant of the Bucharest organization and Deputy Secretary-General of the Legion, working closely with Petrașcu. He also obtained his transfer as a priest to St. Voievozi Church in Bucharest. Boldeanu was not only a leading doctrinaire of the Legionary faith, but also a radical activist, as well: reports of the secret police characterized the priest as "a blood-ferocious temper, recognized as such among the Legionnaires." On September 4, 1940, Boldeanu participated in the violent protests against Carol II at the Royal Palace in Bucharest, a secret service report accusing him of pointing a revolver at the palace guards. He was also part of a Legionary squad who tried to assassinate Carol while the former king was existing Romania by train.[163] Boldeanu was also to play an important role in the preparation of the Legionary Rebellion in January 1941.[164] For his violent activities, the priest was arrested in 1933, 1938, and again in 1941.[165]

The first appointed Legionary State Sub-secretary for Religious Affairs was the archaeologist Vladimir Dumitrescu. At first sight, his designation in the detriment of his direct counter-candidate, priest Ion Dumitrescu-Borșa, seemed odd, to say the least. Dumitrescu-Borșa had earned a state of high prestige within the Legion, as one of the oldest and most devoted Legionary commandants, former Secretary-General of the "All for the Country" Party, and a member of the Legionary team which fought in Spain, decorated with the highest Legionary

medal, the "White Cross."[166] In contrast, although Vladimir Dumitrescu was among the few leading Legionaries who had accumulated experience in the state administration, he was nevertheless an … atheist and an adept of the total separation of the Orthodox Church from the Romanian State and its transformation into a public institution. To be sure, Dumitrescu regarded nationalism as a religious faith, and militated for a national revolution leading to the establishment of a totalitarian state, but regarded the church as no more than a public institution among others.[167] Dumitrescu's designation was, in fact, indicative of the factional disputes within the Legion: the archeologist was a close collaborator of Horia Sima (serving for a short while as Sima's chief of cabinet in August 1940), while his counter-candidate, Dumitrescu-Borșa was an opponent of Sima and a supporter of the rival faction grouped around Ion Zelea-Codreanu (for this reason being later on excluded from the Legion).[168]

The gray eminence behind the Legionary religious policy was Liviu Stan, an intimate, long-term collaborator of Nicolae Bălan from the Sibiu theological circle. Born on June 11, 1910, in the village of Socet, Timișoara County, Stan studied theology in Cernăuți, earning his B.A. in 1932 and his Ph.D. in 1936. With Bălan's help, Stan underwent long periods of research and study in Athens (1932–1934), Warsaw (1934–1935), and Rome (1935–1937). Upon his return to Romania, Stan engaged in a teaching career at the Orthodox Theological Academy in Sibiu. Under Bălan's patronage, Stan climbed fast the academic ladder, becoming a full professor in 1941. His elite academic training, brilliant intellectual qualities and knowledge of ten languages, enabled Stan to impose himself as a leading expert in Orthodox theology, authoring seminal works on canonical matters.[169]

Described by secret service sources as an "ardent nationalist," Stan engaged in radical politics, joining the Legion at Metropolitan Bălan's express request.[170] According to Stan's autobiographical account written for the internal use of the Securitate, the Sibiu professor entered the Legion in October 1937 and participated actively in the 1937 electoral campaign of the "All for the Country" Party.[171] Upon the establishment of the royal dictatorship in February 1938, Stan left the Legion temporarily, at the insistence of Bălan, who did not want to jeopardize the future career of his close collaborator. Stan returned to the Legion in September 1940 and conducted an intense activity during the Legionary rule. Although he was a simple party member—who did not even attain the rank of a full Legionary, granted as a rule after a three-year service in the Legion—Stan was instrumental in recruiting approximately 40 to 50 new members into the Legion among students and intellectuals in Sibiu.[172] In October 1940, Stan was brought to Bucharest by the Secretary-General Petrașcu and appointed general director (class one) in the Sub-Department of Religious Cults, professor at the Theological Academy in Bucharest, and chief of the Legion's debating circle on Orthodox theology and Legionary doctrine.[173] Enjoying the trust and appreciation of Horia Sima, and of his secretary Boldeanu, Stan was to play a crucial role in shaping the Legion's policy on religious matters, elaborating its new

bills on religious cults.[174] To consolidate the influence of the Sibiu group within the Legion, Stan brought to Bucharest other close collaborators, such as Dr. Dumitru Stăniloaie, appointing him president of the Commission for the revision of Orthodox theological academies, in order to harmonize them with the new would-be legal-political structure of the National Legionary State.[175]

Fourth, the relationship between the Legion and church was marred, from the very beginning, by tensions and suspicion. The most significant stumbling block in their collaboration was the recent history of antagonism under the royal dictatorship. The Legionaries had accumulated many grievances against the top leadership of the church, considered co-responsible for the repression against the Legion, a campaign which, as we have seen above, was fully endorsed by Patriarchs Cristea and then by Nicodim. This conflictual legacy hampered cooperation, Patriarch Nicodim fearing an arbitrary involvement of the Legion in church affairs upon the latter's advent to power. Although the church was quick formally to endorse the National Legionary State established in September 1940, pledging institutional collaboration, high church hierarchs leaned, in fact, more toward the monarchy and General Antonescu than toward the Legion. With few but notable exceptions, such as the Metropolitan of Bukovina Titu Simedrea and the Bishop of Roman Lucian Triteanu, regarded as allies of the Legion,[176] the high church prelates, led by Nicodim, continued to regard the Legion's actions with reservation.

Patriarch Nicodim's concerns seemed justified, soon after taking power the Legion announcing plans of "reforming" the Orthodox Church. The "Church Question," as it was euphemistically called, figured prominently on the governmental agenda. On September 18, 1940, at the very first meeting of the Council of Ministers, General Antonescu and the Minister of National Education, Cults, and Arts, Traian Brăileanu, were firm in condemning the state of affairs in the Orthodox Church, the former claiming that, although the masses were naturally religiously inclined, "they lost their faith due to the priests."[177] Antonescu pointed out to the need for a general reorganization of the church by the patriarchy, following general principles that were to be issued by the Council of Ministers. He singled out "the vast problem of priests, of their salaries, and means of existence" as a primary focus of future church reforms. Finally, Antonescu was also for the eradication of foreign cults and sects as part of the process of building a strong Romanian Church.

The Legion was more radical in its criticism, the Legionary press asking openly for the resignation of the patriarch, the rehabilitation of Legionary priests, and the institutional reorganization of the church. The different views of the two political partners became soon evident: The General criticized the Legion's press campaign as too violent. He condemned the sustained Legionary attacks against Nicodim, warning that "the destruction of the prestige of the patriarch" would shake the very foundations of the church as an institution.[178] Pleading for "a controlled press in a controlled state," the general demanded the Legionary press to put an end to its "debauchery."[179]

The church was quick to react to the Legionary attack. In a pre-emptive strike meant to neutralize the political offensive of the Legion, on September 30, Patriarch Nicodim sent an open letter to General Antonescu, as the head of the state, advancing the church's own views on its internal reformation, in 21 points.[180] Nicodim warned the General that "the organization of the Church is one of the most sensitive and most difficult to achieve," and should be therefore done with care. He also insisted that the church be part of the political process, since there cannot be proper organization of the Orthodox Church "without the Church" itself. Nicodim demanded General Antonescu to send his reform proposals in a written form in order to allow the church to examine their canonicity. In a highly reverent and conciliatory answer, General Antonescu declined his own competence in church affairs; he also pointed out that, in his own view, the existing legislation was adequate, and that "the Romanian state of the day had full trust in the Church of the Nation."[181]

In contrast to Antonescu's conciliatory attitude, the Legion did not abandon its plans of reorganizing the church. The opportunity for the adoption of these policies was provided by the new session of the Holy Synod that opened on December 4, 1940. In addition to the high church hierarchs who composed the majority of the Synod, the session was attended by Minister Brăileanu[182] and the State Sub-secretary Vladimir Dumitrescu, who both represented the political viewpoint of the Legion. The dissonance between the positions of the two parties was visible from the very beginning. In his opening speeches, Patriarch Nicodim deplored the territorial losses suffered by Romania in 1940 and expressed his hope that the Romanian lands will be reunited again, with divine help. In two other distinct speeches, Nicodim wished Michael I a long rule and the fortune of reuniting Romania for eternity, following a path even more glorious than that of Michael the Brave and Ferdinand I; he also assured General Antonescu that "the Church, with its prayers and specific powers, is with you and with the government of the country."[183] Significantly, no mention was made in the patriarch's speeches of the Legion and its role in the new regime. In contrast, Brăileanu's speech was centered on the profound changes envisioned by the Legion in the political life of the country, and on the need to achieve a "closer relationship between the state and the church."[184] Brăileanu pointed out that the Legion, legitimized by its numerous blood sacrifices, provided the foundation of the new political order. He insisted that the Legionary idea of self-sacrifice for faith should serve as the foundation of the Orthodox Church and of Romania's spiritual life, in general.[185] To assist the church in reaching that end, Brăileanu presented the Holy Synod a reform program made up of 30 points, and asked the Synod to give them immediate and thorough consideration.[186] The Legionary press published regular reports on the works of the Holy Synod and the progress reached. Signed by major Legionary priests, these critical reports were meant to pressure the Orthodox leadership to comply with the Legionary requests. Thus, an article by Racoveanu published in *Cuvântul* spelled out the message conveyed in Brăileanu's speech, by arguing that, under

the new political order, the Legion was determined to "walk hand in hand with the Church for reaching their common goals: healing the nation."[187] Despite this harmony of interests at the declarative level, the tone of Racoveanu's article was, in fact, imperious: "From the part of the Church, *it is expected* to be a difficult activity, full of redeeming results." In order to successfully implement a thorough "church reform," "the leadership of the Church *will have to take* a series of measures able to turn the much-proclaimed idea of a *living church* into reality." In resolute terms, Racoveanu informed the public that "the National Legionary State *expects* from the Church of Christ the fulfillment of its duty." He made it clear that the Legion "*calls the church* to the work of organizing the religious life of the nation." Although no explicit criticism was voiced against the Orthodox leadership, Racoveanu's statement about the organic communion between the "genuine Church" of the Saint Fathers and Codreanu's charismatic vision, as well as his call to remove distorted laws and return to the canonic tradition, revealed the underlying tensions between the Legion and the church leadership.

Political pressure on the Holy Synod seemed to yield fast results. The Synod accommodated most governmental demands concerning the rehabilitation of the Legionary priests, the reform of Orthodox monasteries, the alteration of the norms of appointment and transfer of priests, the destitution of church officials appointed "illegally" under the royal dictatorship, the reorganization of eparchies and the establishment of new ones, and the re-establishment of the Bishopric of Râmnicu Sărat (which had been abolished due to its pro-Legionary stance).[188] The Synod also agreed to revisit the system of remuneration of priests and to forbid them to officiate funeral services for those cremated on the count that the practice of cremation was non-Christian.[189] Another significant concession to the government was the church's pledge to cancel, by April 23, 1941, all rental contracts signed with Jewish individuals or companies. By these acts, the Orthodox Church reinstated and also consecrated the Legionary presence within the church, since these reforms made the removal of undesirable priests more difficult. The church also aligned itself with the antisemitic campaign of the government.[190] While accommodating these demands, the Synod rejected in exchange calls for the modification of the law on the organization of the church, a reform which was considered not only unnecessary but also potentially as breaching the principle of church autonomy.[191]

The fast closing of the works of the Holy Synod did not bring the debate over the reformation of the church to an end. To prevent a further attack of the Legion on the Statute of the Orthodox Church, Patriarch Nicodim sent General Antonescu another pre-emptive letter in which he detailed the church position over the desired modifications to the organic law governing its Statute.[192] The letter was soon answered in a polemical article by Gheorghe Racoveanu. Cunningly, Racoveanu welcomed the patriarch's proposals as an acknowledgment of the need to modify the statute (which would have provided the Legion the opportunity to impose its own changes). Pleading for an urgent reform of the church, Racoveanu accused the church leadership of utilizing the principle of

respect for traditions and religious cannons as a mere pretext to prevent change. Nevertheless, although he faced a mounting political pressure, also manifest in a hostile press campaign, the patriarch refused to comply with the most radical Legionary demands, preferring instead to leave the scene. According to Dumitrescu, the Sub-secretary of State for Religious Cults, Nicodim advanced his resignation on three different occasions during the short Legionary rule.[193] The first two times, General Antonescu refused to endorse it, but on the third occasion, he finished by accepting Nicodim's resignation as inevitable, instructing Minister Brăileanu to identify an interim solution until the election of a new patriarch. In less than a week, however, the Legion fell from power. This political change eliminated the political pressure over the church, so that Nicodim managed to keep his office until his death in 1948.

While the church leadership thus kept a certain distance from the Legion, there is evidence that the middle and lower ranks of the Orthodox Church *collaborated* extensively and willingly with the Legionary propaganda machinery. Legionary priests propagated a distinct discourse within the Legion, defining it as a movement of religious renewal engaged in a "Christian and not a political struggle." Their discourse was an integral part of the campaign for the creation of the new man, even if the behavioral model propagated by the Orthodox priests was overtly religious:

> We need a new soul, a new man, as our Lord Jesus wants it. The entire work of the Legion acts upon the soul. The Captain found the roots of evil in the soul and started with the Legion the action of healing. […] The cleansing and renewal of the soul to elevate the man to its human condition, is the target of the Legionary fight. This is a Christian and not a political fight! At the foundation of these struggles lay so many glorious sacrifices, as those of the ancient saints and martyrs. Who does not wage this battle against himself, for the purification and renewal of his soul that cannot be a Legionary.[194]

Another key instance of collaboration is the participation of Orthodox priests to the Legionary funeral ceremonies, culminating with the burial of Codreanu. Yet the highest echelon of the church did not take part in these ceremonies. The reserved attitude of the Orthodox Church leadership is not surprising if we consider that, as a successor and continuator of Patriarch Miron Cristea, Patriarch Nicodim had openly condemned the terrorist assassinations committed by the Legion in 1939. The patriarch reluctantly cohabited with the Legion during its short rule. In January 1941, however, he was quick to condemn the Legionary rebellion as a blasphemy, "the temptation of the evil" rather than as a righteous path to salvation. In public letters of support, Patriarch Nicodim, as well as the Metropolitan Bălan expressed the church's adherence to Antonescu's rule. Nicodim celebrated the demise of the Legion from power and its political elimination as a patriotic act, and went as far as to proclaim General Antonescu as the real messiah and the genuine instrument of Archangel Michael's plans for Romanians' protection and divine mission. In his response, General Antonescu reiterated the paramount role

the church was to play in the (re-)education of the youth to the "real" patriotic values and in spreading the values of patriotism and sacrifice for the fatherland among Romanian soldiers.[195] To signal the new era of collaboration, General Antonescu nominated as Sub-secretary of State in the Ministry of Cults, Arts, and Public Instruction Prof. Ion Sandu, a graduate of the Orthodox Theological Academy in Sibiu, who was a close collaborator of the church.[196]

Under the new, reshuffled Antonescu regime, the church thus continued to play a paramount role in the process of sacralizing politics, centered on the fight for national union, the cult of the fallen soldiers, and the idea of blood sacrifice for the fatherland. This campaign emulated the prewar patterns of sacralizing politics, having at its forefront the historical figure of Michael the Brave, the unifier. The main difference was the fact that the role of the monarchy as an instrument of salvation was diminished in favor of Antonescu's charismatic claims. The ideological role of the church was further enhanced after Romania joined the war against the Soviet Union in June 1941, officially dubbed a "crusade against communism." To legitimize his actions, General Antonescu intensified his charismatic claims, arrogating the role of bringing national salvation to the Romanians at a difficult moment in their history: "In a year *I raised the cross of Golgotha toward salvation*, liberating the Eastern lands. We should be able to follow, with the same strength, the command of history,"[197] stated the General in a self-congratulatory proclamation following the approval of his policies in a national plebiscite organized at the celebration of one year of rule. The Orthodox Church was at the forefront of the government's effort to re-Christianize the territories in the east, by fighting "Judeo-Bolshevism," building new churches, and "domesticating" the inhabitants in the occupied territories.[198]

While favoring the involvement of the church in the official regime propaganda, General Antonescu took concerted measures to reinforce the state monopoly over cultural politics. In October 1941, the General placed the erection of monuments under the express control of the Minister of Culture and Religious Cults.[199] In addition, to prevent the exploitation of dead bodies for political purposes, on November 21, 1942, the Minister of National Defense ruled that it is "strictly forbidden" to organize exhumations or to transfer graves without the approval of the National Association for the "Cult of the Heroes." The Association was also obliged to proceed to the identification and proper veneration of unknown graves or corpses of soldiers dead in the Great War.[200]

Conclusions

The intimacy and cooperation but also the divergences between the Orthodox establishment and the Legion, highlighted in this chapter, are not surprising. Despite their temporary and uneasy cohabitation, the Legion and the Orthodox Church remained two distinct communities of salvation, informed by two related yet ultimately conflicting doctrines. Although its message of theological inspiration attracted numerous lower-rank prelates, from the point of view of the

established church, the Legion was ultimately a heretical movement. Building on the long tradition of Romantic palingenetic nationalism and historicism, but also incorporating contemporary fascist references, the Legionaries advanced original articulations of the ideology of *charismatic nationalism* as a new national religion of salvation. The Legionary writings, such as those by Imbrescu, were not merely exercises in Orthodox theology, but blended Orthodox and fascist elements in a particular mixing. Although inserted into a Biblical matrix, the road to Legionary salvation was original and, from the point of view of the official Orthodox dogma, undoubtedly a blasphemy: it valued suffering, expiation, and—above all—the ultimate sacrifice for the cause. While these were mainstream Orthodox religious themes, the Legionary motivations, means, and goals were fundamentally different. First, Legionaries hailed violence as a form of social regeneration and catharsis. Secondly, a significant blasphemy was the substitution of the savior to Codreanu, his life trajectory and actions being a form of *imitatio Christi* that took place *outside and even against* the church as an institution. At certain political moments, the Orthodox leadership tried to use the Legion to pressure political power. Overall, however, the potential cooperation between the church and the Legion did not work out, generating more problems than gains. This collaboration was, in fact, harmful to church interests since the charismatic legitimization of the Legion was ultimately competing with, and even subverting, the charismatic monopoly of the church. The Orthodox leadership understood, early on, that an open and unconditional alliance with the Legion would be an unnecessary complication, since the church could better reach its goals in direct cooperation with existent political power. It could be said that the Legion was important for the church, but in a different way: the very existence of the Legion as a threat to state authority uplifted the role of the church as a critical element in antifascist strategies. In exchange for its close collaboration with the new authoritarian political power of the time, the Orthodox Church was able to achieve one of its most important goals, which it could not reach under the parliamentary regime: in 1942–1943, General Antonescu forbade all religious sects and associations, repressing its members.[201] This pattern of cooperation with the political power of the day for tangible rewards continued under the communist regime: in 1948, the Greek Catholic Church was forcefully integrated into the Orthodox Church. Metropolitan Bălan played an important role in this process, cooperating with the authorities in preparing the liquidation of the sister church, and in organizing the takeover of their believers and property.

Notes

1 ANIC, Fond Ministerul de Interne, Diverse, 8/1927, 61.
2 Cited in Horia Sima, *Doctrina Legionară* (Madrid: Editura Mișcării Legionare, 1980), 20.
3 Gârniceanu, *Din lumea legionară*, 19.
4 Ibid.
5 Sima's main aim was to provide a "unitary structure" to the heterogeneous body of Legionary works (p. 3). But he also planned "to develop further the Legionary doctrine," (7) by providing "new material." In view of the new political realities of

post-1945 Europe, Horia Sima downplayed the "anti" character of the Legion (i.e., its antiliberalism, anticommunism, antisemitism) as accidental and non-representative; instead, he emphasized the "positive" or creative features of its doctrine. See Sima, *Doctrina Legionară*, 2.

6 Sima, *Doctrina legionară*, 20.

7 Atheism was denounced as a capital sin by Legionaries; Codreanu defined the incapacity to believe in God as an "infirmity," an illness that needed to be treated and cured. See the "diagnosis" given by Codreanu on the Legionary dissident George Beza, and his expulsion from the Legion, in "The Circular Letter no. 11," Bucureşti 30 November 1935, in *Circulări*, 76.

8 Sima, *Doctrina Legionară*, 22.

9 Vasile Marin, for example, pointed out to the limits of Ortodoxism, which, based as it was "on a certain idea of universal spirituality, was improper to the creation of a state," being instrumental only in the preservation of the nation. Marin, "Naţiunea împotriva statului de import," *Axa* II, no. 6 (Febr. 5, 1933), 1–2.

10 On clerical fascism as a distinct taxonomic category encompassing fascist movements "based in established religious traditions," and specific mostly to interwar Central Europe, see Chip Berlet, "Christian Identity: The Apocalyptic Style, Political Religion, Palingenesis and Neo-Fascism," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religion* 5, no. 3 (Winter 2004), 489.

11 For Catholic support for the Legion, but also the organization's ambivalent attitude toward them, with a focus on the Moldovan Csangos, see Chris R. Davis, "Catholics and the Iron Guard," in *Hungarian Religion, Romanian Blood: A Minority's Struggle for National Belonging, 1920-1945* (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2019), 58–63. For the oscillating, yet by and large critical, attitude of the Greek Catholic Church toward Nazism and the Legion, see Mihaela Grancea, Cornel Mosneag, "Discursul presei greco-catolice din România despre natura nazismului (1933-1939)," *Studia Universitatis Cibiniensis. Seria Historica* VII (2010), 245–259; and Mihaela Grancea, "Between Passive and Active Anti-Semitism. From the Greek-Catholic Publications Concerning the Solution of the 'Jewish Problem' in Europe and Romania," *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie "George Barițiu" - Seria Historica*, LIV (2015), 151–173.

12 Anania, Memorii, 26.

13 Ibid.

14 Nicolae Iorga, *Byzance après Byzance. Continuation de "l'Histoire de la vie byzantine"* (Bucureşti: Editions de l'Institut d'études byzantines, 1935).

15 Lucian N. Leuştean, "The concept of symphonia in contemporary European Orthodoxy," *International Journal for the Study of the Chrisitan Church* 11, no. 2–3 (May 2011), 188–202.

16 Constantin Hamangiu and Nicolae Georgean, eds., *Codul Civil Adnotat*, vol. 1 (Bucureşti: All Beck, 1999), 67–71.

17 *Anuarul Statistic al României, 1939 şi 1940*, 70–75. Concerning the role of religion as a factor of public identification, it is important to note that, out of a total population of over eighteen million inhabitants, only 6,604 declared themselves atheists and only 6,686 persons refused to declare their religion.

18 Nicolae Popovici, *Manual de drept bisericesc ortodox oriental cu privire specială la dreptul particular al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române*, vol. 1 (Arad: Tiparul Tipografiei Diecezane Ortodoxe Române, 1925), 275.

19 Priest P. Moruşca, "Congresul nostru naţional bisericesc," *Revista Teologică* XI, no. 8–11 (August–November 1921), 223.

20 For a representative articulation of this viewpoint, see the article published in the official journal of the Metropolitan See of Transylvania by Dr. Gh. Ciuhandu: "Unificare la repezeală — ori revizuirea Statutului organic ardelean?" *Revista Teologică* XI, no. 8–11 (August–November 1921), 263–273.

21 Ibid., 264.

22 Ibid., 264, 265, 266.

23 Ibid., 264.
24 Ibid., 264.
25 Ibid., 270.
26 Ibid., 269–270.
27 Ibid., 270.
28 Miron Cristea, *Principii Fundamentale pentru Organizarea Unitară a Bisericii Ortodoxe Române din Regatul Român* (Bucureşti: Tipografia Cărţilor Bisericeşti, 1920).
29 After the Soviet occupation of the province in 1944, the Metropolitan Seat of Bessarabia was incorporated into the Russian Orthodox Church. In 1992, the Metropolitan Seat of Bessarabia was reinstated as part of the Romanian Orthodox Church, with jurisdiction over the territory of the Republic of Moldova. It is important to note that the new Metropolitian Seat still uses the old calendar. This shows the long-term inability of the Romanian authorities to modernize the Bessarabian Church. But it also pointed out that the Romanian Orthodox Church learned from its past experience in dealing with local resistance to change.
30 Russu Ardeleanu, "Introducere," in *Biserica noastră şi cultele minoritare. Marea discuţie parlamentară în jurul legei cultelor*, edited by N. Russu Ardeleanu (Bucureşti: Imprimeria ziarului Universal, 1928), 5.
31 Alexandru Lapedatu, "Expunere de motive," in *Biserica noastră şi cultele minoritare*, 15.
32 "Expunerea de motive la proiectul legii regimului cultelor din 1928," *Monitorul Oficial*, no. 94 (June 2, 1928), Part III, *Dezbateri parlamentare, Adunarea Deputaţilor*, Session of April 4, 1928, 3050.
33 Elie Miron Cristea, *Note ascunse. Însemnări personale (1895–1937)* (Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1999).
34 Ibid., 67.
35 Ibid.
36 Cristea, *Note ascunse*, 69.
37 Popovici, *Manual de drept bisericesc ortodox*, 279.
38 Ibid., 280.
39 These objections have remained, ever since, an integral part of the discourse of the Orthodox Church. See Mircea Păcurariu, *Istoria Bisericii Ortodoxe Române* (Bucureşti: Editura Institutului Biblic şi de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române,1981), 401–405, 420, 423.
40 Nicolae Bălan, *Biserica împotriva concordatului: declaraţiunea episcopatului Ortodox Român prezentată la discuţia pentu ratificarea concordatului, în şedinţa dela 23 Mai 1929, a Senatului Român* (Sibiu: Tiparul Tipografiei Arhidiecezane, 1927), 48–49.
41 Bălan, *Biserica împotriva concordatului*, 48–49.
42 Nicolae Bălan, *Biserica neamului şi drepturile ei* (Sibiu: Tiparul Tipografiei Arhidiecezane, 1928).
43 "Propunere pentru denunţarea convenţiunei închiată la 10 mai 1927 între România şi Sf. Scaun," ANIC, Fond "Parlament," file 2420/1932, 1.
44 *Renaşterea* XIII, no. 43 (Oct. 27, 1935), 1.
45 Olimp Căciulă, "Cultele în România," *Enciclopedia României*, vol. 1 (Bucureşti: Imprimeria Naţională 1938), 441.
46 Uniunea Bisericilor Creştine Baptiste din România, "Istoric," available at: http://uniuneabaptista.ro/despre-noi/istoric/.
47 On the status of neo-protestants in interwar and wartime Romania, including their deportation by General Antonescu, see Dorin Dobrincu, "Religie şi putere în România. Politica statului faţă de confesiunile (neo) protestante, 1919–1944," *Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review* 7, no. 3 (2007), 583–602.
48 Katherine Verdery, *National Ideology under Socialism. Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceauşescu's Romania* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 61.
49 N. Russu Ardeleanu, "Introducere," 5.
50 Ibid., 9.
51 Ibid., 5.

52 Ibid., 7.
53 Ibid., 11.
54 Alexandru Lapedatu, "Statul şi biserica ortodoxă," *Renaşterea* XIII, no. 42 (Oct. 20, 1935), 1.
55 Mihai Stelescu, "Lupta pentru cruce," *Axa* II, no. 6 (February 5, 1933), 8.
56 For a critique of the reaction of the Orthodox Patriarchy, see A. Vântu, "Duhovnicul studenţilor şi Patriarhia," *Axa* II, no. 7 (February 19, 1933), 6.
57 "Agitaţii pe chestiunea dela mormântul soldatului necunoscut," 2.
58 I. Mateiu, "1934," *Renaşterea: organul oficial al Eparhiei ortodoxe române a Vadului, Feleacului, Geoagiului şi Clujului* XII, no. 1 (1934), 1
59 "Moartea şi funerariile lui ION G. DUCA," *Renaşterea* XII, no. 1 (1934), 2.
60 The Holy Synod of the Romanian Orthodox Church, October 23, 1935, no. 1429, in Crăcea, *Dezvăluiri legionare*, vol. 1, 136.
61 "Biserica şi viaţa politică. Hotărârile Sf. Sinod," *Renaşterea* XV, no. 12 (March 21, 1937), 1.
62 "Din şedinţa Sf. Sinod cu data de 10 Martie 1937. Preşedinte, (ss) MIRON CRISTEA," *Renaşterea* XV, no. 12 (March 21, 1937), 1.
63 "Sf. Sinod condamnă francmasoneria," *Renaşterea* XV, no. 12 (March 21, 1937), 2–3.
64 V. B. Religius, "Către Preoţime," *Legiunea* 1, no. 1 (Aug. 5, 1932), 1.
65 Ilie Imbrescu, "Teologii şi Garda de Fier," *Axa* II, no. 15 (June 15, 1933), 3.
66 Imbrescu, "Teologii şi Garda de Fier," 3.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 "Mântuirea," *Axa* II, no. 24 (December 23, 1933), 2.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Gheorghe Racoveanu, "Mişcarea legionară şi Biserica,"in Crăcea, *Dezvăluiri legionare*, vol. 1, 57.
74 Gen. Gheorghe Cantacuzino-Grănicerul, "Pentru Înalţii Prea Sfinţiţi Arhierei din România şi pentru orice Român sau Româncă, creştin de bună credinţă," ACNSAS, Fond Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, file P 11784, vol. 19, 295–296.
75 ACNSAS, Fond Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, file P 011784, vol. 13, 150.
76 Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, "Mişcarea legionară şi biserica. Din scrisoarea răspuns unui preot-profesor," November 25, 1936, *Circulări*, 105.
77 Ibid.
78 ANIC, DGP, 46/1937, 3.
79 Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, "Circulara nr. 109," November 13, 1937, *Circulări*, 218.
80 Trifa, in Mezdrea, *Nae Ionescu*, vol. 1, 55.
81 Ibid., 56.
82 Ibid.
83 *Logos* was short lived, being published in only two issues in 1928. See Mezdrea, "Note," in Ionescu, *Teologia*, 583. On the international reception of *Logos*, see K. V., "Nouvelles Revues Religieuses," *Ecos D'Orient* 29, no. 158 (1930), 256.
84 See articles such as "Locotenenţa patriarhală," "Canoanele," "Mai avem Patriarh?" and "O îndatorire de conştiinţă," republished in Ionescu, *Teologia*, 119–140.
85 Ionescu, "Locotenenţa patriarhală," *Teologia*, 119–121.
86 See "Dificultăţi bisericeşti. Ce e cu data Sfintelor Paşti," "Printre Mărăcini," and "Rătăcirea cea de pe urmă," in Ionescu, *Teologia*, 151–203.
87 Nae Ionescu, "Ce e Predania?" republished in *Teologia*, 116–117.
88 An explicit call for a "creative" "return to the Fathers" was launched by the Russian theologian Georges Florovsky at the First Congress of Orthodox Theologians, held in Athens in 1936. Florovsky argued that a new "Neopatristic synthesis" was the "task and aim of Orthodox theology today." That synthesis was to necessarily be "Christocentric and Christological," based on the figure of "Christ Jesus, as God and Redeemer,

Humiliated and Glorified, the Victim and the Victor on the Cross." See Georges Florovsky, *Aspects of Church History. Volume Four in the Collected Works of Georges Florovsky* (Belmont, MA: Nordland Publishing Company, 1975), 22–23. On the neo-patristics movement, see Ciprian Iulian Toroczkai, "The Orthodox Neo-patristic Movements as Renewal of Contemporary Orthodox Theology: An Overview," *Review of Ecumenical Studies* 7, no. 1 (2015), 94–115. Ionescu knew Florovsky's work and entrusted him the honor of contributing the opening article in the first issue of *Logos*.

89 Nae Ionescu, "Scrisoare deschisă Înalt Prea Sfinţiei Sale, domnului domn dr. Miron Cristea, Patriarh al României,'" republished in Ionescu, *Teologia*, 139.
90 Nae Ionescu, "Pentru o teologie cu 'nespecialişti,'" *Predania* I, no. 1 (February 15, 1937), 3.
91 Ionescu, "Pentru o teologie cu 'nespecialişti,'" 2.
92 Ibid., 3.
93 Nae Ionescu, "Ce e predania," *Predania* I, no. 2 (March 1, 1937), 1.
94 See, for example, the theological debate on the cult of the saints by Pr. I Mihălcescu in *Predania* I, no. 12–13 (Nov. 1–15, 1937), 23–24.
95 Nae Ionescu, "Biserica, Stat şi Naţiune," *Predania* I, no. 4 (April 1, 1937), 1–3.
96 *Predania* I, no. 1 (Feburary 15, 1937), 8.
97 See Gheorghe Racoveanu, "Teologul Ion Nichifor Crainic (I)," *Predania* 1, no. 10–11 (Oct. 1937), 11–13; "Teologul Ion Nichifor Crainic (II)," *Predania* 1, no. 12–13 (Nov. 1–15, 1937), 7–8; and "Noi, falsificatorii," *Predania* 1, no. 12–13 (Nov. 1–15, 1937), 20–22.
98 Veiga, *Istoria Gărzii de Fier*, 231.
99 ANIC, DGP, 54/1936, 2.
100 Ibid., 9.
101 Ibid., 4.
102 See Ştefan Ciobanu, *Unirea Basarabiei: Studiu şi documente cu privire la mişcarea naţională din Basarabia în anii 1917–1918* (Bucureşti: Cartea Românească, 1929), 22, 122–123.
103 *Unirea* XXXIII, no. 21 (May 26, 1923), 3.
104 See ANIC, DGP, 48/1936, 16–18; Lorin Popescu, "'Cazul Gurie' se apropie de clarificare," *Curentul* 3134 (October 22, 1936), in ANIC, DGP, 43/1935, 19; Alycon, "Un grav conflict în biserica basarabeană," *Adevărul* 16180 (October 22, 1936), 5.
105 For Gurie Grosu, *Procesul şi apărarea mea: denunţarea complotului apocaliptic* (Bucureşti: Tip. A-B-C, 1937), 3.
106 Ibid.
107 Gurie Grosu, *Procesul şi apărarea mea*, 288.
108 Gurie Grosu has been recently rehabilitated, in the context of the re-establishment of the Metropolitan Seat of Bessarabia under the authority of the Romanian Orthodox Church. Recent biographical entries condemn the centralizing attitude of Romanian authorities against local specificity, pointing out that Gurie was alone in his struggle and "only the Legionaries supported him." See Gurie Grosu—Wikipedia.
109 ACNSAS, Arhiva Operativa, File Stan, Liviu I 211444, vol. 1, 28.
110 "Legionarii, între pistol şi Dumnezeu 23 octombrie 2012," available at adevarul.ro/cultura/istorie/legionarii-pistol-dumnezeu-1_50b9ebcc7c42d5a663ace29a/index.html.
111 Ibid.
112 ACNSAS, Arhiva Operativă, File Stan, Liviu I 211444, Vol. 1, 28.
113 Ibid., Vol. 2, 114.
114 Ibid., vol. 1, 28.
115 ANIC, DGP, 46/1937, 70.
116 Ibid.
117 Flor Strejnicu, *Creştinismul Mişcării legionare* (Sibiu: Imago, 2001), 217, cited in Adrian Nicolae Petcu, "Despre situaţa juridică a preoţilor legionari în perioada 1938–1943," *Analele Universităţii „Dunărea de Jos" din Galaţi*, series 19, *Istorie*, vol. 4, no. 4 (2005), 285.
118 Cătălin Raiu, *Democraţie şi statolatrie: creştinismul social la Bartolomeu Stănescu, episcopul Râmnicului Noului Severin: (1875–1954)* (Bucureşti: Editura Universităţii din Bucureşti, 2014), 72–73.
119 Ibid., 175.

120 Ibid., 216.
121 See Vartolomeiu S. Stănescu, *Scurte încercări de creştinism social* (Bucureşti: SOCEC, 1913).
122 Raiu, *Democraţie şi statolatrie*, 109–114.
123 Teodor Păcescu, *Fotografii ortodoxe* (Bucureşti: Editura Noii Reviste Bisericeşti, 1930), 17–18.
124 Raiu, *Democraţie şi statolatrie*, 216.
125 Vartolomeiu S. Stanescu, *O scurtă privire asupra unor stări de fapt de azi în legătură cu viitorul* (Râmnicu-Vâlcea: Tipografia Episcopul Vartolomeiu, 1935), 36, cited in Raiu, *Democraţie şi statolatrie*, 174–175.
126 Raiu, *Democraţie şi statolatrie*, 174.
127 Dumitrescu-Borşa, *Cal Troian Intra-Muros*, 178.
128 Ibid.
129 ACNSAS, Fond Informativ–Bartolomeu Stănescu-Anania, file no. 53328, 96, cited in Raiu, *Democraţie şi statolatrie*, 192.
130 Vasile Marin, *Crez de generaţie* (Bucharest: Cartea Românească, 1940), 3rd ed., 130.
131 Cited in Miron Cristea, "Renaşterea Spirituală a Românismului prin tainele bisericii Creştine," *Apostol* XV, no. 1–2 (Jan. 1–31, 1938), 2, in ANIC, Fond Miron Cristea, file 12/1938, 27.
132 Ion Lupaş, "Scrisoarea d-lui Ministru al Cultelor şi artelor Profesor I. Lupaş către I. P. S.. Patriarch Dr. Miron Cristea," *Apostol* XV, no. 1–2 (Jan. 1–31, 1938), 3, in ANIC, Fond Miron Cristea, file 12/1938, 28.
133 Lupaş, "Scrisoarea d-lui Ministru," 3.
134 Ibid.
135 Ibid.
136 "Patriarhul Miron Cristea," *Apostol* XV, no. 1–2 (Jan. 1–31, 1938), 6.
137 *Constituţiunea Regele Carol II* (Bucureşti: Tiparul Românesc, 1938), Art. 8, 10
138 Ibid.
139 "Desbaterile Sfântului Sinod al Sfintei Bisericii Ortodoxe Române," in ANIC, Fond Miron Cristea, file 12/1938, 84.
140 Ibid.
141 Ibid.
142 ANIC, DGP, 46/1937, 8.
143 Ibid., 9.
144 Ibid. 4.
145 Ibid. 4–7.
146 ANIC, DGP, 46/1937, 7.
147 "Rânduiala rugăciunilor de deslegarea jurămintelor neîngăduite de legile Ţării," ANIC, Fond Miron Cristea, file 12/1938, 88–89.
148 See ANIC, DGP, file 44/1938, 10.
149 "Decret lege pentru apărarea ordinii în stat," Hamangiu, ed., *Codul General al României*, vol. XXVI, Part 1, 498–506.
150 "Decret lege pentru apărarea ordinii în stat," 499, 500.
151 *Monitorul Oficial* CVI, no. 88, Part I (April 15, 1938), 1920–1922.
152 ANIC, DGP, file 46/1937, 10, 75.
153 Ibid., 93.
154 Ion Zelea-Codreanu, *Crâmpeie de amintiri*.
155 "Cuvântarea LP.S. Patriarh Nicodim rostită la catafalcul lui Armand Călinescu," *Renaşterea* XVII, no. 40 (Oct. 1, 1939), 2; See also *Biserica Ortodoxă Română* 57, no. 9–10 (Sept.–Oct. 1939), 593–594.
156 "Cuvântarea LP.S. Patriarh Nicodim," 2.
157 Imbrescu, *Biserica şi Mişcarea Legionară* (Bucureşti: Cartea Românească, 1940), 16.
158 Ibid., 171.
159 Ibid., 186.
160 Ioan Gheorghe Savin, "Religia în lupta politică," *Biserica Ortodoxă Română* LVIII, no 11–12 (Nov.–Dec. 1940), 782.

161 Ibid., 783.
162 ACNSAS, Fond Informativ, File Vasile Boldeanu I 155106, vol. 2, 59.
163 Ibid., vol. 1, 6.
164 Ibid., vol. 2, 10.
165 Boldeanu was sentenced to ten years in prison, but managed to escape in 1942. In 1944, he was captured by Gestapo in Belgrade and interned at Buchenwald. He was released in September 1944 and charged by Horia Sima with a clandestine mission in Romania. After the war, Boldeanu settled in France and became part of the "dissident" Romanian Orthodox Church in Paris until his death in 1991. See ACNSAS, Vasile Boldeanu I 155106, vol 1, 53.
166 On his activity, see ACNSAS, Fond Operativ, Dumitrescu-Ion zis Borşa, I 264315.
167 Vladimir Dumitrescu's anti-Clerical convictions were further strengthened by his ministerial experience, his memoirs containing bitter criticism against the education and attitude of the Orthodox priests and hierarcs, and against the functioning of the Orthodox Church as an institution, which he compared to the "monstrous epoch of Borgia Popes." See Vladimir Dumitrescu, *Mărturiile unui "criminal politic"* (Bacău: Babel, 2013), esp. 179–180, 183–185.
168 Nicolae Petraşcu confirmed these tensions, pointing out that, although Ion Dumitrescu-Borşa "had conducted a serious Legionary activity" and was therefore entitled to be Minister of Cults during the Legion's rule, he made a big mistake in supporting Ion Zelea-Codreanu to become head of the movement against Sima. ACNSAS, File Nicolae Petraşcu I 151086, vol. 2, 52.
169 Liviu Stan, *Mirenii in biserică: Importanţa elementului mirean in biserică şi participarea lui la exercitarea puterii bisericeşti. Studiu canonicistoric* (Sibiu: Arhidiecezana, 1939). On his vision on the role of the Church in the Legionary state, see Liviu Stan, "Biserica în statul legionar," *Insemnări Sociologice* IV (December 15, 1940), 8. For his xenophobic and racist views, see Liviu Stan, *Rasă şi religiune* (Sibiu: Tiparul Tipografiei Arhidiecezane, 1942). For a review that values the contribution of his book to clarifying the relationship between race and religion, see *Revista Teologică* XXXII, no. 9–10 (Sept.–Oct. 1942), 447–449. For a comprehensive and insightful overview of Stan's carrer and engagement with the Legion, see Biliuţă, "Fascism, Race, and Religion in Interwar Transylvania," 101–124.
170 ACNSAS, Arhiva Operativă, File Stan, Liviu I 211444, vol. 1, 23.
171 Ibid., 117.
172 Ibid.
173 Ibid., 23.
174 Ibid., 28.
175 ACNSAS, Arhiva Operativă, File Stan, Liviu I 211444, vol. 1, 29.
176 Dumitrescu, *Mărturiile unui "criminal politic,"* 185.
177 *Stenogramele şedinţelor*, vol. 1, 131.
178 General Ion Antonescu, Sept. 21, 1940, *Stenogramele şedinţelor*, vol. 1, 69.
179 Ibid.
180 "Reorganizarea Bisericii. Scrisoarea I. P. S. Patriarh Nicodim adresată d-lui general Antonescu, Conducătorul Statului," *Universul* 57, no. 269 (Sept. 30, 1940), 19.
181 "Răspunsul D-lui G-ral Antonescu la scrisoarea I.P.S. Patriarch Nicodim," *Universul* 57, no. 269 (Sept. 30, 1940), 19.
182 In itself, the presence of the Minister of Religious Cults was not anomalous, since according to the Law on the Organization of the Orthodox Church, that Minister was a member of the Holy Synod with a consultative vote. Brăileanu's close supervision of the works of the Holy Synod and his agenda-setting was notable, however.
183 "Deschiderea Sesiunii Sfântului Sinod," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 52 (Dec. 4, 1940), 11.
184 Ibid.
185 Ibid.
186 Ibid.
187 Gheorghe Racoveanu, "Sfântul Sinod la lucru," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 54 (Dec. 6, 1940), 1.

188 "Importante hotărâri luate în ședința de eri a Sfântului Sinod," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 54 (Dec. 6, 1940), 5.
189 Ibid.
190 Ibid.
191 Ibid.
192 Cited in Gheorghe Racoveanu, "Pentru o reorganizare bisericească," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 60 (Dec. 12, 1940), 1.
193 Dumitrescu, *Mărturiile unui "criminal politic"*, 185–186.
194 Father Nicole Vonica, "Înalțarea omului la treapta de om," *Libertatea* 38, no. 5 (Nov. 10, 1940), 1–2.
195 "Conducătorul Statului și Biserica," *Renașterea* XIX, no. 5, (Febr. 9, 1941), 4. See also "Tineretul a fost purtat pe un drum greșit. Apelul suprem al conducătorului statului," *Renașterea* XIX, no. 3–4 (Febr. 2, 1941), 1.
196 "Numirea unui sub-secretar de stat la Culte și Arte," *Renașterea* XIX, no. 5 (Febr. 9, 1941), 1.
197 "Proclamarea rezultatului definitiv al Adunării Obștești Plebiscitare Cuvântul Mareșalului către Țară," *Renașterea* XIX, no. 48–49 (Dec. 7, 1941), 3.
198 For further details, see Ionut Biliuță, "Christianizing' Transnistria: Romanian Orthodox Clergy as Beneficiaries, Perpetrators, and Rescuers during the Holocaust," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 34, (Spring 2020) 1, 18–44.
199 See "Regulamentul pentru modificarea art. 6 din regulamentul pentru monumentele publice," *Monitorul Oficial* CIX, no. 239 (October 9, 1941), 6049. The decree read that: "Following the historical events that we live, and in view of the monuments and commemorative institutions of great artistic value that are to be erected in the country, it is necessary that this Commission [of monuments] be chaired, in her works, by the Minister of Culture and Religious cults, himself."
200 ANIC, DGP, 25/1928, 26.
201 See Viorel Achim, *Politica Regimului Antonescu față de cultele neoprotestante: Documente* (București: Editura Institutului Național Pentru Studierea Holocaustului din România "Elie Wiesel," 2013).

References

ACNSAS. Fond "Arhiva Operativă," Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, File P 011784, vols. 13, 19.
ACNSAS. Fond "Arhiva Operativă," File Stan, Liviu I 211444, vols. 1, 2.
ACNSAS. Fond "Operativ," File Dumitrescu-Ion zis Borșa, I 264315.
ACNSAS. Fond "Informativ," File Vasile Boldeanu I 155106, vols.1, 2.
ACNSAS. Fond "Informativ," File Nicolae Petrașcu I 151086, vol. 2.
ANIC. Fond "DGP," files: 25/1928; 43/1935; 48/1936; 46/1937; 44/1938; 54/1936.
ANIC. Fond "Parlament," file 2420/1932.
ANIC. Fond "Ministerul de Interne, Diverse," file 8/1927.
ANIC. Fond "Miron Cristea," file 12/1938.
Achim, Viorel. *Politica Regimului Antonescu față de cultele neoprotestante: Documente*. București: Editura Institutului Național Pentru Studierea Holocaustului din România "Elie Wiesel, 2013.
Alycon, "Un grav conflict în biserica basarabeană," *Adevărul* 16180 (Oct. 22, 1936): 5.
Anania, Valeriu. *Memorii*. Iași: Polirom, 2011.
Ardeleanu, Russu. "Introducere." In *Biserica noastră și cultele minoritare. Marea discuție parlamentară în jurul legei cultelor*, edited by N. Russu Ardeleanu, 3–12. București: Imprimeria ziarului Universal, 1928.
"Biserica și viața politică. Hotărârile Sf. Sinod," *Renașterea* XV, no. 12 (March 21, 1937): 1.

Bălan, Nicolae. *Biserica neamului şi drepturile ei*. Sibiu: Tiparul Tipografiei Arhidiecezane, 1928.

Bălan, Nicolae. *Biserica împotriva concordatului: declarațiunea episcopatului Ortodox Român prezentată la discuția pentu ratificarea concordatului, în ședința dela 23 Mai 1929, a Senatului Român*. Sibiu: Tiparul Tipografiei Arhidiecezane, 1927.

Berlet, Chip. "Christian Identity: The Apocalyptic Style, Political Religion, Palingenesis and Neo-Fascism," *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religion* 5, no. 3 (2004): 469–506.

"Conducătorul Statului şi Biserica," *Renaşterea* XIX, no. 5 (Feb. 9, 1941): 4.

"Cuvântarea LP.S. Patriarh Nicodim rostită la catafalcul lui Armand Călinescu," *Renaşterea* XVII, no. 40 (1939): 2.

Căciulă, Olimp. "Cultele în România," *Enciclopedia României*, vol. 1. Bucureşti: Imprimeria Naţională 1938.

Ciobanu, Ştefan. *Unirea Basarabiei: Studiu şi documente cu privire la mişcarea naţională din Basarabia în anii 1917–1918*. Bucureşti: Cartea Românească, 1929.

Ciucă, Marcel-Dumitru, Aurelian Teodorescu, and Bogdan Florin Popovici, eds. *Stenogramele şedinţelor Consiliului de Miniştri: guvernarea Ion Antonescu*, vol. 1: Sept.–Dec. 1940. Bucureşti: Arhivele Naţionale ale României, 1997.

Ciuhandu, Gh. "Unificare la repezeală — ori revizuirea Statutului organic ardelean?" *Revista Teologică* XI, no. 8–11 (August–November 1921): 263–273.

Constituțiunea Regele Carol II. București: Tiparul Românesc, 1938.

Crăcea, Nicu, ed. *Dezvăluiri legionare*, 3 vols. Bucureşti: Buna Vestire, 1997.

Cristea, Miron. "Renașterea Spirituală a Românismului prin tainele bisericii Creștine," *Apostol* XV, no. 1–2 (Jan. 1–31, 1938): 2.

Cristea, Miron. *Note ascunse. Însemnări personale (1895–1937)*. Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1999.

Cristea, Miron. *Principii Fundamentale pentru Organizarea Unitară a Bisericii Ortodoxe Române din Regatul Român*. București: Tipografia Cărților Bisericești, 1920.

"Deschiderea Sesiunii Sfântului Sinod," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 52 (Dec. 4, 1940): 11.

"Din şedinţa Sf. Sinod cu data de 10 Martie 1937. Preşedinte, (ss) MIRON CRISTEA," *Renaşterea* XV, no. 12 (March 21, 1937): 1.

Dobrincu, Dorin. "Religie şi putere în România. Politica statului faţă de confesiunile (neo) protestante, 1919–1944," *Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review* 7, no. 3 (2007): 583–602.

Dumitrescu, Vladimir. *Mărturiile unui "criminal politic"*. Bacău: Babel, 2013.

Florovsky, Georges. *Aspects of Church History. Volume Four in the Collected Works of Georges Florovsky*. Belmont, MA: Nordland Publishing Company, 1975.

Gârniceanu, Victor Puiu. *Din lumea legionară*. Madrid: Colectia Omul Nou, 1951.

Grancea, Mihaela and Cornel Moşneag. "Discursul presei greco-catolice din România despre natura nazismului (1933-1939)," *Studia Universitatis Cibiniensis. Seria Historica* VII, (2010): 245–259.

Grancea, Mihaela. "Between Passive and Active Anti-Semitism. From the Greek-Catholic Publications Concerning the Solution of the 'Jewish Problem' in Europe and Romania," *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie "George Barițiu" - Seria Historica* LIV, (2015):151–173.

Grosu, Gurie. *Procesul şi apărarea mea: denunţarea complotului apocaliptic*. Bucureşti: Tip. A-B-C, 1937.

Hamangiu, Constantin, and Nicolae Georgean, eds. *Codul Civil Adnotat*, vol. 1. Bucureşti: All Beck, 1999.

Hamangiu, Constantin, ed. *Codul General al României, Coduri, Decrete-Legi şi Regulamente*, vol. 26, Part 1. București: Imprimeria Centrală, 1938.

"Importante hotărâri luate în ședința de eri a Sfântului Sinod," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 54 (Dec. 6, 1940): 5.
Imbrescu. *Biserica şi Mişcarea Legionară*. Bucureşti: Cartea Românească, 1940.
Imbrescu, Ilie. "Teologii şi Garda de Fier," *Axa* II, no. 15 (June 15, 1933): 3.
Institutul Central de Statistică. *Anuarul Statistic al României, 1939 şi 1940*. Bucureşti: Imprimeria Naţională, 1940.
Ionescu, Nae. "Biserica, Stat şi Naţiune," *Predania* I, no. 4 (April 1, 1937): 1–3.
Ionescu, Nae. "Ce e predania," *Predania* I, no. 2 (March 1, 1937): 1.
Ionescu, Nae. "Pentru o teologie cu 'nespecialişti," *Predania* I, no. 1 (Feb. 15, 1937): 3.
Ionescu, Nae. Teologia. Integrala publicisticii religioase. Sibiu: Deisis, 2003.
Iorga, Nicolae. *Byzance après Byzance. Continuation de "l'Histoire de la vie byzantine*. Bucureşti: Editions de l'Institut d'études byzantines, 1935.
"Legionarii, între pistol şi Dumnezeu" (23 octombrie 2012), available at adevarul.ro/cultura/istorie/legionarii-pistol-dumnezeu-1_50b9ebcc7c42d5a663ace29a/index.html.
Lapedatu, Alexandru. *Biserica noastră şi cultele minoritare. Marea discuţie parlamentară în jurul legei cultelor*, edited by N. Russu Ardeleanu. Bucureşti: Imprimeria ziarului Universal, 1928.
Lapedatu, Alexandru. "Statul şi biserica ortodoxă," *Renaşterea* XIII, no. 42 (Oct. 20, 1935): 1.
Leuştean, Lucian N. "The concept of symphonia in contemporary European Orthodoxy," *International Journal for the Study of the Chrisitan Church* 11, no. 2–3 (May 2011): 188–202.
Lupaş, Ion. "Scrisoarea d-lui Ministru al Cultelor şi artelor Profesor I. Lupaş către I. P. S. Patriarch Dr. Miron Cristea," *Apostol* XV, no. 1–2 (Jan. 1–31, 1938): 3.
"Mântuirea," *Axa* II, no. 24 (Dec. 23, 1933): 2.
"Moartea şi funerariile lui ION G. DUCA," *Renaşterea* XII, no. 1 (1934): 2.
Marin, Vasile. "Naţiunea împotriva statului de import," *Axa* II, no. 6 (Feb. 5, 1933): 1–2.
Marin, Vasile. *Crez de generaţie*, 3rd ed. Bucureşti: Cartea Românească, 1940.
Mateiu, I. "1934," *Renaşterea: organul oficial al Eparhiei ortodoxe române a Vadului, Feleacului, Geoagiului şi Clujului* XII, no. 1 (1934): 1.
Mezdrea, Dora, ed. *Nae Ionescu şi discipolii săi în arhiva securităţii*, vol. 1: *Nae Ionescu*. Bucureşti: Mica Valahie, 2008.
Monitorul Oficial CIX, no. 239 (October 9, 1941); CVI, no. 88, Part I (April 15, 1938); no. 94 (June 2, 1928), Part III, *Dezbateri parlamentare, Adunarea Deputaţilor*, Session of April 4, 1928, 3050.
Morușca, Priest P. "Congresul nostru naţional bisericesc," *Revista Teologică* XI, no. 8–11 (August–November 1921): 221–228.
"Numirea unui sub-secretar de stat la Culte şi Arte," *Renaşterea* XIX, no. 5 (Feb. 9, 1941): 1.
"Patriarhul Miron Cristea," *Apostol* XV, no. 1–2 (Jan. 1–31, 1938): 6.
"Proclamarea rezultatului definitiv al Adunării Obşteşti Plebiscitare. Cuvântul Mareşalului către Ţară," *Renaşterea* XIX, no. 48–49 (Dec. 7, 1941): 3.
Păcescu, Teodor. *Fotografii ortodoxe*. Bucureşti: Editura Noii Reviste Bisericeşti, 1930.
Păcurariu, Mircea. *Istoria Bisericii Ortodoxe Române*. Bucureşti: Editura Institutului Biblic şi de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, 1981.
Petcu, Adrian Nicolae. "Despre situaţa juridică a preoţilor legionari în perioada 1938-1943," *Analele Universităţii „Dunărea de Jos" din Galaţi* 4, no. 4 (2005): 277–301.
Popovici, Nicolae. *Manual de drept bisericesc ortodox oriental cu privire specială la dreptul particular al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române*, vol. 1. Arad: Tiparul Tipografiei Diecezane Ortodoxe Române, 1925.

"Răspunsul D-lui G-ral Antonescu la scrisoarea I.P.S. Patriarch Nicodim," *Universul* 57, no. 269 (Sept. 30, 1940): 19.

"Reorganizarea Bisericii. Scrisoarea I. P. S. Patriarh Nicodim adresată d-lui general Antonescu, Conducătorul Statului," *Universul* 57, no. 269 (Sept. 30, 1940): 19.

Racoveanu, Gheorghe. "Noi, falsificatorii," *Predania* 1, no. 12–13 (Nov. 1–15, 1937): 20–22.

Racoveanu, Gheorghe. "Pentru o reorganizare bisericească," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 60 (Dec. 12, 1940): 1.

Racoveanu, Gheorghe. "Sfântul Sinod la lucru," *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 54 (Dec. 6, 1940): 1.

Racoveanu, Gheorghe. "Teologul Ion Nichifor Crainic (I)," *Predania* 1, no. 10–11 (Oct. 1937): 11–13.

Racoveanu, Gheorghe. "Teologul Ion Nichifor Crainic (II)," *Predania* 1, no. 12–13 (Nov. 1–15, 1937): 7–8.

Raiu, Cătălin. *Democraţie şi statolatrie: creştinismul social la Bartolomeu Stănescu, episcopul Râmnicului Noului Severin: (1875–1954)*. Bucureşti: Editura Universităţii din Bucureşti, 2014.

Religius, V. B. "Către Preoțime," *Legiunea* 1, no. 1 (Aug. 5, 1932): 1.

"Sf. Sinod condamnă francmasoneria," *Renașterea* XV, no. 12 (March 21, 1937): 2–3.

Savin, Ioan Gheorghe. "Religia în lupta politică," *Biserica Ortodoxă Română* LVIII, no. 11–12 (1939): 779–783.

Sima, Horia. *Doctrina Legionară*. Madrid: Editura Mişcării Legionare, 1980.

Stan, Liviu. "Biserica în statul legionar," *Insemnări Sociologice* IV (Dec. 15, 1940): 8–9.

Stan, Liviu. *Mirenii in biserică: Importanţa elementului mirean in biserică şi participarea lui la exercitarea puterii bisericeşti. Studiu canonicistoric*. Sibiu: Arhidiecezana, 1939.

Stan, Liviu. *Rasă şi religiune*. Sibiu: Tiparul Tipografiei Arhidiecezane, 1942.

Stănescu, Vartolomeiu S. *Scurte încercări de creştinism social*. Bucureşti: SOCEC, 1913.

Stelescu, Mihai. "Lupta Pentru Cruce," *Axa* II, no. 6 (Feb. 5, 1933): 8.

"Tineretul a fost purtat pe un drum greşit. Apelul suprem al conducătorului statului," *Renașterea* XIX, no. 3–4 (Feb. 2, 1941): 1.

Toroczkai, Ciprian Iulian. "The Orthodox Neo-patristic Movements as Renewal of Contemporary Orthodox Theology: An Overview," *Review of Ecumenical Studies* 7, no. 1 (2015): 94–115.

Uniunea Bisericilor Creştine Baptiste din România. "Istoric," available at: http://uniuneabaptista.ro/despre-noi/istoric/.

V., K. "Nouvelles Revues Religieuses," *Ecos D'Orient* 29, no. 158 (1930): 254–256.

Vântu. "Duhovnicul studenților și Patriarhia," *Axa* II, no. 7 (Feb. 19, 1933): 6.

Veiga, Francisco. *Istoria Gărzii de Fier, 1919–1941. Mistica ultranaţionalismului*. Bucureşti: Humanitas, 1993; 2nd ed., 1995.

Verdery, Katherine. *National Ideology under Socialism. Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceauşescu's Romania*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.

Vonica, Nicole, Pr. "Înalțarea omului la treapta de om," *Libertatea* 38, no. 5 (Nov. 10, 1940): 1–2.

Zelea-Codreanu, Corneliu. *Circulări și manifeste, 1927-1938*. München: Colecţia Europa, 1981.

Zelea-Codreanu, Ion. *Crâmpeie de amintiri* (1936). Available at http://www.miscarea.net/ion-zelea-codreanu-crampeie-de-amintiri1.htm.

CONCLUSION

From a Civil Religion to a Fascist Political Faith

This book has provided a theoretically informed investigation into the nature of the Legion "Archangel Michael." The text presented the argument that the Legion articulated a palingenetic political faith of a theological type, with roots in Romantic theories of social palingenesis. Its historical doctrine of national salvation was based on a complex system of myths, rites, and rituals (linked with pagan as well as Christian popular cultural elements), a mythical perspective on Romanian national history, and a panoply of heroes and martyrs. In the following, I summarize my findings on the emergence, consolidation, and main features of the Legionary political faith, with a focus on salvific sacrifice as its driving force. I also assess the Legion's short- as well as long-term political impact.

The Doctrine of National Salvation, from Civil Religion to a Fascist Political Faith

The first part of the book has explored the multiple intellectual genealogies of the palingenetic historical ideology of national salvation and its political implementations, in Romantic, conservative, and fascist versions. The main ingredients of this ideology were elaborated by Romantic writers in the second quarter of the nineteenth century and transmitted, via a teacher-disciple pedagogical line, from Lazăr to Heliade, and from Heliade to Bălcescu. The palingenetic ideology of national salvation was further consolidated after the establishment of the Romanian nation-state in 1859, and was given a new impetus after the turn of the century by practices of sacralizing politics that united the church, the school, and the army around the Hohenzollern dynasty. In the interwar period, the Legion redefined the palingenetic doctrine of national salvation in an extremist

DOI: 10.4324/9780429428043-13

key and implemented it in a political experiment that aimed at building a fascist totalitarian state by violent means.

The foundations of the ideology of national salvation were set by Ion Heliade-Rădulescu's palingenetic nationalism. Heliade developed a "theological" philosophy of palingenesis. Based on ideas on regeneration derived from the Gospel, this theology promoted an anthropological vision of humanity centered on the question of the perfectibility of human nature through suffering, following the behavioral model of Jesus Christ—the notion of *imitatio Christi*.[1] Its mythical core was the idea of the regeneration of the Romanian people, encoded in the cult of Michael the Brave as a redemptive hero, and of his patron saint, Archangel Michael. Convinced that the history of the Romanians entered the "period of palingenesis,"[2] Heliade elaborated a "literary ideology of regeneration."[3] During the 1848 revolution in Wallachia, Heliade attempted to institutionalize this ideology under the form of a new civil religion, the poet playing the role of the demiurge artist. Heliade's political fortune was short-lived: after the defeat of the revolution, he was forced into exile and upon his return became a marginal politician in united Romania. His literary and historical works, as well as his vision of sacralizing politics were, however, hugely influential, having a formative intellectual role for subsequent generations.

In the second half of the nineteenth century, Romanian national ideology suffered numerous mutations. These were triggered by major political events in the process of nation- and state-building, such as the 1859 union of Moldova and Wallachia and the 1877–1878 War of Independence. Further steps in the intellectual consolidation of Romanian nationalist ideology took the form of critical responses to a series of major challenges, namely, the "Jewish question," which referred to the refusal of Romanian politicians to emancipate the Jews, and the "Transylvanian question," which referred to the Romanian state's irredentist policy of annexing Transylvania as a means to forge a unitary nation-state. Corroborated with new intellectual and political transfers, mostly from the German and French contexts at the turn of the century, these mutations brought to the forefront a novel conception of national regeneration, based on an essentialist understanding of national culture, social Darwinism and antisemitism, a new type of political militancy, and a renewed messianic nationalism centered on the idea of national unity.

On the eve of World War I, some of these changes were captured by a new type of conservative-authoritarian nationalism. Its catalyst was the aristocratic politician Nicolae Filipescu, the initiator and director of the innovative Dealu military school. While building on the main elements of Heliade's palingenetic nationalism (most importantly the interlinked cults of Michael the Brave and Archangel Michael as symbols of divine predestination, and the army as a vehicle of regeneration and national unity), Filipescu superimposed them on traditional conservative values (such as monarchism, elitism, and a patriarchal organization of society), and combined them with modern political themes, such as the idea of the regeneration of the nation through the action of a youth elite educated in

military-religious values, according to the principles of the progressive pedagogy. Filipescu also set the conservative-military discourse on a new intellectual basis represented by the two new "prophets of the nation": the Romantic "national" poet Mihai Eminescu and the historian-politician Nicolae Iorga. According to Iorga, Eminescu was not just a "great poet," but "the educator himself, the creator of high and noble thoughts" insofar as "we and our generation are, above all, his own [disciples]."[4] In the spirit of Eminescu's political thought, Iorga redefined the nationalist doctrine as a militant and exclusive faith, above party politics and incompatible with other political doctrines. On the long run, this shift obscured the intellectual origins of the ideology of national salvation in Heliade's palingenetic ideology.

The keystone of the new nationalist faith remained the ideal of national unity, fulfilled in 1918 through the creation of Greater Romania. During the interwar period, the tradition of the palingenetic ideology of national regeneration was continued at the official level, in a renewed campaign of sacralizing the unified nation, having as main components the reburial of Michael the Brave's skull in 1920, the coronation of King Ferdinand in Alba Iulia in 1922, the erection of the monument of the unknown soldier in Bucharest in 1923, and the construction of the mausoleum at Mărășești (1923–1938). This tradition of sacralizing politics inspired new rebel, antidemocratic political movements. The most important of them was the Legion "Archangel Michael," an organization based on the violent subculture of a group of young nationalist fanatics. The Legion promoted, in the spirit of the nationalist tradition of Romantic inspiration, a theological type of palingenetic ideology according to which the salvation of humanity would be the result of a global struggle of the "elect nation" against the forces of decay, following the behavioral model of *imitatio Christi*.

Apparently, Codreanu did not implement major innovations to the Romantic doctrine of messianic nationalism. Most of the elements of Legionary palingenetic ideology had already been elaborated in the prewar period, namely the ideas of the divine election and the manifest destiny of the Romanians, fears of degeneration centered on rabid antisemitism, the idea of regeneration, its codification in the cult of Michael the Brave and his patron saint, the Archangel Michael, the cult of the martyrs, and the central role assigned to the army and the values of militarism in the regeneration of the nation. At the level of political practice, there had already been experiments by the conservative *elite* in institutionalizing this palingenetic myth through new forms of education and the socialization of the youth based on a combination of Romantic nationalism, religion, and militarism that provided sources of inspiration. As a specific product of the elite Dealu military school, Codreanu internalized the main tenets of Romantic nationalism and militarism, being determined to continue the spirit of the Dealu military academy in interwar Romania.

These lines of continuity should not conceal, however, the major innovations the Legion introduced in the Romanian national ideology and political practice. The new post-war generation was socialized in the nationalist political

faith by Nicolae Iorga's school, but its vision and political actions were nevertheless adapted to new circumstances and implemented by different methods. The archeologist Vladimir Dumitrescu—a leading Legionary whose political vision was shaped by Iorga's historical and political writings, the program of the *Action française*, and Henryk Sienkiewicz's messianic novels—underscored the continuity but also the rift between Iorga's teachings and the Legionaries, the latter being determined to die for their faith:

> Popular wisdom tells one that you should not do what the priest does, but what the priest teaches you. And Iorga was the priest of a faith which he himself has betrayed. … We have not betrayed [the cause] as he did, we carried the cross of our faith until the end, many of us embracing this true faith after Nicolae Iorga had abjured it not only once but a thousand times. … Some died long ago [in the service of this faith], others are dying now, while I am writing, and the ones who have survived are about to share the same fate.[5]

What were the main innovations introduced by the Legion in the messianic doctrine of national salvation? First, the Legion was successful in appropriating the palingenetic myth, claiming the custody of the cult of heroes, and presenting itself as the only "legitimate" continuator of the fight for national emancipation and as a divine instrument of salvation and redemption. Second, the Legion reinterpreted the palingenetic myth, adapting it to the specific historical context of interwar Romania and imbuing it with a renewed apocalyptic sense of urgency, based on the alleged danger of degeneration at the hand of the "Judeo-Bolshevik" conspiracy which threatened the very existence of the nation. Third, the Legion amplified many themes that were only latently present in earlier theories of palingenesis, such as the emphasis on salvation through the expiations of sins, ideas of metempsychosis as a form of national solidarity, and mysticism based on a communion with God mediated by the divine vocation and actions of the charismatic leader and of the movements' martyrs, in many ways standing in for a clerical caste. The latter became a defining mark of the Legion: although highly influenced by pre-Marxist Christian Socialism, for Heliade the mystical components of palingenesis were limited to the scriptural foundations of his philosophical system and religious symbols such as annunciation, suffering, redemption, and purification.[6] The Legion invoked, by and large, the same Christian themes and symbols, but intensified them, blending them into a new fascist ideological matrix.

Fourth, the Legion had an anti-establishment, revolutionary character, evident in its charismatic nature, in its paramilitary organization, in its employment of violent means of political combat, in its totalitarian drive, and in its attempt to forge a new elite to replace the country's old "degenerated" elite. This was, again, a major political innovation, since Heliade's palingenetic socio-political thought—which provided the foundation of the palingenetic doctrine of national

salvation—lacked a revolutionary dimension, opting instead for evolutionary reforms from above. We find a revolutionary dimension in the palingenetic theory of Bălcescu; however, an ardent democrat, the Wallachian revolutionary promoted a liberal political project, his declared goal being the establishment of a democratic republic. True, in the Romantic period, all the dominant palingenetic theories of regeneration—such as the ones promoted by Heliade, Bălcescu, and Brătianu—regarded the nation as the main object of collective salvation. Yet, the political ideals of these theories were progressive and democratic, having as main goals the struggle against tyranny, the enlightenment of people through education and social emancipation, and the belief in the principle of self-determination founded on the natural right of nations to existence. The patriotism of the Romantics was, therefore, interwoven with universalism.

Soon, however, nationalist political discourses were to take exclusive or even xenophobic connotations, directed against "external" as well as "internal" enemies. In fact, the palingenetic theory of the superiority of Romanian patriarchalism developed by Heliade already included antisemitic and xenophobic overtones. In this intellectual scheme, the cause of *Romanianism* was identified with "the good," while denouncing foreigners and their influence (*străinismului*) as "evil," a feature which undermined its universalism. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the idea of the national revolution was explicitly coupled with antiliberal political projects characterized by populism, antisemitism, and social Darwinism. While at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Greeks, in general, and the Phanariots and their political clientele, in particular, were blamed as the agents of Romanian national degeneration, in the second half of the nineteenth century, their place was taken by the Jews, presented in the public sphere as strangers and intruders.[7] This trend was heightened at the turn of the century, when antisemitism became a central vector of domestic political life, being championed by new political leaders such as A. C. Cuza.[8] In the interwar period, the Legion went much further in this right-wing political orientation. On the one hand, it promoted the implementation of a totalitarian political project, advocating the replacement of a pluralist political system with a single party dictatorship, the remodeling of the state on corporatist principles, and a patriarchal organization of social and gender relations. On the other hand, the Legion militated for the implementation of a policy of "purifying" the nation by removing certain national minorities from the territory of Romania, first and foremost the Jews, presented in the Legionary propaganda as agents of degradation.

Another innovation of the Legion, specific to the era of interwar mass politics, was the central role assigned to the charismatic leader in the transformation of society. Surely, charismatic authority was not a new phenomenon in Romanian politics. The Romantic tradition of messianic nationalism had already established the role of intellectuals and nationalist activists as "apostles" of regeneration, having as emblematic figures the professor Gheorghe Lazăr, the poet Ion Heliade Rădulescu, and the historian-politician Nicolae Iorga, among others. However, in the interwar period, the conjunction of state-building and mass

politics produced an explosive form of charismatic nationalism. The Legion managed to give a new form and content to the doctrine of messianic nationalism. Its ideology adopted ideas on the predestined role of the youth, in general, and of the new post-war generation, in particular, for the radical transformation of society. It also merged the idea of generational messianism with the cult of Codreanu, presented as a charismatic leader invested with a divine mission to save the nation from decay. The principle of charismatic leadership shaped the organization of the movement: the Legion exercised a new type of charismatic authority, demanding from its members total and unconditional devotion to the leader, consecrated in oath-taking ceremonies. The Legion also promoted new forms of political organization and activism, based on (para)military values and new mechanisms of socialization and education aimed at the creation of new fascist men and women.

Finally, the sacred foundations of the Legionary doctrine of national salvation challenged its ideologues to spell out the movement's relation to the Orthodox Church and its dogma. Due to overlapping themes, rituals, and membership, this challenging task received diverse and even contradictory answers. This book presented prominent attempts to interpret the Legion's *charismatic nationalism* through the prism of theology, developed, among others, by Nae Ionescu and Gheorghe Racoveanu, by the lay aristocratic leader Alexandru Cantacuzino, and by the priest Ilie Imbrescu. These discourses should not be mistaken for attempts to reconcile Legionary ideology with the Orthodox Church and its dogma, but as explicit attempts to *subordinate* the church to the new fascist political faith. Capitalizing on the transcendental dimension of the Legion's charismatic nationalism, Legionary theologians claimed the *superiority* of the Legionary faith over Orthodox dogma, underscoring the Legionaries' divine mission and proposing an alternative road to "national salvation" through violent sacrifice. Although this path to salvation openly contradicted the position of the Orthodox Church, it was allegedly in line with God's divine will and the religious tradition of the Romanian people.

Fascist Terrorism as Faith-Making Martyrdom

The study of the Legion's history provides new insights into the dynamics of youth radicalization in interwar Europe, the employment of terrorism in fascist ideology and practice, the co-dynamism of fascist terrorism and state counterterrorism, and the spiral of violence these intertwined processes generated. As far as the social composition of the Legion is concerned, this book has argued, following the neo-Weberian theoretical perspective advanced by Bryan Turner, that the driving social force behind the violent Legionary political faith was resentment: its ideology can be classified as a "theodicy of the underprivileged," understood as a derivate salvific religion, which attracted followers from the underprivileged classes, who—although not necessarily poor—resented their marginality and powerlessness: "While the dominant classes wanted legitimacy, the subordinate

strata wanted compensation and, in the absence of compensation, revenge," Turner pointed out.[9] Empowered by a resentful drive for both material compensation and revenge, the Legionary faith became a powerful force for societal change; its "this-worldly orientation" imprinted upon it a revolutionary social role.

These Legionary resentments led to self-sacrificial actions of violent revenge. The founding acts of the Legion were terroristic. The 1923 student plot and the crimes committed by the two foremost leaders of the movement, Moța and Codreanu, became models to be emulated by other fighters, channeling various kinds of lonely *desperado* grievances into terrorist attacks as a dominant form of political violence. In the early 1930s, spontaneous grass roots acts of violence, such as the assassination attempts by Berza and Socor, pressured the Legion to systematize terrorist initiatives into a planned campaign of political violence. To this end, the Legion set up death squads, conceived as a form of group martyrdom pursuing well-defined revenge missions.

The main Legionary assassinations, namely the ones against Prime Ministers I. G. Duca in 1933 and Armand Călinescu in 1939, as well as that against their former comrade Mihai Stelescu in 1936, qualify as terrorist attacks because they were premeditated acts of violence committed for political purposes against non-combat targets by clandestine perpetrators of an armed organization.[10] It is also important to note that all these actions encompassed a quasi-suicidal component: the death squads were conceived as self-sacrificial units committed to the idea of martyrdom for the fascist cause. Legionary terrorists were expected to sacrifice their life in mission. Invariably, after fulfilling their missions, all attackers gave themselves up to police and expected retribution for their deeds; the authorities eventually executed all of them, either on the spot (as happened with the Miti Dumitrescu team in 1939), or well afterward (as with the *Nicadori* and the *Decemviri*, in 1938). Technically, these terrorist acts were thus not classical suicide attacks but *martyrdom-seeking operations*.

In judging the tactical functions of terrorism, it should be noted that the Legionaries did not attack armed military objectives, but soft targets: unarmed civilians. The ad hoc and small-scale nature of their attacks proves that the Legionaries were not interested primarily in the military impact of their acts, but in the creation of martyrs (either as political prisoners or as dead heroes). This goal explains the terrorist acts' conspicuous lack of "efficiency": e.g., the killing of a single "enemy"—Stelescu—was made at the expense of no less than ten "martyrs." The Legionaries were also keen to capitalize on the psychological effect of their unexpected attacks upon their enemies and society at large. In this respect, they benefited from—and efficiently exploited—the exceptional media attention devoted to these attacks, which increased their notoriety. This form of "propaganda by the deed" was meant to prove to the general public the Legionaries' high degree of commitment, fanaticism, and determination to reach their political goals by violent means.

Moța and Marin's voluntary sacrifices illustrated yet another peculiar practice employed by the Legion for producing martyrs: demonstrative sacrifice

for political purposes. Although they occurred in armed combat, Moța and Marin's deaths cannot be classified as 'Christian martyrdom,' as claimed by the Legionaries. First, Moța and Marin did not suffer a violent death at the hand of the Legion's internal enemy, the democratic state; they died in the Spanish Civil War, fighting as volunteers on Franco's side. Second, the two were not enrolled in a regular army; the Legionary delegation was only engaged in propagandistic fighting operations on the Spanish front. Technically, Moța and Marin were thus fallen volunteers for the fascist cause.

Overall, these innovative practices patented a new way of doing politics. The Legion's political faith, charismatic style of politics, and terrorist actions became characteristic features of the movement in the eyes of the contemporary. It is telling in this respect that, on July 24, 1936, the General Inspectorate of Police in Cernăuți reported that "the Legionaries present the crimes they committed or will commit as heroic deeds, which will remain in history." It pointed out that "the mystique that characterizes the Legionaries increasingly demonstrates that what Corneliu Codreanu created, following political aims, is not a political organization but rather a religious sect of a terrorist character." The report then concluded that the social profile of the Legion was very heterogeneous, but that all members were devoted entirely to the charismatic leader: "Codreanu is no longer regarded as a [political] chief but as a representative of God, sent to remove the evils that affect the Romanian country."[11] Reportedly, Codreanu was regarded even by his own family as "the reincarnation of the Archangel Michael" and his "living icon" on earth.[12] Legionaries were advised to "venerate, in their house, the icon of Jesus Christ and of Corneliu Codreanu."[13] Faith in the mission of the charismatic leader accounted for the fanaticism of the Legionaries: "With such beliefs, the Legionaries go to death or commit crimes without fear of God because they execute the orders of his messenger on earth; they do not fear men either, because the divine messenger accounts for his orders only in front of God."[14]

How vital was the Legionary political faith in the evolution of the movement? Can the Legionary ideology and practice be "reduced" to its political faith dimension? Surely, similarly to other fascist movements, the Legion had a multifaceted and often contradictory nature that cannot be described in view of a single characteristic. First, as shown in this book, its composite membership was an aggregate of multiple factions and groupings, each one with its specific worldview, social interests, and relation to religion. Most leaders were Orthodox believers, but few of them were Roman or Eastern Catholics. Some leaders, such as Codreanu and Moța, were genuinely religious, while others, such as Mihail Polihroniade and Vasile Marin, believed in secular politics or joined the Legion animated by purely pragmatic or economic reasons. Yet, I argue that *the Legion's political faith was the central, most integrative aspect of its collective belief-system*, subsuming all other components. This feature illuminates the strength but also the weakness of the movement. On the one hand, it accounts for the Legion's proselytizing force and the fanaticism and devotion of its followers, many of

them ready to sacrifice their lives for the movement. On the other hand, the dogmatic nature of the faith inhibited the political development of the movement, imprinting on it a self-destructive nature. It is revealing in this respect that Polihroniade was dissatisfied with Codreanu's strategy of political passivism during the establishment of the royal dictatorship, arguing that state repression was facilitated by the Legion's policy of focusing on "religious services and funerals" rather than militant politics.[15] Although after 1940 Sima tried to imprint on the Legion a more pragmatic political orientation, the charismatic scenario embedded in its faith had become a self-fulfilling prophecy, subduing political goals. The Legion's orientation toward symbolic politics was also encouraged by General Antonescu, who utilized the Legion as an instrument of mass mobilization and legitimization centered on the aestheticization of politics but who was reluctant to grant it autonomous governing powers. Aware of Antonescu's strategy, P. P. Panaitescu lamented that the General "removed all leading positions from the control of the Legionaries, leaving them only the cult of the dead."[16]

The Legionary Faith and Romanian Politics: Impacts, Strategies of Deradicalization, and Legacies

What were the impacts of the Legion on Romania's political life? As was the case everywhere in Europe, political life in post-1918 Romania was generally characterized by the acute polarization of rival ideological outlooks. Although the country emerged victorious from the war, the process of democratic consolidation was hampered by numerous structural crises generated by regional cleavages and ethnoreligious tensions. The regime of unconsolidated democracy that functioned in interwar Romania proved unable to curb right-wing political extremism. The Legion managed to challenge the parliamentary political system because representative institutions were too weak to serve as a stable basis of popular consensus. At the same time, the government often lacked adequate legal means to exercise its executive power, a strong political will, or well-designed policies to bring such a complex operation to a successful end. This book also points out the responsibility of members of political elites, who sponsored the Legion intending to manipulate its action against their own enemies or for countering the communist "danger."

Ideological conflicts were further aggravated during the 1930s, a decade that was marked by the collapse of most liberal democracies in Europe and the emergence and consolidation of authoritarian regimes. Its multiple flaws notwithstanding, it is important to note that the pluralist political regime that existed under the 1923 Constitution survived until 1937, while the southern and northeastern parts of the continent had already succumbed to authoritarianism. Nevertheless, in the late 1930s, politics in Romania came to be dominated by the confrontation of pluralist versus dictatorial forces. In the end, the latter prevailed, their rule unleashing a period of political experimentation with hybrid ideological and institutional forms. Manifold domestic and external reasons account

for the gradual but steady departure from democratic politics: the pressure for change from the part of radical movements that found themselves on the fringes of the political system and which wanted to remodel the sociopolitical system to their advantage; the profound impact of the economic crisis that destabilized the country's fragile socio-economic balance; the authoritarian tendencies of Carol II; and the geopolitical pressure exercised by Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.

In this context, the 1937 elections led to a continuum of dictatorships, each with different ideological emphases and supported by different social strata. Brought to power briefly in December 1937, the National Christian Party (NCP) was unable to transcend its regional and ideological limits and to bring the conservative right together into a broad coalition. Its time in government served as a forerunner of Carol II's dictatorship. Proclaimed in February 1938, the royal dictatorship revived the prewar patterns of sacralizing politics uniting the throne, the army, and the church, in a new, authoritarian fashion: Carol's cult of personality as a providential savior replaced the democratic discourse on the constitutional monarchy; a single party rule replaced political pluralism; and the youth was indoctrinated with a new official ideology of national messianism based on "faith, work, and the national idea." The regime employed the rhetoric of change, legitimized by a comprehensive plan for socio-economic modernization centered on the figure of the providential monarch.

The nature of this royal dictatorship changed significantly over time. Initially, the regime stood on a resolute antifascist platform and enjoyed the support of the traditional elites. In 1940, due mainly to foreign policy considerations, antifascist attitude was replaced by fascistization and cooperation with the Legion "Archangel Michael." Although it can be argued that this change was dictated by pragmatic geopolitical considerations, it is nevertheless undeniable that the regime increasingly turned toward nationalist and antisemitic interest groups. This spectacular political acrobatics could not save Carol's rule. Territorial losses and the ambivalent policy toward the Legion delegitimized the royal dictatorship, leading to Carol II's abdication and paving the way for the Legion's rule.

Proclaimed on September 14, 1940, the National Legionary State represents the third attempt to establish a fascist regime without foreign aid, similar to Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany.[17] During its brief time in government, the Legion tried to build a totalitarian state by replacing the multiparty system with a single-party dictatorship, by reshaping the state along corporatist lines, and by advocating an ethnic understanding of citizenship and a patriarchal organization of gender and social relations. However, the Legion failed to establish a long-lasting regime. The reasons for its failure are multiple, ranging from the charismatic and thus unstable nature of its political legitimacy to its fragmented internal organization and leadership crisis, and the effective blockage to full power exercised by the army. First, despite its claim to have come to power as a result of a grass roots revolution against the king's tyrannical rule, the Legion was brought into office following negotiations with General Antonescu and was thus forced to share power with the army. To ensure this cohabitation, the Legion had to make significant

concessions and renounce its most radical demands. Second, the Legion's program was consciously undermined by Carol II and General Antonescu, both utilizing selected elements of the Legionary program within an authoritarian political framework. Finally, the escalation of violence to unprecedented heights during the Legion's short rule and unruly attacks against civilians and the army compromised the movement in the eyes of the public and decertified its claims to victimization.

After the Legion's removal from power, the nature of Antonescu's regime gradually changed. Antonescu developed his own charismatic cult, presenting himself as the country's real savior, a guarantor of law and order, and a fighter for Romania's territorial unity. Although the Antonescu regime lacked the support of a grass roots political movement and relied mainly on the army, the police, and the gendarmerie to enforce its rule, it cannot be classified as merely a military dictatorship. While generally military dictatorships do not have a ruling ideology, Antonescu's regime was motivated by the principles of integral nationalism, characterized by antisemitism and xenophobia against ethnoreligious minorities. This policy culminated with the deportation and partial extermination of Jews and the Roma and the organized persecution of non-Orthodox religious groups, cults, and sects. Moreover, although on the surface, the regime appeared tolerant of the political opposition, allowing traditional elites limited freedom of expression, the regime was averse to democratically elected institutions, promoting the concentration of power in the hands of an almighty dictator.

Overall, from 1937 to 1944, Romanian political life illustrates the process of hybridization of dictatorial regimes, combining conservative, authoritarian, and fascist elements. The fluidity of these experiments is remarkable, as evident in the transition from an antifascist to a fascitized royal dictatorship, and from a fascist regime to a xenophobic, conservative-nationalist military dictatorship. While these regimes were apparently hostile to one another, each successive regime inherited major ideological themes, legislation, and institutions from those preceding it. One example of continuity among these regimes is their aversion to the constitutional parliamentary system, insofar as each dictatorial regime took additional steps toward the absolute concentration of power. Another example of continuity was the antisemitic legislation that was first adopted by the NCP in 1937, then extended under the royal dictatorship in 1940, comprehensively developed by the National Legionary State in 1940–1941, and further systematized and fully implemented by the Antonescu regime through its collapse in 1944. Beyond these continuities, it is important to stress that Romania's complex "family of authoritarians" was unable to forge a grand coalition or agree on a particular form of government but remained fragmented among rival political groupings. Despite concerted efforts, neither the NCP, nor Carol II, or Antonescu were able to unify the authoritarian right.

The main stumbling block in this respect was the tension between the conservative right and the fascist Legion "Archangel Michael." The three political regimes devised different strategies to cope with the Legion, made up of a

mixture of hostile tolerance, harsh repression, and attempts at political neutralization or co-optation. The Legion thrived under the regime of unconsolidated democracy, marked by corruption and the inconsistent rule of law. Romania's main democratic parties banned the Legion, set its leaders on trial, and used harsh police measures to crack down on its activities. In the process, Romania became the first country in Europe to adopt explicit antiterrorist legislation. The legal measures meant to *deradicalize* the movement proved inefficient, however, as the Legion turned into a mass party rather than becoming extinct.

Conversely, the movement proved more vulnerable to state repression under authoritarian regimes. Its access to full power was successfully blocked by traditional elites on at least two occasions: in 1937–1938, by Carol II in alliance with the church and parts of the traditional elites; and in September 1940 by General Antonescu, as the head of the army, in alliance with conservative elite factions. Carol II was the first to initiate a program of re-education of Legionaries in internment camps, employing a wide range of strategies, from religious ceremonies of oath abjuring to official declarations of faith renunciation and co-optation to the new regime in leading positions.[18] These strategies yielded limited results, however, with most Legionaries resuming their activity after Carol's abdication with renewed vigor. Carol II's harsh repression proved equally unproductive. While it did decapitate and thereby weaken the movement, it also bestowed on it an aura of martyrdom, thus unintentionally paving the way to the Legion's bid for power. General Antonescu proved more successful than Carol II in eliminating the Legion from the political scene. While apparently sharing the power with the Legion, Antonescu cunningly forced it into a narrow legal-institutional setup. Although Antonescu granted the Legion full monopoly over the country's administration, he systematically exposed its reckless actions. The repression against the movement in January 1941 could thus be convincingly justified as part of a campaign to restore "law and order." What followed was a skillfully orchestrated repression that made use of military tribunals (rather than jury courts) to prosecute the Legionaries. Overall, despite their success in containing the Legion, conservative politicians failed for a long time to understand the uncompromising nature of fascism, repeatedly entertaining hopes of manipulating it for their purposes. Attempts to co-opt the Legion failed in 1937, 1938, and 1940. In the end, unable to uproot the Legionary faith, dictatorial regimes resorted to strategies of physical elimination either through assassinations or by sending Legionaries to the front line of the war against the Soviet Union.

On August 23, 1944, the Antonescu regime was overthrown by a *coup d'état* led by Michael I, with help from a broad political coalition that included the National Liberal Party (NLP) and the National Peasant Party (NPP). As a result of this act, Romania exited the Axis alliance and joined the antifascist coalition. The 1923 Constitution was reinstated, the multiparty regime restored, and preparations made for parliamentary elections. This democratic interlude lasted only for six months, however. On March 6, 1945, another radical, revolutionary-minded party captured political power: the Communists. Outlawed in 1924

because of its subordination to Moscow and its campaign for the break-up of Greater Romania, the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) re-entered political life in August 1944 and captured the government by forging the 1945 national parliamentary elections. Under communist rule and Soviet patronage, Romania plunged into another long-lasting totalitarian experiment in social engineering. In the new political context, some Legionaries joined the armed anticommunist resistance until it was eventually liquidated in the mid-1950s. Many other Legionaries joined the Communist Party, however, and, in exchange for political amnesty, contributed directly to the destruction of the "Old Regime" and the construction of the new totalitarian party-state. In the early 1950s, this experiment in political co-optation on an anti-Western, antidemocratic, and antiliberal platform came to an abrupt end. With the consolidation of the Communist regime, former Legionaries were purged and imprisoned, their "saint relics" dispersed and their *lieux des memoires* further de-sacralized. With the abolition of the monarchy in 1947 and the full communist takeover, the conservative doctrine of national salvation uniting the throne, the church, and the army under the sign of Archangel Michael was also discontinued, being replaced by an exclusivist communist political faith.

The communist regime initiated a vast re-education program targeting former Legionaries, which included punitive measures (imprisonment, deprivation of civil and political rights, strict surveillance), but also a path to political rehabilitation and eventual co-optation as secret police informers or official propaganda collaborators. The archives of the Communist political police, *Securitatea*, preserve a high number of files documenting the process of re-education of former Legionaries, be they top leaders or rank and file members. These files prove that the Communist authorities were well aware of the deep-seated religious aspect to its ideology and that the way to co-opt these cadres, or at least to neutralize the possibility of an internal fascist revival, was through heavy-handed secularization via re-education. This program involved a set of mandatory "rehabilitation rituals," including a written declaration of repentance, of abjuring the fascist faith, antireligious condemnations, but also a formal adherence to the precepts of Marxism, and loyalty to the RCP. Upon liberation from prison, the behavior of former Legionaries was strictly monitored until the authorities were convinced of the sincerity of the renunciation of their faith and their successful integration into the socialist society.

The formal declaration of faith renunciation was a central part of the process of rehabilitation. The statement had to be ample and comprehensive and had to include an explicit condemnation of the Legionary doctrine as irrational and blasphemous. For example, in a written statement issued in the Aiud Prison on July 19, 1962, the leading Legionary Radu Budişteanu—former Minister of Cults in the Gigurtu government, arrested in 1948 and sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment—underscored the contradiction between the professed Christian character of the Legion and its employment of violence.[19] He also denounced Codreanu's autocratic style of leadership based on the axiom "The leader is

of the divine essence," stating that "Corneliu Codreanu was nothing else but a human being. The Legionary mystique cannot turn him into a saint." He concluded, in a secular spirit: "The time of bigots has passed. In our age, they have been substituted by reason."[20] These template-like ideological statements did not seem sincere, however. The *Securitate* informants around Budișteanu pointed out that, despite his formal cooperation, he remained hostile to the new regime.[21]

In a similar vein, Nicolae Petrașcu—a former Secretary-General of the Legion and a close collaborator of both Codreanu and Sima, who was sentenced to life imprisonment but released in 1964—condemned the Legion's violence and fanaticism from a secular perspective. In several written statements, but also prison lectures to other Legionary inmates, Petrașcu denounced Codreanu as a religious fanatic, a mystical person dominated by "retrograde religious practices," i.e., his attempts to "consult" Archangel Michael and the dead Moța "when he had to make a decision." The Captain imprinted on the Legion his traits and character, committing it to crime and violence. The Legionary doctrine thus gave birth to a quasireligious sect: "We believed in Codreanu and never asked ourselves why we believed in him and where we were going, but took the oath of allegiance and sang hymns of glory."[22] This blind faith in their leader turned many Legionaries into "mutilated souls, some wanting to become monks, living in caves, and feeding on roots. They have reached such a degree of darkness in their minds that they can no longer distinguish between the times of today and those in which people lived in primitive conditions."[23] Just as in Budișteanu's case, in the long run, these claims did not prove sincere. According to a *Securitate* informer, in a private discussion that took place in 1962, Petrașcu was still convinced that "[t]he Legionary movement is a Romanian way of living the Christian idea of politics, it represents an independent, unitary and original conception, which should not be confused with Christianism."[24]

In addition to individual statements, the *Securitate* encouraged Legionaries to write collective works of condemnation that could be used in prison re-education "clubs" or target the general public. Three former Legionaries, Vasiliu Constantin, Constantin Grigoriu, and Dumitru Popovici, authored such a pedagogical brochure. Written from a Marxist perspective, the brochure was virulently anti-Legionary but also antireligious.[25] Building on their own lived experience in the Legion but also on oral history accounts by other inmates,[26] the three former Legionaries denounced upfront "the reactionary and criminal nature of the Legion."[27] The brochure responded to the authors' "imperative need to pull us out of the clutches of this monstrosity and to take an attitude against it," but it was also meant to assist other former Legionaries to "renew and purify their consciousness, a sustained effort in the work of ennobling and crafting the new man."[28]

The pamphlet denounced the manipulative nature of religion, in general, and of Christianity in particular. In order to prove that *Legionarism* was a related yet blasphemous version of Christianity, it drew a parallel between the two, focusing

on the charismatic cult of Codreanu and on practices of sacrifice and redemption. These conscious forms of *imitatio Christi* culminated in the tendency to sanctify Codreanu as a godly creature, as evidenced by the use of prayers "in the name of the Father, the Son, the Captain, and the Holy Spirit."[29] This syncretism between Christianity and fascism, and the alliance between the Legion and the Orthodox Church, "which sometimes went as far as to fusion," led to a hybrid faith, combining Christianity and *Legionarism*:

> We all believed firmly in the genius of Codreanu's teaching and in the universality of Christian teachings. We combined the two, amplifying our faith, but we lost touch with reality. This hampered our reasoning, turning us into miserable, easy-to-manipulate persons. In the process, we fabricated illusory arguments for ourselves, in order to justify our diversion. It seemed to us that we were reasoning and even that we were right. We did not realize that both faith in Jesus Christ and faith in Codreanu were in reverse proportion to reason. In other words, the more we believed in the two, the more we were extinguishing in us the flame of reason, and the other way around, the more we were reasoning the faster we were extinguishing the flame of faith in the two.[30]

The authors argued that "*Legionarism*, in its criminal outburst, deformed Christianism, forging genuine blasphemies and departing flagrantly from the Christian ethics."[31] Yet, these blasphemous strategies were so successful in enrolling the masses that "if, by absurdity, *Legionarism* would have lasted for a thousand years and would have managed to turn the culture and civilization that stand in its way to dust, it would have surely come to the point of seeing Codreanu as the son of God born by the virgin, crucified and resurrected from the dead, etc."[32] The inmates' renunciation of *Legionarism* was portrayed as a return to reason, a genuine awakening from hypnosis: "In adolescence, we assigned to Codreanu the values of good and truth, on the basis of faith. We had strong feelings of attachment that helped us attack, resist, and justify. A work of reeducation was needed to break these ties. Each of us has begun to harvest the fruits [of reeducation] only after he started to judge objectively."[33] The former Legionaries acknowledged that the process of re-education was extremely difficult, because "for a believer, rational arguments are inaccessible." The three authors concluded with a mobilizing appeal: "In a new world, let each of us become a new man. For the destruction of our faith, we still have many enemies to defeat." Although challenging, the process was particularly rewarding because "we are not prevailing against an external enemy, but against our old mentality and habits."[34] In the end, the antireligious language of the authors took on an explicitly Marxist character. The success of re-education, and the achievements of the new regime, were facilitated, they argued, by the fact that "all transformations are in line with the objective laws of development" professed by scientific socialism.

Despite these concerted efforts, communist authorities were unable to eradicate the Legion fully. After the collapse of the communist dictatorship in 1989, the symbolic confrontation among monarchic, nationalist, and democratic perspectives on Romanian national identity resurfaced with vigor. On the one hand, the Royal House of Romania and the Orthodox Church have discreetly revived the monarchic doctrine of national salvation centered on the figure of Archangel Michael as its patron saint. It is telling in this respect that Michael I visited the Mausoleum of Mărăşeşti on November 8, 2004, on the feast day of Archangel Michael, and inaugurated the Museum of the Romanian Veteran, thus re-establishing the symbolic link between the monarchy, the cult of the army and of the war heroes, and the Archangel Michael as the guardian angel of the Romanians and of their royal house. On the same occasion, Michael I was proclaimed an honorary citizen of Mărăşeti, the martyr city of Romania's fight for union in World War I. Moreover, the new royal necropolis built near the medieval cathedral at Curtea de Argeş, where Michael I was buried on December 16, 2018, is dedicated to the Archangels Michael and Gabriel, just like the 1922 Cathedral of the Coronation.[35] In a similar vein, in 2002 the Metropolitan of Transylvania, Bartolomeu Anania (a former Legionary), established the "Prince Michael" Monastery (*Mănăstirea Mihai Vodă*) on the place of Michael the Brave's grave in Turda, dedicated to the Archangels Michael and Gabriel.[36]

On the other hand, the Legionary "Archangelic" doctrine of national salvation through martyrdom proved not only enduring but also adaptive to the new circumstances, being employed in the post-communist period as means to rehabilitate the movement. Taking advantage of their newly gained political freedom, former Legionary interest groups living in Romania or in exile, joined by new converts, attempted to revive the Legion in new garments.[37] Although these initiatives failed to coagulate into a mass party, they were nevertheless successful in reaffirming and in popularizing the basic tenets of the Legionary faith. Legionaries imprisoned under Antonescu and the communist regime are presented to the general public as behavioral role models in view of their perseverance and endurance in preserving their political faith under harsh state repression. Once again, just like in the Legionary doctrine, prison suffering is seen as a way of bestowing sacrality on the nation, hence calls to glorify Legionary detainees as leading anticommunist fighters and martyrs for the national cause and officially to sanctify them as "prison saints" and Christian Orthodox "martyrs of the cross."[38] These views disregard the fact that the Legionaries were not fighting communism animated by democratic values, but in the name of another, rival totalitarian ideology, fascism, focused on the idea of regeneration through violent cleansing. In reaction to these rehabilitation attempts that resulted in a genuine "nostalgia industry," Law 217 adopted in 2015 banned Legionary propaganda and the cult of Legionary leaders convicted for crimes against humanity, classifying them as fascists. The adoption of the law revived the passionate societal debates about the nature of the Legion and the relationship between its political faith and Romanian national ideology.[39] It is my hope that this book

contributes to bringing additional clarity to this politicized debate—at a time when new, more chameleonic mass extremist movements emerge with vigor on the political scene—by exposing such salvific political faiths as *cul-de-sac*, self-fulfilling prophecies leading to fanaticism, violence, and destruction.

Notes

1 Tomoiagă, *Ion Eliade Rădulescu*, esp. 33, 36, 40.
2 Ion Heliade-Rădulescu, *Curs întregu de poesie generale* (Bucureşti: Tipografia Lucrătorii Asociaţi,1868), vol. 1, XXXIII.
3 Popovici, *Ideologia literară*. On Heliade as a cultural intermediary and his utopian thinking, see Sorin Antohi, "La originile utopismului românesc: mentalităţi şi evenimente," in *Civitas Imaginalis. Istorie şi utopie în cultura română* (Iaşi: Polirom, 1999), 20–43.
4 Nicolae Iorga, *Eminescu. El, generaţia lui şi generaţia noastră. O conferinţă la Bucureşti* (Văleni de Munte: Datina Românească, 1929), 1, 13.
5 Dumitrescu, *Mărturiile unui "criminal politic,"* 30–31.
6 Tomoiagă, *Ion Eliade Rădulescu*, 56.
7 Iordachi, *Liberalism*, 593–596.
8 Ibid., 392–398.
9 Turner, "Max Weber and the spirit of resentment," 84.
10 For a *definition*, see United States Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2002), 1.
11 ACNSAS, Fond Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, vol. 8, 260.
12 Ibid., 64.
13 Ibid., 261.
14 Ibid.
15 Răzvan Codrescu, "Prefaţă," in Dumitrescu, *Mărturiile unui "criminal politic,"* 20.
16 P. P. Panaitescu, "Pentru ce," *Cuvântul*, January 24, 1941, in Scurtu, et al., *Ideologie*, vol. VII, 85.
17 Weber, "The Men of the Archangel," 103.
18 For *example*, on November 7, 1939, in the Caransebeş camp, Acrivu Gheorghe demanded "to be removed from the list of former Legionaries because I hereby declare that I am no longer part of the former Iron Guard organization. I also declare that I am dissociating myself from any subversive actions against the country's interests and I condemn the assassination of Prime Minister Armand Calinescu at such difficult times for our beloved country." ACNSAS, Fond Penal, Acrivu Gheorghe P000371, vol, 2, 8.
19 ACNSAS, Fond Operativ, Radu Budisteanu I 310005, vol. 1, 141.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 ACNSAS, Fond Operativ, Petraşcu I 151086, vol. 5, 551.
23 Ibid., 473.
24 Ibid., vol. 4, 163.
25 ACNSAS, *Stud*. Ing. Vasiliu Constantin, Prof. Grigoriu Constantin, Ing. Popovici Dumitru, *Biserica creştină şi Legiunea Arhanghelului Mihail*, Club Secţia XIa, manuscript catalogued FB 5073.
26 These informants were: Nata Constantin, a priest; Langa Mihai, a technician; Dr. Stefanescu Al.; Dr. Crisan Mihai; Popa Veniamin, a priest; Anania Valeriu, a monk; Manta Dumitru, a priest; Boiangiu Petre, a priest; Grigorescu Nicolae; and Jeravleb Vasile, a worker.
27 Constantin, Grigoriu, Dumitru, *Biserica creştină*, 1.
28 Ibid., 4.

29 Ibid., 19–20.
30 Constantin, Grigoriu, Dumitru, *Biserica creştină*, 74.
31 Ibid., 4.
32 Ibid., 19.
33 Ibid., 76–77.
34 Ibid., 2.
35 See "Locul de înmormântare al Regelui *Mihai*, subiect TABU pentru Casa Regală," March 3, 2015, *Libertatea*, http://www.libertatea.ro/ultima-ora/1304335-1304335 (accessed on March 4, 2016).
36 See the website of the Monastery at http://manastirea-mihaivoda-turda.ro/istoric/ (accessed on October 10, 2018).
37 A key figure in this respect was Nicador Zelea-Codreanu (1935–2014), the son of Horia Zelea-Codreanu. After 1989, Nicador Zelea-Codreanu tried to revive the Legionary movement. In 2000, he established the Romanian Action Association (*Asociaţia Acţiunea Română*), and in 2003 he initiated the newspaper *Cuvântul Legionar*. On his activity, see http://www.frontpress.ro/2014/02/a-murit-nicador-zelea-codreanu-nepotul-intemeietorului-miscarii-legionare.html. For a selective appropriation of the Legion's political legacy, see also the Christian-nationalist movement "The New Right" (*Noua Dreaptă*) established in 2000, and acting as a registered political party since 2015. See its website: https://www.nouadreapta.org.
38 See, in this regard, the campaign for canonizing Valeriu Gafencu (1921–1952). A leader of the Brotherhood of the Cross in Iaşi, Gafencu was arrested after the Legionary rebellion in January 1941, under the Antonescu regime. Freed and then again arrested in Fall 1941, Gafencu continued to serve in prison under the Communist regime. He died at the age of 31 in the prison of Târgu Ocna, after 11 years of detention. In the post-Communist period, Gafencu is glorified in neo-Legionary writings as a martyr of the cross: see Monk Moise Sava, *The Saint of the Prisons: Notes on the Life of Valeriu Gafencu* (Sibiu Editura Agnos, 2009). Octavian Anastatescu, *Lângă Valeriu Gafencu, Sfântul închisorilor. Mărturia unui fost socialist* (Bucureşti: Editura Meditaţia, Editura Areopag, 2014). See also the sites www.sfintii-inchisorilor.ro, and www.orthodoxword.wordpress.com/.../19/a...christ-valeriu-gafencu. This public campaign bore fruits: in 2012, authorities in Târgu Ocna proclaimed Valeriu Gafencu a post-mortem honorary citizen of the city; despite public criticism, they refused to withdraw the title.
39 For a pro-Legionary condemnation of the law as "anti-national," see Cezarina Condurache, *Eroii anticomunisti şi sfinţii închisorilor Reincriminaţi de legea 217/2016* (Bucureşti: Editura Evdochimos, Fundaţia Profesor George Manu, 2015).

References

ACNSAS. Fond Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu, vol. 8.
ACNSAS. Fond Penal, Acrivu Gheorghe P000371, vol, 2.
ACNSAS. Fond Operativ, File Radu Budisteanu I 310005, vol. 1.
ACNSAS. Stud. Ing. Vasiliu Constantin, Prof. Grigoriu Constantin, Ing. Popovici Dumitru, *Biserica creştină şi Legiunea Arhanghelului Mihail*, Club Secţia XIa, manuscript catalogued FB 5073.
ACNSAS. Fond Operativ, File Petraşcu I 151086, vol. 5.
Anastatescu, Octavian. *Lângă Valeriu Gafencu, Sfântul închisorilor. Mărturia unui fost socialist*. Bucureşti: Editura Meditaţia, Editura Areopag, 2014.
Antohi, Sorin. *Civitas Imaginalis. Istorie şi utopie în cultura română*. Iaşi: Polirom, 1999.
Codrescu, Răzvan. "Prefaţă." In Dumitrescu, Vladimir. *Mărturiile unui "criminal politic"*. Bacău: Babel, 2013, 15–24.
Condurache, Cezarina. *Eroii anticomunisti şi sfinţii închisorilor Reincriminaţi de legea 217/2016*. Bucureşti: Editura Evdochimos, Fundaţia Profesor George Manu, 2015.

Dumitrescu, Vladimir. *Mărturiile unui "criminal politic."*Bacău: Babel, 2013.
Heliade-Rădulescu, Ion. *Curs întregu de poesie generale*, 2 vols. Bucureşti: Tipografia Lucrătorii Asociaţi, 1868.
Iordachi, Constantin. *Liberalism, Constitutional Nationalism, and Minorities: The Making of Romanian Citizenship, c. 1750–1918*. Leiden: Brill, 2019.
Iorga, Nicolae. *Eminescu. El, generaţia lui şi generaţia noastră. O conferinţă la Bucureşti*. Văleni de Munte: Datina Românească, 1929.
"Locul de înmormântare al Regelui Mihai, subiect TABU pentru Casa Regală" (March 3, 2015), *Libertatea*, http://www.libertatea.ro/ultima-ora/1304335-1304335 (accessed on March 4, 2016).
Popovici, Dimitrie. *Ideologia literară a lui I. Heliade Rădulescu*. Bucureşti: Cartea românească, 1935.
Sava, Moise. *The Saint of the Prisons: Notes on the Life of Valeriu Gafencu*. Sibiu: Editura Agnos, 2009.
Scurtu, Ion (coord.) et al., eds., *Ideologie şi formaţiuni de dreapta in Romania*, vol. VII: ianuarie 1941–februarie 1943. Bucureşti: INST, 2009.
Tomoiagă, Radu. *Ion Eliade Rădulescu. Ideologia social-politică şi filozofică*. Bucureşti: Editura Stiinţifică, 1971.
Turner, Bryan. "Max Weber and the Spirit of Resentment: The Nietzsche Legacy," *Journal of Classical Sociology* 11, no. 1 (2011): 75–92.
United States Department of State. *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001*. Washington, DC: United States Department of State, 2002.
Weber, Eugen. "The Man of the Archangel," *Journal of Contemporary History* 1, no. 1 (1966): 101–126.

REFERENCES

Archival Sources

The Archive of the National Council for the Study of the State Security Archives, Bucharest (Arhiva Consiliului Național pentru Studiul Arhivei Securității Statului, București, ACNSAS)

Fond Documentar
Fond Operativ

The National Historical Archive, Bucharest
(Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale, București, ANIC):

Fond Ministerul Cultelor și Instrucțiunii Publice
Fond Direcția Generală a Poliției (DGP)
Fond Ministerul de Interne, Divese (MI-D)
Fond Președenția Consiliului de Miniștrii (PCM)
Fond Miron Cristea
Fond A. C. Cuza
Fond Parlament

The National Archive of the Republic of Moldova, Chișinău
(Arhivele Naționale ale Republicii Moldova, Chișinău, ANRM):

Fond 680/1

Newspapers and Journals

Adevărul
Apostol
AXA

Buletin informativ
Buletin Legionar
Buna Vestire
Buna Vestire de Duminică
Criterion
Cruciada Românismului
Curentul
Curierul Legionar
Cuvântul
Cuvântul Argeşului
Cuvântul Studenţesc
Drum
Gândirea
Garda de Fier
Garda. Organ al Grupărei "Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu"
Glasul Strămoşesc
Iconar
Însemnări Sociologice
Legionarii
Lumea Nouă
Monitorul Oficial al României
Muncitorul Român
Neamul Românesc
Pământul Strămoşesc
Predania
Renaşterea: organul oficial al Eparhiei ortodoxe române a Vadului, Feleacului, Geoagiului şi Clujului
România
Românul
Sfarmă-piatră. Ziar de informaţie şi luptă strămoşească
Unirea
Universul
Vestul României
Vremea

Primary Sources

Abrudeanu, Ion Rusu. *Păcatele Ardealului față de Sufletul Vechiului Regat. Fapte, documente, facsimile*. București: Cartea Românească, s.a.

Achim, Viorel. *Politica Regimului Antonescu față de cultele neoprotestante: Documente*. București: Editura Institutului Național Pentru Studierea Holocaustului din România "Elie Wiesel," 2013.

"Agitații pe chestiunea dela mormântul soldatului necunoscut. Comunicatul guvernului," *Adevărul* 47, no. 15053 (Jan. 29, 1933): 1–2.

Alycon. "Un grav conflict în biserica basarabeană." *Adevărul*, no. 16180 (Oct. 22, 1936): 5.

Amintiri despre Jubileul de 40 ani de domnie a M.S. Regelui Carol I. Bucureşti: Imprimeria Statului, 1906.

Anania, Valeriu. *Memorii*. Iaşi: Polirom, 2011.

Anastasescu, Fănică. "Căpitanul." *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 49 (Dec. 1, 1940): 3.

Angelescu, Ion, and Constantin Argetoianu, eds. *Aşezământul corporativ: principii, organizare, realizări, legislaţie*. Bucureşti: Atelierele Luceafărul, 1939.

Annales de l'Université de Paris, vol. 8. Paris: La Société des amis de l'Université, 1933.

Ante-Proect de Constituţie întocmit de secţia de studii a Partidului Tărănesc. Bucureşti, Tipografia Viaţa Românească, 1922.

Antonescu, Ion. *Generalul Antonescu către ţară, 6 septemvrie 1940–22 iunie 1941*. Bucureşti: Imprimeria naţională, 1941.

———. *Temelia statului naţional-legionar: 6 septembrie 1940–6 octombrie 1940*. Bucureşti: Monitorul Oficial şi Imprimeriile Statului, Imprimeria Centrală Bucureşti, 1940.

Antonescu, Mihai A. *In serviciul justiţiei românesti; patru luni de activitate la Ministerul Justiţiei. Reforma justiţiei româneşti*. Bucureşti: Monitorul Oficial şi Imprimeriile Statului, Imprimeria Centrală, 1941.

Ardeleanu, N. Russu, ed. *Biserica noastră şi cultele minoritare. Marea discuţie parlamentară în jurul legei cultelor*. Bucureşti: Imprimeria ziarului Universal, 1928.

Argetoianu, Constantin. *Însemnări zilnice*, edited by Stelian Neagoe, vol. 4. Bucureşti: Machiavelli, 2002.

———. *Însemnări zilnice*, edited by Stelian Neagoevol, vol. 8, *1 ianuarie–21 iulie; 25 octombrie–31 decembrie 1940*. Bucureşti: Machiavelli, 2007.

Argetoianu, Constantin. *Memorii*. Bucureşti: Machiavelli, 1996.

Bacalbaşa, Constantin C. *Bucureştii de altă dată*, vol. 1: 1871–1884. Bucureşti: Universul, 1935.

Bălan, Nicolae. *Biserica neamului şi drepturile ei*. Sibiu: Tiparul Tipografiei Arhidiecezane, 1928.

———. *Biserica împotriva concordatului: declaraţiunea episcopatului Ortodox Român prezentată la discuţia pentu ratificarea concordatului, în şedinţa dela 23 Mai 1929, a Senatului Român*. Sibiu: Tiparul Tipografiei Arhidiecezane, 1927.

Ballanche, Pierre-Simon. *Essais de palingénésie sociale*, 2 vols. Paris: Imprimerie Jules Didot Ainé, 1827–29.

Banea, Ion. "Căpitanul." *AXA* II, no. 21 (Oct. 29, 1933): 1.

———. *Capitanul*. Sibiu: "Totul pentru Ţară," 1936.

———. *Ce este şi ce vrea Mişcarea legionară. Cărticică pentru săteni*. Sibiu: Curierul, 1937.

Beldiman, Dana (Honciuc). *Statul Naţional Legionar: Septembrie 1940-Ianuarie 1941. Cadrul legislative*. Bucureşti: Institutul Naţional pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, 2005.

———, and Gheorghe Buzatu, eds. *Dosar Horia Sima, 1940–1946*. Bucureşti: Evenimentul Românesc, 2000.

Bernea, Ernest. *Cartea Căpitanilor*. Bucureşti: Tipografia Bucovina, 1937.

"Biserica şi viaţa politică. Hotărârile Sf. Sinod." *Renaşterea* XV, no. 12 (Mar. 21, 1937): 1–2.

Blaga, Lucian. "Începuturile şi cadrul unei prietenii." *Gândirea* XIX, no. 4 (Apr. 1940): 223–227.

Blănaru-Flamură, V. V. *Generalul Antonescu în cămaşa verde legionară: Detronarea Regelui Carol al II-lea şi 'Rebeliunea' văzute din stradă, de la Radiodifuziunea Română şi din 'Buncărul' Antoneştilor*. Bucureşti: Sepco, 1995.

Boilă, Zaharia. *Amintiri şi consideraţii asupra mişcării legionare*. Cluj-Napoca: Biblioteca Apostrof, 2002.

Bonnet, Charles. *La palingénésie philosophique, ou Idées sur l'état passé et sur l'état futur des êtres vivants: ouvrage destiné à servir de supplément aux derniers cécrits de l'auteur et qui contient principalement le précis de ses recherches sur le christianisme*. Genève: Philibert et Chirol, 1769–1770. Available online at: http://home.tiscalinet.ch/biografien/sources/bonnet_palingenesie.htm

Bordeiu, Puiu D., ed. *Mişcarea legionară din Dobrogea anilor 1932–1940 în documente*. Constanţa: Muntenia, 2012.

———. *Mişcarea legionară în Dobrogea anilor 1940-1944 în documente*. Bucureşti: Editura Enciclopedică, 2014.

Borobaru, Traian, ed. *Legiunea în Imagini: Semicentenarul Mişcării Legionare*. Madrid: Ed. Mişcării Legionare, 1977.

Brădesco, Faust. *La Garde de Fer et le terrorisme: ă l'occasion du semi-centenaire du mouvement légionnaire*. Madrid: Carpaţi, 1979.

———. *Cele trei probe legionare: elemente de doctrină*. Bucureşti: Majadahonda, 2000.

———. *Conducere şi disciplină: (problema conducerii în Mişcarea Legionară)*. Bucureşti: Majadahonda, 2000.

———. *Corneliu-Zelea-Codreanu, Erou Neo-Cosmogon*. Madrid: Carpaţi, 1987.

Brăileanu, Traian. "Ce vom 'însemna.'" *Însemnări Sociologice* 1, no. 1 (April 1935): 1.

———. "Doctrina legionară şi stiinţa socială." *Însemnări Sociologice* IV, no. 8 (Dec. 15, 1940): 1–5.

———. "Problema muncitorească în lumina doctrinei naţionaliste (Schiţarea problemei)." *Însemnări legionare* I, no. 3 (1935): 23–25

———. *Sociologia şi arta guvernării: Articole politice*. Bucureşti: Cartea Românească, 1940.

Brătianu, Vintilă I. C. *Scrieri şi cuvântări*, vol. I.: *1899–1906*. Bucureşti: Imprimeria Independenţa, 1937.

Buzatu, Gheorghe, et al., eds. *Evenimentele din ianuarie 1941 în Arhivele germane şi române*, 2 vols. Bucharest, Majadahonda, 1998–1999.

Buzatu, Gheorghe, and Victor Roncea, eds. *Documente din Arhiva Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu: 22–24*, 27 vols. Iaşi: Tipo Moldova, 2012.

Căciulă, Olimp. "Cultele în România." In *Enciclopedia României*, vol. 1. Bucureşti: Imprimeria Naţională, 1938.

Călinescu, Armand. *Însemnări politice: 1916–1939*. Bucureşti: Humanitas, 1990.

Cantacuzino, Alexandru. *Cum suntem*. Bucureşti: Editura Mişcării Legionare, 1940.

———. *Între lumea legionară şi lumea comunistă*. Bucureşti: Editura Mişcării Legionare, 1940.

———. *Opere complete*. Munich: Traian Golea, 1940. Colecţia "Omul Nou."

———. *Pentru Christos (amintiri de pe frontul din Spania)*. Madrid: Colecţia "Omul Nou," 1952.

———. *Românul de mâine. Românismul nostru*. Bucureşti: Editura Mişcării Legionare, 1940 [1935].

Cantacuzino-Grănicerul, Gheorghe. "Chemare." *Cuvântul Argeşului* I, no. 5 (Aug. 10, 1935): 3.

Cântece legionare. Bucureşti: Editura L.A.M., 1997.

Carol II. *Cuvântările regelui Carol II, 1930–1940*, 2 vols. Bucureşti: Fundaţia pentru literatură şi artă Regele Carol II, 1940.

———. *Însemnări zilnice, 1837–1951*, vol. I–IV. Bucureşti: Scripta, 1998.

Carp, Matatias. *Cartea neagră: Suferinţele evreilor din România în timpul dictaturei fasciste, 1940–1944*, 3 vols. Bucureşti: Atelierele grafice Socec, 1946–48.

"Casa Verde îşi primeşte Ziditorul." *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 50 (Dec. 2, 1940): 4.

"Ce a poruncit Comandantul Legionarilor la moartea Părintelui Moţa." *Libertatea* 38, no. 8 (Nov. 23, 1940): 2.

"Cetiți slovă legionară." *Libertatea* 39, no. 1 (Jan. 5, 1941): 3.
Christescu, Vasile. "Actualizarea evului mediu." *AXA* II, no. 8 (Mar. 5, 1933): 5.
Cioran, Emil. *Schimbarea la față a României*. București: Vremea, 1936.
Ciucă, Marcel-Dumitru, Aurelian Teodorescu, and Bogdan Florin Popovici, eds. *Stenogramele ședințelor Consiliului de Miniștri: guvernarea Ion Antonescu*, vol. 1: Sept.–Dec. 1940. București: Arhivele Naționale ale României, 1997.
Ciuhandu. Gh. "Unificare la repezeală — ori revizuirea Statutului organic ardelean?" *Revista Teologică* XI, no. 8–11 (Aug.–Nov. 1921): 263–273.
"Coboară morții." *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 40 (Oct. 29, 1940): 3.
Colescu, Leonida. *Analiza rezultatelor recensământului general al populației României din 1899*. București: Institutul Central de Statistică, 1944.
———. *La Population de Religion Mosaique en Roumanie. Etude Statistique*. București: Imprimeria Independența, 1915.
"Comandantul Mișcării Legionare face apel la ordine și disciplină." *Curentul* XIII, no. 4599 (Nov. 29, 1940): 1.
"Comunicatul D-lui Horia Sima." *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 11 (Sept. 20, 1940): 1.
"Comunicatul președintelui consiliului de miniștri." *Curentul* XIII, no. 4599 (Nov. 29, 1940): 1.
"Conducătorul Statului și Biserica." *Renașterea* XIX, no. 5, (Feb. 9, 1941): 4.
Conovici, Mariana, Silvia Iliescu, Octavian Silvestru, eds. *Țara, Legiunea, Căpitanul. Mișcarea legionară în documente de istorie orală*. București: Humanitas, 2008.
Consiliul Legislativ. Zece ani de activitate 1926-1936. București: Institutul de Arte Grafice Luceafărul, 1936.
Constant, Alexandru. "Așa erau." *Cuvântul Argeșului* II, no. 28–30 (Feb. 1, 1937): 3.
———. "Întâlnire pe Culmi." *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 38 (Oct. 27, 1940): 1.
Constantinescu, Titus H. *Acuzarea in procesul Corneliu Zelea Codreanu. Rechizitor ținut în audiența dela 25 mai 1925*. Turnu Severin: L. I. Niculescu and Ion N. Bojeneagu, 1925.
Constituțiunea Regele Carol II. București: Tiparul Românesc, 1938.
Costescu, George. *Bucureștii Vechiului Regat*. București: Universul, 1944.
Crăcea, Nicu, ed. *Dezvăluiri legionare*, 3 vols. București: Buna Vestire, 1997.
Crainic, Nichifor. "Roma Universală." *Sfarmă Piatră* II, no. 13 (Feb. 13, 1936): 3.
———. "Modul teandric." *Gândirea* XIX, no. 1, special issue titled "Nostalgia paradisului,"(Jan. 1940): 1–7.
———. "Spiritualitate." *Gândirea* VIII, no. 8–9 (1928): 307–310.
———. *Puncte cardinale în haos*. Iași: Timpul, 1996 [1936].
———. *Zile albe, zile negre. Memorii*, edited by Nedic Lemnaru, vol. 1. București: Gândirea, 1991.
———. "A doua neatârnare." *Gândirea* VI, no. 1 (Jan. 1927): 1–5.
———. "Parsifal." *Gândirea* III, no. 8–9–10 (1924): 181–186.
———. "Revoluția Legionară." *Gândirea* XIX, no. 8 (Oct. 1940): 521–525.
———. "Scurtă recapitulare." *Gândirea* XIX, no. 7 (Sept. 1940): 465–469.
———. "Tineretul și creștinismul." *Gândirea* XIII, no. 3 (1934): 65–73.
———. *Dostoievski și crestinismul rus*. Cluj: Arhidiecezana; București: Anastasia, 1998.
———. *Ortodoxie și etnocrație: Cu o Anexă: Programul Statului Etnocratic*. București: Albatros, 1997 [1938].
Cristea, Miron. *Note ascunse. Însemnări personale (1895–1937)*. Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1999.
———. "Renașterea Spirituală a Românismului prin tainele bisericii Creștine." *Apostol* XV, no. 1–2 (Jan. 1938): 2.
———. *Principii Fundamentale pentru Organizarea Unitară a Bisericii Ortodoxe Române din Regatul Român*. București: Tipografia Cărților Bisericești, 1920.

"Crucea pentru mormântul Eroului Necunoscut." *Renașterea* XI, no. 5 (Feb. 5, 1933): 1–2.
"Cum a fost dus la locul de veci parintele Moța. Lucruri văzute și scrise de către un trimis anume al redacției." *Liberatea*, 38, no. 9 (Nov. 23, 1940): 2–4.
"Cum s-a făcut desgroparea sfintelor oseminte ale Căpitanului." *Libertatea* 38, no. 8 (Dec. 1, 1940): 7.
"Cuvântarea LP.S. Patriarh Nicodim rostită la catafalcul lui Armand Călinescu." *Renașterea* XVII, no. 40 (Oct. 1, 1939): 2.
Cuvântul Studențesc, Festive Issue, XII (Jan.–Feb. 1937): 1–4.
Demolins, Edmond. *L'Éducation nouvelle. L'École des Roches*. Paris: Firmin Didot, 1898.
"Deschiderea Sesiunii Sfântului Sinod." *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 52 (Dec. 4, 1940): 11.
"Desființarea comisarilor de românizare." *Porunca Vremii* X, no. 1850 (Jan. 21, 1941): 1–2.
Diaconescu, Ion. "Icoane din martirajul dela Vaslui." *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 38 (Oct. 27, 1940): 3.
———. "Zguduitoarea solemnitate a deshumării martirilor legionari uciși la Vaslui." *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 37 (Oct. 26, 1940): 4.
"Din ședința Sf. Sinod cu data de 10 Martie 1937. Președinte, (ss) MIRON CRISTEA." Renașterea XV, no. 12 (Mar. 21, 1937): 1.
Dobre, Bănică. *Crucificații: zile trăite pe frontul spaniol*. București: I. N. Copuzeanu, 1937.
Dobrincu, Dorin. "Legionarii și Guvernarea Ion Antonescu (1941–1944)." In *Romania: A Crossroads of Europe*, edited by K. W. Treptow, 199–230. Iași: The Center for Romanian Studies, 2002.
Domnia lui Bibescu, Tomul al doilea: Legi și decrete 1843–1848. București: F. Göbl, 1894.
"Dramatica moarte a lui Ion I. Moța." *Buletin Legionar* 1 (Jan. 1937): 2.
"Drumul spre veșnicie al Căpitanului." *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 50 (Dec. 2, 1940): 3.
Dumitraș-Bițoaica, Gheorghe, ed. *Statutul Juridic al Evreilor și Legislația Românizării*. n.a.: Editura Prometeu, 1942.
Dumitrescu, Vladimir. *Mărturiile unui "criminal politic"*. Bacău: Babel, 2013.
Dumitrescu-Borșa, Ion. *Cal Troian intra Muros. Memorii legionare*. București: Lucman, 2002.
———. *Cea mai mare jertfă legionară*. Sibiu: "Totul pentru Țară," 1937.
Eliade, Mircea. *Întoarcerea din rai*. București: Luceafărul, 1934.
———. *Huliganii: roman*. București: Editura Națională-Ciornei, 1935.
———. "De ce cred în biruința mișcării legionare?" *Buna Vestire* I, no. 244 (Dec. 17, 1937): 1–2.
———. *De Zalmoxis à Gengis-Khan. Études comparatives sur les religions et le folklore de la Dacie et de l'Europe orientale*. Paris: Payot, 1970.
———. *Zalmoxis, the Vanishing God*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972.
———. Autobiography, *vol. 1*: 1907–1937, *Journey East, Journey West*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.
———. *Texte "Legionare" și despre "Românism"*. Cluj: Dacia, 2001.
———. *Itinerariu spiritual: scrieri de tinerețe 1927*. București: Humanitas, 2003.
Eliade, Mircea [Plăeșu, Ion]. "S-a încheiat un ciclu." *Credința* I, no. 11 (Dec. 14, 1933): 4.
Ferdinand I. *Cuvântări de Ferdinand I, Regele României 1889-1922*. București: Fundația Culturală Principele Carol, 1922.
Floru, Ion S. *Istoria românilor pentru cursul superior de liceu*. București: Socec, 1924.
"Funerariile Patriarhului nostru." *Biserica și școala* LXIII, no. 13 (Mar. 19, 1939): 98–99.
Gârneață, Ilie. *Din lumea legionară*. Madrid: Colectia Omul Nou, 1951.

———. *Amintiri nepublicate. Crâmpeie*. Unpublished manuscript.
Gavrilescu, Sandu. "Pe crucea Căpitanului." *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 50 (Dec. 2, 1940): 2.
Generalul Antonescu către țară, 6 septemvrie 1940–22 iunie 1941. Bucureşti: Imprimeria națională, 1941.
Genvra. "Biruința legionară, biruința neamului!" *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 75 (Dec. 29, 1940): 5.
Georgescu, Corneliu. *Pe drumul cu arhangheli. Însemnări din viața unui legionar*, vol. 1, 2nd ed. București: Majadohonda, 1996.
"Preotul Georgescu-Edineți." *AXA* II, no. 6 (Feb. 5, 1933): 2.
Gherginescu-Vania. "Moartea lui Făt Frumos." *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 49 (Dec. 1, 1940): 1.
Ghimpa, Nicolae D., et al., eds. *Codul de Românizare*. Bucureşti: Editura Ziarului Universul, 1942.
Goga, Octavian. *Mustul care fierbe*. București: Imprimeria Statului, s.a.
Gregorian, Al. "6 martie: România urcă pe șantierul istoriei." *Sfarmă-piatră* VIII, no. 92 (Mar. 7, 1941): 1.
———. "Generalul față în față cu țara." *Sfarmă-piatră* VIII, no. 86 (Mar. 1, 1941): 4.
Grosu, Gurie. *Procesul și apărarea mea: denunțarea complotului apocaliptic*. București: Tip. A-B-C, 1937.
Groza, Dumitru. "Căpitanul, Mesia Muncitorului Român." *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 76 (Dec. 30, 1940): 7.
———. "Între nebunia lor și cumințenia noastră." *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 50 (Dec. 2, 1940): 8.
———. "Să ne gândim la Căpitanul nostru." *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 48 (Nov. 30, 1940): 1.
Hamangiu, Constantin, and Nicolae Georgean, eds. *Codul Civil Adnotat*, 2 vols. Bucureşti: All Beck, 1999.
Hamangiu, Constantin, ed. *Codul General al României, Coduri, Decrete-Legi și Regulamente*, vol. 19. Bucureşti: Imprimeria Centrală, 1931.
———, ed. *Codul General al României, Coduri, Decrete-Legi și Regulamente*, vol. 26, Part 1. Bucureşti: Imprimeria Centrală, 1938.
Herseni, Traian. *Mișcarea legionară și țărănimea*. Bucureşti: Bucovina, 1937.
Hitler, Adolf. *Mein Kampf*, translated by Ralph Manhein. London: Pimlico, 1992.
Iancu, Carol, ed. *La Shoah En Roumanie: Les Juifs Sous Le Régime D'antonescu (1940–1944): Documents Diplomatiques Français Inédits*. Montpellier: Université Paul Valéry, 1998.
Imbrescu, Ilie. "Teologii şi Garda de Fier." *AXA* II, no. 13 (Jun. 15, 1933): 3.
———. *Biserica şi mişcarea legionară*. Bucureşti: Cartea Românească, 1939.
"Importante hotărâri luate în ședința de eri a Sfântului Sinod." *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 54 (Dec. 6, 1940): 5.
"Informațiuni privitoare la aducerea în țară a corpurilor neînsuflețite ale eroilor Moța și Marin." *Buletin Legionar*, no. 2 (Feb. 1, 1937): 1.
"Înmormântarea legionarilor căzuți în noaptea de 3 Septembrie la Constanța." *Buna Vestire* V, no. 5 (Sept. 13, 1940): 3.
"Inscriptii." *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 49 (Dec. 1, 1940): 2.
Institutul Central de Statistică. *Anuarul Statistic al României, 1939 şi 1940*. Bucureşti: Imprimeria Naţională, 1940.
Ion, Ştefan Gheorghe. "Iaşii, oraşul mişcării legionare. Iaşii, cetatea sufletului românesc." *AXA*, no. 27 (Dec. 5, 1940): 1.
Ionescu, Nae. "Biserica, Stat și Națiune." *Predania* 1, no. 4 (Apr. 1, 1937): 1–3.
———. "Ce e predania." *Predania* I, no. 2 (Mar. 1, 1937): 1.
———. "Pentru o teologie cu 'nespecialiști.'" *Predania* I, no. 1 (Feb. 15, 1937): 1–3.
———. "Primejdia celor 'de pe urmă.'" *Iconar* 1, no. 12 (1935): 1–2.
———. *Fenomenul legionar*. Cetatea Eternă [Rome]: Armatolii, 1963.
———. *Roza vînturilor*. Bucureşti: Roza Vânturilor, 1990.

———. *Prelegeri de filosofia religiei*, edited by Marta Petreu. Cluj: Biblioteca Apostrof, 1994.
———. *Teologia. Integrala publicisticii religioase*. Sibiu: Deisis, 2003.
Iorga, Nicolae. *Cultura Națională și Politica Națională. Supliment la Neamul Românesc*. Vălenii de Munte: Neamul Românesc, 1908.
———. "Doi băieți viteji." *Neamul Românesc* XXXII, no. 12 (Jan. 19, 1937): 1.
———. *Conferințe și prelegeri*. București: Institutul de Istorie Universală Nicolae Iorga, 1943.
———. *Eminescu. El, generația lui și generația noastră. O conferință la București*. Văleni de Munte: Datina Românească, 1929.
———. *Orizonturile mele. O viață de om așa cum a fost*. București: Minerva, 1972.
Istrate, Gheorghe. *Frăția de cruce*, 2nd ed. București, 1937.
"Jurăm." *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 50 (Dec. 2, 1940): 4.
"La Botezul Domnului." *Libertatea* 39, no. 1 (Jan. 5, 1941): 1.
"La înmormântarea camaradului Gheorghe Grigor (Cuvinte rostite de prof. univ. dr. Traian Brăileanu și prof. Constantin Zoppa)." *Iconar* I, no. 12 (1936): 1–2.
Lapedatu, Alexandru. "Statul și biserica ortodoxă." *Renașterea* XIII, no. 42 (Oct. 20, 1935): 1.
Legea pentru unificarea administrativă. București: Institutul de Arte Grafice și Editură, s.a.
"Legionarii, între pistol și Dumnezeu." *Adevărul*, (Oct. 23, 2012). Online. Available at adevarul.ro/cultura/istorie/legionarii-pistol-dumnezeu-1_50b9ebcc7c42d5a663ace29a/index.html
"Legiunea Arhanghelul Mihail." *Pământul Strămoșesc* I, no. 2 (Aug. 15, 1927): 3–4.
Legiunea Arhanghelului Mihai, Garda de Fier. Programul și caracterul general. Cluj: Cartea Românească, 1931.
Lovinescu, Eugen. *Istoria literaturii române contemporane*. București: Ancora, 1926.
Luca, Radu. "Colectivism organic." *Lumea Nouă* VI, no. 1 (Jan. 1937): 15–20.
Lupaș, Ioan. *Avram Iancu. Comunicare făcută în Ședința Academiei Române la 8 iunie 1924*. Cluj: Ardealul, 1924.
———. "Scrisoarea d-lui Ministru al Cultelor și artelor Profesor I. Lupaș către I. P. S. Patriarch D. D. Dr. Miron Cristea." *Apostol* XV, no. 1–2 (Jan. 1938): 3.
Lupta de la mormântul fără cruce. București: Institutul de arte grafice Bucovina, I. E. Toroutiu, 1933.
M. S. "Eroul Nostru Necunoscut." *Vestul României* I, no. 9 (May 18, 1923): 1.
Macrin, George. "Luptători și doctrinari." *Iconar* II, no. 9 (1937): 1.
———. "Taberele de muncă: tabăra de la Carmen Sylva." *Însemnări Sociologice* 2, no. 7 (1936): 17–23.
Maiorescu, Titu. *Discursuri parlamentare: cu priviri asupra dezvoltării politice a României sub domnia lui Carol I*, vol. 2: *1876–1881*. București: Socecu, 1897.
Manoilescu, Mihail. *Politica producției naționale*. București: Cultura Națională, 1923.
———. *Théorie du protectionnisme et de l'échange international*. Paris: Marcel Giard, 1929.
———. "Naționalismului nostru." *Lumea Nouă* II, no. 1 (1933): 19.
———. *Generația nouă și politica veche: discurs ținut în Senat la 27 Noemvrie 1936*. București: Imprimeria Centrala, 1936.
———. *Le Parti unique: institution politique des régimes nouveaux*. Paris, Les Oeuvres Françaises, 1936.
———. *Le siècle du corporatisme: doctrine du corporatisme intégral et pur*. Paris: Alcan, 1934.
———. *Românismul și dreptul său: discurs ținut în Senat la 3 decembrie 1935*. București: Universul, 1936.

———. *Rostul şi destinul burgheziei româneşti*. Bucureşti: Cugetarea - Georgescu Delafras, 1942.

Munteanu, Victor. "Continuarea naţionalismului nostru." *Lumea Nouă* V, no. 2 (1936): 36.

"Mântuirea." *AXA* II, no. 24 (Dec. 23, 1933): 2.

Marcovici, Simion. "Un apel la amintirea lui Mihai Viteazul: Istoria patriei." *Curier de ambe sexe* I (1836–38): 1–3.

Marcu-Balş, Petre. "Autohtonia ordinei juridice (Concepţia rationalistă şi concepţia istorică a codificaţiilor) (1928)." In *Dreptul la memorie*, edited by Iordan Chimet, vol. 3, 142–143. Cluj: Dacia, 1992.

Marin, Vasile. "Extremismul de dreapta." *AXA* II, no. 21 (Oct. 29, 1933): 1.

———. "Naţiunea împotriva statului de import." *AXA* II, no. 6 (Feb. 5, 1933): 1–2.

———. *Crez de generaţie*. Bucureşti: Tipografia Bucovina I. E. Torouţiu, 1937.

———. *Fascismul. Organizarea Constituţională a Statului Corporativ Italian: Teză pentru Doctorat în Ştiinţele Politice şi Economice*. Bucureşti: Serviciul şi Editura Colportajului Legionar, s.a.

———. *Cuvinte pentru studenţi*. Bucureşti, 1937.

Mateiu, I. "1934." *Renaşterea* XII, no. 1 (1934): 1.

Mezdrea, Dora. *Nae Ionescu şi discipolii săi în arhiva securităţii*, vol. 1: *Nae Ionescu*. Bucureşti: Mica Valahie, 2008.

Micul Dor şi Marele Dor. Cântece poporale, strigături de joc, colinde de sfintele sărbători, doine, cântece frumoase de dragoste adunate de prin foi şi publicaţii să le citească tot românul, de A.M., Biblioteca Generaţia Nouă, no. 2. Iaşi, 1925.

Mihălcescu, I. and Father I. "Mihălcescu despre Teologia Scriitorului Nichifor Crainic." *Predania* I, no. 12–13 (Nov. 1–15, 1937): 23–24.

Milcoveanu, Şerban. "Crăciunul în prigoană: 1938-1939, 1939-1940 în penitenciarul special de la Râmnicu Sărat." *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 73 (Dec. 25, 1940): 3, 8.

———. "Mormânt de sfânt. Neam Mesianic." *Cuvântul Studenţesc* XII, no. 1–4 (Jan.-Feb. 1937): 1.

Mişcarea Legionară. *Adevărul despre procesul lui Corneliu Z. Codreanu. Maiu 1938*. n.p., 1938.

"Moartea şi funeraliile lui ION G. DUCA." *Renaşterea* XII, no. 1 (1934): 2.

Moruşca, P. "Congresul nostru naţional bisericesc." *Revista Teologică* XI, no. 8–11 (Aug.–Nov. 1921): 221–228.

Moţa, Ion I. "Faza precorporativă." *AXA* II, no. 17 (Sept. 6, 1933): 1.

———. "Garda de Fier şi L.A.N.C." *AXA* II, no. 19 (Oct. 1, 1933): 1.

———. "Răspuns (la invitaţia dlui Prof. G. Bogdan-Duică)." *Pământul Strămoşesc* II, no. 1 (Jan. 1, 1928): 7–11.

———. "Sfântul Arhanghel Mihail: Voevodul Puterilor Cereşti." *Pământul Strămoşesc* I, no. 5 (Oct. 1, 1927): 5–12.

———. "Spasmul şi concluziile sale." In *Almanahul Societăţii "Petru Maior"*. Cluj: Cartea Românească, 1929.

———. "Sub povara remanenţelor." *AXA* II, no. 23 (Dec. 7, 1933): 3.

———. *Memoriu Regelui Ferdinand. Scris în închisoarea Galata, 1924*. Iaşi, 1925.

———. *Cranii de Lemn. Articole, 1922–1936*. Sibiu: Totul Pentru Ţară, 1936.

———, ed. *Protocoalele înţelepţilor sionului*, trans. by Ion I. Moţa. Orăştie: Tipografia şi Editura Libertatea, 1923.

———. "La Icoană." *Pământul strămoşesc* I, no. 1 (Aug. 1, 1927): 9–10.

"Muncitoreşti." *AXA* II, no. 5 (Jan. 22, 1933): 1.

Mussolini, Benito. *Discorsi del 1929*. Milano: Alpes, 1930.

———. "The Doctrine of Fascism." In *Fascism Doctrine and Institutions*. Rome: Ardita Publishers, 1935 [1932], 7–42.

Noica, Constantin. "Cumplita lor călătorie." *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 4 (Sept. 12, 1940): 1.

———. "Sufletul Cetății." *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 16 (Sept. 24, 1940): 14.

Noua Constituție a României. Textul, pe Articole, al Nouei Constituții. Brasov: Unirea, 1938.

Noua legislațiune cu privire la evrei. București: Curierul Judicial, 1940.

"Numirea unui sub-secretar de stat la Culte și Arte." *Renașterea* XIX, no. 5 (Feb. 9, 1941): 1.

Onciul, Dimitrie. *Ştefan cel Mare şi Mihai Viteazul. Doue cuvântări comemorative*. Bucureşti: I. V. Socecu, 1904.

"Organizarea Legiunii Arhanghelul Mihail." *Pământul Strămoşesc* I, no. 5 (Oct. 1, 1927): 3–5.

"Osemintele sfinte ale Căpitanului au fost scoase la lumină." *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 45 (Nov. 27, 1940): 14.

"Ostașul Necunoscut." *Foaia Diecezană* XXXVIII, no. 10 (May 7, 1923): 3–6.

Palaghiță, Ștefan. *Garda de Fier spre reinvierea României. Însoțită de o cronologie privind istoria mișcării legionare*. Buenos Aires: S. Palaghiță, 1951.

Panait, C. *Şcoala nouă*. Bucureşti: Atelier de Arte grafice "Universală" Iancu Ionescu, 1915.

Panaitescu, P. P. "Căpitanul și Unitatea Națională." *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 50 (Dec. 2, 1940): 1.

———. "Profeții neamului." *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 49 (Dec. 1, 1940): 1.

Papanace, Constantin I. "Desjudaizare, Desfanariotizare, Desțiganizare." *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 76 (Dec. 30, 1940): 1.

———. *Despre Căpitan, Nicadori şi Decemviri. Crâmpei de amintiri*. Cetatea Eternă: Armatolii, 1963.

———. *Destinul unei Generații*. Cetatea Eternă: Armatolii, 1952.

———. "Evoluția mișcării legionare după arestarea și asasinarea Căpitanului. Cazul Horia Sima." *Pământul Strămoşesc*, no. 4 (1977): 2.

———. *Fără căpitan: conducerea în a doua prigoană*. Rome: Armatolii, 1984.

———. *Fermentul aromân (macedo-român) în sud-estul european. Extract din Noul Album Macedo-Român, Biblioteca Română*. Freiburg: Institutul Român de Cercetări, 1959.

———. *Martiri Legionari*. Cetatea Eternă: Armatolii, 1952.

———. "Românii de peste hotare." *AXA* II, no. 8 (Mar. 3, 1933): 2.

———. "Schimbul de populații." *AXA* II, no. 12 (Apr. 9, 1933): 7–8.

Papanace, Constantin I. "Cuvânt Introductiv." In *Fenomenul legionar*, edited by Nae Ionescu. Cetatea Eternă [Rome]: Armatolii, 1963, 17.

Pappasoglu, Dimitrie. *Monumentul lui Mihail Vodă Vitedul cum şi cortegiul Aducerei în capitală a craniului său de la Monastirea Dealu, potrivit votului onorabilei Cameri legislative din 1864 de a se aşeda într'un monument*. Bucureşti: n.p., 1866.

"Patriarhul Miron Cristea." *Apostol* XV, no. 1–2 (Jan. 1938): 6.

Păun, Nicolae. "Circulara nr. 1: Către toti legionarii din Județul Buzău." *Buletinul legionar* 1, (Jan. 1, 1937): 1.

Pavel, R. "Spre o nouă orientare a muncitorimei." *AXA* II, no. 11 (Apr. 30, 1933): 3.

Pavel, Sorin, Ion Nestor, and Petre Marcu-Balş. "Manifestul Crinului Alb." *Gândirea* VIII, no. 8–9 (1928): 311–317.

"Pe crucea Căpitanului." *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 50 (Dec. 2, 1940): 2.

Pe Marginea Prăpastiei, 21–23 ianuarie 1941. Ion Antonescu şi Mişcarea Legionară, vol. 1, Part 1: *Lovitura de stat din septembrie 1940*. Part 2: *Guvernarea național–legionară*; Vol. 2, Part 3: *Pregătirea rebeliunii*; Part 4: *Rebeliunea*. Bucureşti: Scripta, 2014 [1941].

"Pedepsirea infracţiunilor împotriva persoanei, proprietăţii şi bunurilor publice." *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 45 (Nov. 27, 1940): 14.
"Pentru judecata opiniei publice. Cum s-a desfăşurat rebeliunea în zilele de 21-23 ianuarie 1941." *Unirea* I, no. 2 (Feb. 12, 1941): 5.
Petrescu, Christian. "Fascism, national-socialism şi legionarism." *Lumea Nouă* VI, no. 7 (1937): 293.
———. "Instituţionalim şi Spiritualitate. Legionarism şi corporatism." *Lumea Nouă* VI, no. 1 (Jan. 1937): 21–34.
"Pioasa ceremonie a ridicării urnelor cu cenuşa camarazilor arşi la Crematoriu." *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 40 (Oct. 29, 1940): 3.
Polihroniade, Mihail, "Dreapta Românească." *AXA* I, no. 2 (Nov. 10, 1932): 1.
———. "Naţionalism şi Cuzism." *AXA* II, no. 5 (Jan. 22, 1933): 1.
———. "Sensul revoluţiei naţionale." *AXA* II, no. 15 (Jun. 15, 1933): 1–5.
———, ed. *Tabăra de muncă*. n.p., 1935.
Posteucă, Vasile. "Amintiri de la Iconar." *Drum* XI, no. 4 (Nov.–Dec. 1975): 14–17.
———. "Nevoia ispăşirii." *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 50 (Dec. 2, 1940): 1.
———. "Patriarhul neamului românesc." *Libertatea* 38, no. 8 (Dec. 1, 1940): 2.
———. *Desgroparea Capitanului*. Madrid: Editura Mişcării Legionare, 1977.
"Predealul, simbolul eroismului legionar." *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 40 (Oct. 29, 1940): 3.
Predescu, Lucian, ed. *Enciclopedia Cugetarea*. Bucureşti: Cugetarea, 1940.
"Procesul studenţilor dela Văcăreşti." *Renaşterea* II, no. 14 (Apr. 6, 1924): 2–3.
"Proclamarea rezultatului definitiv al Adunării Obşteşti Plebiscitare Cuvântul Mareşalului către Ţară." *Renaşterea* XIX, no. 48–49 (Dec. 7, 1941): 3.
"Programul transportării la Predeal, a urnelor cu cenuşa camarazilor ucişi la Bucureşti." *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 38 (Oct. 27, 1940): 3.
Racoveanu, Gheorghe. "Teologul Ion Nichifor Crainic (I)." *Predania* 1, no. 10–11 (Oct. 1937): 11–13.
———. "Teologul Ion Nichifor Crainic (II)." *Predania* 1, no. 12–13 (Nov. 1937): 7–8.
———. "Noi, falsificatorii." *Predania* 1, no. 12–13 (Nov. 1-15, 1937): 20–22.
———. "Pentru o reorganizare bisericească." *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 60 (Dec. 12, 1940): 1.
———. "Sfântul Sinod la lucru." *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 54 (Dec. 6, 1940): 1.
———. "Tâlcul jertfei celei mari." *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 47 (Nov. 29, 1940): 1.
"Radio Romania despre jertfa Căpitanului, Nicadorilor şi Decemvirilor." *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 50 (Dec. 2, 1940): 6.
Rădulescu, Alexandru. *Unificarea Legislativă*. Bucureşti: Curtea Naţională, 1927.
Rădulescu, Dan. "Semnificaţia muncii legionare." *Glasul Strămoşesc* IV, no. 9 (Nov. 1, 1937): 1–2.
Rădulescu, Ilie. "Trăiasca Armata!" *Porunca Vremii* X, no. 1853 (Jan. 26, 1941): 1.
Randa, Alexandru. "Aripile Arhanghelului." *AXA* IX, no. 27 (Dec. 5, 1940): 1.
Ranetescu, D. M. "Predealul." *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 38 (Oct. 27, 1940): 1.
"Răspunsul D-lui G-ral Antonescu la scrisoarea I. P.S. patriarch Nicodim." *Universul* 57, no. 269 (Sept. 30, 1940): 19.
"Regulamentul pentru modificarea art. 6 din regulamentul pentru monumentele publice." *Monitorul Oficial* CIX, no. 239, (Thursday 9 Oct. 1941): 6049.
"Regulamentul pentru monumentele publice." *Monitorul Oficial* CVI, Part I, no. 293 (Dec. 16, 1938): 5974–5976.
"Reînhumarea la Predeal a celor 46 legionari asasinaţi pentru credinţa lor, la Miercurea Ciuc." *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 4 (Sept. 12, 1940): 2.

"Reînhumarea Legionarilor Martiri uciși la Vaslui." *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 3 (Oct. 24, 1940): 3.

Religius, V. B. "Către Preoțime." *Legiunea* 1, no. 1 (Aug. 5, 1932): 1–2.

"Reorganizarea Bisericii. Scrisoarea I. P. S. Patriarh Nicodim adresată d-lui general Antonescu, Conducătorul Statului." *Universul* 57, no. 269 (Sept. 30, 1940): 19.

"Revizuirea proceselor politice privitor pe Corneliu Z. Codreanu." *Monitorul Oficial al României*, Part 1, no. 303 (Dec. 24, 1940): 7004–7007.

Rostás, Zoltán. *Monografia ca utopie. Inverviuri cu Henri H. Stahl (1985-1987)*. Bucureşti: Paideia, 2000.

Roșu, Nicolae. *Ce este "Frăția de Cruce:" origine, organizare, doctrină*. Timisoara: Gordian, 1996.

Rugăciune rostită de I.P.S. Mitropolitul Nicolae al Ardealului în Biserica Sf. Ilie Gorgani din Capitală în ziua de Sâmbătă 13 Februarie 1937, la înmormântarea în Bucureștii Noi a eroilor Ion I. Moța și Vasile Marin. Sibiu: Tiparul Tipografiei Arhidiocezane, 1941.

Salleo, Eminerdo, ed. *Mussolini e Codreanu. Cornelio Z. Codreanu, Memorie inedite*. Palermo: Libreria Agate, 1940.

Sava, Moise. *The Saint of the Prisons: Notes on the Life of Valeriu Gafencu*. Sibiu: Agnos, 2009.

Savin, Ioan Gheorghe. "Religia în lupta politică." *Biserica Ortodoxă Română* LVIII, no. 11–12 (Nov.–Dec. 1939): 779–783.

"Scrisoarea echipei care a pedepsit pe Armand Călinescu, adresată legionarilor." *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 13 (Sept. 22, 1940): 2.

Scurtu, Ion, et al., eds. *Totalitarismul de dreapta în Romania. Origini, manifestări, evoluție 1919–1927*. București: Institutul Național Pentru Studiul Totalitarianismului, 1996.

———. *Ideologie și formațiuni de dreapta în România*, vol. II. București: Institutul Național Pentru Studiul Totalitarianismului, 2000.

———. *Ideologie și formațiuni de dreapta în România*, vol. IV: *1934–1938*. Bucureşti: INST, 2003.

———. *Ideologie și formațiuni de dreapta în România,* vol. VII: *ianuarie 1941-februarie 1943*. Bucureşti: INST, 2009.

Sebastian, Mihail. *De două mii de ani. Cum am devenit huligan*. București: Humanitas, 1990.

Sebastian, Mihail. *Jurnal 1935-1944*. Bucureşti: Humanitas, 1996.

Șeicaru, Pamfil. "Doi români morți pe frontul spaniol." *Curentul* X, no. 3218 (Jan. 17, 1937): 1.

Sell'Arno, Guido Dé Rossi, ed. *Cornelio Codreanu (pensieri e massime di vita)*. Roma: Prof. P. Maglione, 1938.

"Sf. Sinod condamnă francmasoneria." *Renașterea* XV, no. 12 (Mar. 21, 1937): 2–3.

"Sfânta credință legionară." *Curentul* XIII, no. 4601 (Dec. 1, 1940): 3.

"Sfintele oseminte ale Căpitanului vor fi îngropate Sâmbătă la Casa Verde." *Libertatea* 38, no. 8 (Dec. 1, 1940): 7.

Sidorovici, Teofil Ch. *Carol II. Din culmea unui deceniu de glorioasă domnie*. București: Atelierele Luceafărului, 1940.

Sima, Horia. "Felul de organizare legionar." *Curierul Legionar* 1, no. 1 (Nov. 1, 1940): 1.

———. "Eri au fost desgropate la Jilava osemintele Capitanului, Nicadorilor si Decembirilor." *Curentul* XIII, no. 4599 (Nov. 29, 1940): 10.

———. "Ordin către toți legionarii." *Cuvântul* XVIII, no. 98 (Jan. 23, 1941): 1.

———. *Doctrina legionară*. Madrid: Editura Mișcării Legionare, 1980.

———. *Era libertății. Statul Național–Legionar*, 2 vols. Madrid: Editura Mișcării Legionare, 1982–86.

"Slujba pentru plecarea morților." *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 40 (Oct. 24, 1940): 3.
Slușanshi, Barbu. "Imn Jertfei." *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 49 (Dec. 1, 1940): 1–2.
———. "Conspirația jidovilor." *Iconar* I, no. 12 (1936): 4.
"Sociale. (Rugăminte către I.P.S.S. Mitropolitul Visarion pentru ajutorarea mamei studentului Gheorghe Grigor, omorât de comuniști)" *Iconar* II, no. 2 (1936): 7.
Stamatu, Horia. "Iar au fost printre noi. La Predeal s-a pus temela noii biserici a neamului." *Buna Vestire* IV, no. 39 (Oct. 30, 1940): 1.
Stan, Liviu. "Biserica în statul legionar." *Insemnări Sociologice* IV, no. 8 (Dec. 15, 1940): 8–9.
———. *Mirenii in biserică: Importanța elementului mirean in biserică și participarea lui la exercitarea puterii bisericești. Studiu canonic-istoric*. Sibiu: Arhidiecezana, 1939.
———. *Rasă și religiune*. Sibiu: Tiparul Tipografiei Arhidiecezane, 1942.
Stefanovici, I. Al. "Cartea Căpitanului." *Însemnări Sociologice* 2, no. 9 (Dec. 1936): 9.
Stelescu, Mihai. "Cine apără pe muncitori." *AXA* II. no. 8 (Mar. 5, 1933): 1–2.
———. "Lupta pentru cruce." *AXA* II, no. 6 (Feb. 5, 1933): 8.
Streinul, Mircea. "Cartea Căpitanului." *Iconar* II, no. 3 (1936): 5.
———. "Iarăși o jertfă: Gheorghe Grigor." *Iconar* I, no. 12 (1936): 3.
———. "Înmormântarea camaradului Gheorghe Grigor." *Iconar* I, no. 12, (1936): 6.
Târgovișteanu, Emilian. "Un martir al Datoriei, Armand Călinescu (1893-1939)." *Biserica Ortodoxă Română* 57, no. 9–10 (Sept.–Oct. 1939): 594–595.
Tase, Mihail. *Miti Dumitrescu, legionarul care n-a purtat nici o clipă cămașa verde*. Ploiești: Tip. "Presa Noastră," 1940.
"Thèses de doctorat soutenues devant la faculté de Droit de Paris en 1932." *Annales de l'Université de Paris* 8 (1933).
Thirkield, Ben A. "150,000 Follow Codreanu's Body, Nazis Drop Wreaths." *The Washington Post*, Dec. 1, 1940, 1.
"Tineretul a fost purtat pe un drum greșit. Apelul suprem al conducătorului statului." *Renașterea* XIX, no. 3–4 (Feb. 2, 1941): 1–2.
Titulescu, Nicolae. *Eu și Garda de Fier*. București: Universul, 1937.
Țopa, Leon. *Universitatea Țărănească. Teoria și practica ei*. Cernăuți: Editura Societății pentru cultura și literatura română în Bucovina, 1935.
Tota, Ioan-Laurian, ed. *Cântece legionare*. București: Editura L.A.M., 1997.
Totu, Neculai. *Însemnări de pe front: note din expediția legionară în Spania, noiembrie 1936-ianuarie 1937*. Sibiu: Curierul, 1937.
Trașcă, Ottmar, and Ana–Maria Stan, eds. *Rebeliunea legionară în arhive străine: germane, maghiare, franceze*. București: Albatros, 2002.
"Trimișii Corpului Legionar participă la recucerirea Susaiului." *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 50 (Dec. 2, 1940): 8.
Troncotă, Cristian. *Eugen Cristescu. Asul serviciilor secrete românești*. București: Roza Vânturilor, 1994.
Tudor, Ilie. *Un an lângă căpitan: amintiri sfinte din viața legionară*, 5th ed. Pitești: Editura Fundația Sfinții Închisorilor, 2013.
Țurcan, Ion. "Însemnări sociologice." *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 46 (Nov. 28, 1940): 1.
———. "Tabere și șantiere." *Însemnări Sociologice* 2, nr. 9 (1936): 10–22.
"Un adevărat plebiscit moral." *Unirea* I, no. 1 (Feb. 11, 1941): 1.
"Un comunicat al comandamentului Frăției de Cruce." *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 47 (Nov. 29, 1940): 1.
"Un singur steag: Al țării." *Vremea* XIII, no. 587 (Jan. 26, 1941): 1.
Uniunea Bisericilor Creștine Baptiste din România. "Istoric." http://uniuneabaptista.ro/despre-noi/istoric/.

V. M. "Ultimul drum al I.P.S.S. Patriarhului Dr. Miron Cristea." *Renașterea* XVII, no. 12 (Mar. 19, 1939): 2–4.
Vântu, A. "Duhovnicul studenților și Patriarhia." *AXA* II, no. 7 (Feb. 19, 1933): 6.
———. "Ion I. Moța. Schiță Biografică." *Cuvântul Studențesc* XII, no. 1–4 (Jan.–Feb. 1937): 2–20.
Vasile, Ion. "Naștere și renaștere." *Buna Vestire* I, no. 250 (Dec. 25, 1937): 2.
Veverca, Ion. "Biruința Jertfei." *Cuvântul* XVII, no. 50 (Dec. 2, 1940): 1–2.
"Victims of the Iron Guards." *The Times*, issue 48788, Dec. 2, 1940, 4, col. E.
Vintilescu, Petre. "Originea și simbolismul veștmintelor liturgice." Available at: http://www.crestinortodox.ro/liturgica/viata-liturgica/originea-simbolismul-vestmintelor-liturgice-70640.html
Vlădescu, Toma. "O țară asediată de democrație." *Sfarmă Piatră* II, no. 13 (Feb. 13, 1936): 4.
Vlahuță, Alexandru. "Strigătul vremii." *Universul Literar* XLI, no. 48 (Nov. 29, 1925): 4–5.
Vojan, Ioan Victor. "Soluția crizei." *AXA* II, no. 5 (Jan. 22, 1933): 1.
Vonica, Nicole. "Înalțarea omului la treapta de om." *Libertatea* 38, no. 5 (Nov. 10, 1940): 1–2.
Vulcănescu, Mircea. "Generație." *Criterion* I, no. 3–4 (1934): 3–6.
———. *Tendințele tinerei generații*. București: Editura Țară Nouă, 1936.
———. *Nae Ionescu așa cum l-am cunoscut*. București: Humanitas, 1992.
———. *Tânăra generație. Crize vechi în haine noi. Cine sunt și ce vor tinerii români?* București: Compania, 2004.
———. *Mitologie Română*. Bucuresti: Editura Academiei, 1987.
Wiskemann, E. "Reviewed work(s): Die Eiserne Garde: Eine Darstellung der völkischen Erneuerungsbewegung in Rumanien by Klaus Charle." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1931–1939)* 18, no. 6 (Nov.–Dec. 1939): 863.
Zelea-Codreanu, Corneliu. "Chestiunea Căminului." *Pământul Strămoșesc* II, no. 10 (May 15, 1928): 3–9.
———. *Cuvântare la mesaj*. Câmpulug-Muscel: Tipografia și Tibraria Ch. N Vlădescu, 1932.
———. "Legionari!" *Legionarii* II, no. 8 (Oct. 11, 1931): 1.
———. *Cărticica șefului de cuib*. București: Tipografia "C. S. m. c.," 1933. English ed.: *The Nest Leader's Handbook*. London: The Rising Press, 2001.
———. *Circulări și manifeste, 1927-1938*. München: Colecția Europa, 1981.
———. *Însemnări de la Jilava*. București: Majadahonda, 1995.
———. *Pentru legionari*, vol. 1. Sibiu: "Totul pentru Țară," 1936. English ed.: *For My Legionaries (The Iron Guard)* (Reedy, West Virginia, Liberty Bell Publications, 1990).
———. *Scrisori studențești din închisoare. Văcărești, 9 octombrie 1923-30 martie 1924*. Iași: Biblioteca Generația Junǎ, 1925.
Zelea-Codreanu, *Discurse la Mesaj*, December 3, 1931.
Zelea-Codreanu, Ion. *Crâmpeie de amintiri* (1936). Available at http://www.miscarea.net/ion-zelea-codreanu-crampeie-de-amintiri1.htm.
Zelea-Codreanu, *Monitorul Oficial*, no. 22, Part III, *Destaberile Parlamentare, Adunarea Deputaților, Sesiunea Ordinară 1932–1933,* Dec. 18, 1932, 485.
———. *O mărturie*. Iași, 1941.
Zeletin, Ștefan. *Burghezia Română. Orginea și rolul ei istoric*. București: Nemira, 1997.

Secondary Sources

Abse, Tobias. "Italian Workers and Italian Fascism." In *Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. Comparisons and Contrasts*, edited by Richard Bessel, 40–60. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Alfieri, Dino, Luigi Freddi, ed. *Exhibition of the Fascist Revolution. 1st Decennial of the March on Rome*. Rome: National Fascist Party, 1933.

Alter, Peter. *Nationalismus*. Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main, 1985.

Aly, Götz *Hitler's Beneficiaries: Plunder, Racial War, and the Nazi Welfare State*. London: Verso, 2016.

Anastatescu, Octavian. *Lângă Valeriu Gafencu, Sfântul închisorilor. Mărturia unui fost socialist*. Bucureşti: Meditaţia; Areopag, 2014.

Ancel, Jean. *Contribuţii la istoria României. Problema evreiască, 1933–1944*, 3 vols. Bucureşti: Hassefer, 2001.

Antohi, Sorin. *Civitas Imaginalis. Istorie şi utopie în cultura română*. Iaşi: Polirom, 1999.

Arendt, Hannah. *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1973 [1951].

Asad, Talal. "The Construction of Religion as an Anthropological Category." In *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam*, 27–54. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993.

Bach, Maurizio. *Die charismatischen Führerdiktaturen: Drittes Reich und italienischer Faschismus im Vergleich ihrer Herrschaftsstrukturen*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1990.

Baird, Jay W. "Goebbels, Horst Wessel, and the Myth of Resurrection and Return." *Journal of Contemporary History* 17, no. 4 (1982): 633–650.

———. *To Die for Germany: Heroes in the Nazi Pantheon*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990.

Bancoş, Dorel. *Social şi national în politica guvernului Ion Antonescu*. Bucureşti: Eminescu, 2000.

Bănică, Mirel. *Biserca Ortodoxă Română: stat şi societate în anii '30*. Iaşi: Polirom, 2007.

Barbu, Zeev. "Psycho-Historical and Sociological Perspectives on the Iron Guard, the Fascist Movement of Romania." In *Who Were the Fascists? Social Roots of European Fascism*, edited by Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet, Jan Petter Myklebust, 379–394. Bergen: Universitetsforlaget; Irvington-on-Hudson: Columbia University Press, 1980.

———. "Rumania." In *European Fascism*, edited by S. J. Woolf, 146–166. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968.

Barnes, Joseph. "The Social Basis of Fascism." *Pacific Affairs* 9, no. 1 (Mar. 1936): 24–32.

Bärsch, Claus-Ekkehard. *Die politische Religion des Nationalsozialismus*. München: Wilhelm Fink, 1999.

Behrenbeck, Sabine, *Der Kult um die toten Helden: Nationalsozialistische Mythen, Riten und Symbole 1923 bis 1945*. Vierow: SH-Verlag, 1996.

Bejan, Cristina A. *Intellectuals and Fascism in Interwar Romania: The Criterion Association*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.

Bellah, Robert. "Civil Religion in America." *Daedalus* 97, no. 1 (1967): 1–21.

Bendix, Reinhard. "Charismatic Leadership." *Scholarship and Partisanship: Essays on Max Weber*, edited by Reinhard Bendix and Guenther Roth, 170–187. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971.

Benjamin, Lya. *Prigoană şi rezistenţă în istoria evreilor din Romania, 1940–1944*. Bucureşti: Hasefer, 2001.

Berger, Peter, and Brigitte Berger. *Sociology: A Biographical Approach*. New York: Basic Books, 1975.

Berlet, Chip. "Christian Identity: The Apocalyptic Style, Political Religion, Palingenesis and Neo-Fascism." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religion* 5, no. 3 (Winter 2004): 469–506.

Betts, Paul, and Alon Confino, Dirk Schumann, eds., *Between Mass Death and Individual Loss: The Place of the Dead in Twentieth-Century Germany*. Oxford: Berghahn, 2011.

Bernauer, James W. "Confessions of the soul. Foucault and theological culture." *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 31, no. 5–6 (Sept. 2005): 557–572.

———. "Michel Foucault's Ecstatic Thinking." *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 12, no. 2–3 (Jul. 1987): 156–193.

———. "The Prisons of Man: An Introduction to Foucault's Negative Theology." *International Philosophical Quarterly* 27, no. 4 (1987): 365–380.

———, and David Rasmussen, eds. *The Final Foucault*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988.

———, and Jeremy Carrette, eds. *Michel Foucault and Theology: The Politics of Religious Experience*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004.

Bessel, Richard, ed. *Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany: Comparisons and Contrasts*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Biliuță, Ionuț. "Fascism, Race, and Religion in Interwar Transylvania: The Case of Father Liviu Stan (1910–1973)." *Church History* 89 (March 2020) 1: 101–124.

Biliuță, Ionuț. "'Christianizing' Transnistria: Romanian Orthodox Clergy as Beneficiaries, Perpetrators, and Rescuers during the Holocaust." *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 34, (Spring 2020) 1: 18–44.

Billington, James H. *Fire in the Minds of Men: Origins of the Revolutionary Faith*. New York: Basic Books, 1980.

Biondich, Mark. "Radical Catholicism and Fascism in Croatia, 1918–1945." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 8, no. 2 (Jun. 2007): 383–399.

Black, Monica. *Death in Berlin: From Weimar to Divided Germany*. Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Blamires, Cyprian, ed. *World Fascism: A Historical Encyclopedia, 2 vols*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2006.

Blinkhorn, Martin. "Afterthoughts, Route Maps and Landscapes: Historians, 'Fascist Studies' and the Study of Fascism." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 5, no. 3 (2004): 507–526.

Boia, Lucian. *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness*. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001. Romanian ed.: *Istorie şi mit în conştiinţa românească*. Bucureşti: Humanitas, 1997.

Braham, Randolph L. *Romanian Nationalists and the Holocaust: The Political Exploitation of Unfounded Rescue Accounts*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998.

Brands, Gunnar. "From World War I Cemeteries to the Nazi 'Fortresses of the Dead,'" *in Places of Commemoration*, edited by Joachim Wolschke-Bulmahn, 215–256. Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks, 2001.

Bregantin, Lisa. *Per non morire mai: La percezione della morte in guerra e il culto dei caduti nel primo conflitto mondiale*. Padua: Il Poligrafo, 2010.

Brown, Peter. *The Cult of the Saints: Its Rise and Function in Late Christianity*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981.

Brubaker, Rogers W. *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001.

———. *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Bruja, Radu Florian. "Traian Brăileanu în documente (I)." *Codrul Cosminului* no. 12 (2006): 223–231.

———. "Traian Brăileanu in documents (III)." *Codrul Cosminului* no. 14 (2008): 297–302.

———. *Extrema Dreapă în Bucovina*. Târgoviște: Cetatea de Scaun, 2012.

———. *Traian Brăileanu. Studii, documente. Încercări literare*. Iaşi: Junimea, 2011.

Brunn, Geoffrey, and Victor S. Mamatey. *The World in the Twentieth Century*, 4th ed. Boston: Hearth, 1962.

Bucur, Maria. "Birth of a Nation: Commemorations of December 1st, 1918 and the Construction of National Identity in Communist Romania." In *Staging the Past: The Politics of Commemoration in Habsburg Central Europe, 1848 to the Present*, 286–325. La Fayette, In.: Purdue University Press, 2001.

———. *Heroes and Victims: Remembering War in Twentieth-Century Romania*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.

Bucur, Maria. *Eugenics and Modernization in Interwar Romania*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010.

Burleigh, Michael. *Earthly Powers: The Clash of Religion and Politics in Europe from the French Revolution to the Great War.* New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2005.

———. *Sacred Causes: The Clash of Religion and Politics from the Great War to the War on Terror.* New York: Harper Collins, 2007.

Burrin, Phillipe. "Political Religion. The Relevance of a Concept." *History and Theory* 9, no. 1–2 (1997): 321–349.

Butnaru, I. C. *The Silent Holocaust: Romania and its Jews*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1985.

Buzatu, Gheorghe, et al., eds. *Mareşalul Antonescu în faţa istoriei*, 2 vols. Iaşi: BAI 1990.

Călinescu, Matei. "Ionesco and Rhinoceros: Personal and Political Backgrounds." *East European Politics and Societies* 9, no. 3 (1995): 393–434.

Caplan, Jane, ed. *Nazism, Fascism and the Working Class. Essays by Tim Mason*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Carp, Matatias. *Cartea Neagră: Suferinţele evreilor din România în timpul Dictaturei Fasciste, 1940–1944*, 3 vols. Bucureşti: Atelierele grafice Socec, 1946–48. English ed.: Matatias Carp, *Holocaust in Rumania: Facts and Documents on the Annihilation of Rumania's Jews, 1940–44* (Budapest: Primor Pub, 1994).

Cârstocea, Raul. "Breaking the Teeth of Time. Mythical Time and the 'Terror of History' in the Rhetoric of the Legionary Movement in Interwar Romania," *Journal of Modern European History*, 13 (2015): 79–97.

Childers, Thomas. "The Social Bases of the National Socialist Vote." In *International Fascism. New Thoughts and New Approaches*, edited by George L. Mosse, 161–188. London and Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979.

Ciobanu, Ştefan. *Unirea Basarabiei: Studiu şi documente cu privire la mişcarea naţională din Basarabia în anii 1917–1918*. Bucureşti: Cartea Românească, 1929.

Ciura, Alexandru. *Povestire pe scurt a vieţii lui Avram Iancu*. Cluj: Ardealul, 1921.

Clark, Roland. "Nationalism and orthodoxy: Nichifor Crainic and the political culture of the extreme right in 1930s Romania." *Nationalities Papers* 40, no. 1 (2012): 107–126.

———. "Orthodoxy and nation-building: Nichifor Crainic and religious nationalism in 1920s Romania." *Nationalities Papers* 40, no. 4 (2012): 525–543.

———. *Holy Legionary Youth: Fascist Activism in Interwar Romania*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015.

Codrescu, Răzvan. "Taina Jertfei: Moţa şi Marin." In *In căutarea Legiunii pierdute*. Bucharest: Vremea, 2001, 47–104.

———. *Taina jertfei. Dosar istoric Moţa-Marin*. Sibiu: Puncte Cardinale, 2002.

Cojocaru, I. and Zigu Ornea. *Falansterul de la Scăieni*. Bucureşti: Editura Politică, 1966.

Colomy, Paul. "Neofunctionalism and Neoinstitutionalism: Human Agency and Interest in Institutional Change." *Sociological Forum* 13, no. 2 (Jun. 1998): 265–300.

Constantinescu, Ioan. *Despre exegeza extremei drepte româneşti. Însemnări polemice*, 2nd ed. Iaşi: Junimea, 1999.

Conway, Martin. *Catholic Politics in Europe, 1918–1945*. London: Routledge, 1997.
Dan, Ioan. "*Procesul" Mareşalului Antonescu*. Bucureşti: Lucman, 2005.
Davis, R. Chris. *Hungarian Religion, Romanian Blood: A Minority's Struggle for National Belonging, 1920-1945*. Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2019.
Delehaye, Hippolyte. *Les origines du culte des martyrs*. Bruxelles: Société des bollandistes, 1933.
Deletant, Dennis. "The Holocaust in Transnistria: An Overview in the Light of Recent Research." In *Moldova, Bessarabia, Transnistria*, edited by Rebecca Haynes, 143–161. London: University College London, 2003.
———. *Hitler's Forgotten Ally: Ion Antonescu and His Regime, Romania, 1940–44*. Hampshire, and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
Dimitrov, Georgi. "The Fascist Offensive and the Tasks of the Communist International in the Struggle of the Working Class against Fascism." Main Report Delivered at the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International, Aug. 2, 1935, available online at: http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/dimitrov/works/1935/08_02.htm.
Dinu, Radu Harald. *Faschismus, Religion und Gewalt in Südosteuropa. Die Legion Erzengel Michael und die Ustasa im historischen Vergleich*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2013.
Dobrincu, Dorin. "Legionarii şi guvernarea Ion Antonescu (1941-1944)." In *Romania: A Crossroads of Europe*, edited by Kurt W. Treptow, 199–230. Iaşi–Oxford–Portland: The Center for Romanian Studies, 2002.
———. "Religie şi putere în România. Politica statului faţă de confesiunile (neo) protestante, 1919-1944." *Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review* 7, no. 3 (2007): 583–602.
Donovan, Jim. *The Blood of Heroes: The 13-Day Struggle for the Alamo and the Sacrifice that Forged a Nation*. New York: Little, Brown and Co., 2012.
Dragomir, Silviu. *Avram Iancu*. Bucureşti: Casa Şcoalelor, 1924.
Dreidemy, Lucile. *Der Dollfuss-Mythos: Eine Biographie Des Posthumen*. Köln–Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 2014.
Dubuisson, Daniel. *Mythologies du XXe siècle: Dumézil, Lévi-Strauss, Eliade*. Lille: Presses universitaires de Lille, 1993.
Durkheim, Emile. *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Dutt, Rajani Palme. *Fascism and Social Revolution*. New York: International Press, 1934.
Eatwell, Roger. "Fascism and Populism." In *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, edited by Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser et al., 363–383. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
———. "On defining the 'Fascist Minimum:' The centrality of ideology." *Journal of Political Ideologies* 1, no. 3 (1996): 303–319.
———. "Reflections on Fascism and Religion." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religion* 4, no. 3 (Winter 2003): 145–166.
Ehrenreich, Barbara. *Blood Rites: Origins and History of the Passions of War*. New York: Metropolitan Books, 1997.
Eisenstadt, N. S., ed. *Max Weber on Charisma and Institution Building*. Chicago, London: Chicago University Press, 1968.
Eley, Geoff. *Nazism as Fascism: Violence, Ideology, and the Ground of Consent in Germany 1930-1945*. Oxon: Routledge, 2013.
Eliade, Mircea. *Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal Return*, translated from the French by Willard R. Trask. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959.
———. *Zalmoxis, the Vanishing God*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972.

———. *De Zalmoxis ă Gengis-Khan: études comparatives sur les religions et le folklore de la Dacie et de l'Europe orientale*. Paris: Payot, 1970.
Enescu, C. "Semnificaţia algerilor din decemvrie 1937 în evoluţia politică a neamului românesc." *Însemnări sociologiceSociologice* III, no. 11–12 (1937): 512–526.
Erikson, Erik H. *Young Man Luther. A Study in Psychoanalysis and History*. London: Faber, 1959.
Falasca Zamponi, Simonetta. *Fascist Spectacle: The Aesthetics of Power in Mussolini's Italy*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
Fătu, Mihai, and Ion Spălăţelu. *Garda de Fier, organizaţie teroristă de tip fascistă*, 2nd ed. Bucureşti: Editura Politică, 1980.
Feldman, Matthew, Marius Turda, and Tudor Georgescu, eds. *Clerical Fascism in Interwar Europe*. London: Routledge, 2008.
Felice, Renzo de, ed. *Mussolini*, 8 vols. Torino: Einaudi, 1965–1997.
———. *Intervista sul fascismo, a cura di Michael A. Ledeen*. Roma: Laterza, 1999 [1975]. English ed.: *Fascism: An informal introduction to its theory and practice, an interview with Michael A. Ledeen*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1976.
———. *Le interpretazioni del fascismo*. Roma, Bari: Laterza, 1969.
Fischer-Galaţi, Stephen. "Fascism in Romania." In *Native Fascism in the Successor States, 1918–1945*, edited by Peter F. Sugar, 112–122. Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 1971.
Florian, Alexandru, Constantin Petculescu, eds. *Ideea care ucide: dimensiunile ideologiei legionare*. Bucureşti: Noua Alternativă, 1994.
Florovsky, Georges. *Aspects of Church History. Volume Four in the Collected Works of Georges Florovsky*. Belmont, MA: Nordland Publishing Company, 1975.
Fogu, Claudio. *The Historic Imaginary: Politics of History in Fascist Italy*. Toronto, Ont: University of Toronto Press, 2003.
Foot, John. *Italy's Divided Memory*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
Frantzen, Allen J. *Bloody Good: Chivalry, Sacrifice, and the Great War*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.
Friling, Tuvia, Radu Ioanid and Mihai E. Ionescu, eds. *Final Report of the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania*. Iaşi: Polirom, 2005.
Fussell, Paul. *The Great War and Modern Memory*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975.
Geertz, Clifford. *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays*. New York: Basic Books, 1973.
Gentile, Emilio. *Le origini dell'ideologia fascista (1918-1925)*. Roma: Laterza, 1975.
———. "Fascism as Political Religion." *Journal of Contemporary History* 25, no. 2–3 (1990): 229–251.
———. *Il culto del littorio: la sacralizzazione della politica nell'Italia fascista*. Roma: Laterza, 1993.
———. "Mussolini's Charisma," *Modern Italy* 3, no. 2 (1998): 219–235.
———. *Le religioni della politica: Fra democrazie e totalitarismi*. Bari: Laterza, 2001.
———. "The Sacralisation of Politics: Definitions, Interpretations and Reflections on the Question of Secular Religion and Totalitarianism." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religion* 1, no. 1 (2000): 18–55.
———. *The Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003.
———. "Fascism, Totalitarianism and Political Religion: Definitions and Critical Reflections on Criticism of an Interpretation." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 5, no. 3 (2004): 326–375.

———. "Political religion: a concept and its critics – a critical survey." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 6, no. 1 (2005): 19–32.

———. *God's Democracy: American Religion after September 11*. Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2008.

———. *Politics as Religion*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.

Gillespie, Michael Allen. *The Theological Origins of Modernity*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008.

Glassman, Ronald M., and William H. Swatos, eds. *Charisma, History and Social Structure*. New York, Wesport Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1986.

Grancea, Mihaela and Cornel Moșneag. "Discursul presei greco-catolice din România despre natura nazismului (1933-1939)." *Studia Universitatis Cibiniensis. Seria Historica* VII, (2010): 245–259.

Grancea, Mihaela. "Between Passive and Active Anti-Semitism. From the Greek-Catholic Publications Concerning the Solution of the 'Jewish Problem' in Europe and Romania." *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie "George Barițiu" - Seria Historica* LIV, (2015):151–173.

Gregor, A. James. *The Ideology of Fascism*. New York: Free Press, 1969.

Griffin, Roger, ed. *Fascism, Totalitarianism and Political Religion*. London: Routledge, 2005.

Griffin, Roger. *The Nature of Fascism*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.

———. "Cloister or cluster? The Implications of Emilio Gentile's ecumenical theory of political religion for the study of extremism." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 6, no. 1 (2005): 33–52.

———. "Introduction: God's counterfeiters? Investigating the Triad of Fascism, Totalitarianism, and (political) Religion." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 5, no. 3 (2004): 291–326.

———. "The Primacy of Culture: The Current Growth (or Manufacture) of Consensus within Fascist Studies." *The Journal of Contemporary History* 37, no. 1 (2002): 21–43.

———, ed. *Fascism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

———. *Modernism and Fascism: The Sense of a Beginning under Mussolini and Hitler*. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

Gullace, Nicoletta. *The Blood of Our Sons: Men, Women, and the Renegotiation of British Citizenship During the Great War*. New York: Palgrave, 2002.

Hanebrink, Paul A. *A Specter Haunting Europe: The Myth of Judeo-Bolshevism*. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2018.

———. *In Defense of Christian Hungary: Religion, Nationalism, and Antisemitism, 1890–1944*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006.

Hastings, Adrian. *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Hastings, Derek. "How Catholic was the early Nazi movement? Religion, Race, and Culture in Munich 1919-1924." *Central European History* 36, no. 3 (2003): 383–433.

Hausleitner, Mariana. *Die Rumänisierung der Bukowina. Die Durchsetzung des nationalstaatlichen Anspruchs Grossrumäniens 1918–1944*. München: R. Oldenbourg, 2001.

Hayes, Carlton J. H. *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*. New York: R.R. Smith, Inc, 1931.

Haynes, Rebecca. "Work Camps, Commerce, and the Education of the 'New Man' in the Romanian Legionary Movement." *Historical Journal* 51, no. 4 (2008): 943–967.

Heinen, Armin, Oliver Jens Schmitt, eds. *Inszenierte Gegenmacht von rechts Die "Legion Erzengel Michael" in Rumanien 1918–1938*. Munchen: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 2013.

Heinen, Armin. *Die Legion "Erzengel Michael" in Rumänien: soziale Bewegung und politische Organisation. Ein Beitrag zum Problem des internationalen Faschismus*. München:

R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1986. Romanian ed.: *Legiunea "Arhanghelul Mihail." Mişcare socială şi organizaţie politică. O contribuţie la problema fascismului internaţional*. Bucureşti: Humanitas, 1998.

Hitchins, Keith. *Rumania, 1866-1947*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.

Hobsbawm, E. J. *Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1959.

Huttner, Markus. *Totalitarismus und säkulare Religionen: Zur Frühgeschichte totalitarismuskritischer Begriffs- und Theoriebildung in Großbritannien*. Bonn: Bouvier, 1999.

Iancu, Carol. *Jews in Romania, 1866–1919: From Exclusion to Emancipation* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1996. Original French ed.: *Les Juifs en Roumanie, 1866–1919. De l'exlcusion a l'emancipation*. Provence: Editions de l'Université de Provence, 1978.

———. *Les Juifs en Roumanie, 1919–1938: de l'émancipation à la marginalization*. Paris: Peeters, 1996.

Iancu, Gheorghe. *The Ruling Council: The Integration of Transylvania into Romania, 1918–1920*. Cluj-Napoca: Center for Transylvanian Studies, 1995.

Iggers, G. *The Social History of Politics: Critical Perspectives in West German Historical Writing since 1945*. Dover, N.H.: Berg, 1985.

Ioanid, Radu. *The Sword of the Archangel: Fascist Ideology in Romania*. Boulder: East European Monographs, 1990.

———. "The Sacralized Politics of the Romanian Iron Guard." *Totalitarian Movements & Political Religions* 5, no. 3 (2003): 419–453.

———. *The Holocaust in Romania: The Destruction of Jews and Gypsies under the Antonescu Regime, 1940–1944*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000.

Ionescu, Ghiță, and Ernest Gellner, eds. *Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics*. New York: Macmillan. 1969.

Iordachi, Constantin, and Ottmar Traşcă. "Ideological Transfers and Bureaucratic Entanglements: Nazi 'Experts' on the 'Jewish Question' and the Romanian-German Relations, 1940–1944." *Fascism: Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies* 4, no. 1 (2015): 48–100.

———. "Aristocracy, Fascism and the Social Origins of Mass Politics in Inter-war Romania." In *Noble Fascists? European Aristocracies and the Radical Right*, edited by Karina Urbach, 201–232. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

———. "Problema Holocaustului în România şi Transnistria – Dezbateri istoriografice." In *România şi Transnistria: Problema Holocaustului. Perspective istorice şi comparative*, edited by Viorel Achim and Constantin Iordachi, 23–77. Bucureşti: Curtea Veche, 2004.

———. *Liberalism, Constitutional Nationalism and Minorities: The Making of Romanian Citizenship, 1750–1918*. Leiden: Brill, 2019.

Jenkins, Brian M. "International Terrorism: A New Kind of Warfare." The Rand Paper Series, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 1974. Available at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2008/P5261.pdf.

K. V. "Nouvelles Revues Religieuses." *Ecos D'Orient* 29, no. 158. (1930): 254–256.

Kaltwasser, Cristobal Rovira, Paul Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy. "Populism: An Overview of the Concept and the State of the Art." In *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, edited by Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser et al., 1–24. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.

Katz, Richard S., William J Crotty. "Electoralist Catch-All Party." In *Handbook of Party Politics*, 256–258. London: Sage, 2006.

Kedourie, Elie. *Nationalism*. London: Hutchinson, 1960.

Kershaw, Ian. *Hitler*. London, New York: Longman, 1991.

———. *The 'Hitler Myth.' Image and Reality in the Third Reich*. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.

Kirchheimer, Otto. "The Catch-All Party." In *The West European Political Party System*, edited by Peter Mair, 51–60. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990.

Kligman, Gail. *The Wedding of the Dead: Ritual, Poetics, and Popular Culture in Transylvania*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.

Koenigsberg, Richard A. *Dying for One's Country: War as Sacrifice*. New York: Library of Social Science, 1996.

Krouwel, André. "Otto Kirchheimer and the catch-all party." *West European Politics* 26, no. 2 (2003): 23–40.

Laignel-Lavastine, Alexandra. *Cioran, Eliade, Ionescu: L'oubli du fascisme. Trois intellectuels roumains dans la tourmente du siècle*. Paris: PUF, 2003.

———. *Filozofie și nationalism: Paradoxul Noica*. București: Humanitas, 1998.

Lakoff, George. *Moral Politics: How Liberals and Conservatives Think*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.

Laqueur, Walter, ed. *Fascism: A Reader's Guide. Analyses, Interpretations, Bibliography*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.

Laqueur, Thomas W. *The Work of the Dead: A Cultural History of Mortal Remains*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2015.

Larsen, Stein Ugelvik, Bernt Hagtvet, and Jan Petter Myklebust, eds. *Who Were the Fascists? Social Roots of European Fascists*. Bergen, Oslo and Tromso: Universitetsforlaget, 1980.

Lauenstein, Oliver, J. S. Murer, M. Boos, and S. Reicher. "'Oh motherland I pledge to thee …': a study into nationalism, gender and the representation of an imagined family within national anthems." *Nations and Nationalism* 21, no. 2 (2015): 309–329.

Lauenstein, Oliver. *From family metaphor to national attachment? A social identity approach towards framing nationhood*. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of St Andrews, 2013.

Lavric, Sorin. *Noica și Mișcarea Legionară*. București: Humanitas, 2007.

Lazzari, Giovanni. "Linguaggio, ideologia, politica culturale del fascismo." *Movimenteo Operaio e Socialista* 7, no. 1 (Jan.–Apr. 1984): 49–56.

Leuștean, Lucian N. "The concept of symphonia in contemporary European Orthodoxy." *International Journal for the Study of the Chrisitan Church* 11, no. 2–3 (May 2011): 188–202.

Ley, Michael, and Julius H. Schoeps. *Der Nationalsozialismus als politische Religion*. Bodenheim b. Mainz: Philo Verlagsgesellschaft, 1997.

Ley, Michael. *Apokalypse und Moderne: Aufsätze zu politischen Religionen*. Wien: Sonderzahl, 1997.

Liebes, Tamar, Elihu Katz, and Rivka Ribak. "Ideological Reproduction." *Political Behavior* 13, no. 3 (Sep., 1991): 237–252.

Liebman, C.S. and E. Don-Yehiya, *Civil Religion in Israel*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.

Linehan, Thomas. "The British Union of Fascists as a Totalitarian Movement and Political Religion." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 5, no. 3 (2004): 397–418.

Linz, Juan J. "Political space and fascism as a late-Comer." *In Who Were the Fascists? Social Roots of European Fascists*, edited by Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet and Jan Petter Myklebust, 153–189. Bergen, Oslo and Tromso: Universitetsforlaget, 1980.

———. "Some Notes toward a Comparative Study of Fascism in Sociological Historical Perspective." In *Fascism: A Reader's Guide: Analyses, Interpretations, Bibliography*, edited by Walter Laqueur, 2–103. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1976.

Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Stein Rokkan. "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction." In *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-national Perspectives*, edited by Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, 1–64. New York: Free Press, 1967.

Livezeanu, Irina. "Interwar Poland and Romania: The Nationalization of Elites, the Vanishing Middle, and the Problem of Intellectuals." *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 22 (1998): 407–430.

———. *Politics in Greater Romania: Regionalism, Nation Building and Ethnic Struggle, 1918–1930*. Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 1995.

Love, Joseph. *Crafting the Third World: Theorizing Underdevelopment in Rumania and Brazil*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1996.

Macleod, Jenny, ed. *Defeat and Memory: Cultural Histories of Military Defeat in the Modern Era*. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

MacLinscott, Ricketts. *Mircea Eliade: The Romanian Roots, 1907–1945*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1988.

Maier, Hans. *Politische Religionen: die totalitären Regime und das Christentum*. Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder Spektrum, 1995.

———, and Michael Schäfer, eds. *Totalitarismus und Politische Religionen. Konzepte des Diktaturvergleichs*, 3 vols. Paderborn: Schöningh, 1997.

———. "Political Religion: A Concept and its Limitations." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 8, no. 1 (2007): 5–16,

Mann, Michael. *Fascists*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Manolescu, I., C. Nedelcu, and Teofil Sidorovici. "Straja Ţării." *Enciclopedia României*, vol. 1. *Enciclopedia României*, vol. 1. Bucureşti: Imprimeria Naţională 1938, 482–489.

Marchand, Eckart. "Monastic 'Imitatio Christi:' Andrea del Castagno's 'Cenacolo di S. Apollonia.'" *Artibus et Historiae* 24, no. 47 (2003): 31–50.

Marian, Simion Florea. *Înmormântarea la români: Studiu etnografic*. Bucureşti: Litotipografia Carol Göbl, 1892.

Martin, H., Huck Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton. *Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988.

Marvin, Carolyn, and David W. Ingle. *Blood Sacrifice and the Nation: Totem Rituals and the American Flag*. Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Mason, Timothy M. "Labour in the Third Reich, 1933–39." *Past and Present* 33, no. 1 (Apr. 1966): 112–41.

———. "National Socialism and the German Working Class, 1925-May 1933." *New German Critique* 11 (Spring 1977): 49–93.

———. *Social Policy in the Third Reich: The Working Class and the National Community*. Providence, RI: Berg, 1993.

———. *Nazism, Fascism, and the Working Class*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Mavrogordatos, George Th. *Stillborn Republic. Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece, 1922-1936*. Berkeley–Los Angeles–London: University of California Press, 1983.

McSweeney, John. "Foucault and Theology." *Foucault Studies* 2, no. 2 (2005): 117–144.

Melograni, Piero. "The Cult of the Duce in Mussolini's Italy," *Journal of Contemporary History* 11, no. 4 (1976): 221–237.

Micu, Dumitru. "*Gîndirea*" *şi gîndirismul*. Bucureşti: Minerva, 1975.

Mihăilescu, Dan C. "Generaţia '27, atunci şi acum." *Cuvântul* XI, no. 3 (Mar. 2005): 12.

Mosse, George L. "National Cemeteries and National Revival: The Cult of the Fallen Soldiers in Germany," *Journal of Contemporary History* 14, no. 1 (1979): 1–20.

———. *The Nationalization of the Masses. Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich*. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1991.

———. *The Fascist Revolution. Toward a General Theory of Fascism*. New York: Howard Fertig, 1999.

Mudde, Cas. "Populism: an Ideational Approach." In *The Oxford Handbook of Populism*, edited by Cristobal Rovira Kaltwasser, Paul A. Taggart, Paulina Ochoa Espejo, and Pierre Ostiguy, 27–47. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.

Mühlberger, Detlef. *The Social Bases of Nazism, 1919–1933*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.

———, ed. *The Social Basis of European Fascist Movements*. London: Croom Helm, 1987.

Murărescu, Dumitru. *Naţionalismul lui Eminescu*. Bucureşti: ATOS, 1994 [1932].

Murri, Romolo. *Fede e Fascismo*. Milano: Alpes, 1924.

Murvar, Vatro. "Some Reflections Weber's Typology of Herrschaft," *The Sociological Quarterly* 5, no. 4 (1964): 374–384.

Muşat, Mircea, Ion Ardeleanu. *România după Marea Unire*, vol. 2, Part II: *Noiembrie 1933-Septembrie 1940*. Bucureşti: Editura Ştiinţifică şi Enciclopedică, 1988.

Nagy-Talavera, Nicholas M. *The Green Shirts and the Others: A History of Fascism in Hungary and Rumania*. Berkeley–Los Angeles–London: University of California Press, 1967.

Neocleous, Mark. "Long live death! Fascism, resurrection, immortality." *Journal of Political Ideologies* 10, no. 1 (Feb. 2005): 31–49.

Nora, Pierre, ed. *Realms of Memory. The Construction of French Past*; English edition edited and with a foreword by Lawrence D. Kritzman, 3 vols. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996–1998.

———, ed. *Rethinking France: Les lieux de mémoire*, translated by Mary Trouille. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.

Nyomarkay, Joseph. *Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi Party*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1967.

O'Brien, Conor Cruise. *God-Land: Reflections on Religion and Nationalism*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988.

Orlow, Dietrich. *The History of the Nazi Party: 1919–1933*, 2 vol. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1969–73.

Ornea, Zigu. *Anii treizeci: extrema dreaptă românească*. Bucureşti: Editura Fundatiei Culturale Române, 1995. English ed.: *The Romanian Extreme Right: The Nineteen Thirties*. Boulder: East European Monographs, 1999.

Otto, Rudolf. *The Idea of the Holy*, translated by John W. Harvey. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1923.

Păcurariu, Mircea. *Istoria Bisericii Ortodoxe Române*. Bucureşti: Editura Institutului Biblic şi de Misiune al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române, 1981.

Pasetti, Matteo. *L'Europa corporativa. Una storia transnazionale tra le due guerre mondiali*. Bologna: Bononia University Press, 2016.

Passerini, Luisa. *Mussolini immaginario: Storia di una biografia 1915-1939*. Roma: Laterza, 1991.

Pătrăşcanu, Lucreţiu. *Sub trei dictaturi*. Bucureşti: Forum, 1944.

Paxton, Robert O. *The Anatomy of Fascism*. London: Allen Lane, 2004.

Payne, Stanley G. *Fascism. Comparison and Definition*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1980.

———. *A History of Fascism, 1914–1945*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1995.

———. "On the Heuristic Value of the Concept of Political Religion and its Application." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 6, no. 2 (2005): 163–174.

———. "The NDH State in Comparative Perspective." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 7, no. 4 (2006): 409–415.

Petcu, Adrian Nicolae. "Despre situaţa juridică a preoţilor legionari în perioada 1938-1943." *Analele Universităţii „Dunărea de Jos" din Galaţi* 4, no. 4 (2005): 277–301.

Petculescu, Constantin. *Mişcarea legionară: mit şi realitate*. Bucureşti: Noua Alternativă, 1997.

Petreu, Marta. *Diavolul şi Ucenicul Său: Nae Ionescu - Mihail Sebastian*. Iaşi: Polirom, 2009.

———. *Un trecut deocheat sau "Schimbarea la faţă a României"*. Cluj: Biblioteca Apostrof, 1999. English ed.: *An Infamous Past. E. M. Cioran and the Rise of Fascism in Romania*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee Publisher, 2005.

Petrovici, Ioan. *De-a lungul unei vieţi. Amintiri*. Bucureşti: Editura pentru Literatură, 1966.

Pinto, António C., Roger Eatwell, and Stein U. Larsen, eds. *Charisma and Fascism in Interwar Europe*. London: New York, 2007.

Politics and Political Parties in Roumania. London: International Reference Library Pub. Co, 1936.

Pollard, John F. *The Vatican and Italian Fascism, 1929–1932: A Study in Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Popescu-Spineni, M., Iulian Peter and Iosif I. Gabrea. "Organizaţia învăţământului în România." In *Enciclopedia României*, vol. 1. Bucureşti: Imprimeria Naţională 1938, 443–482.

Popovici, Nicolae. *Manual de drept bisericesc ortodox oriental cu privire specială la dreptul particular al Bisericii Ortodoxe Române (Inclusiv noua lege pentru organizarea bisericească din anul 1925)*. Vol. 1, Parts 1 and 2. Arad: Tiparul Tipografiei Diecezane Ortodoxe Române, 1925.

Potts, John. *A History of Charisma*. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillian, 2009.

Primăria Municipiului Orăştie. "Catedrala Ortodoxă din Orăştie, 'Sf.Arhangheli Mihail şi Gavriil.'" Available at http://www.orastie.info.ro/index.php?im=106

Pugliese, Stanislao G. ed. *Italian Fascism and Antifascism: A Critical Anthology*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001.

Raiu, Cătălin. *Democraţie şi statolatrie: creştinismul social la Bartolomeu Stănescu, episcopul Rămnicului Noului Severin: (1875–1954)*. Bucureşti: Editura Universităţii din Bucureşti, 2014.

Redles, David. *Hitler's Millennial Reich: Apocalyptic Belief and the Search for Salvation*. New York: New York University Press, 2005.

Reichardt, Sven, Armin Nolzen, eds. *Faschismus in Italien und Deutschland. Studien zu Transfer und Vergleich*. Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2005.

Riall, Lucy. "'I martiri nostri son tutti risorti!' Garibaldi, i garibaldini e il culto della morte eroica nel Risorgimento." In *La morte per la patria: La celebrazione dei caduti dal Risorgimento alla Repubblica*, edited by Oliver Janz and Lutz Klinkhammer, 23–44. Rome: Donzelli, 2008.

Roberts, David. *The Totalitarian Experiment in Twentieth Century Europe. Understanding the Poverty of Great Politics*. New York, London: Routledge, 2006.

Roberts, David R. "'Political Religion' and the Totalitarian Departures of Interwar Europe: On the Uses and Disadvantages of an Analytical Category." *Contemporary European History* 18, no. 4 (2009): 381–414.

România - Stat Naţional-Corporativ. programul oficial al Ligei Naţional-Corporatiste. Bucureşti, 1938.

Rostás, Zoltán. *Monografia ca utopie. Inverviuri cu Henri H. Stahl (1985-1987)*. Bucureşti: Paideia, 2000.

Rotaru, Florin. *"Pro Patria"—In Memoriam*. Bucureşti: Editora Biblioteca Bucureştilor, 2001.

Rusu, Mihai Stelian. "Domesticating Viragos. The Politics of Womanhood in the Romanian Legionary Movement." *Fascism* 5, (2016) 2: 49–176.

Săgeată, Radu. "Reformele administrative din România - între raţiunile politice şi realităţile geografice." *Geograful* 3, no. 2 (Jan.–Jun. 2011): 3–26.

Sandu, Traian. *Un Fascisme Roumain: Histoire de la Garde De Fer.* Paris: Perrin, 2014.

Săndulescu, Valentin. "Sacralised Politics in Action: The Feb. 1937 Burial of the Romanian Legionary Leaders Ion Moţa and Vasile Marin." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 8, no. 2 (2007): 259–269.

———. "Taming the Body: Preliminary Considerations regarding the Legionary Work Camps System (1933–1937)." *Historical Yearbook* V, (2008): 85–94.

Schenk, H. G. *The mind of the European romantics: An essay in cultural history.* Garden City: Doubleday, 1969.

Schiffer, Irvine. *Charisma: A Psychoanalytic Look at Mass Society.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973.

Schivelbusch, Wolfgang. *The Culture of Defeat: On National Trauma, Mourning, and Recovery.* New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003.

Schmitt, Oliver Jens. "Approaching the Social History of Romanian Fascism. The Legionaries of Vâlcea County in the Interwar Period." *Fascism. Journal of Comparative Fascist Studies* 3, no. 2 (2014): 117–151.

———. "Wer waren die rumänischen Legionäre? Eine Fallstudie zu faschistischen Kadern im Umland von Bukarest 1927 bis 1941." *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* 64, no. 3 (2016): 419–448.

———. *Căpitan Codreanu: Aufstieg Und Fall Des Rumänischen Faschistenführers.* Wien: Paul Zsolnay Verlag, 2016.

Schweitzer, Arthur. "Theory and Political Charisma." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 16, no. 2 (Mar. 1974): 150–181.

Sdrobiş, Dragoş. *Limitele meritocraţiei într-o societate agrară: Şomaj intelectual şi radicalizare politică a tineretului în România interbelică.* Iaşi: Polirom, 2015.

Shafir, Michael. "Marshal Antonescu's Postcommunist Rehabilitation. *Cui bono*?" In *The Destruction of Romanian and Ukrainian Jews during the Antonescu Era*, edited by Randolph L. Braham, 349–410. Boulder, CO: The Rosenthal Institute for Holocaust Studies, Graduate Center, City University of New York, and Social Science Monographs, 1997.

———. *Între negare şi trivializare. Negarea Holocaustului în ţările postcomuniste din Europa Centrală şi de Est.* Iaşi: Polirom, 2000.

Shapiro, Paul. "Faith, Murder, Resurrection: The Iron Guard and the Romanian Orthodox Church." In *Antisemitism, Christian Ambivalence, and the Holocaust*, edited by Kevin P. Spicer, 136–170. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007.

Shils, Edward. "Charisma, Order, and Status." *American Sociological Review* 30, no. 2 (1965): 199–213.

Simion, Aurică. *Regimul politic din România în perioada septembrie 1940–ianuarie 1941.* Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1976.

———. *Preliminarii politico-diplomatice ale insurecţiei române din august 1944.* Cluj-Napoca: Dacia, 1978.

Smith, Anthony D. "Culture, Community, and Territory: The Politics of Ethnicity and Nationalism." *International Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1996): 445–458.

———. *Chosen Peoples: Sacred Sources of National Identity.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

———. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations.* Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1988.

Spengler, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes: Umrisse einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte*, 2 vols. Wien–Leipzig: W. Braumüller, 1918–22. English ed.: *The Decline of the West*. New York: A. A. Knopf, 1926.

Spicer, Kevin P., ed. *Antisemitism, Christian Ambivalence, and the Holocaust.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007.

Solonari. Vladimir. *Purifying the Nation: Population Exchange and Ethnic Cleansing in Nazi-Allied Romania*. Baltimore, Md: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010.

Sorel, Georges. *Reflections on Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Steigmann-Gall, Richard. *The Holy Reich: Nazi Conceptions of Christianity, 1919–1945*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Sternhell, Zeev, ed. *Maurice Barrès et le nationalisme français*. Paris, A. Colin, 1972.
———. *La droite révolutionnaire: 1885–1914. Les origines françaises du fascisme*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1978.
———. *Neither Right Nor Left: Fascist Ideology in France*, translated by David Maisel. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.
———, with Mario Sznajder and Maia Asheri. *The Birth of Fascist Ideology: From Cultural Rebellion to Political Revolution*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994.
———. "Fascism: Reflections on the Fate of Ideas in Twentieth Century History." *Journal of Political Ideologies* 5, no. 2 (2000): 139–162.
Stigliano, Tony. "Fascism's Mythologist Mircea Eliade and the Politics of Myth." *ReVision* 24, no. 3 (2002): 32–38.
Sturdza, Michael. *The Suicide of Europe. Memoirs of Prince Michael Sturdza, Former Foreign Minister of Rumania*. Boston, Los Angeles: Western Islands, 1986.
Tal, Uriel. *Faith, Politics, and Nazism: Selected Essays*. London: Frank Cass, 2003.
Talmon, Jacob L. *Political Messianism: The Romantic Phase*. New York: Praeger, 1960.
———. *Romanticism and Revolt: Europe 1815–1848*. New York: Norton, 1979.
———. *The Myth of the Nation and the Vision of Revolution: Ideological Polarisation in the Twentieth Century*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1991.
———. *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy*. New York: Norton, 1970.
Tănase, Stelian. *Elite şi societate. Guvernarea Gheorghiu-Dej, 1948–1965*. Bucureşti: Humanitas, 1998.
Tomoiagă, Radu. *Ion Eliade Rădulescu. Ideologia social-politică şi filozofică*. Bucureşti: Editura Ştiinţifică, 1971.
Toroczkai, Ciprian Iulian. "The Orthodox Neo-patristic Movements as Renewal of Contemporary Orthodox Theology: An Overview." *Review of Ecumenical Studies* 7, no. 1 (2015): 94–115.
Tosini, Domenico. "A Sociological Understanding of Suicide Attacks." *Theory Culture Society* 26, no. 4 (2009): 67–96.
Treptow, Kurt W. "Populism in Twentieth Century Romanian Politics." In *Populism in Eastern Europe*, edited by Joseph Held, 197–218. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.
———, and Gheorghe Buzatu, eds., *"Procesul" lui Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu (Mai, 1938)*. Iaşi: S.C. Dosoftei, 1994.
———, and Gheorghe Buzatu. *Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu în faţa istoriei*. Iaşi: n.p., 1994.
Tucker, Robert C. "The Theory of Charismatic Leadership." *Daedalus* 97, no. 3 (1968): 731–756.
Ţurcanu, Florin. *Mircea Eliade. Le prisonnier de l'histoire. Préface de Jacques Julliard*. Paris: La Découverte, 2004.
Turczynski, Emanuel. "The Background of Romanian Fascism." In *Native Fascism in the Successor States, 1918–1945*, edited by Peter F. Sugar, 101–111. Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 1971.
Turda, Marius. *Biopolitică şi eugenism în România, 1920-1944. Biopolitics and eugenics in Romania, 1920-1944*. Bucureşti Editura Muzeului Municipiului Bucureşti, 2019.
Turner, Bryan. "Max Weber and the spirit of resentment: The Nietzsche legacy." *Journal of Classical Sociology* 11, no. 1 (2011): 75–92.
United States Department of State. *Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001*. Washington, DC: United States Department of State, 2002.

van der Veer, Peter. "Nation, Politics, Religion." *Journal of Religious and Political Practice* 1, no. 1 (2015): 7–21.

———. *Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in India*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.

Veiga, Francisco. *La Mística del Ultranacionalismo. Historia de la Guardia de Hierron. Rumania, 1919-1941*. Bellaterra: Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, 1989.

Ventrone, Angelo. *La Seduzione Totalitaria: Guerra, Modernită, Violenza Politica (1914–1918)*. Roma: Donzelli, 2003.

Verdery, Katherine. *National Ideology under Socialism. Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceaușescu's Romania*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.

———. *Secrets and truths: ethnography in the archive of Romania's secret police*. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2014.

———. *Political Life of Dead Bodies: Reburial and Postsocialist Change*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999.

Vinereanu, Mihai. *Dictionar Etimologic al Limbii Romane. Pe baza cercetărilor de indo-europenistică*. Bucureşti: Alcor Edimpex, 2009.

Voegelin, Eric. *Die Politische Religionen*. Wien: Bermann-Fischen Verlag, 1938.

———. *Hitler and the Germans*. Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 1999.

———. *Religion and the Rise of Modernity*. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1998.

Volovici, Leon. *Nationalist Ideology and Anti-Semitism: The Case of Romanian Intellectuals in the 1930s*. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1991.

Vondung, Klaus. "National Socialism as a Political Religion: Potentials and Limits of an Analytical Concept." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions* 6, no. 1 (2005): 87–95.

Vulcănescu, Romulus. *Mitologie Română*. Bucureşti: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1987.

Walicki, Andrzej. *Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism: The Case of Poland*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982.

———. "National Messianism and the Historical Controversies in the Polish Thought of 1831–1848." In *Culture and Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Eastern Europe*, edited by Roland Sussex and J. C. Eade, 128–142. Columbus, Ohio: Slavica Publishers, 1983.

———. "Polish Romantic Messianism in Comparative Perspective." *Slavic Studies* 22, no. 1 (1978): 1–15.

Watts, Larry L. *Romanian Cassandra: Ion Antonescu and the Struggle for Reform, 1916–1941*. Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1993.

Weber, Eugen. "Romania." In *The European Right. A Historical Profile*, edited by Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber, 501–574. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1965.

———. "The Man of the Archangel." *Journal of Contemporary History* 1, no. 1 (1966): 101–126.

———. *L'Action française*. Paris: Fayard, 1985.

———. *Varieties of Fascism: Doctrines of Revolution in the Twentieth Century*. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1964.

Weber, Max. *Basic Concepts in Sociology*. New York: Citadel Press, 1990.

———. *Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*, 2 vols, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978

———. *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, edited by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1998.

Wehler, Hans-Ulrich. *The German Empire, 1871–1918*. Providence, Oxford: Berg, 1985.

White, Howard B. "Political Faith and Francis Bacon." *Social Research* 23, no. 3 (1956): 343–366.

Wiles, Peter. "A Syndrome, not a Doctrine, Some Elementary Theses on Populism." In *Populism: Its Meanings and National Characteristics*, edited by Ghiţă Ionescu and Ernest Gellner, 166–179. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969.

Williams, Howard. "Metamorphosis or Palingenesis? Political Change in Kant." *Review of Politics* 63, no. 4 (Fall 2001): 693–722.

Winter, Jay. *Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History*. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Wintrobe, Ronald. *Rational Extremism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Wohl, Robert. *The Generation of 1914*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979.

Wolf, Eric R. "On Peasant Rebellions." In *Peasants and Peasant Societies*, edited by Teodor Shanin, 264–265. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971.

———. *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century*. New York: Harper & Row, 1969.

Wolff, Richard J. and Jörg K. Hoensch, eds. *Catholics, the State and the European Radical Right, 1919–1945*. Boulder: Social Science Monographs, 1987.

Woolf, S. J., ed. *European Fascism*. New York: Vintage Books, 1969.

Wydra, Harald. *Politics and the Sacred*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Yeomans, Rory. *Visions of Annihilation: The Ustasha Regime and the Cultural Politics of Fascism, 1941–1945*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2013.

Zajcev, Oleksandr. *Ukrayins"kyj integral"nyj nacionalizm 1920–1930-x rokiv Narysy intelektual"noyi istoriyi*. Kyiv: Krytyka, 2013.

Zamfirescu, Dragoş. *Legiunea Arhangelul Mihail. De la mit la realitate*. Bucureşti: Editura Enciclopedică, 1997.

Zarifopol-Johnston, Ilinca. *Searching for Cioran*. Bloomington: Indiana Univeristy Press, 2009.

Ziolkowski, Theodore. *Modes of Faith: Secular Surrogates for Lost Religious Belief*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007.

INDEX

Acterian, Arşavir 118
Action Française 67–68, 437
Adjud 219
Advetists, Greater Romania 373
Alba Iulia 101, 219, 321, 322, 347, 348, 349
Alcázar 214
Alea Vulpache, Bucharest 314
Alecsandri, Vasile, "Union's Round Dance" 190
Alexander I, King of Yugoslavia (1929–1931) 269
Alexander of Macedon 102
All for the Country Party (*Totul pentru Țară*) 28, 83, 87–89, 127, 133, 164, 168, 197, 199, 214, 216, 219, 227, 228, 242, 254, 282, 378, 382, 389, 393, 396, 397; disbanding of 276–277; election results 255–260, 267
American Revolution 388
Anania, Bartolomeu 429
Anastasescu, Fănică 345
Anderson, Benedict 64
Andrei, Petre 126
Andrei, Vasile 340
D'Annunzio, Gabriele 225
Anti-Christian 135, 292, 325, 375, 376, 398
anticommunist resistance xiii; anti-Bolshevism 108; "The Anti-Communist Falange" 80; *see also* Bolshevism
antisemitism 347, 108, 154; alleged anti-Romanian actions 105; alleged 'invasion' of foreign Jews 206; anti-Jewish decrees during royal dictatorship 284–285; anti-Jewish plot 66; and trial 66–67; anti-Jewish student plot 66, 244; anti-Jewish violence 299; demonization of 91–92, 100, 103–106, 110, 113, 115, 123, 126, 130, 172, 188, 196, 203, 214, 240, 242, 245, 250, 258, 322, 346, 347, 364, 366, 418; denaturalization of 270, 271, 284; deportation and extermination *xiii*, 7, 302–303, 424; *numerus clausus* 50, 63, 64, 85, 105, 106, 110; *numerus nullus* 50, 105; opposition to Jewish emancipation 65–66; status under the National Legionary Regime 292–294, 296, 302; *see also* Jews
Anton of Padua, Catholic Saint 161
Antonescu, Ion 6, 7, 10, 30, 113, 268, 270, 289–303, 306, 313–314, 317, 319–320, 328–330, 334, 335, 340, 341, 347, 350–351, 373–374, 398–403, 422–425, 429
Antonescu, Mihai 293, 319
Antonio, Jose *xiv*
Apărarea națională [National Defense], newspaper 69, 156
Arad 342
"Arboroasa" Association 213
Archangel Gabriel 78, 101, 190, 429
Archangel Michael, and the monarchy 107, 426, 429; archangelism 109; "Archangelists' Question" 70; and the cult of war heroes 191–193; depiction in the Coronation Cathedral 99; icon

of 78, 89, 95, 96–99, 100, 163, 342; Legionary cult of 9, 68, 70, 78, 89, 90, 95–102, 120, 168, 172, 207, 321, 327, 331, 336–337, 340–344, 346, 364, 377, 421, 426, 427; 190; links with the cult of Michael the Brave 96–102, 190–193, 210, 216, 415–416; and the personality cult of Antonescu 401; as symbol of Mărăşeşti 191
Arendt, Hannah 25–26
Argeşanu, Gheorghe, General 282
Argetoianu, Constantin 82, 117
Arieş River 337–338
Armenia 24
Arnota labour camp 389
Arnota Monastery 389
Aromanians, within the Legion 202, 203, 210, 347
Arrow Cross, Hungary 252
Aryans 156
Astra 348
Atheneum, Bucharest 349
Austria 251; Nazi annexation of 277, 283
Austria-Hungary 51, 52, 53, 54, 64, 164, 349; Austrian-Hungarian Army 187, 248
Authoritarianism 7, 25, 283, 289, 422
Averescu, Alexandru, General, Marshall from 1930 56, 83, 85, 124, 129
AXA group 90–91, 107, 112, 113–116, 117, 120, 131, 174, 209, 222, 282, 363
AXA journal 131, 157, 209, 246, 251–252, 375, 377

Bacău 219
Bagdad, Elena 319
Baia 383
Bălan, Nicolae (1882–1955), Metropolitan of Transylvania 220, 368, 372–373, 383, 385–387, 393, 396, 397, 401, 403
Bălcescu, Nicolae and palingenetic laws 175, 414, 418; and messianic nationalism 250, 344; and the cult of Michael the Brave 281
Balkans 115, 121, 201, 246, 269
Ballanche, Pierre-Simon (1776–1847), *Essais de palingénésie sociale* (1820) 17
Bălţi County, Bessarabia 253, 254, 383, 384
Banat 51, 52, 54, 55, 57, 62, 70, 80, 255, 257, 258, 303, 310, 347, 351, 367
Bandac, Leonida 66
Banea, Dumitru 338
Banea, Ion 81, 90, 167, 168, 178, 221, 282, 338, 363; and the cult of the Captain 157–158
Bănescu, Eugen 323, 327, 328
Baptists, Greater Romania 370, 373; German Baptists 373; Hungarian Baptists 373; Romanian Baptists 373
Barbu, Zeev 4, 5, 239–240
Bârnova sanatorium 319
Barres, Maurice 69, 70, 72, 158, 214
Bârşa 317
Bartolomeu (also Vartolomeiu) Stănescu, Bishop of Râmnicu Noul Severin (1921–1938) 387–389, 392; and Center for Social-Christian studies (*Centrul de Studii Social-Creştine*) 388; and social Christianism 388–389
Basarab Avenue, Bucharest 337, 340
Belimace, Doru 204–206, 208; "Doru Belimace Height" 316; house of 324; family of 340; see also *Nicadori*
Belu Cemetery, Bucharest 227
Beneyto Luis, the delegate of the Spanish Phalange in Romania 336
Berdiaef, Nicolas 134
Berghof 279
Berlin 68, 115, 117, 120, 153, 218, 292, 298, 333, 338
Bernea, Ernest 118
Bessarabia 51, 52, 53, 62, 64, 65, 79, 80, 102, 167, 191, 205, 212, 213, 250, 252, 254, 255, 256, 260, 289, 294, 303, 368, 369, 378, 382–385, 392, 393; Bessarabian Metropolitan Seat 368; Bessarabian Orthodox Church 367; Southern Bessarabia 239, 243
Biberi, I. 118
Bidinaru, A. 387
Billington, James H. 18
Bismarck, Otto von 107
Bistriţa Monastery 289, 389
"Black Hill" (*Dealul Negru*) Legionary unit 323
Blănaru, Ion 332, 334
Blum, Léon 217, 218
Bogdan-Duică, Gheorghe 90
Bohle, Ernst Wilhelm, head of the Nazi Organization for Germans Abroad 335
Boldeanu, Vasile 324, 396–397
Bolshevik Revolution 104–105, 250
Bolshevism 80, 81, 115, 119, 121, 123, 126; contamination with 64; Bolshevisation of Romania 214; fear of 225; and internationalism 251; attack on the Russian Orthodox Church 375
Bonnet, Charles, *La Palingenesie philosophique* (1769–1770) 17
Boris III, King of Bulgaria (1938–1943) 269

Borzea, Aurel 316
Botoşani 254
Botta, Dan 118
Brăileanu, Traian 107, 124–129, 162, 213, 251; and the Cernăuţi sociological group 179, 395; as Minister of National Education 319, 395, 398, 399, 401; see also *Iconar*
Brâncoveanu, Constantin, Wallachian Prince 190
Braşov 282, 317, 321, 342
Brătianu Avenue, Bucharest 337; statue of Brătianu, statue 340
Brauner, Eliza, Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu's mother 64
British Union of Fascists (BUF) xiv
Brotherhoods of the Cross (*Frăţiile de Cruce*) 3, 163, 164–169, 172–174, 209, 282, 318, 319, 338, 340, 351, 363
Bucharest 219, 282, 317, 319, 320
bucium (bugle) 338
Bukovina 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 62, 63, 64, 65, 90, 102, 104, 124, 126, 128, 164, 167, 212, 219, 252, 254, 255, 258, 262, 294, 337, 338, 367, 382, 393; deportation of Jews from 303; Northern Bukovina 289; Southern Bukovina 80
Bulgaria 73, 201, 246, 269, 281, 289
Bulgarians in Dobrudja 53, 205, 248, 257; Bulgarian Exarchate 367
Buna Vestire (The Annunciation) 133, 164, 216, 299, 318, 327, 332
Burgos 218
Butnaru, G. 336
Byzantium 24

Cadrilater/Southern Dobrudja colonization of 115, 201, 203, 205; annexation by Bulgaria 289
Cahul 254
Calea Şerban Vodă, Bucharest 318
Caledoniu, Ovid 124
Călinescu, Armand 81, 282, 318, 319, 326
Călugăreni, battle of 101
Calvinists, Greater Romania 370
Câmpina 317, 392
Câmpulung 102
Cantacuzino, Alexandrina 192, 313
Cantacuzino, Alexandru 4, 21, 90, 215, 218, 221, 222, 224, 282, 313; and fascist theology 133–137
Cantacuzino, George Matei 118
Cantacuzino, Gheorghe "Zizi" *Grănicerul* (Border Guard) 83–84, 134, 189, 197, 198, 205, 207, 208, 214, 215, 218; burial of 226–228, 310
Cantonieru, Nicolae 125
Caraiman Mountain 345
Caraiman, Carol 117, 129; *see also* Carol II, King of Romania
Caranica, Ion 204, 206, 208, 210, 316; "Ion Caranica Height" 315; see also *Nicadori*
Carol II, King of Romania (r. 1939–1940) 82, 84, 192, 204, 206, 212, 246, 259, 267, 289, 291, 308, 310, 311, 314, 321, 323, 348, 385, 390–394, 396, 423–425; royal dictatorship of 269–285; *see also* Caraiman, Carol
Carpathian Mountains 314–315, 321
Caşin 101
Cathedral of the Coronation, Alba Iulia 96–99
Caucasus 115
Central Europe 5, 10, 82, 115, 279, 288, 303
Cenuşa [Ashes] Crematorium, Bucharest 318
Cernăuţi county 129, 253, 256, 262
Cernăuţi/Cernowitz 1, 55, 28, 62, 63, 66, 194, 219, 220, 395, 421; Cathedral 213; Cernăuţi Conservatory 125; Monument for the Union of Bukovina 213; Square of the Union 213
Cernăuţi/Czernowitz Cathedral 213; Monument for the Union of Bukovina 213; Square of the Union 213
Cernica Monastery 318; Cernica Monastic Seminary Choir 339
charisma and fascism 20–22
charismatic nationalism 11–12, 21, 26, 51, 70, 137, 220, 403, 419
Charlotenville, Virginia xiv
Charlottesville rally xiv
Chelaru, Traian 125
Chişinău 10, 58, 62, 206, 208, 384, 385
Christescu, Vasile 90, 112, 116, 222
Ciano, Galeazzo, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy 335
Ciocăneşti 205
Cioran, Emil xiii, 120–121, 118, 346; *Schimbarea la faţă* 121
Ciorogariu, Gheorghe 301
Ciumetti "Sterie Ciumetti Height" 316
Ciumetti, Maria 340
Civil Code, Romania 327
Clime, Gheorghe, leader of "All for the Country" 89, 218, 282
Cluj 66, 219

Cobălcescu avenue, Bucharest 318
Codrii Câmpulungului, Bukovina 337
Cold War 25–26
Comăneşti 219
Comarnescu, Petru 118
Commission of Investigation of the Legionary Crimes 328
Company of Honor of the Hunters' Regiment No. 17, Transylvania 317
Constant, Alexandru 114
Constantin, Theodor 124
Constantinescu, Nicolae (Niki) 206, 207, 208, 210; "Nicolae Constantinescu Height" 315–316; family of 340; see also *Nicadori*
Constantinescu, Titus H. 68, 155
Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu Grouping (*Gruparea Corneliu Zelea-Codreanu*) 28, 157, 164
Corporativism 12, 107, 114, 115, 418; "corporative ethnocracy" 110; in Crainic's work 110–111, 113; in the Legionary doctrine 114–116; in Manoilescu's work 129–133; and the organization of the Legion 169; and social Christianity 388; under the royal dictatorship 270, 273–274; totalitarian-corporatist state 107, 423
Coşbuc, George 97, 141
Costeşti 101
Crainic, Nichifor 107–113, 116, 119, 130, 132, 177, 198, 379, 382; and corporatism 110–111, 113
Creţu, Gheorghe, Legionary Police Commissar 328
Crişana 167, 255, 256, 257, 258
Cristea, Miron, Patriarch 101, 220, 271, 310, 320, 350, 368, 384, 394, 401; funeral of 310, 311, 350
Cristescu, Eugen, director of the Romanian Intelligence Service 242
Cristescu, Grigorie, Father 227, 370, 379, 380, 389
Crişul Alb river 338
Criterion debating circle (1932–1933) 118
Croatia 246
Cruciada Românismului (the Crusade of Romanianism), newspaper 85, 209–210
Curentul 332
Cuvântul 319, 346, 347
Cuza, A. C. 65, 68, 69, 85, 90, 103, 112–114, 124, 131, 154, 156, 159, 244, 270, 418
Cuza, Alexandru Ioan, (r. 1859–1866) 102, 103, 190, 365–366
Czechoslovakia 52, 70; partition of 283

Dacia, Kingdom of 101, 327; war against the Roman Empire (105–106 CE) 101
Dacians 56, 97, 101; and the cult of authenticity 338
Dancu, Cristofor 336
Danilă, Constantin 81
Day of Legionary Suffering (1940) 84
Dealu Mare Monastery 96, 190, 195, 344; "St. Nicholas Church" 96
Dealu Military School 96, 415, 416
Decemviri 211, 279, 311, 312; reburial of 320–325, 330, 339, 341–343
Degeneration fascism and 27; Jews as agents of 245, 346, 416–418; in the Legionary ideology 92–93, 103–104, 110, 214, 416–418
Degrelle, Léon xiv
Deutsches Nachrichtenbüro GmbH 117
Dinicu Golescu avenue, Bucharest 318
Dobre, Bănică 214
Dobre, Gheorghe, General 329
Dobre, Ion 198; prefect of Tecuci county 317
Dobrudja 52, 191, 243, 255, 256, 351, 383, 393; Bulgarians in 205, 243; Northern Dobrudja 257–258, 367, 368
Dolj 387
Dollfuss, Engelbert Austrian chancellor 350
Dorneşti 219
Drăgănescu, Ştefan 323
Drăgăşani 389
Dragomirescu, Theodor 124
Dragomirescu, Victor 160, 281, 318
Drumur, Gheorghe 125
Dubneac, monk deacon Felix 339
Duca, I. G. 82, 83, 84, 203, 204, 205, 326, 420; assassination of 160, 177, 204–206, 208, 210, 213, 326, 376
Dumas, Alexandre, *The Three Musketeers* 173
Dumitrescu-Borşa, Ion, Father 83, 214, 301, 389, 396, 397
Dumitrescu, Miţi 218, 318
Durkheim, Emile (1905–1909) 387; Durkheim's social theory 388

East-Central Europe 52, 246
Eatwell, Roger 6, 20
Éducation Nouvelle, also *nouvelle pédagogie* 171–172

Edward VII, funerals of 218
Elektra 327
Eliade, Mircea *xiii*, 118–120, 125; "Spiritual Itinerary" (*Itinerariu spiritual*) (1927) 118
Elian, Alexandru 118
Elisabeta Avenue, Bucharest 227, 337
Eminescu, Mihai (1850–1889) 103, 416

Fabricius, Wilhelm the Ministry of Nazi Germany to Bucharest 317, 335
Fălciu 254
Farben Industrie, I. G. 117
Felice, Renzo de 5
Ferdinand I, King of Romania (1914–1927) 56, 190, 191, 384, 399; coronation 190, 416
Filipescu, Nicolae 415–416
Flondor, Iancu 56
Florescu, Antipa 336
Focşani 155
Foucault, Michel 26
France 16, 17, 18, 19, 69, 82, 121, 122, 126, 153, 174, 217, 218, 225, 279, 283, 283, 310
Franco, Francisco, General 335
freemasonry 135, 213–215; "Jewish Masonic hydra" 299; Judeo-Masonic bankers 204; Judeo-Masonic front 176; "Liberal Masonic hydra" 299; masonic influence 195; masonic plot 176; masonic policy of the National Liberal Party 214
French revolution 121, 388

Galata Prison 159
Galaţi 80
Galaţi County 79
Galicia 153, 272
Gandhi, Mahatma 188
Gărneaţă, Ilie 66, 98–99, 316, 319, 323, 330, 334
Gârniceanu, Puiu 66; and the cult of the Captain 158
Găvănescu, Ion, Professor 246
Gazeta Transilvaniei 349
Generic fascism 10, 17; approach to generic fascism 10–27; ideal-type definition 12; new consensus 11
Gentile, Emilio 6, 24–25
Gentile, Giovanni 20
Georgescu, Corneliu 66, 190, 222, 316, 323, 329; autobiographical account 243–244
Georgescu, Serafim, Archimandrite, abbot of the Sinaia Monastery 316, 319
Georgescu-Edineţ, Nicolae 195, 222, 227, 336, 375, 379
German air force mission (*Deutsches Luftwaffe Mission in Rümanien*) 335
Germany iii, 3, 7, 25, 52, 68, 107, 113, 115, 121, 133, 134, 153, 189, 210, 215, 217, 218, 252, 270, 276, 277, 279, 283, 293, 295, 298, 300, 303, 317, 321, 335, 387, 423
Gheorghiu, Aristotle 316
Gheorgieni railway station 316
Ghici, Pellegrino the Ministry of Italy to Bucharest 317, 336
Ghighiu Monastery 316
Giurgiu, Marcu (1733–1785), alias Crişan 349
Glasul Bucovinei 125
Goebbels, Paul Joseph 117
Goga, Octavian 54, 61, 85, 100, 112, 270; and church policy 390, 395; and the denaturalization of Jews 284, 292; Goga government 289; and the Jewish invasion of cities 100; *see also* National Christian Party; National-Agrarian Party
Golopenţia, Anton 118
Göring, Hermann 218
Gramsci, Antonio 4
Great Britain 82
Great National Assembly of Alba Iulia in 1918 322, 347, 348
Greece 24, 248; ancient Greece 327
Greek Catholic Church 349
Greek Phanariots, as agents of degeneration 103, 347, 418
Green House (*Casa Verde*), Bucharest 314, 321, 322, 334, 337, 340, 341, 342; construction of 82
Griffin, Roger on the Iron Guard 6; on charismatic leadership 20; and the paligenetic nature of fascism 17–18
Grigor, Gheorghe 189; burial of 212–213
Grigore Ghica Vodă 219
Grigoriu, Constantin 427
Griviţa Avenue, Bucharest 337
Griviţa Workshops, Bucharest 340
Groza, Dumitru, chief of the Workers' Corps 328, 340
Gurie, Orthodox Metropolitan of Bessarabia 197, 336, 351, 384
Gustloff, Wilhelm 218
Gyr, Radu 3, 120, 189, 389

haiducs 344
Hannibal 157
Hansen, Erik, General, military attaché to Bucharest 335
Harmel, Léon 388
Heimbach, Matthew xiv; and the US Traditionalist Worker Party xiv
Heinen, Armin 5, 240, 242, 260, 295
Heliade Rădulescu, Ion 96, 103, 104, 109, 250, 344, 415, 416; *Mihaida*, poem epic 96; "theological" philosophy of palingenesis 415–418
Heroism 189; Codreanu as an model of heroism 155, 162, 173, 345; Crainic's view on 108; and the Cross Brotherhood 173; heroic Christianity 93; in *Iconar* 125; Legionary heroism 83, 101, 216, 313, 315, 321, 345
Herseni, Traian 118, 395
High Court of Cassation and Justice 327
Himmler, Heinrich, *Reichsführer* SS 336
Hitler, Adolf *Mein Kampf* 13, 117, 127, 131, 133, 174, 210, 279, 300, 302, 335, 387; and political faith 13, 21
Hitlerism 123
Hobsbawm, Eric 5
Hoinic, Mircea 339
"Hoist the Flag and Close Your Ranks" [*Drapelul sus şi rândurile strânse*] Legionary anthem 317
Holocaust 10; Holocaust studies 22
Horthy, Miklós 316
Hotin 101, 384
Hungarians in Greater Romania 51, 53, 54, 61, 188, 240, 243, 256, 257, 258
Hungary 7, 252, 289, 316, 322

Iancu, Avram 101, 102, 119, 349
Iamandi, Victor 208, 376, 385, 391
Iaşi 66, 96, 383
Iaşi Cultural House 78
Iaşi Metropolitan Church 190
Iasinschi, Vasile 1, 213, 316, 317, 319, 330
Iconar 107, 124–126, 212, 246
Imbrescu, Ilie, Father 90, 195, 332, 377, 393–394, 403, 419
imitatio Christi 93, 160, 321, 332
integral nationalism 9, 16, 51, 60, 68, 104, 112, 130, 131, 173, 270, 289, 290, 292, 293, 295, 297, 301, 424; Christian-integral nationalism 65; integral Romanianism 130
Ioan the Terrible (*Ioan cel Cumplit*), Wallachian prince 101
Ionescu, Andrei 332
Ionescu, D. N. 380
Ionescu, Dominic 227
Ionescu (Ionesco), Eugen (1909–1994) xiii, 122
Ionescu, Nae *xiii*, 107, 112, 116–118, 119, 123, 126, 132, 157, 215, 379–382, 389, 395, 419
Ionescu, Şerban 388
Ionescu, Virgil 112, 113, 114, 216
Iorga, Nicolae 54, 58, 61, 87, 90, 103, 111, 112, 117, 124, 226, 278, 328, 329, 344, 365, 416–418
Iovin, Vasile 338
Iron Guard, establishment 79–80, 81; ban of 81, 82, 83, 106, 116, 164; *see also* Legion "Archangel Michael"
Irun 218
Islamic religion, Greater Romania 370
Ismail 254
Ispir, Vasile Gh. 388
Istrate, Gheorghe leader of the Cross Brotherhoods 282
Italian Fascism 4, 13, 25, 68, 107, 110, 114, 116, 119, 120, 121, 125, 133, 134, 174, 199
Italy iii, 3, 16, 17, 18, 19, 25, 52, 71, 107, 113, 115, 121, 133, 134, 189, 218, 225, 270, 276, 295, 298, 317, 321, 335, 336, 423

Japan 321; status of Japanese citizens in Romania 335
Jena 68
Jews, in Old Kingdom 52, 60, 62; alleged 'invasion' by foreign Jews 206; alleged anti-Romanian actions 105; anti-Jewish decrees during royal dictatorship 284–285; anti-Jewish plot 66; anti-Jewish violence 299; demonization of 91–92, 100, 103–106, 110, 113, 115, 123, 126, 130, 172, 188, 196, 203, 214, 240, 242, 245, 250, 258, 322, 346, 347, 364, 366, 418; denaturalization of 270, 271, 284; deportation and extermination xiii, 7, 302–303, 424; in Greater Romania 53, 54, 60, 61; legal status of the mosaic religion, Greater Romania 370; opposition to Jewish emancipation 65–66; status under the National Legionary Regime 292–294, 296, 302; and trial 66–67; *see also* antisemitism
Jianu, Ionel 118
Jilava Prison 322, 323, 326, 338

Jiu River 101
Judaism 135
Judea 24
Judeo-Bolshevism *iii*, 8, 9, 50, 70, 105, 213, 250, 402, 417
Julius Caesar 102
Junimea Literară 124

Kemalist Turkey 134
Kempis, Thomas, *The Imitation of Christ* (*De imitatione Christi*, 1418) 160
Kiev 384
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 52
Knights of the "Michael the Brave" Military Order 227, 334, 340
Kraft durch Freude, KdF, Nazi Germany 274
Krakow 217, 218
Krasiński, Zygmunt (1812–1859) 19
Kraus, Erwin King, Colonel 334, 340

Lady's Stone (Pietrele Doamnei) 315
Lapedatu, Alexandru 374
Lapuşna 205
Latinity 215, 218, 225; pan-Latinism 225; 'non-Bolshevized Latinity' 226
Lauric, Filon 213
Lazăr, Gheorghe 414, 418
League of Nations 82
League of the Archangel Michael, Russia 96
Lecca, R. priest 316
Lefter, Mile, Commander of the Annunciation 81, 317, 319, 323, 330
Legion "Archangel Michael" 70; anti-liberalism 154; anti-Marxism 250–251; ban on 81, 83; charismatic scenario of salvation 89–96; confrontation with the Army 298–299, 320, 350, 423–424; electoral results 89; establishment ceremony 100–101; Legion's charismatic ideology xv; Legionary Senate 81; Legionary Superior Council 81; membership 1934–37 84; and the new man and woman 6, 12, 13, 26, 91, 106, 133, 136, 137, 164, 169–180, 243, 323, 363, 401, 427, 428; and the Orthodox Church 351, 352, 362–403; origins in Northern Moldova 253–254, 270, 281; "rebellion" of January 1941 300, 330–331, 383, 396, 401; seat on Gutenberg Street no. 3 324, 332; and violent revenge 326–330; *see also* All for the Country Party; Iron Guard
Legionary Workers' Corps 319, 326, 327, 332, 340
Lenin (Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov) 118; funerals of 218
Leninism 121
Leo XIII, Pope 388
Leuca, Ioan 316
Libertatea (Freedom) 64, 78, 344, 386
Liebenfels, Lanz von 104
Liga culturală 348
Lincoln, Abraham, funerals of 218
Livezeanu, Bartolomeu 170, 318, 337
Livezeanu, Irina 61–62, 240
Lorenz, Werner, *Obergruppenführer* 336
Loyola, Ignatius, *Spiritual Exercises* (1522–1524) 160
Lucifer 191, 394; *see also* Satan
Lumea Nouă (The New World) 107, 129–133
Lumina Satelor, newspaper 386
Lupescu, Elena 205, 314
Lutherans, Greater Romania 370

Macrin, George 125, 126, 213
Madgearu, Virgil 329
Măgură, Victor 124
Majadahonda 218, 320
Malaxa, Nicolae, industrialist 239
Malaxa Locomotive Factory, Bucharest 239
Mamu Monastery 389
Manciu 326; assassination of 155
Maniu, Iuliu xiii, 55, 57, 58, 87, 259, 260
Mann, Michael 6, 61, 238, 240, 258–259
Manoilescu, Mihail 107, 129–133, 379; and corporatism 129–133; *see also* *Lumea Nouă* (The New World)
Manoliu, Petru 118
Mărăşeşti 65, 96, 101
Mărăşti 101, 191
March on Rome (1922) 297
Mareş, Nicolae, General 329
Maria, Queen of Romania 190
Marie, Adrien Albert, Comte de Mun 388
Marin, Aurel 125
Marin, Firmilian, arch-priest 336
Marin, Vasile 66, 91; as theoretician of totalitarianism 116; *Crez de Generaţie* (Creed of a Generation) 222; *see also* Moţa and Marin
Marinescu, Gabriel, Prefect of Police 212
Marinescu-Filipesti, M. 316
Marxism 15, 134, 135, 250, 362, 426; German Marxism 119
Maurras, Charles 68, 119

Mausoleum of Mărăşesti 192–193, 416, 429
Mausoleum of the Martyrs, Green House, Bucharest 217, 311, 314, 322, 324, 341; *see also* Moţa and Marin
Mazzini, Giuseppe 20
Mecca 315
Mehedinţi 253
Mehedinţi, Simion 379
Metempsychosis 9, 93, 94, 417
Michael I (Mihai I) King of Romania (r. 1927–1930, 1940–1947) 290, 291, 334, 380, 399, 425, 429
"Michael the Brave" Church, Bucharest 227
Michael the Brave cult of, as unifier and redemptive hero 101, 102, 190–192, 349, 387, 415, 416; death 281; divine mission 96; grave of 101, 420; link with the cult of Archangel Michael 96, 190–192, 193; military medal "Michael the Brave" 83, 198; model for Ferdinand I 399; reburial of (1920) 218, 416; and the sacralization of politics 190
"Michael the Brave" Military Order 226; *see also* Knights of the "Michael the Brave" Military Order
Mickiewicz, Adam (1798–1855) 19
Miercurea Ciuc 282, 316
Mihalache, Ion 81
Mihăilescu, Ion, arch-priest 319
Mihăilescu-Gorgani, Andrei 336
militarism 301, 416; and fascism 9, 137; and Romantic nationalism 416; social militarism 301; *see also* paramilitarism
Mirceşti 190
Mironescu, G. G. 81
Mironovici, Radu 66, 98, 323, 330, 334, 337
Moglan, PSS Valeriu, the Vicar of the Metropolitan of Moldova 336
Moldova 19, 52, 54, 64, 79, 101, 167, 195, 200, 219, 254, 255, 256, 258, 320, 338, 351, 365, 384; Central Moldova 258; earthquake in 320; and the Jewish Question 65; metropolitan seat 366, 382; Northern Moldova 60, 79, 153, 239, 254, 260; and the origins of the Legion 253–254, 270, 281; *problema stilistă* in 383; Southern Moldova 239, 254, 258; union with Wallachia 301, 365, 366, 415; Western Moldova 79
Moscardó, José 214, 215
Mosley, Oswarld, Sir xiv
Mosse, George 309
Moţa and Marin, death of 49, 216, 421; cult of 1, 220–226, 322, 341, 343, 391; funerals of 1, 86, 216–221, 226, 228, 295, 310, 312, 314, 316, 340–341, 352, 382, 387, 389, 392; Legionary Mausoleum of the Martyrs 311, 334; Moţa-Marin Corps 134, 224, 282; "Moţa and Marin" Legionary anthem 317
Moţa, Ioan, Father 64, 65, 78, 86, 219, 311, 320, 321, 322, 341, 386, 387; burial of 320–321
Moţa, Ion I. 1, 2, 64–68, 78, 86, 90, 91, 96, 98, 99, 104, 106, 114, 115, 134, 164, 177, 189, 195, 209, 244–245, 320–321, 327, 362, 363; acquittal for assassination 205; and antisemistism 103–105; and AXA 114–115, 209; and the cult of Codreanu 90, 155–157; as creator of Codreanu's cult 156–157; cult of 420, 427; death 215–216; fighting missing in Spain 214; and suicide terrorism 188; and view on corporatism 130–131; Wooden Skulls 174; *see also* Moţa and Marin
Moţa, Iridenta 340
Munich 110
Muntenia 52, 167, 219, 255, 396
Mussolini, Benito 68, 118, 335

Naciu, Vasile 319
Nadoleanu, Enache 318
Napoleon I 102
National Christian Defense League (*Liga Apărării Naţional-Creştine*, LANC) 61, 65, 68, 69, 70, 79, 85, 90, 97, 112, 114, 124, 133, 155, 156, 159, 194, 203, 210, 219, 244, 256, 267; *lăncieri* 270, 295, 303, 384, 393
National Christian Party 85, 112, 197, 219, 254, 255, 257, 259, 260, 267, 270, 295, 390, 422; and Goga-Cuza government 380
National Democratic Party 89
National Legionary State 10, 110, 122, 268, 290–302, 311–312; and the Church 394–402
National Liberal Party 55, 81–82, 84, 205, 246, 267, 386, 425
national messianism *xiii*, 16, 19, 109, 271, 394, 423; and charisma 21; French-Slavonic messianism 19; generational messianism 419; Polish national

messianism 19; Romantic messianism 8, 19
National Orthodox Society of Romanian Women 192
National Party of Transylvania 56, 58, 277
National Peasant Party (NPP) 57, 81, 117, 196, 248, 267, 277, 379, 425
National salvation xiii, xiv, 2, 3, 20, 51, 71, 89, 90, 107, 109, 128, 137, 172, 187, 193, 224, 226, 260, 279, 301, 312, 343, 346, 350, 366, 402, 414–422, 426, 429
National Union of Christian Romanian Students 164, 209, 222, 242, 244, 378, 387; Craiova Congresses 388; Piatra-Neamț Congress 70; Târgu Mureș Congress 134, 209, 211, 228
National-Agrarian Party 61
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (NSDAP) 13, 252, 387; National Socialism 119, 121
Nazi Ministry of Propaganda 218
Neamț 101, 383
Near East 24
Negură, Ion 125
Neocleous, Mark 309
Neubacher, Hermann 335
Nicadori 211, 279, 311, 312; reburial of 320–325, 330, 339, 341–343
Nicodim, Patriarch 291, 294, 310, 320, 351, 352, 378, 383, 389, 393, 398, 399, 400, 401
Nicola, Ursu (1731–1785), alias Horea 101, 349
Nicolae, Panait 124
Nicolescu, Nicoleta 170, 318
Nicoloiu, Valeriu archimandrite 319
Nicorești 205
Niculescu, Ilie 340
Nietzsche, Friedrich 15
Nistor, Ion 125
Noica, Constantin 118, 327
Northern Railway Station (*Gara de Nord*), Bucharest 318, 321
Northwestern Transylvania 80, 322
Nuremberg, in Nazi propaganda 311

Oarga, Ion (1747–1785), alias Cloșca 349
Octavian L. Veştemean printing house 387
Odessa 190
Office for the Education of the Romanian Youth 274
Oituz 101, 191
Oltenia 52, 167, 219, 255, 257; Southern Oltenia 258, 259
Onciulescu, Dimitrie, Father 213
Opera nazionale dopolavoro, Fascist Italy 274
Opris, Romulus, Colonel 323, 327
Orășanu, Constantin 327, 328
Orăștie 219, 320
Orăștie Orthodox Cathedral 321
Orestes 327
Orthodox Theological Academy "Andreiana," Sibiu 387
Ottoman Empire 211, 366; Ottomans 101, 196
Outram, Dorina, *The Body and the French Revolution* 152–143

Palace of Justice, Bucharest 66
Palaghiță, Ștefan 336
palingenesis approach to 17–18; crique of Griffin's approach 17–18; Romantic palingenesis 19; social palingenesis *xvi*, 11, 17, 18, 27, 171, 414; Heliade's "theological" philosophy of palingenesis 415; and the Legionary ideology 93, 417
Pământul Strămoșesc (The Ancestral Land) 78, 90, 97–99
Panaitescu, Petre P. 319, 344, 345
Pantea, Nicolae 316
Papanace, Constantin 90, 347
Papen, Franz 13
paramilitarism 27, 86, 172, 260, 391
Pârvan, Vasile 119
Paşcani 134, 219
Pătrăşcanu, Lucreţiu 4, 6, 239
Paulescu, Nicolae 246
Payne, Stanley G. 20, 246, 247
Pentecostals, Greater Romania 373
People's Party 83, 85, 124, 129; *see also* Averescu, Alexandru
Persia 24
Petraşcu, Nicolae 249, 332, 396, 397, 427
Petraşincu, Dan 118
Petrescu, Costin 190
Petrescu, I. D. 380
Petrovicescu, Constantin General, Minister of Interior General Constantin 329
Petru Rareș 219
Piatra Olt 219
Pitești 219, 319
Ploeşteanu, PSS Veniamin, the first Vicar of the Patriarchate 336
Ploiești 317, 319, 321, 342

Podul Înalt 101
Poland 18, 19, 218
Polihroniade, Mihail 90, 105–106, 112, 114–115, 118, 134, 277, 282, 421, 422; and antisemitism 105–106
political faith nationalism as a political faith 18–20; Carol II's attempts to eradicate it 270; Codreanu as creator of the political faith 353; as a cul-de-sac 430; fascism as a political faith esp. xvi, 10–18, 32; Legionaries' refusal to abjure it 280; Legionary political faith esp. 1–8, 49, 89–137, 153, 164, 169, 173, 210, 225, 241; and martyrdom 188; and radicalization 180; and terrorism 201–208; and the Orthodox dogma 294, 362–403; and the political religion approach 22–27; and totalitarianism 25–27
political religions approach 22–27
Polytechnic School in Bucharest 323
Pop, Amos Horaţiu 81
Popa, George 125
Popa, Ioan 316
Popescu, Atanasie, Father, Abbot of the Ghighiu Monastery 316, 336
Popescu, Gheorghe Dan 339
Popescu, Nicolae M. 380
Popescu, Şerban 380
Popescu, Tudose 66, 98
Popovici, Dumitru 427
Portugal 225
Porunca Vremii 389
Posteucă, Vasile 125, 213
Potecaş, Ion 125, 339
Prahova Valley 317
praxeological approach to Fascism 12
Predania: Revistă de critică teologică (*Tradition: Review of Theological Critique*) 364, 379–382, 395
Predeal 314–319, 342
Predeal Monastery, and Legionary Cemetery 314–319, 321
Prefecture of Bucharest Police 327
Primitive Christianity 313
"Prince Michael" Monastery (*Mănăstirea Mihai Vodă*), Turda 429
Prodan, Nicandru 316
"Progresul" (Progress) Church 324
Prussia 18
Prut River 79, 80
Purishkevich, Vladimir 96
Putin, Vladimir xiv
Putna 383
Pythagoras 94
Racoveanu, Gheorghe 377, 379, 382, 399, 400, 419
Rădăuţi 125
Radical right iv, xiii, xv, 59–61, 85, 106, 114, 269, 270, 295, 303; *see also* National Christian Defense League (*Liga Apărării Naţional-Creştine*, LANC)
Rădulescu-Motru, Constantin 110
Râmnicu Sărat 282, 317
Râmnicu Sărat Prison 313
Rarău Mountain 315, 316
Râşnov 317
Războeni (also Războieni) 101, 219
Răzleţii [Scattered] Legionary unit 318, 319, 340
Regional Council (*Sfatul Ţării*), Bessarabia 384
Regional Inspectorate of Police, Bessarabia 80
Renaissance, Priestly Association 388
Republic of Moldova 10
Rerum novarum (1891), Papal encyclical 388
Rexist Party, Belgium xiv
Ribbentrop, Joachim von, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nazi Germany 335
Rilke, Rainer Maria, German poet 125
Rioşanu (Rioşianu), Alexandru 327
Risorgimento 51
Roberts, David 26
Robu, Nichifor 112
Roma, as agents of degeneration 347
Roma, and discrimination, and deportation during WWII 347
Roman Catholics, Greater Romania 370
Roman Empire 101, 219, 225
Roman-Catholic Church, in Greater Romania, Concordat with the Romanian state 372–373, 376; *see also* Vatican
Romanian Army and the monarchy 107, 112, 115, 128, 189–190, 191, 193, 270–271, 414–416; and burial of Călinescu 282; and the burial of Codreanu 351; and burial of General Cantacuzino 227; confrontation with the Legion 298–299, 320, 350, 423–424; and the peasantry 107, 247; in power 290–292, 301; in WWI 191, 197, 199, 243
Romanian National Party, Bessarabia 384
Romanian Orthodox Church legal status 365–374, 386; adoption of the Gregorian Calendar 369, 383; campaign against the Condordat with

Vatican 372–374, 386; doctrine of the Romanian National Orthodoxy 374; Holy Synod 276, 210, 366, 368, 371, 376, 378, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 390, 391, 392, 393, 399, 400; and the Legion 351, 352, 362–403; and resistance (*problema stilistă*) 383; status under the National Legionary state 394–402
Romanianism (*Românism*) 117, 157, 172, 191, 390, 418; and Orthodoxism 109; integral Romanianism 130
Rome 89, 115, 131, 155, 276, 374, 397
Romulus Opriș, Quaestor of Police 327, 328
Roşcani 101
Rosenberg, Alfred 117
Royal dictatorships, the Balkans 269
Ruginoasa 190
Russia 18, 19, 24, 51, 52, 96, 126, 250, 369, 369; Bolshevik Russia 91, 121, 218, 362; Slavophilism 19; Stalinist Russia 7, 134, 214
Russian minority in Romania 53
Russian Orthodox Church 370
Russian patriarchy, Moscow 367
Rusu, Liviu 125
Rybiczka, Rudolf 125

Sacralization of politics 24–25; and the Iron Guard 6; in the Old Kingdom 89, 190
Saint-Jean-de-Luz 218
Salazar, Antonio de Oliveira 131, 225
San Sebastian 218
Sarmizegetusa 101, 155
Satan 91, 160; *see also* Lucifer
Săulescu, Edward 192
Sava, Valentin 323
Saxony, Ludolph, *De Vita Christi* (1474) 160
Schirach, Baldur von, Governor of Vienna 335
Schitu Măgureanu, Bucharest 227, 318
Schleich, Eduard Ritter von, General-major 335
School of Bridges and Roads, Bucharest 129
Sebastian, Mihail (1907–1945), writer *xiii*, 118, 122–124; Sebastian's critique of totalitarianism 123; relation to Nae Ionescu 122–124
Sebeș 219
Second Balkan War (1913) 83
Securitatea informants of 296, 427; archives of 11, 426, 397
Siberia 115
Sibiu 219
Siguranța 1, 10, 74, 87, 117, 230, 286, 370, 383
Silenzi, Mussolini's personal representative 336
Sima, Horia 169, 284, 290, 291, 296, 298, 299, 300, 301, 308, 313, 319, 320, 321, 329, 330, 334, 340, 341, 350, 362, 363, 365, 366, 397, 422, 427
Sinaia 83, 317, 321, 342
Sinaia Monastery 316
Sîrbu, Sergeant, Codreanu's hangman 328
Slatina 219
Słowacki, Juliusz 19
Sluşanschi, Barbu 125, 126, 213
Smulțea, Ilie 340
Social Darwinism 134, 136, 415, 418
Society of Theologian Students 387
Solidaritatea (Solidarity) (1920–1929) 388
Sorbonne University 387
Sorel, Georges theory of violence and impact on Romanian fascism 136, 327
Soroca 101
Soviet Union 214, 246; annexation of Bukovina and Bessaravia 289, 294; anti-Soviet feelings in Romania xiii; war with 303, 402, 425
Spain 216, 224, 321, 336
Spanish Civil War iii, 1, 134, 188, 214, 216, 225, 421
Spanish Foreign Legion 215
Speidel, Wilhelm, Luftwaffe Lieutenant General 335
Spengler, Oswald 108, 121
Splaiul Dâmboviței, Bucharest 318
"St. Anton" Church, Bucharest 389
"St. Ilie Gorgani" Church, Bucharest 320, 321, 322, 324, 330–334, 337
Stahl, H. H. and Codreanu's physical charisma 159
Stalinism 23, 43, 46, 75, 79, 123, 186, 194, 249 (fnt 1), 306; Stalinist Russia 134
Stan, Liviu Dr. (1910–1973) 364, 386, 397–398; General Director in the Ministry of Religious Cults 336, 397–398
Stanca, wife of Michael the Brave 190
Stăniloaie, Dumitru 398
Stelescu, Mihail 80, 81, 85, 86, 160, 164, 209, 210, 211, 212, 228, 251, 326, 364, 375, 420; manifesto of "Battalion I Covurlui" 80; and antisemitism 80

Stephen the Great (*Ştefan cel Mare*) 101, 102, 158, 193, 344, 349
Stephen the Great Avenue, Iaşi 190
Sternhell, Zeev 16
Stoicănescu, Constantin 316
Stojadinovic, Alexander 122
Stony Mountain (*Pietrosul*) 316
Streinul, Mircea, writer 124, 125
Suceava 101
Suceava county 253, 254, 255, 384
Susai Mountain 342
Swastika 68, 97, 102, 156, 194, 197, 363

Take Ionescu avenue, Bucharest 340
Talmon, Jacob 19
Ţara Moţilor, Apuseni Mountains 323, 337
Târgovişte 190
Târgu Mureş 219
Tarnavschi, Cose 125
Tatar-Bunar, Soviet-sponsored terrorist attack 209
Tătărescu, Cheorghe, Prime Minister 84, 209
Tecuci 129, 319
Tecuci county 317
Teiuş 219
Tell, Alexandru Cristian 118, 282
Terchila, Nicolae 387
Terpeziţa-Dolj 387
Thiel, C. 117
Tibet 101
Tighina 254
Tincoca, Remus 336, 339
Titulescu, Nicolae 82, 204, 214, 215
Toledo 218
Ţopa, Leon 128
Toropeşti, Vaslui County 383
Totalitarianism 9, 11, 283; and Christian "technologies of the self" 27; "fascism–totalitarianism–political religion" Triad 22–27; Marin as theoretician of totalitarianism 116; National Legionary State as a totalitarian experiment 268; and "pastoral power" 26–27; and political faith 12; Sebastian's critique of totalitarianism 123; "totalitarian Messianic democracy" 12; "totalitarianism of the right" 12, 16, 17; unitotalitarianism 134
Totu, Nicolae 81
Trajan, Roman Emperor 225
Trandafir, Ion, family of 340
Trandafir, Lucia 340
Transylvania 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58, 62, 63, 64, 191, 200, 213, 219, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 270, 277, 282, 311, 317, 322, 347, 348, 349, 351, 368, 369, 370, 372, 383, 385, 386, 415; 1848–1849 revolution 101; Central Transylvania 79, 239, 254, 257, 258; Northern Transylvania, annexation by Hungary 289, 322; Ruling Council of Transylvania 56; Southern Transylvania 243, 303
Tremaglia, Mirko 196
Triaj 134
Trieste 193
Trifa, Iosif 386
Trifa, Viorel D., deputy president of the Bucharest Student Circle 389
Tripartite Pact, the Axis 313, 334, 335, 341, 425
Triteanu, Lucian, Bishop of Roman 220, 398
Tsar Alexander III, funerals of 218
Ţurcan, Ion 125, 126
Turda 101
Turner, Bryan 419–420
Turtucaia 101
Ţuţea, Petre 118
Tutova 254

Udişteanu, Dionisie 318, 324, 336
Ukraine xiv
ultranationalism 11, 240
Union of Russian People 96
Union of the Russian People of the Archangel Michael 96
Union Square, Iaşi 190
Unitarians, Greater Romania 370
United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Washington, DC, USA 10
United States of America, political life in xiv
University of Berlin 68
University of Bucharest xii, 107, 110, 134, 319, 387, 388, 395
University of Cernăuţi 108, 124, 128, 246, 368, 393, 397
University of Cluj 64, 90, 243, 396
University of Iaşi 64, 65, 153, 154, 155, 243, 246
Ursu, Nicolae S. 125
Usatiuc, Claudiu 125

Văcărești group 67, 90, 95, 154, 164, 177, 222, 242, 330

Văcăreşti Monastery Prison 66, 69, 95, 202, 212
Vaida-Voevod, Alexandru 82
Val, Merry del, *chargé d'affaires* 336
Valeriu, Sandu 324
Vasiliu, Constantin 427
Vaslui 282, 317, 319, 383
Vaslui Internment Camp 317
Vatican 372, 376; *see also* the Roman-Catholic Church
Vernichescu, Alexandru 66, 67
Versailles system 82, 271, 277, 283
Vesper, Iulian 125
Victoria Square, Bucharest 337, 340
Victory Avenue, Bucharest 227, 276
Vienna Diktat (August 30, 1940) 322
violent cleansing (*curăţire*) xiv, 17, 27, 91–93, 103–106, 136, 187, 215, 243, 252, 302, 303, 312, 347, 401, 428, 429; *see also* antisemitism
Virchow, Rudolf 96
Visarion, Orthodox Metropolitan of Bukovina 213, 378, 389
Vitencu, Dragoş 124, 125
Vlad Ţepeş League 84
Vlad the Impaler (Vlad Ţepes) 102
Vladimirescu, Tudor 102, 211
Vlaşca 205
Vojen, Ioan Victor 112, 222, 301
Vulcănescu, Mircea 118–119

Walicki, Andrzej 19
Wallachia 19, 52, 102, 190, 195, 200, 227, 243, 253, 254, 255, 256, 301, 351, 365, 366, 368, 415; Northwestern Wallachia 258; Southern Wallachia 383; Wallachian regional identity 346
Weber, Eugen 4, 5, 239, 241, 258
Weber, Max, theory of charismatic leadership 20–21, 153, 241, 419; ideal-types 187
Western Europe 19, 24
Women Fortresses (*Cetăţui*) within the Legion 319, 340
women, and emancipation 106–107; and citizenship rights 272; within the Legion 85, 165, 167, 340, 419; and the new fascist woman 1, 10, 26, 89, 91, 93, 171, 249
wooden crucifix (*troiţa*) 200, 338, 342
Work and Leisure (*Munca şi Voe Bună*) 274
World War I (Great War) 2, 10, 15, 17, 27, 49, 51, 65, 83, 101, 106, 118, 119, 154, 189, 190, 191, 195, 196, 197, 199, 215, 225, 226, 247, 267, 315, 368, 380, 387, 393, 402, 415, 429
World War II 7, 122, 246

Yugoslavia 269; *see also* Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes

Zamolxis 94, 135
Zăvoianu, Ştefan 327, 328, 336
Zelea-Codreanu, Codreanu xiii, xiv, 2, 3, 28, 50, 64–68, 78, 79, 81, 82, 89, 91, 93, 94, 96, 101–104, 106, 112, 113–117, 120, 121, 122, 124, 131, 134; and antisemistism 103–105; assassination of Prefect Manciu 155; as Bălcescu 344; as Căpitan 155, 158; charismatic attraction 112–113, 120, 124, 327, 387; as Commander-in-Chief of the Legion 347; cult of: as model of heroism 155, 162, 173, 345; diary of 160; execution of 280; as *Făt Frumos* (Prince Charming) 344; *For my Legionaries* 79, 93, 101, 160–162; and *imitatio Christi* 345, 350, 351; and *imitation Christi* 162; *Insemnări de la Jilava* [Notes from Jilava] 161–162; as Jesus Christ 345; and the making of charismatic authority 152–164; as Messiah 350–351; *The Nest Leader's Manual* 326; as a new Stephen the Great 344; and the Orthodox Church 350–351; and physical charisma 159; as predestined leader 90, 127–128, 164; print run (*For my Legionaries*) 162, 343; print run (*The Nest Leader's Manual*) 163, 343; reburial of 321–353; as Sky's Messenger 345; stay in Berlin 68; stay in Jena 68; trial of 66–69, 154–155, 278–279, 425; view of the army 193, 198
Zelea-Codreanu, Elena 313, 323, 340
Zelea-Codreanu, Ion 64, 65, 66, 79, 81; and antisemistism 105; election as deputy of Tutova County 81, 323, 340, 393, 397
Zoppa, Constantin 213